8 Cow. 178 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1828
The principal question argued, though I think not necessarily involved in the demurrer, is, whether a judge of a court of record is responsible for a corrupt exercise of his office ?
The question upon the record is, whether malicious and corrupt conduct in his office can be alleged and proved against a person acting under a special and limited jurisdiction, in contradiction to his own record, which is declared by statute to be conclusive evidence ?
*The declaration expressly charges that the defendant acted corruptly and maliciously and without jurisdiction, in granting Shepherd’s discharge. The plea sets forth the insolvency and petition upon which the proceedings were founded; and then avers that such proceedings were had
But it was contended that the declaratioin is bad in substance, inasmuch as it shows no damage; that it contains no averment of the issuing of a ca. sa. against Shepherd, and non constat but that he might have paid the plaintiff’s demand, if charged in execution. The averment is, that he could not be found to satisfy the plaintiff. This is sufficient upon general demurrer. Had the defendant demurred specially to the declaration, it might have been held otherwise. Whether it would, we need not now decide. The charge in the declaration is substantially stated, that by means of the defendant’s irregular and unlawful and corrupt conduct as a commissioner, under the act of 1819, the body of Shepherd was discharged from imprisonment, in consequence of which the plaintiff lost his debt. For the purposes of the present discussion, these facts must be considered as admitted: they are admitted on the record by the pleadings.
The general question then, is, whether the facts alleged can avail the plaintiff in the present suit ? In deciding this question, it will be found, on inquiry, that the law of judicial irresponsibility is, as I before remarked, out of the case.
“The doctrine which holds a judge exempt from a civil suit or indictment, for any act done or omitted to be done by him sitting as judge,” (says Kent, Ch. J., 5 John. 291,) “ has a deep root in the common law.” In the case of Yates v. Lansing, (5 John. 282, and 9 John. 895,) the question of judicial inviolability was fully discussed, both *by the counsel and by the court; but the question in that case was whether the chancellor had acted without jurisdiction in imprisoning the plaintiff, and was, therefore, personally liable; not whether the chancellor or a judge would be liable civilly for corrupt conduct in his office Many of the English cases cited, assert the total exemp
In the case now under consideration, it cannot be succesfully contended that the defendant is a judge of record. He is a commissioner, not clothed with any general judicial authority; not vested with power to fine and imprison; but specially 'authorized to do certain acts under certain circumstances. Within his jurisdiction, he acts judicially. He is a commissioner to perform certain duties of a judge of the supreme court; but judges of the supreme court, as such, have no authority to discharge insolvent debtors. That power is conferred upon them severally by the same statute which gives a similar authority to commissioners. When judges act under the insolvent law, they act, not as judges, but as commissioners, clothed with the same powers, and subject to the same liabilities as all other commissioners. In some things they act judicially; and while they so act, are not responsible for any error of judgment, if they are for wilful misconduct. On this point there are some decisions both in the English courts and in our own. Ashby v. White, (2 Ld. Ray. 938,) *is a leading case in the class of actions brought against persons clothed with a special authority. The ultimate determination in that case was, that a person, entitled to vote at an election for members of parliament, might prosecute for an obstruction of that right; and, for any thing to be collected from the opinion of Oh. J. Holt, the motives of the defendant were not considered material, though from the declaration it appears that the refusal of the plaintiff’s vote is charged
In the case of Mother v. Hood, (8 John. 50,) this court held, that a justice was justified, while acting within his jurisdiction, under the statute to prevent forcible entries and detainers. They say the decisions are uniform, that the record is not traversable, because the justice, in making it, acts not as a minister, but as a judge; and, according to settled principles of law, a record of such proceedings, which is regular and correct upon the face of it, cannot be questioned or traversed in a collateral action. It is a full and complete bar to any suit against the magistrate.
*The case of Bigelow v. Stearns (19 John. 39,) was an action against the justice of the peace for - false imprisonment. The plaintiff had been committed to jail upon conviction before the defendant as a magistrate, of an offence against the act for suppressing immorality. The defendant justified by producing the record of conviction of the plaintiff, who then offered to show that he was not brought into court before the justice previous to conviction. This was objected to, but admitted. Spencer, Oh. J., who delivered the opinion of the court, held, that the conviction
The statute under which the commissioner acted, contains this clause: “ which discharge, or the record thereof, shall be sufficient authority to the sheriff or jailer for discharging such prisoner : and shall be conclusive evidence in all courts within this state, of the facts therein contained,” &e. In the case of Mather v. Hood, the court held the record of'conviction conclusive, and not traversable, when it shows that the justice had jurisdiction, and that he proceeded regularly. The statute does not make the discharge a record until the proceedings shall be filed with the county clerk; but it makes the discharge itself, or the record of it, conclusive evidence of the facts contained *in it. A record is also conclusive evidence of the facts contained in it. The discharge, then, is of the same authority as a record. Both are conclusive evidence of the facts set forth in them; and if conclusive, then no evidence can be given to contradict or impeach them. In Mather v. Hood, the plaintiff offered to show that the important fact stated in the record, viz., that the party convicted held the premises forcibly, was untrue ; but the court would not listen to the testimony. If this case had gone down to trial upon the general issue, and the discharge had been produced in evidence under a
If the discharge could not be contradicted in evidence, neither should it be in pleading.
There is no question arising here, as to jurisdiction. The commissioner had, by statute, jurisdiction of the subject matter. By the petition and oath of Shepherd, he acquired jurisdiction of his person. The subsequent proceedings,. if irregular, are voidable; but not void. They may be reversed on certiorari; but while they remain matter of record, and conclusive evidence, the facts stated in the discharge cannot be controverted. They, of course, furnish a perfect protection to the officer. (See 3 Cowen, 209.) Whether it was wise in the legislature to put it in the power of officers thus to protect themselves, by making their records correct in form, though contrary to the.truth, is not a question for our consideration. They undoubtedly knew that if the proceedings of officers acting under a limited and special jurisdiction, should be erroneous, they might be reversed on certiorari; and that if, upon certiorari brought, the officers, to support their erroneous proceedings, should make a false return, they would be personally responsible to the party inj ured. ^Subject to this remedy, they seem occasionally to have thought it proper, in relation to delicate and important trusts, though to be executed summarily, and by single magistrates, to throw around them the shield of judicial irresponsibility. Seeing this established in "relation to certain common law magistrates, should remove doubt, if there be any, as to the conclusiveness of this discharge, though that conclusiveness depends upon statute. It is not a strange or anomalous doctrine. I have supposed it established at common law. We have seen how strongly it is supported. No case has been produced showing that a judge of a court of record
But I forbear to pursue this subject. It is enough, in the case before us, that the statute has made the commissioner’s own act, not only evidence, but conclusive evidence of his proceedings. It is not to be contradicted. While the discharge, therefore, remains in force, we must look into that, and no where else, for a correct history.
The defendant is entitled to judgment on the demurrer.
Judgment for the defendant.
) Vid. 5 Cowen, 289.