249 Pa. 134 | Pa. | 1915
Opinion by
At the time the plaintiff below was injured he was enu
The negligence with which the appellant is charged is that although defendant’s shifting crew knew the cars which the plaintiff and others were unloading should not. have been moved or interfered with in any manner, they nevertheless, notwithstanding such knowledge, pushed or caused to be pushed, in a violent and negligent man
When the shifting crew of the defendant company pushed the draft of cars up track No. 5 there was nothing whatever to indicate to them, or any one of them, that the plaintiff or any other employee of the scrap company was at work in, on or about the two cars against which the draft of cars bumped. This being so, the shifting crew had no reason to suppose any employee of the scrap company had crawled under one of the cars and was seated there, eating his lunch. There was, therefore, no legal duty resting upon the crew to give warning of the approach of the engine and cars, so far as the plaintiff was concerned, for he had done a most unusual and extraordinary thing, of which the defendant had no conceivable notice. To him at the time he was injured the defendant owed no duty, and the jury ought not to have been permitted to find that, as to him, it had been negligent, even if its employees had not given notice of the approach of their train: Politowski v. Burnham, 214 Pa. 165. In Carey v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, 84 Kansas 274, 46 L. R. A. (new series), 877, a number of workmen were employed in uncovering rock in a quarry operated by a railroad company. Several loaded cars, awaiting removal, were standing upon a spur track near where they were at work. A rain having come up all but one of them entered the cars; he took shelter beneath the car and was run over and killed when a freight train backed into the cars in the process of picking them up. In reversing the judgment recovered by his widow in the court below, the appellate
But it is contended that the defendant was properly adjudged guilty of negligence, because it had no right to back its cars on any of the tracks in the scrap yard. This is not borne out by the testimony; on the contrary it appears that it did have such right directly from the scrap company. The plaintiff admitted that he had seen the foreman of the scrap yard point out to a conductor, in the employ of the defendant, cars which were to be taken out of the yard, and the foreman himself testified that prior to the day of the accident cars were frequently placed on the tracks in the yard, and taken from them by the defendant’s employees at his direction. He further stated that on the very morning of the accident he had'given orders to the defendant company, through one of its employees, to remove cars from the yard. The crew of the defendant company was, therefore, lawfully in it and upon track No. 5 when the plaintiff was injured;
As the judgment must be reversed, because the plaintiff failed to show any negligence on the part of the defendant,'the question of his contributory négligence, under all the circumstances, becomes immateriaL