Culp v. United States

reasons, foregoing For the we hold that denying

the trial court erred Durso’s summary judgment

motion for on the parallel 1983 claim and the local law

§ (except involving

claim for the claim Dur- conduct) post-hearing ordering

so’s and in discovery

Durso to submit to further relat- Accordingly,

ed to those issues. the case is summary judg-

remanded for the Durso, appellant,

ment for Michael on the 1983 claim and the claim made under damages

local law for based on Durso’s

discretionary Taylor decisions to exclude prior hearing

from school officer’s respect

decision. With to the claim based Taylor

on Durso’s refusal to readmit decision, hearing officer’s we hold that suit,

Durso is not immune from but we do

not decide the merits of of his other

defenses. The case is remanded for fur- proceedings

ther opin- consistent with this

ion. part, part, Reversed in affirmed

remanded proceedings. for further CULP, Appellant,

Bernard STATES, Appellee.

UNITED

No. 91-CF-555. Appeals.

District of Columbia Court of

Argued Oct. 1992. 4,May

Decided Mann, Ashton, MD, appel- for

Peter N. lant. Gusman,

Larry Atty., J. Asst. register. U.S. cash from the cash The assailant Jay Stephens, whom then Atty., holding B. backed out of the store U.S. John R. the Fisher, employee, shield, as a Black, gunpoint. human at Thomas C. and Robert A. As gunman he reached the door the Feitel, took Attys., Washington, DC, Asst. U.S. mask, pushed off his employee away, the brief, were on appellee. the for

and fled the store. ROGERS, Before Judge, Chief employees Store appellant identified the FARRELL, KING, Judges. and Associate gunman photo as the array. from a It was then appellant ascertained that the resided KING, Judge: Associate Place, addition, at 611 Keefer N.W. In Appellant was informant, convicted of two counts of learned from an who had robbery, personally armed 22-2901, weapon, D.C.Code observed the §§ present Uzi (1989), premises inside of -3202 and possession one count of preceding within the 24 hours the search during of a firearm a crime violence or application warrant appellant and that dangerous offense, 22-3204(b) D.C.Code § spoken “doing robbery.” a Finally, ap (1989). Appellant argues appeal on pellant fit description perpetra tangible evidence, certain including an imi- approximately tor of eleven other robber gun, tation Uzi machine should have been ies, all within the six preceding weeks suppressed during because it was seized a search, involving the use of an automatic search that violated the District of Colum- weapon similar to the one used in the Trak bia’s statute, “knock and announce” robbery.3 information, Auto Based-on this 23-524(a) (1989).1 D.C.Code In denying requested a search warrant for appellant’s suppress, motion to premises. Keefer Place Because of the found that the justi- action was weapon, nature of the repeated and its by exigent fied circumstances. We affirm. by appellant, recent nighttime use a war sought rant approved by the au

