150 Ark. 187 | Ark. | 1921
(after stating the facts). In Jackson v. Lady, 140 Ark. 512, the court held that a deed must be so construed that all of its parts may be harmonized and stand together, if the same can be done, and yet carry out the manifest intention of the parties. The court held further that, to ascertain the intention of the parties, not only must the contents of the deed as a whole be considered, but also the relation of the grantor to the property conveyed.
In the application of this well known rule of construction, we think the decision of the chancellor was wrong. Under the terms of the lease from appellants, appellee became entitled to sink a shaft and mine the coal on a certain forty-acre tract of land of appellants for a certain stipulated period. On the 19th day of February, 1917, appellants conveyed to the grantors of appellee one acre of land to establish a tipple to better mine the coal on said forty-acre tract. In the deed it was expressly stipulated that the object of the conveyance was to facilitate the opening of the coal mine and the conducting of the mining operation on the leased forty-acre tract and that,when the land ceased to be used for this purpose, the title should revert to the grantors.
It further provided that the conveyance only covered the surface of the earth and gave no title to the coal or minerals under the surface. On Máy 17, 1917, appellee and its grantors, Hoye and Chitwood, executed an instrument whereby they guaranteed to appellants a minimum royalty of $250 per annum, commencing . January 1,1918, until all the coal on a certain forty-acre tract is worked out from the shaft to be sunk on the adjoining forty acres.
The agreement also recites that it is made in consideration of a certain tract of land given to the grantors' for tipple purposes. Under this clause it is insisted that this obligation became void when the deed of May 14, 1918, from appellants to appellee was executed. In making this contention, however, counsel have not given full effect to the entire deed conveying the 4.2 acres of land. It is true that the latter deed includes the one-acre tract in the description of the 4.2 acre tract; hut, immediately following the description, the deed recites that it is in addition to the former deed conveying the one-acre tract, and for the purpose of conveying the additional land described in the latter deed and not described in the former deed. Moreover, the deed is a deed in fee simple, and does not contain any clause whereby the land reverts to the grantor when the land ceases to be used for the purpose of opening up the mines and conducting mining operations on the leased premises.
So it will be seen by the latter deed that three additional acres of land are conveyed, and the title to the one-acre tract is granted in fee simple to appellee. There is nothing in the language of the instrument to indicate that it was the intention of the parties to cancel the guaranty agreement whereby the minimum royalty was fixed at $250 per annum. It is true that the guaranty obligation recites that it is made in consideration of the one-acre tract for tipple purposes; but it will be noted .that the second deed, as above stated, grants the fee simple title to the one-acre tract as well as the additional three acres. There is no language in the deed, nor is there anything from the surrounding circumstances, that indicates that it was the intention of the parties’to cancel the. guaranty contract by the execution of the later deed.
On the contrary, when all three instruments are read and considered in the light of each other, we think that it was not the intention of the parties to cancel the guaranty agreement by the execution of the later deed conveying the 4.2 acres of land, and that the chancellor erred in so holding.
But it is insisted that the decree must be affirmed, because it recites that the cause was heard on the pleadings and the attached exhibits and the admission of the parties as to the deed to the one-acre tract. There is no bill of exceptions, and the insistence is, that on this account there is a presumption that the admission of the parties as to the deed to the one-acre tract supports the finding and decree of the court. This would be true if the decree did not recite what the admission of the parties was. The decree specifically recites that the admission was that the warranty deed subsequently executed to the 4.2-acre tract also includes the, one-acre tract mentioned in the first deed. It is well settled that when the decree itself contains a recital of the testimony, no bill of exceptions is necessary. Baucum v. Waters, 125 Ark. 305 and Strode v. Holland, Ante p. 122, and cases cited.
So in the present case, the record itself having recited what the admission as to the one-acre tract was, it was not necessary to bring the facts relating to the admission into the record by bill of exceptions. This being an equity case, the exhibits attached to the pleadings became a part of the record and might be considered as well as the recitation concerning the admission contained in the decree itself.
The decision of the chancellor was based upon the pleadings, the exhibits thereto, and the recital of the decree as to the admission of the parties that the deed to the 4.2 acre tract also included the one-acre tract.
Upon this state of the record the court erred in holding for appellee and in dismissing the complaint of appellants for want of equity.
It follows that the decree must be reversed, and the cause will be remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the principles of equity and not inconsistent with this opinion.