[¶ 1.] The circuit court held that (1) alimony payments due before the effective date of SDCL 25-7-7.3 and 7.4 could be retroactively modified and that the alimony recipient had not met her burden of showing extraordinary circumstances justifying continuance of alimony after her remarriage. In addition, the court (2) denied reimbursement for medical expenses, but awarded (3) past due private school tuition, and (4) child support arrearages; and denied (5) paternity testing, and (6) disbursements. We affirm (1) in part and reverse in part; affirm (2), affirm (3), but remand for further findings, and affirm (4), (5) and (6).
Background
[¶ 2.] Margaret Culhane and Stephen W. Michels were married on May 27, 1978. The two met while attending the University of South Dakota in Vermillion. After their marriage, Michels continued his education and acquired an MBA degree. Two daughters were born during the marriage: the first on May 16, 1980, and the second on June 6, 1982. Culhane and Michels agreed in early 1986 to end their marriage.
[¶ 3.] In July 1986 they entered into a property settlement and child custody agreement. Attorney John Billings prepared the necessary documents. Billings was counsel for the Broadcaster Press, the publishing business where Michels worked as a general managing partner and Culhane performed payroll and various other office duties. Billings represented Michels. Culhane was not represented. Under the settlement, Culhane was given custody of the children, Michels was to pay $800 per month child support, the children’s medical insurance and uncovered medical expenses were allocated between the parties, and Michels would pay Culhane $1,100 in monthly alimony for two years. In addition, the parties agreed that the children would attend St. Agnes School, a Catholic grade school in Vermillion, and that Michels would pay the tuition and fees. On July 22, 1986, the circuit court adopted the settlement agreement and entered a decree of divorce.
[¶ 4.] Eleven years later, in September 1997, Culhane sued on the divorce decree to recover delinquent alimony and child support, as well as unpaid medical expenses and tuition. Michels sought to abate retroactively his alimony obligation. Both sides moved for summary judgment. Following various legal proceedings, the court ultimately held that Culhane was entitled to a portion of the alimony pay *583 ments together with interest. It also granted Culhane the tuition and child support arrearages requested, denied her claim for medical expenses, and denied Michels’ request for paternity testing. Both sides were denied disbursements.
[¶ 5.] Culhane now appeals the court’s decision that she cannot recover all unpaid alimony, medical expenses, and disbursements as the “prevailing party.” Mi-chels, by notice of review, appeals the award of interest, tuition, and child support, and the denial of his request for paternity testing. As the circuit court made its decision based on depositions and affidavits, with no live testimony, we review the case de novo unimpeded by any deference to the court’s findings.
Miller v. Weber,
1. Alimony and Interest
[¶ 6.] In the divorce decree of July 22, 1986, Michels was directed to pay Culhane $1,100 alimony per month for twenty-four months. Michels made only one payment. Culhane remarried in August 1986. On the advice of his attorney, Michels claims, he stopped paying alimony. Culhane says that Michels contacted her several months later and asked if he could delay payments while he “got on his feet.” She agreed to a temporary postponement. She also asserts that in November or December of 1986, attorney Billings invited her to his office and asked her to sign a form releasing Michels of his alimony obligation. She refused. Culhane says she called Michels in May of 1989 requesting some of the money he owed, but he declined. Michels did not file a motion to terminate his alimony obligation until September 1998.
[¶ 7.] Crucial to the question before us is the enactment of SDCL 25-7-7.3 and 7.4, effective July 1, 1987. SDCL 25-7-7.3 states:
Any past due support payments are not subject to modification by a court or administrative entity of this state, except those accruing in any period in which there is pending a petition for modification of the support obligation, but only from the date that notice of hearing of the petition has been given to the obligee, the obligor, and any other parties having an interest in such matter.
SDCL 25-7-7.4 provides:
Any payment or installment of support under an order for support, as defined by § 25-7A-1, whether entered by a court or an administrative entity of this state or of any other state or jurisdiction, which is unpaid after the date it is due, is a judgment by operation of law, with the full force, effect and attributes of a judgment of this state, including enforceability, and is entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in this state.