I. thorizing judge, because it was believed that, 26, 1990, circumstances, On November under the a search approximately p.m., night 8:00 dangerous. a would be less man entered the Trak Auto store Road, located at 318 Riggs N.E., Special Operations The Division’s Emer- wearing a mask and carrying Tropicana a gency Response (“ERT”) Team was re- juice box. He walked parts counter, quested to execute the warrant based on pulled style an Uzi gun2 machine out of potential for violence. When the ERT the box and ordered the manager, store arrived at the residence at 8:00 who servicing customer, open p.m. approximately December store safe. After manager gave the eight days after the robbery, Trak Auto gunman safe, from $508 another store saw coming heard voices employee was ordered to turn over $338 from inside the home. Officer Grooms briefs, 1.In appellant their govern- (1991). both and the language 18 U.S.C. § 3109 This near- is ment relied on the provi- "knock ly and announce” 33-565(g), identical to that of D.C.Code § sion set 33-565(g) forth in D.C.Code § only which differs in that it does not include the however, provision, That applicable language after the word "admittance." search warrants for controlled substances. The governs witness, statute According which question the search an Uzi machine here, 23-524, gun incorporates D.C.Code § carries section "at least 32 rounds of ammunition (sic). 3109 of title 18 of rapid velocity” the United ... States Code which fired ... at [are] provides: open any officer break outer or 3. The documented the similarities in the house, inner door or part window of a descriptions perpetrator(s) of the of all twelve house, therein, anything of a execute crimes in a "flow chart” attached to the affidavit warrant, if, after notice of support nighttime his authori- search warrant. ty purpose, he is refused admittance or descriptions per- Our own examination these necessary when per- liberate himself or a suades us that grounds had reasonable aiding son him in suspecting execution of the war- for had com- rant. mitted all or most of them. prior announcement.” Williams his without three times with knocked on the door (D.C. announced, “Police, search war- 576 A.2d shield and thereafter talking stopped rant.” 1990) (citing Miller v. United acknowledgement of the no there was 1190, 1194-95, knock, toward the of movement sound (“From (1958) the earliest door, home. After scuffling inside the drastically limited common law days, the battering the used five seconds the officers break the of law open the door. ram to force arrest.”)). a house to effect door of they only five seconds because waited a resi executing a search warrant When delay “any other feared notify the dence, police must knock and the arm inside to possibly allowed someone authority to search occupants of the The officers weapon.” this themself with 23-524(a) home, (incorpo the D.C.Code § discovered an the arrested 3109). in This court’s rating 18 U.S.C. § in the rafters of gun machine imitation Uzi knock and announce terpretation of the informant ceiling where the the basement virtually 33-565(g), is provision in which reported seeing it.4 counterpart, 18 to its federal identical trial, moving sup- appellant, Prior to courts federal circuit U.S.C. § the tangible seized from press evidence recognized provision, have interpreting that arrested, challenged he was house which and an exceptions to the knock two broad (1) grounds: separate three the search on exception The first requirement. nounce supported not warrant was that the search delay if the police to enter without allows cause, (2) that the warrant was by probable reasonably infer from the actions comply police did not can nighttime but executed nighttime of a occupants of the or inactions (3) warrant, the officers admittance.5 United refused have been require- the knock and announce violated 164, 168 Covington, 385 A.2d v. States judge The motions ments of the D.C.Code. exception allows (D.C.1978). The second and denied the motion. rejected each claim if are confronted with police to enter exigent circum- judge found that circumstances, immi as the such entry after the justified the forced stances of evidence nent destruction only seconds because the passage of five entering officer. Williams risk weapon posed “a serious nature States, at 703. supra, 576 A.2d or other citi- challenge to Our review of zens. ...” determination the trial court’s appeal, only presented claim On police intrusion justified judge motions erred that the legitimate government “all must afford the entrance did not violate that the officers’ testimony and uncon- from the inferences requirements. and announce the knock record,” States facts of United troverted II. (quot 385 A.2d at Covington, A.2d ing Jenkins United “po It is well established inferences are (D.C.1971)), if those forcibly person’s enter a lice not fact that the Uzi to consider the Although gun plastic of an court 4. was a imitation people gun, toy gun Steven Mann or that Uzi submachine Detective turned out to be not, fact, visually it identical to a real testified that premises armed with in the were only weapon. difference Mann testified that finally got inside. any weapons when gun agree We