36 So. 107 | La. | 1904
Opinion on the Merits
On the Merits.
We Shall address ourselves to the attack made by plaintiffs on the act of adoption. In that connection the contention is that the adopted daughter was without right to inherit; that, if she had acquired any right at all under the act of adoption, it was no longer of any avail after the death of Jonathan Sprowl, adopted father, and after the subsequent marriage of Mrs. Sprowl, widow of Jonathan Sprowl, adopted mother, and after the marriage of the adopted daughter, Mrs. Lawson.
The act was in the form required, and the authority under which it was passed was not amenable to the objection urged by plaintiffs. ,
The question is not res I nova. We limit our decision to the issues raised by the pleadings. The question is not of first impression in this state. The right to adopt has been recognized under repeated decisions, as well as the extent of the right.
In the Vidal v. Commagere decision, 13 La. Ann. 517, the legal controversy was, as in this ease, between the nephew and nieces of the deceased and an adopted child.
The court stated in the cited decision, with which we entirely agree, that the whole question is one of interpretation. From that point of view, we have naught to do with the policy of the law. It gives rise to questions which belong to the legislative branch of the government. The court said in that case:
“We conclude, therefore, that as, by the common acceptation of the word ‘adoption,’ the relationship of parent and child, with all the consequences of that relationship, is understood, as such was the legal meaning of the word under the former laws of Louisiana.”
It follows that the adopted child had all the rights of a legitimate child, to the extent mentioned in the act in question.
She, it was declared, in legal form, and under proper authority, was to have the right of “the issue of the marriage.”
The organic law at the date of adoption contained nothing which prohibited the adoption in question, as made. Ordinances of a restrictive character contained in constitutions of subsequent date cannot have a retroactive effect. An act fixing a personal status remains unaffected by subsequent laws, if it was legal at the date it was passed. As to this one act of adoption, there was no limitation on the legislative authority to grant the right; nor does the limitation spring from the nature of government (i. e., without reference to the Constitution), for in this state the right is of ancient date.
Plaintiffs invoke the article of the Civil Code upon the subject of inheritance, and urge that the) act is in some way illegal, because it changes the order of descent therein provided.
Plaintiffs can gather scant support from the Civil Code, for in one of its articles it provides:
“The person adopted shall have the rights of a legitimate child in the estate of the persons adopting him.” Civ. Code, art. 214.
The rights laid down in this article were specially recognized in Succession of Hosser, 37 La. Ann. 841, and, even in opposition to the will pleaded, the court held:
“The rights conferred were those of a legitimate child; that is, right to iDherit both without and notwithstanding a will”—a much stronger case than the one now in hand.
The special act of the Legislature before referred to and the Civil Code having provided that the adopted child shall have capacity to inherit in preference to all others, save forced heirs, we cannot do less than follow the plain letter of the law.
With reference to the community property claimed by plaintiffs: The right to any portion of this property was dependent upon plaintiffs’ success in their attack upon the act of adoption. Having failed in that respect, it necessarily follows that they have no right to question the disposition made of the property, as they are without interest.
For reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Lead Opinion
Mrs. Cunningham, a niece, and L. P. Sprowl, a nephew, of the late Jonathan Sprowl, have brought this suit against the defendant Alice L. Lawson, wife-of Andrew L. Lawson, and against the widow of Jonathan Sprowl, who, after the death of Jonathan Sprowl, became the wife of - Lockett, for the separate property of Jonathan Sprowl, and for one-half 'of the community which existed between him and his wife, on the ground that they were the nearest of kin of their said uncle.
In order to establish their right to inherit the assets just mentioned, it became necessary for them to attack an act of adoption whereby Mrs. Alice L. Lawson became the adopted daughter of Jonathan Sprowl and his wife, Nancy Barker.
The authority to adopt Alice L. Lawson was conferred by Act No. 66, p. 43, of 1862, which reads as follows:
“That Jonathan Sprowl and his wife Nancy Barker, of the parish of Natchitoches be, and they are hereby authorized to adopt by an authentic act, to be drawn by a notary public, in and for the parish of Natchitoches, Alice Leonora Hammet, the said Alice Leonora, when adopted, to be known as, and named Alice Leonora Sprowl, and to possess such rights and privileges as she would have had as the issue of the marriage of said Sprowl and wife: provided, however, this act shall not be construed so as to affect in any way the rights of forced heirs if any there be.”
A notarial act was signed by these parties, and Alice Leonora Hammet was adopted in conformity with the act.
Mrs. Jonathan Sprowl died, and left no children, except her adopted daughter. The record informs us that Mrs. Alice Leonora Sprowl, the adopted child, who became Mrs. Andrew L. Lawson by marriage, as before stated, inherited the succession of her adopted mother, Mrs. Jonathan Sprowl, consisting of one-half of the community property between her and Jonathan Sprowl, at the date of her death.
Jonathan Sprowl, after the death of his wife, Nancy Barker, became the husband of Mrs. Nancy M. Long, who is, by second marriage, the wife of - Lockett, as just mentioned.
We glean from the pleadings that the main grounds of plaintiffs’ attack are that the act of adoption is contrary to law,; that, in any event, the adoption was no longer valid after the death of Mrs. Jonathan Sprowl, née Barker, the adopted mother, and after the marriage of Mrs. Alice Leonora Sprowl with Lawson, the adopted daughter, and after the second marriage of Jonathan Sprowl, the adopted father.
Plaintiffs have alleged another cause of action, on the assumption that they are the legal heirs and entitled to inherit, and that is, in substance, that the succession of Jonathan Sprowl was illegally taken possession of by defendants, to the prejudice of their rights as heirs. Plaintiffs claim for rent and revenues of the property which they aver have been illegally taken possession of by defendants, and for which they are, in consequence, liable.
Defendants have pleaded res judicata, and the exception of no cause of action. These exceptions having been overruled, they answered by a general denial. The judge of the district court rejected plaintiffs’ demand.
We pass the plea of res judicata and the exception of no cause of action, which were overruled by the judge of the district court, in order to take up the only issue of any importance in the case; that is, the rights of the adopted daughter.
Our conclusion being that adoption excludes collateral heirs from inheritance, there is no necessity of deciding the other pleas just mentioned.