Opinion
In this action plaintiffs (collectively referred to as Cummings) filed a complaint against defendants (collectively referred to as OMCOA). OMCOA filed a cross-complaint against Cummings. Cummings *1294 then filed a cross-complaint against OMCOA. As a sanction for discovery abuse, the trial court struck Cummings’ complaint and cross-complaint and the answer to OMCOA’s cross-complaint. The court entered a default judgment in favor of OMCOA on its cross-complaint. Cummings filed a timely appeal 1 contending the trial court abused its discretion in terminating the actions in favor of OMCOA as a discovery sanction against Cummings and in awarding punitive damages to OMCOA in the absence of notice to Cummings of the amount claimed and in the absence of evidence of Cummings’ net worth. We affirm the judgment but modify the award of punitive damages.
Facts and Proceedings
This action stems from OMCOA’s purchase of the Valley Medical Industrial Center (Valley Medical) from Cummings in July 1985. Under the terms of the agreement OMCOA executed a $700,000 promissory note in favor of Cummings to be paid off in three installments of $233,333.33, on January 1, 1986, January 1, 1987, and January 1, 1988. Under the agreement, Cummings warranted the accuracy of certain disclosures concerning the current and projected financial condition of Valley Medical, and Cummings agreed not to compete with OMCOA by practicing medicine within a seven-mile radius of Valley Medical for a period of three years.
In April 1986, Cummings filed this action against OMCOA, asserting causes of action for moneys due under a promissory note, intentional infliction of emotional distress and slander. This action was primarily based upon OMCOA’s alleged failure to make its first required $233,333.33 installment payment under the promissory note on January 1, 1986.
OMCOA answered and filed a cross-complaint against Cummings, alleging 11 causes of action which were substantially based upon Cummings’ alleged misrepresentations concerning the medical practice’s financial condition and Cummings’ violation оf the covenant not to compete.
Thereafter Cummings filed a cross-complaint against OMCOA for breach of the purchase agreement, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unfair competition, interference with prospective economic advantagе and deceit.
As we discuss more fully in part I below, OMCOA’s attempts at discovery in this action were stymied by Dr. Cummings’ refusal to attend deposition *1295 sessions and refusal to comply with requests for production of documents. Dr. Cummings falsely denied the existence of certain categories of documents requested by OMCOA; falsely clаimed an edited tape recording was a true and correct copy of the original; and falsely claimed to be suicidal and taking Valium in order to obtain an order staying his deposition. On numerous occasions, Cummings promised to deliver certain documents to OMCOA but failed to do so. Cummings persisted in delaying the рroduction of documents even after deadlines for production were ordered by the trial court.
After having to go to the trial court three times for orders requiring Cummings to comply with its discovery requests, OMCOA moved the court for an order dismissing Cummings’s complaint and cross-complaint and striking Cummings’s answer to OMCOA’s cross-complаint and entering default thereon. OMCOA listed 12 separate abuses of the discovery process by Cummings with documentary evidence backing up each claimed abuse.
The trial court held two lengthy hearings on the motion and concluded the motion for terminating sanctions should be granted. The court thereafter entered an order striking Cummings’s complaint and cross-complaint as well as its answer to OMCOA’s cross-complaint. The court entered a default on the OMCOA cross-complaint.
Following the entry of Cummings’s default on OMCOA’s cross-complaint the court heard evidence on the damages claimed by OMCOA. The testimony disclosed that Cummings was paid $700,000 in cash at the time OMCOA purchased Valley and at that time Valley had a fair market value of $480,000. With inclusion of interest, Cummings received as a result of his misconduct $354,300. Further, as a result of Cummings’s violation of the covenant not to compete, OMCOA lost and Cummings profited in the sum of $248,820 per year. These profits reasоnably continued for a period of five years for a total profit to Cummings of $1,244,100.
By judgment dated June 20, 1990, the court awarded OMCOA $4,367,717 including $1 million in punitive damages.
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Ordering Terminating Sanctions. *
*1296 II. There Was an Adequate Basis for the Award of Punitive Damages.
A. Cummings Was on Notice of the Amount of Punitive Damages OMCOA Sought.
Cоde of Civil Procedure section 580 provides, “The relief granted to the plaintiff [by way of a default judgment] cannot exceed that which he shall have demanded in his complaint. . . .” California courts have consistently interpreted this section to mean that before a default is entered against the defendаnt the defendant must be put on notice of the specific amount of damages demanded.
(Greenup
v.
Rodman
(1986)
This notice requirement is not limited to cases where a default is entered because the defendant has failed to answer. It also applies in cases, such as the one before us, wherе a default is entered after the defendant’s answer is stricken as a discovery sanction.
(Greenup
v.
Rodman, supra,
Cummings concedes OMCOA’s amended cross-complaint, on which the default judgment was based, specifies the amount of punitive damages OMCOA sought. 5 Nevertheless, Cummings argues, the statement of punitive damages violated Civil Code section 3295, subdivision (e). 6 Because inclusion of the amount of punitive damages violated the statute it did not constitute notice to Cummings and Cummings “could ignore it.”
As authority for this argument Cummings relies on
Schwab
v.
Rondel Homes, Inc.
(1991)
The Supreme Court reversed the default judgment in
Schwab,
but
not
for the reason suggested by Cummings: failure to give a separate notice under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.11 of the amount of damages sought. The court had previously held in
Greenup
v.
Rodman, supra,
The appropriate precedent here is
Uva
v.