with the a real is heavier. is that trial who observed: found that the The trial also 5. things inappropriate delay supported to use as it is Just a five second justify the open after the search to occupants were discovered refusal of constructive place, also in the first it is basis for the search entry was hold that the door. Since we things inappropriate that were discov- to use circumstances, by exigent do not supported we a search the search to invalidate ered after finding by the refusal the constructive address proper inception. at its that was otherwise judge. therefore, And, proper for a review- it is not weapon that was and use the apprehension “supportable view of under reasonable Ibid, weapon police be- disposal or the (quoting at his Scarbeck v. evidence.” Fifth, and ac- disposal. lieved was at his signifi- the most cording to the trial court any kind of reason, just (1963)). “this wasn’t cant 10 L.Ed.2d at least automatic or weapon, it was an case, present the issue before weapon gun type semiautomatic machine determining exigency judge in the motions inflicting tremendous capable of an “ob the evidence satisfied was whether period of time damage in a short judi calls for a ... jective test ... which defend adequately the officers circum evaluation whether those cial judge concluded The trial themselves.” support legal conclusion of ... stances officers, stat- danger to the that there was circumstances_” exigent United States ing: scurrying kind of there is not the while The test how the officers through the experienced reasonable and officer destroy attempt an could conclude was circumstances. See respond under these weapons that other evidence or obtain States, supra, 576 v. United Williams exigent circum- pointed to as cases have (citing v. Bon- A.2d at 704 United States entry, justifying an immediate stances ner, U.S.App.D.C. at 874 F.2d at Culp didn’t police Mr. for all the knew 829). principles, the trial Applying these anywhere get his Uzi scurry judge found that: immediately avail- weapon because it was in acting reasonably] these officers were able to him.... concluding very passage after a short purpose of recognized that the We have exigent time that there was an need to pro- is to knock and announce statute premises by enter those force immedi- safety. encourage tect and ate[ly] in order to avoid what was ... States, supra, 576 Williams injury a serious risk of believed Williams, however, we A.2d at 706. or other citizens in the execu- there are circum- recognized that also tion of that warrant. safety is officers’ stances “where judge The trial noted five factors entry, by immediate forced protected better together justified taken the officers’ deter- and by rigid adherence to knock than mination that circumstances neces- Our review requirement.” announce Id. First, entry. sitated their forced trial persuades us that the of the record executing grown were a warrant that had concluding not err in judge did investigation out of an for at least twelve action justified perpetrator armed robberies in which the taken here. weapon type used a described as an Uzi record that gun. It is clear from the Appellant machine had been linked to appellant’s resi all of the ERT arrived at those robberies identification evi- when Second, suspected of that he was dence of one kind or another. dence knew robberies, committing many appellant using that the as twelve information They also using type weapon. drugs police concern exe- each an Uzi increased about Third, weapon cuting appellant had used the the warrant. the ERT had knew that es to ensure safe application reviewed the and “made its own to take a human shield robbery committing latest independent judgment appro- cape it that was robbery had “racked priate previous and in one warrant for them to execute because action,” i.e., top of the moved bolts on to citizens and law enforce- ERT threatening manner. The personnel reasonably posed by gun ment in a ... learned, person had premises from a who appellant weap- those and the had also Fourth, the Uzi had been appel- weapon, ons to him.” if seen the accessible him, premises Street within lant believed the were there for seen on the Keefer appellant and past twenty-four hours might desperate way he act in a to avoid the Moreover, spoke “doing robbery.”6 forcibly entering appellant’s before home. appellant rec aggres- were aware that had a knowledge appellant’s past With use, ord for and and violence PCP Uzi, use of the sive using been informed that properly could reason- find drugs at the time. See Coates United waiting longer ably conclude that than five (D.C.1989) 558 A.2d announcing presence their seconds after (“[PCP] in a and users act violent endanger safety. purpose would their and following drug”). way irrational use of the Supreme long recognized has Court premises, When the ERT arrived at the privacy in- that the historical roots of the they saw and heard voices inside the compel judicial in one’s home re- terests home. Their knock and announcement of carving exceptions out straint authority purpose their met Thus, requirements. knock and announce silence.7 The motions found that the in Miller v. were reasonable any 313, there was serious risk of delay. agree

