delivered the opinion of the Court.
Thе decree in this case dismissed the bill of complaint filed by a widow against the administrators of her deceased husband’s estate to require them to pay out of the personal estаte certain mortgages on a house and lot which the widow and her husband held as tenants by the entireties and occupied as a home. The dismissal of the bill was expressed to be without prejudice to the plaintiff’s right to a credit on the second mortgage for one-half of the sum paid by the administrators on account of the debt which it secured, the mortgage having been assigned to them when they made the payment, and for certain rent collected by them from a tenant of the property. 'On this appeal it is to be determined whether the plaintiff is еntitled to have the personal estate of her husband charged with the full amount of both mortgages.
At the time of her marriage, in May, 1926, the plaintiff was twenty-seven, and her husband, John P. Cunningham, sixty-five years of age. He had adult children, born of a former marriage. The plaintiff was without means, while her husband was possessed of considerable real estate, in Balti *375 more City and Howard and Anne Arundеl Oounti.es, and personal assets worth about $12,000. By an antenuptial agreement they each relinquished any marital interest in the property of the other which might accrue to them resрectively by virtue of their marriage. As provided in the agreement, however, Mr. Cunningham conveyed to his prospective wife an estate for her life in two lots of ground, subject to a life еstate in himself which the deed reserved. After they had been married about a year, Mr. Cunningham purchased the home in Anno Arundel County, in which they lived until the time of his death on August 1st, 1927. The price of the prоperty was $4,500. Of that amount Mr. Cunningham made a preliminary payment of $100 and paid $3,000 as the proceeds of a loan, which he obtained from a building association, secured by a first mortgagе on the property, and for the balance, $1,400, a second mortgage was accepted by the vendors. The deed was made to Mr. Cunningham and his wife as tenants by the entireties, and she jоined with him in the execution of both mortgages and of the note which the second mortgage secured. It was recited in the first mortgage that the loan of $3,000 was an advancement on thirty sharеs of the building association’s stock, on which specified weekly payments were required until the amount of the shares would be paid in full. Until the death of Mr. Cunningham the stipulated instalments were paid by him without any contribution from his wife. The second mortgage, by its terms, was to be payable .one year from its date, but Mr. Cunningham died before it matured. About a year before his marriage he had made a will devising and bequeathing his estate, in varying amounts, to a sister and his children then living, but the posthumous birth of a child of his second marriage rendered his will inoperative and it was therefore not admittеd to probate. It contained a direction to his executor to sell all of the testator’s property and to pay all his just debts. That provision is said to reflect upon the questiоn of intent, on which, it is argued, the decision of the case should depend.
*376
In
Harris v. Dodge,
The same principle applies in-favor of the heirs at law with respect to the exoneration of the realty by payment of the decedеnt’s mortgage indebtedness out of the personalty.
Chase v. Lockerman,
11 G. & J. 185; 24
C. J.
145; 9
R. C. L.
102. It is available also for the relief of a dower estate, though the widow may have joined with her husband in the execution of the mortgagе sought to be thus discharged.
Mantz v. Buchanan,
In the present case there is a state of intestacy, and the right of exoneration is claimed by one whose interest in the mortgaged property is not that оf an heir or a dowress, because of the terms and effect of the antenuptial agreement (9
R. C. L.
599), but is solely the interest of a surviving tenant by the entireties. That was an estate which vested in thе plaintiff by virtue of the conveyance to her husband and herself prior to his death. The effect of the grant was to clothe each of them with the entire title, subject to termination аs to either by his or her death in the lifetime of the other spouse.
Marburg v. Cole,
In a recent case, the Court of Errors and Appeals of Hew Jersey held, as stated in the syllabus by the court: “The-rule that аn heir or devisee may have exoneration of a mortgage debt from, and out of, the estate of the deceased mortgagor, does not apply where the widow of the deceased mortgagor and such mortgagor held the lands as husband and wife by an estate in entirety.”
In re Staiger’s Estate,
The plaintiff in the pending case has no interest in her deceased husband’s estate as dowress, heir, or devisee, or in any other capacity, which entitles her to have the land acquired by her as a tenant by the entireties exonerated, by-payment out of the personal assets, from the mortgage indebtedness contracted for its purchase.
It is contended, however, that, as between the plaintiff and her husband, she should be treated as surety, and he as principal, with respect to the loans secured by the mortgages, and that she has the right to hare the mortgages first charged against the estate of the dеbtor primarily liable. The record does not sufficiently support that contention. While the pay-
*378
meats on the purchase price and the mortgage indebtedness were all made by the husband, and the wife had no means ■of meeting the liability which they together assumed, yet the execution of the mortgages was for their joint benefit, and the presumption is that an equal responsibility was thereby incurred.
Brady v. Brady,
■ There is no proof in the case rebutting the presumption of equal liability of the plaintiff and her husband as princiрals in consequence of their joint execution of the mortgages in •question, which include covenants for the payment of the debts thereby secured. As between joint and equal principals the right of proportionate contribution exists (Brady. v. Brady, supra), and that right is assertable against the ■estate of a deceased co-principal. The decree appealed from ■recognized the right in regard to the second mortgage, which the administrators paid, but the dismissal of the bill of eom-plaint was in effect a denial of similar relief with respect to the first mortgage. With that disposition of the case we are unable to agree.
While the two mortgage claims involved in this suit have both been filed against the decedent’s personal estate, there .are two other mortgages, for amounts aggregating $35,000, •on real estate owned by him in Baltimore City, which have not have been so presented. But the suggested right of the heirs to have those debts paid ratably out of the personalty, to the extent of the amount available, would be subordinate to the right of a claimant in the position of a coprinciрal with the decedent to be protected from loss on account of that relationship.
The general provision, in the husband’s inoperative will, *379 for tlie payment of his debts, was made long before his prenuptial agreement and mаrriage with the plaintiff, and in -our judgment should hare no influence upon our decision.
The case will be remanded for further proceedings, under the prayer in the bill for general relief, and for a decree-giving’ effect to the conclusion we have stated.
Decree reversed and case remanded for further-proceedings in accordance with the opinion-, the costs to he paid out of the estate in course of administration.