[¶ 8.] In holding Michels responsible for the alimony payments due after the enactment of SDCL 25-7-7.3, the court ruled that remarriage will not automatically cancel alimony; instead, a party seeking modification must petition for a change. Because Michels did not petition for modification until 1998, the payments due after the enactment of the statute became vested and could not be retroactively terminated. However, the court differentiated the payments due before July 1, 1987, concluding that the statute did not apply to alimony accruing before its effective date. The court held that Michels could seek retroactive termination of alimony due before July 1, 1987, and that Culhane must establish extraordinary circumstances showing why alimony should continue after her remarriage. Because she failed to establish such circumstances, the court granted Michels an abatement of that part of the unpaid alimony. Culhane believes the court erred in refusing to give retroactive application to the statutes.
*584
[¶ 9.] Michels argues that at the time the alimony was owed, he did not have an obligation to petition for modification or termination. Referring to
Marquardt v. Marquardt,
[¶ 10.] Michels then cites
Thomer-son v. Thomerson,
[¶ 11.] The enactment of SDCL 25-7-7.3 substantially changed the retroactive modification of support awards. In
Vellinga v. Vellinga,
A narrow window is provided for modification of past due payments which accrue after notice of hearing is given to the obligee. Any other past due support payments are not subject to modification. The use of the term any, understood in its ordinary sense, dearly encompasses both past due support payments which accrued after the effective date of the statute and those which accmed prior to July 1, 1987.
Id. at 474 (emphasis added). Thus, we specifically held that the statute “is to be applied retroactively.” Id.
[¶ 12.] The application of the statute to past-due alimony was examined in
Gunn v. Gunn,
[¶ 13.] Michels contends that SDCL 25-7-7.3 applies to child support obligations, not alimony. He points out that while this statute is located in the chapter titled “support obligations,” encompassing support for both spouses and children, it is more strategically positioned within those statutes controlling only child support. Much the same argument can be said for SDCL 25-7-7.4. That statute refers to support “as defined by § 25-7A-1,” and states that amounts unpaid after they become due are judgments as a matter of law. Although SDCL 25-7A-1, which defines “order for support,” currently does not include alimony in its definition, when SDCL 25-7-7.4 became effective, the definition in § 25-7A-1 included “any order of the court or an administrative agency which provides for periodic payment of funds for the support of a child
or maintenance of a spouse
....”
1
(Emphasis added). At the time SDCL 25-7-7.3 and 7.4 were enacted, the Legislature evidently intended the statutes to cover both child support and alimony. Additionally, this Court has repeatedly interpreted these enactments as applying to alimony.
See Taecker v.
Taecker;
[¶ 14.] Michels next argues that waiver and laches bar recovery of alimony. For ten years, he asserts, “Culhane did nothing to request or demand the alimony payments.” In response, Culhane says that Michels requested a delay in paying shortly after the divorce, and that in 1989 she asked him for some of the alimony he owed. In our view, Michels alleges no act or statement by Culhane that misled him to his detriment.
See Harms v. Northland Ford Dealers,
[¶ 15.] Laches is also inapplicable. To prove laches, Michels must show that: “(1) [Culhane] had full knowledge of the facts upon which the action is based, (2) regardless of this knowledge, she engaged in an unreasonable delay before commencing the suit, and (3) that allowing her to maintain the action would prejudice [Michels].”
Conway v. Conway,
[¶ 16.] Michels appeals the circuit court’s award of interest. Alimony is a support obligation subject to interest at the judgment rate. SDCL 21-1-13.1; SDCL 15-16-3;
see Vander Woude v. Vander Woude,
[¶ 17.] We held in
Myhre
that when circumstances support a “good faith termination of alimony payments,” equity will not allow an interest award to the recipient on past due amounts.
Id.
at 909. There, the parties stipulated that alimony would end when the wife remarried.
Id.
at 906. She moved in with a man and they held themselves out as married. The ex-husband gave written notice that he would no longer be making alimony payments because of her “remarriage.”
Id.
at 907. Here, in contrast, there was no such agreement. Culhane states that Michels approached her and asked to postpone his payments, and that his attorney asked her to waive alimony. In addition, Culhane says that she asked Michels for the past due alimony payments in 1989. Even if she had not done so, failure to demand support payments does not negate the obligation to make those payments.