further We and hold that the (1958), require- the Court stated that “[t]he judge’s supported conclusion was prior pur- ment of notice of ample for dis evidence find no basis pose forcing entry into a home is turbing Covington, supra, it. See 385 deeply heritage should rooted our A.2d at 166. given grudging application.” not be See stated, 585, For the reasons we find that the v. United 391 U.S. Sabbath police action was under these 1755, 1758, warranted 589, 88 S.Ct. 20 L.Ed.2d 828 properly circumstances and the trial court (1986) (same). Following the federal appellant’s denied the motion to suppress interpretation courts’ of the federal stat- the evidence. ute, which is identical to the District of statute, knock and announce this Accordingly, judgment the is Columbia exceptions recognized court has two broad Affirmed. compliance to full with the of exception The first is on ROGERS, the statute. based Judge, concurring: Chief ritual, the of mere where con- avoidance I by concur the result reached the permit entry can structive refusal case, majority separately in this and I write police from the inferred the importance using because of the of occupants, of and the action or inaction proper Here, analysis to reach that result. exigencies exception second arises from the exigency simply pos- turns not on the enforcement, permitting the of law suspected session of a armed Uzi fully complying forcibly to enter “without robber, but the fact that the made with the knock and announce statute” a reasonable effort under the circum- imminent of comply order to avoid the destruction statutory stances to with the re- danger entering quirement that knock and announce evidence or some to the eight days departure that 6. The search warrant was executed the extent and nature of robbery justified. exigency required after the Trak Auto in which the assail- must be weapon. ant had used an automatic We do not justify a warrantless differs from lapse believe that this of time diminishes the noncompliance required sec- to excuse with exigency since the had fresh infor- provision. tion 3109’s announcement That premises. mation that the Uzi was seen on the is, turn, degree greater exigency than that of noncompliance needed to excuse with significance 7. Nor it without portion section 3109. refusal indisputably knocked and announced their au- 275, (em- U.S.App.D.C. 277 at 874 F.2d at 826 thority purpose, meeting require- one of the added). phasis where a crime of vio- At least ments of 18 U.S.C. 3109. United States v. warrant, subject lence is the of the search Bonner, supra, similarly in which the had here, agree departure we that the extent of from authority purpose, announced their and the the statute’s commands is relevant to the show- exigent justi- issue was whether circumstances exigency hasty entry, explained: required. fied their the court exigency justify Whether the is sufficient to challenged upon the officers’ behavior turns

