21 Minn. 366 | Minn. | 1874
The complaint alleges that Mary Cummings, being owner in fee of certain premises, and in the occupancy thereof jointly with her husband, Isaac N. Cummings, said Isaac, “with the knowledge, consent and wishes” of the said Mary, agreed to sell, and did sell, the same to defendant for $9,000, to be paid as specified in a written instrument, executed by and containing the contract between the parties,
The jury by which the action was tried rendered the following verdict:
(title on action.)
“In the above entitled action, we, the jury, find that the plaintiffs shall have and retain all the property delivered to them by defendant, under the contract set forth in the pleadings in said action, and that the defendant shall retain possession of and have the Mill property, described in said pleadings, provided that the plaintiffs shall have ownership
As defendant’s answer set up a counterclaim, to wit: “ a cause of action arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the complaint as the foundation of plaintiffs’ claim,, or connected with the subject of the action,” (Gen. Stat., ch. 66, § 80; Barker v. Walbridge, 14 Minn. 469,) the motion for judgment on the pleadings was properly overruled. Whether the counterclaim can be sustained, to the-full extent to which it is set up or attempted to be set up in the answer, is a question which is not before us at this time.
As to the motion for a new trial: a verdict is defined by section 217, ch. 66, Gen. Stat., as follows: “The verdict of a jury is either general or special. A general verdict is that by which they jironounce generally, upon all or auy of the issues, in favor of the plaintiff or defendant. A special verdict is that by which the jury find the facts only, leaving the judgment to the court: it shall present the conclusions of fact as established by the evidence, and not the evidence to prove them; and those conclusions of fact shall be so presented as that nothing remains to the court but to draw from them conclusions of law.” No comment is required for the purpose of showing that the so-called verdict of the jury in this case is neither a general nor a special verdict, within the definition of the statute. It is rather in the nature of an award of arbitrators, or of a decree in chancery. For its total insufficiency, the new trial aslced for should have been granted.
With reference to any new trial which may be had, it is proper to be observed that this is not a case which should be submitted generally to a jury, as it was on the trial which
Order denying new trial reversed.