Evans
(1978)
*1298 We adopt the reasoning of Uva v. Evans which we find entirely consistent with the views expressed by the Supreme Court in Greenup and Schwab. 7 Where, as here, the defendant admits receiving actual notice of the punitive damages sought it would be a travesty of justice, much less logic, to hold defendant did not have actual notice.
Logic notwithstanding, Cummings contends we must ignore the notice of damages in OMCOA’s cross-complaint or else Civil Code section 3295, subdivision (e) will become meaningless. We disagree. When the plaintiff improperly stаtes in the complaint the amount of punitive damages being sought the defendant has several remedies available including a motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 435, subdivision (b)(1)
(Uva
v.
Evans, supra,
B. Punitive Damages Were Properly Based on Evidence of the Profitability of Cummings’s Fraudulent Conduct.
Cummings argues the award of punitive damages must be reversed because there was no evidence of defendants’ net worth introduced at the default prove-up. For the reasons discussed below, we hold that where the defendant has been guilty of fraud, punitive damages may properly be based on evidence of the profitability of the defendant’s misconduct.
The purpose of punitive damages “is to punish wrongdoing and thereby to protect [the public] from future misconduct, either by the same defendant or other potential wrongdoers.”
(Adams
v.
Murakami
(1991)
Evidence of the defendant’s financial condition is relevant to a punitive damages award in two ways. “[O]bviously, the function of deterrence . . . will not be served if the wealth of the defendant allows him to absorb the award with little or no discomfort. ... By the same token, of course, the function of punitive damages is not served by an award which, in light of the defendant’s wealth and the gravity of the particular act, exceeds the level necessary to punish and deter.”
(Neal
v.
Farmers Ins. Exchange
*1299
(1978)
Although appellate courts have sometimes used the terms “wealth,” “financial condition” and “net worth” interchangeably, (sеe, e.g.,
Wollersheim
v.
Church of Scientology
(1992)
As the court in
Adams
recognized, the key question before the reviewing court is not “what is the defendant’s net worth?” Rather, the question is “whether the amount of damages ‘exceeds the level necessary to properly punish and deter.’ ” (
In relating this inquiry to the defendant’s wealth, courts and commentators have often looked to the profitability of the defendant’s misconduct. (See, e.g.,
Grimshaw
v.
Ford Motor Co.
(1981)
The defendant’s profits from misconduct are objectively based and uniquely appropriate as the basis for punitive damages. For example, an insurer who knowingly induces an individual to purchase a grossly inadequate рolicy for an unreasonable sum undoubtedly “profits” from the use of *1300 excess premiums it improperly gained. Removing the gain in such a case, in addition to requiring the insurer to compensate the plaintiff for its actual losses, makes it less likely the defendant will repeat the conduct. A gain-based measure of this sort sends a clear signal to defendants that such misconduct does not pay and, thus, serves the deterrent function of punitive damages.
Of course, a gain-based measure of punitive damages may not always adequately serve the deterrent function. A defendant may, for example, escape effective deterrence if its conduct is rarely challenged in litigation. (See Mallor & Roberts,
supra,
Deterrence is not the only function of punitive damages. As our Supreme Court has made clear, punitive damages function as punishment as well.
(Neal, supra,
In the present case, OMCOA proved compensatory damages on its fraud cause of action consisting of the difference between the fair market value of Valley and what OMCOA рaid for it ($220,000), interest on the $700,000 OMCOA paid to Cummings ($134,000), and OMCOA’s loss of profit resulting from Dr. Cummings’s fraudulent promise not to compete ($1,244,000). (Civ. Code § 3343, subd. (a).) These compensatory damages totaled $1,598,300. However, because OMCOA’s cross-complaint sought only $1 million in compensatory damages on the fraud cause of action, OMCOA’s judgment on default was limited to $1 million.
The trial court also awarded OMCOA $1 million in punitive damages on the fraud cause of action. This amount is not unreasonable in light of the *1301 reprehensibility of Cummings’s conduct and the amount of compensatory damages proven (approximately $1.6 million). However, because the only evidence of Cummings’s financial condition was the profitability of the fraudulent conduct and $1 million of that profit was recovered by OMCOA through compensatory damages, the punitive damage award must be reduced to $598,300, which represents the remaining illegal profit obtained by Cummings.
Disposition
The judgment is modified to reduce the punitive damages to $598,300. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.
Lillie, P. J., and Woods (Fred), J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied December 7, 1992, and appellants’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied January 28, 1993.
Notes
We construe the trial court’s judgment to include dismissal of Cummings’ actions against OMCOA.
See footnote, ante, page 1291.
The cross-complaint sought punitive damages “in an amount in excess of $2,000,000.00”. This language provides sufficient notice to support a default judgment of $2 million or less.
(Engebretson & Co.
v.
Harrison
(1981)
Civil Code section 3295, subdivision (e) provides, “No claim for exemplary damages shall state an amount or amounts.”
The court, in Schwab, was clearly aware of Uva v. Evans and had the oрportunity to disapprove it but did not. (53 Cal.3d at pp. 432, fn. 5, 434, fn. 7; id. at p. 436 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)
This is not meant to imply punitive damages resulting from fraudulent conduct are
limited
to the profit defendant obtained through its misconduct. We only hold punitive damages calculated on the basis of the profitability of the defendant’s fraudulent conduct satisfy the requirement the trier of fact consider the financial condition of the particular defendant. (See
Neal, supra,