465 provision. That announcement 576 tion 3109’s Williams officers. turn, omitted). is, greater 700, (D.C.1990) (citations exigency than degree A.2d 703 noncompliance with needed to excuse government’s burden to show portion of section 3109.” only the refusal increases, however, exigency nature of the 4, 4 874 F.2d at 825 & n. Id. at 275 & n. comply to the extent that the fail to section (“near-complete compliance with knock and announce statute. See with the justify en- exigency to requires 3109 less United States v. U.S.App.D.C. 277 notice”). entry absent trance than does (1989) (citing 874 F.2d range Noting that broad “[a] Harris, United States v. U.S.App.D.C. justify has found to circumstances been cert. (1970), compliance full the various less than U.S. 3109,” the court requirements of section States, (1971); Masiello v. United “in- observed that ac (1963); 317 F.2d 121 identified them- creased once the officers cord, United States v. Bustamante-Ga door, forced selves and waited before de (9th Cir.), mez 11-12 interpret import with- sounds nied, S.Ct. in.” Id. at 874 F.2d at 825-26.2 (1974)). Hence, L.Ed.2d a critical fact concluded, further, de- The court in the instant case is that the officers statutory requirements parture from the identity knocked and announced their slight,” by knock- “exceedingly since forcing their waited five seconds before giving notice of ing on two occasions and Otherwise, into home. police officer purpose, his opinion the majority could be misconstrued “thereby principal satisfied the values proposition to stand for the that whenever section 3109.” Id. embodied involved, a semi-automatic firearm is Sabbath, (citing F.2d at 826 permit 1758). Finally, the 88 S.Ct. at ting suspect’s a forced into a criminal by obtaining a search war- court noted that home without reference to the knock and that ele- rant the officers had “eliminat[ed] See requirements. announce majority opin exigency requirement designed ment of the 463; see also id. ion at 464 at n. But 7. to ensure that the Fourth Amendment’s that is not the law. by exigen- not eroded Warrant Clause is The decision of the United States Court cy quickly perceived by those called too Appeals of for the District of Columbia line.” Id. 277 upon firing to serve on the supra, U.S.App.D.C. Circuit 277 278, 828. U.S.App.D.C. at 874 F.2d at 271, 822, 874 F.2d is instructive.1 The held, alternatively, court The in the instant case found cir- justified cumstances en- officers could officers’ forced Id. at try refused admit- after eleven to twelve seconds. conclude that had been conclusion, 275, explained 874 F.2d at reached this 825. The court tance. The however, out, appellant points without exigency required justify “[t]he meaningful warrantless re- of whether the officers differs from that review quired stat- non-compliance complied to excuse sec- with the knock and announce case, Id., See United 1. knocked and an- admittance. 825. times, occasions, separate DeLutis, (1st nounced three and apartment, ing on two F.2d 909 Cir. States v. 722 upon hearing footsteps running from the 1983) (upholding forced after 20 seconds suspected where cocaine was of be- (and delay) surveyed). cases sold, battering used a ram to force open the door after a total of eleven to twelve Meier, generally, Annota- 2. See Marvin Owen 272, 275, passed. seconds had Id. at 874 F.2d at tion, USC What Constitutes Violation 18 of few addition- 825. court noted that “a Requiring Notice Federal to Give § 3109 Officer delay clearly supported al seconds’ would have Breaking Authority Purpose Prior to his the conclusion that the officers had been re- Open or Other Part House to Door Window admittance.” F.2d fused Id. at 874 at 826. Warrant, Nevertheless, concluded, 21 A.L.R. Fed. Execute Search the court on the basis circumstances, of the five reasonably 856-61 that the officers had concluded had been refused 466 1287, upheld view,3 findings, F.2d remand for 524 Contrary judge’s to the trial