Vander Woude,
2. Medical Expenses
[¶ 18.] Culhane argues that the circuit court ignored the language of the judgment and decree of divorce when it interpreted the decree to direct her to assume “any medical, dental or eye care expenses of the children” not covered by medical insurance. Medical expenses were incurred on behalf of the two children between 1994 and 1998. The parties’ property settlement “adopted” in the decree of divorce contained the following:
It is agreed that [Michels] shall keep in effect the medical insurance on the children of the parties until such time as [Culhane] finishes her education and is duly employed. It is agreed and understood that when [Culhane] is employed, [Michels’] obligations to maintain said insurance shall terminate. It is understood that [Michels] shall assume the *587 costs of any medical, dental or eye care expenses of the children which are not covered by said insurance. This duty shall also remain in effect until [Mi-chels’] obligation to maintain said insurance terminates.
When this provision in the settlement agreement was repeated in the decree of divorce, the last sentence was omitted. Culhane argues that this sentence was obviously eliminated because the judge felt it was unfair to burden her with both insurance and uncovered medical expenses. She argues that it is the judgment that controls, not the stipulation. However, as we noted earlier, the settlement agreement was expressly “adopted” in the decree.
See Weekley v. Weekley,
[¶ 19.] “In determining the proper interpretation of an agreement incorporated into a divorce decree, a court must seek to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties.”
Kier,
3. Tuition Expenses
[¶ 20.] Michels appeals the circuit court’s reimbursement award to Culhane for expenses incurred for the children’s tuition for the years they attended private school. In their settlement agreement, the parties provided that the children would attend St. Agnes School in Vermillion as long as Cul-hane lived in Vermillion and the children were eligible to attend that school. On expenses, the agreement stated: “It is understood that the tuition or any other fees incurred as a result of this attendance shall be paid by [Michels].”
[¶ 21.] Michels argues that the statute of limitations expired on this claim. He asserts that contract principles apply when a settlement agreement is interpreted, that the limitations period governing contract claims is six years, and therefore the claim for tuition expenses is barred. This claim, however, is based on a decree of divorce, and as we explained earlier, the time limit is twenty years. SDCL 15-2-6(1);
Hershey,
[¶ 22.] The circuit court found that Culhane met her burden of proving that she incurred tuition expenses of $3,325. This figure was based on her deposition, which in turn was based on “Exhibit 1,” apparently prepared by Culhane. 3 Her testimony and the exhibit, however, contradict an exhibit from St. Agnes School, which shows that for the school years spanning the fall of 1986 through the spring of 1989, the tuition totaled $1,200. 4 “Exhibit 1” also miscalculates the number of school years involved, which under the breakdown for the youngest daughter should be six rather than seven years. *588 The single St. Agnes exhibit was the only evidence of the amount of tuition expenses incurred during the years in question. With these discrepancies, although Cul-hane has met her burden of proving that tuition was incurred, the precise amount of tuition remains unclear. We remand for further findings.
4. Child Support Arrearages
[¶ 23.] Michels challenges the circuit court’s order finding him in arrears on child support. The court awarded Cul-hane $6,000 in past child support based on $400 per month for fifteen months of ar-rearages. The judgment and decree of divorce requires Michels to “pay the sum of $800 per month for the support and maintenance of the minor children until they reach the age of 18 years.” From the outset, Michels and Culhane treated the child support as a separate obligation of $400 for each child. Michels deposited $400 per month in each girl’s savings account, and Culhane withdrew money for the children’s expenses from those accounts. When the oldest child turned eighteen in May 1998, Michels began paying $400 only to the youngest child’s account. Michels argues that the parties’ intent, as shown by their conduct, was to create an obligation to pay $400 for each child. He asserts that this interpretation is backed up by Culhane’s own statement in her affidavit ascribing payments to each child.
