74 W. Va. 406 | W. Va. | 1914
The suit is by a vendor of land against the vendee, for the enforcement of a vendor’s lien retained in the general warranty deed conveying the land. Defendant sought by her answer to be absolved from payment of the residue of the purchase money demanded by the suit, alleging deficiency in the acreage and breaches of the warranty as entitling her to an
During the progress of the cause plaintiff was allowed to amend his bill. The amendment set up the fact that a public school house lot of small area had been, without making proper exception thereof, left within the boundary in drawing the deed, by mutual mistake of the parties. A correction of this mutual mistake was asked. We see nothing improper in this course of pleading. It was allowable because it surely tended to substantial justice. Defendant was claiming abatement because superior title to the school house lot was in the public authorities. The amendment was pertinent to the cause. Defendant’s answer fully responded to the allegations of mutual mistake.
And just here we may as well remark that the decree, wherein it finds the allegations of such mutual mistake to be sustained and corrects the mistake, is fully warranted by the evidence. It is clear from the facts and circumstances appearing that both the grantor and the grantee knew that this public property was not within the sale of real estate evidenced by the deed and that they at no time intended that the conveyance should include it. Quite right is the decree in excluding the school house lot from the conveyance and allowing no abatement of purchase money for the same. The school house lot did not enter into contemplation in making the conveyance. It was never intended to be conveyed. By what right should defendant have abatement for that which was never intended to be a part of the conveyance? •
The deed stated a given number of acres, more or less. It evidenced a sale in gross and not one by the acre. The sale was not expressly by the acre, nor is the purchase money an exact multiple of the number of acres. Yet defendant submits that she should have abatement for a small deficiency of acreage shown. The evidence does not warrant a conclusion that there was fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the grantor as to the acreage, inducing the grantee to purchase. The latter’s purchase was not on the strength of the form
Defendant insists that her purchase of land from plaintiff contemplated the inclusion of about 13 acres of bottom land which plaintiff had theretofore sold to S. B. Hamrick, and that she was deceived in making the purchase by- plaintiff’s keeping from her the fact that Hamrick had prior and superior title to the 13 acres. The chancellor from conflicting evidence has found otherwise — that the inclusion oi die 13 acres was not contemplated and that defendant was not defrauded in this regard. We are by no means disposed to disturb that finding. It is warranted from the evidence, and upon the whole seems right. Defendant does not ask a rescission of the contract for the alleged fraud. She only seeks an abatement of the purchase money because of Hamrick’s possession under superior title to the 13 acres, which she claims is covered by the deed made by plaintiff to her: But the deed, in the giving of metes and bounds, calls for the “13 acre tract of S. B. Hamrick” as an adjoinder. Clearly the deed does not include the parcel. Surveyors, fitting to the ground the description of the land conveyed by. plaintiff to defendant, say that the 13 acre tract is not included. How then may defendant have abatement for what was not contracted by the deed, or intended to be contracted thereby!
In the conveyance to defendant all the coal underlying the land was reserved “except the coal reserved in John T. Me-Graw deed.” In plaintiff’s prior deed to MeGraw for the coal, however, he had reserved no coal. So the exception in the reservation really meant nothing. Plaintiff had reserved no coal in the MeGraw deed, and therefore his conveyance to defendant embraced no coal. Defendant says here is a loss that entitles her to an abatement to the extent of it. . It seems that she was to have some coal by plaintiff’s deed to her. But
Defendant maintains that plaintiff fraudulently represented to her that he had reserved in the McGraw deed valuable coal rights, and that she purchased on the strength of getting the same. We do not think this is sustained. Still it is unimportant as to the question of abatement, and that is all defendant raises. The right to abatement for loss by defect of title must be governed by the deed as it is, not by what it ought to have been. What plaintiff’s rights may be for a reformation or rescission is another matter. As the deed stands it does not vouch to defendant any defined right as to coal on which an abatement of purchase money can be based. Yet it is to the warranty in the deed, which is only co-extensive with the grant, that defendant must resort for her alleged right to- abatement for loss by McGraw’s superior title to all the coal. 8 Amer. & Eng. Enc. of Law. (2nd Ed.) 66.
In the deed to McGraw, plaintiff had granted rights other than those that are legally implied in a grant of coal. The reservation of the coal -in plaintiff’s deed to defendant of course did not reserve other than the legally implied rights for removal. Because of McGraw’s superior rights not reserved in the deed to defendant, she further claims abatement of the purchase money. Those rights which are vested
Defendant relies on Smith v. Ward, 66 W. Va. 190, and Smith v. White, 71 W. Va. 639. These cases are not in point.
Defendant took a conveyance of the land subject to the McG-raw rights and did not see fit to take a covenant covering them. The legal import of the transaction is that defendant deemed the property worth what she contracted to pay notwithstanding the McGraw rights thereon; We must assume that she did not consider their existence damaging-in relation to the purchase price of the land, otherwise she would have required the grantor either to clear them before her acceptance of the deed or to covenant in the deed against them. The records were open to defendant, showing these rights to be incumbrances on the land. Nevertheless she so contracted that she must pay the purchase money regardless of their existence. She must be presumed to have intended such legal consequence of her contract, for she is charged with a knowledge of the law as are all persons. The claim of defendant that she was deceived by plaintiff in regard to what mining rights he had given McG-raw is not pertinent to the issue she raises for an abatement of the purchase money, even if we considered her claim in this behalf as established by the evidence. For fraud in this particular she might have the contract of purchase rescinded. But rescission is not asked. She stands on the contract and asks an abatement of the purchase money under its legal force. As we have seen, it gives her no right to abatement because of in-cumbrances.
On the score of an interlock with the lands of Arnold Ham-rick, defendant claims abatement for the loss of five acres. Defendant’s title papers, however, call for the line of the Arnold Hamrick land. Then there can be no interlock. The line is the same wherever its true location may be. The
An error assigned is that there is an omitted call in the deed and that the court did not correct the same. The omission of the call is no ground of defense against the payment of purchase money. Neither is it ground for abatement of the same. A case was not made by the pleadings calling for the correction of the deed as to the omitted call. Why should we consider the assignment?
We have now disposed of the points raised, briefly, but we hope with clearness. The decree properly reserves to defendant action at law which may avail in case the general warranty is broken by eviction under the mining rights. It remains only to say that the decree is right and will be affirmed.
Affirmed.