ute. when exi- entry after announcement carefully scrutinize the forced the courts must inside created noises gent circumstances underlying a claim of a stat suggested destruction apartment is at utory precisely violation because what evidence). concealment of right privacy risk is the individual’s pri his or her home as well as the trial majority does not address as a result of a vate citizens and admittance finding of refusal of judge’s in Mar pointed entry. forced As was out presence of it concludes that because siello, supra, 317 created circumstances. the Uzi (after to trial court for F.2d at 123 remand See majority opinion at 462 n. 5 and violation, findings alleged statutory Nevertheless, finding— judge’s periods of 10 to officers two where waited by silence that after five seconds followed forcing entry), “close 20 seconds before reasonably conclude that always care cases such as this will receive they had denied admittance —cannot been appellate scrutiny. ful It desirable on the record before us: five be sustained appellate review that the facts as an aid to generally afford the oc- seconds would not steps concerning required preliminary open the door cupants sufficient time to developed and the fac should be See, Masiello, supra, e.g., voluntarily. prosecution should tors relied on (re- F.2d at 122 U.S.App.D.C. at subject record and be the appear affirma- admittance not restricted to fused v. James, See United findings.” v. refusal); United States tive Griffin (D.C.1992) (“where con 618 A.2d 114 basic Cir.1976) (5th (“[failure to implicated, a more stitutional are liberties respond time was tan- within reasonable searching war refusal”; standard of review 80 seconds tamount to a California, ranted”) (citing Ker v. occupants announcements for the and two house, gas L.Ed.2d into fired tear to exit Rodriguez, (1963); Griffin, United States see also house); (D.C.1987) (“Given F.Supp. (no at 122 cited A.2d protect early morning important purposes delay behind 3109 30 seconds suspi- precious privacy interest of as summed sufficient in absence of some ‘the hours police, or adage [person’s] activity following arrival of up in the ancient cious circumstance); Com- Miller castle’[,] equivalent some other house is his Newman, monwealth v. 429 Pa. at 307 S.Ct. at [78 1194] (20 (Pa.1968) delay in ..., seconds this concludes that 3 to 5 sec A.2d Court admittance). answering door not refused onds is insufficient time to constitute ‘re statute”; In of the evidence that the conversa- fused under the 6:30 view admittance’ Davis, stopped v. a.m.)); persons within the house see also United States 199 tion of announced, it police after the knocked and U.S.App.D.C. 617 F.2d findings court to make (1979) (“[t]he re for the trial time that was statute] [the occupants could have they may or not the quires officers to wait before whether response the knock in so called out in to response no as a denial of admit construe only a time or whether depends largely on factual determina brief tance court”; fact that of to internalize the by made the trial wait been able tions at the door. the absence entry forced into someone was to 30 seconds before denied, on); findings by judge, the rec- cert. any house with Williams, here, support not ord as does 100 S.Ct. 64 L.Ed.2d Smith, (Louis) (1980) police had waited United States 171 the conclusions (1975) (after long enough to decide that there was 520 F.2d 74 have instead waited six seconds or ten stated: should 3. The trial concluding reasonably seconds inappropriate I conclude that it is for going in. And in were not to be allowed reviewing judge guess by to second me as the simply my judgment too those distinctions are split there a matter of a second here or wheth- police or the fine to be made. er five seconds was sufficient statutory departure from them. Si- extent of constructive refusal to admit greater requirements is since the same as lence for five seconds is not on one occa- only knocked and announced moving people with the evidence that were only five seconds. then waited sion and escaping obtaining possibility of endanger entering police offi- means to recognized pres- The trial cers.4 not the Uzi inside the was ence of create circum- itself sufficient to Hence, question gov is whether regard to the knock and without stances to exi ernment has met its burden show of the statute. announce in gent circumstances. The instant case judge found that: weap presence of an automatic volves knock, announce did did officers [the] informed was on which the were way purpose their kept in the rafters in the of the basement people calculated for the was However, nothing house. there was understand their inside to hear it and to suggest presence their to the exigent circum- there. And the purpose persons inside the had been detected presented at that moment there- stances their house before the announced justified the immediate fore ... knocking presence by on the front door. passage five seconds after the See, e.g., Spinelli, United States v. seconds was passage even if the of five (2d Cir.1988). quick F.2d 29-80 for them to have concluded not sufficient con police entry also not based on a was being denied.... their cern the destruction of evidence. about my judgment these officers were And See, Nabors, e.g., United States af- acting reasonable [sic] (6th Cir.1990); v. Bar United States passage of time that ter a short rientos, (7th Cir.1985), there need to enter those premises by immediate in or- force [sic] there infor Nor was der to what was believed avoid ... guard mation that an armed would be sit a serious risk window, ting by the front more or that in the execution of the other citizens gun than one was inside the house much warrant. illegal activity go any less that there was See, Williams, presence of an Clearly, knowledge on in the house. e.g., gun in the rafters supra, 576 A.2d 700. After the Uzi machine basement knocked, moreover, they give police grounds did not hear did not suffice to Nabors, knock; rather, response noise in to their into home. See break (although during there F.2d at 1354 circum- was silence the five seconds Thus, drug posses- entry. before the forced their stances of a felon trafficker out, habitually appellant points finding firearms who array of exi sion of vest, threat gency unsupported by providing bulletproof showed facts wore occupants safety, others’ and the need a reasonable belief that the justified forced attempting destroy the house were to evi conserve narcotics evidence knocking an- resisting apprehension. moments after and dence or that sense, every that exigency nouncing, found the trial do not hold ... “[w]e personnel suspect exigency here is less than the found time law enforcement Williams, 700, pos- supra subject that the of a search warrant 576 A.2d and See, Rodriguez, F.Supp. announce after e.g., supra, to 10 seconds after knock and 663 587 (forcible entry room); 3 to 5 seconds after knock and observing illegal drug sale in motel police announce where in heard sounds from with- Cir.) (9th 332 F.2d 19 McClure creating suspects reasonable belief (entry 4 to seconds after knock and announce 5 resist, destroy attempt escape, would to or evi- approaching police house and where were seen Rummer, dence); 786 F.2d 381 United States v. announcing knocking footsteps and heard (10th Cir.1986) (entry 5 to 10 seconds after defendant), escape of and feared police figure knock and announce where leaving saw 1027, S.Ct. 13 L.Ed.2d 963 room); Wysong, United States v. (9th Cir.1976) (entry into motel room 5 F.2d 345 appellant contemplated com- firearm, believe that split-second announce- sesses a a robbery, and thus mitting another armed a forced sufficient- ment followed 3109”). the Uzi in his home. complies likely The still to have ly with 18 U.S.C. police that the Uzi had had reason to believe that police had no information The also hostage during anywhere ever seen inside the a human appellant been had used Contrary in the rafters in the prior robbery other than basement. a with the Uzi. type weapon person contention, it that a Nor is were not carry person, or her like a on his simply acting “generalized on a mere be- response pistol. That there was no whatso- might immediately the Uzi lief” says knock at the door almost ever appellant longer if waited available exigent nothing regard cir- relevant majority entering the home. As the cumstances; anyone did not hear out, majority opinion at points see su- sound, running scurrying other and circum- relied on five pra, not inconsistent with and the silence was supporting finding stances as a occupants being or unable to startled circumstances, including that the had quickly. respond to the front door so personal information that made findings evaluating the ef- judge’s illegal drugs. use of circum- fect of this silence on overall circumstances, there Under all of the finding limited to that as a stances was fore, consistent our standard of knocking announcing, result of their review,5 this court is constrained to con entirely “the officers were ... reasonable compliance clude that there was reasonable people that the inside were with the knock and announce people then aware that the outside were light cir of the statute execute a search police officers there to cumstances created State thereafter. Cf. warrant.” Jeter, Wash.App. P.2d Nevertheless, heightened in view of the (1981) (“a police safety concern for capacity injury, to inflict lethal of an Uzi knowledge upon prior must be based majority opinion see at 461 n. subject of the direct observation particularly had reason to be concerned per keeps weapons that such anyone had an enter before inside them”); propensity to use son has a known opportunity to inflict serious on offi- Cruz, F.Supp. States v. cers or others. Fear of violence had (W.D.Tex.1967) (upholding entry 15 sec Emergency use caused the po after knock and announce where onds nighttime Response Team and to seek a dan lice heard sounds and defendant “was Emergency warrant. The members of the always deadly gerous man who had Response thought that the Team Uzi was weapon in his residence” in view available real, an imitation. While the five sec- not might apprehension delay was insufficient to ond constitute shoot-out); compare People v. encounter a entry, constructive refusal of Dumas, Cal.Rptr. 9 Cal.3d the fact conclude that (1973) (defendant 512 P.2d they had and announced their knocked gun). to answer door armed with a known heightened poten- presence purpose I in the affirmance of Accordingly, concur tially dangerous situation. See judgment. were on in the F.2d at 825-26. people heard talk-

house and the that a in the house. The information only twenty-four

Uzi was the house was

hours old and the had reason to it, Williams, ("af- trial court as to the facts before 5. See 576 A.2d at 703 drawn ford[ing] government legitimate 'all infer- supportable under view of if evidence'”) (citations are testimony and ences from the uncontroverted omitted). 'accept[ing] facts of record’ and the inferences

Case Details

Case Name: Culp v. United States

Court Name: District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Date Published: May 4, 1993

Citation: 624 A.2d 460

Docket Number: 91-CF-555

Court Abbreviation: D.C.