[¶ 24.] In
O’Grady v. O’Grady,
[¶ 25.] Similarly, in
Houser v. Houser,
[¶ 26.] Here, the decree does not prorate a support amount for each child. Instead, it provides for $800 per month until both reach eighteen. Whatever the parents’ subjective understanding may have been, the decree proclaims their legal obligations. The circuit court ruled that Mi-chels had not timely petitioned the court for modification of the child support obligation. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s ruling that Michels was obligated to pay $800 per month in accordance with the decree.
5. Paternity Testing
[¶ 27.] Michels moved for paternity testing to learn whether he is the biological father of the youngest daughter. He offered affidavits from two of Cul-hane’s friends stating that she told them that she knew even when she was pregnant with this child that Michels was not the father. He states he only became aware of this recently. Culhane refused to answer questions on the topic during her deposition, which Michels asserts raises an *589 adverse inference. Without further explanation, the circuit court held that “Michels is not entitled to paternity testing at this time.”
[¶ 28.] In
Godin v. Godin,
[¶29.] Under this statutory presumption, the
Godin
court wrote, “the State retains a strong and direct interest in ensuring that children born of a marriage do not suffer financially or psychologically merely because of a parent’s belated and self-serving concern over a child’s biological origins.”
Id.
at 910. The court acknowledged that other jurisdictions have rejected requests to reopen paternity judgments “absent clear and convincing evidence that it serves the best interests of the child.”
Id.
(citing
In re JRW,
Although we understand plaintiffs interest in ascertaining the true genetic makeup of the child, we agree with the many jurisdictions holding that the financial and emotional welfare of the child, and the preservation of an established parent-child relationship, must remain paramount. Where the presumptive father has held himself out as the child’s parent, and engaged in an ongoing parent-child relationship for a period of years, he may not disavow that relationship and destroy a child’s long-held assumptions, solely for his own self-interest. ... Whatever the interests of the presumed father in ascertaining the genetic “truth” of a child’s origins, they remain subsidiary to the interests of the state, the family, and the child in maintaining the continuity, financial support, and psychological security of an established parent-child relationship.
Id. (internal citations omitted). The court stated that although the father had an opportunity to raise the issue of paternity during the divorce proceedings, he did not do so, and instead continued to treat the child as his own. Id. at 910-11. Finding that there was no basis to relieve the father of the legal and financial responsibilities of paternity, the court reasoned that a finding of nonpaternity would in essence leave the child without a father. Id. at 910 & n. 3.
[¶ 30.] Belated efforts to declare a child illegitimate, for whatever reasons, should seldom prevail. Michels has failed to show sufficient cause for paternity testing at this late juncture. The welfare of the child must be considered over the father’s long delayed challenge to the child’s parentage. Michels has treated both children as his own since birth. He claims that his request is not made to recover past child support, but merely to find out if he is the father and whether Culhane perpetrated fraud upon him.
5
These are not compelling enough reasons to disrupt the life of a child born during their marriage.
See Miles v. Stovall,
6. Disbursements to “Prevailing Party”
[¶ 31.] Finally, Culhane appeals the circuit court’s denial of disbursements. The court held that neither party was entitled to costs or disbursements under SDCL 15-17-37 since “both parties prevailed on some of the issues and lost on some of the issues.” Culhane argues that it is not necessary that she prevail on all her claims to be the “prevailing party.”
[¶ 32.] A denial or award of disbursements is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.
High Plains Genetics Research, Inc. v. JK Mill-Iron Ranch,
[¶ 33.] “The prevailing party in an action is ‘the party in whose favor the decision or verdict is or should be rendered and judgment entered.’ ”
Michlitsch v. Meyer,
[¶ 34.] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Notes
. SDCL 25-7A-R12) currently provides:
"Order for support," a judgment, decree, or order, whether temporary, final, or subject to modification, issued by a court or an administrative agency of competent jurisdiction, which provides for the support and maintenance of a child, including a child who has attained the age of majority under the law of the issuing state, or of the parent with whom the child is living, which provides for monetary support, health care, arrearages, or reimbursement, and which may include costs and fees, interest and penalties, income withholding, attorney’s fees, and other relief[.]
This language was enacted in 1997. 1997 S.D.Laws ch. 155, § 5.
. No question has been raised on renewal of the judgment. SDCL 15-16-33 (judgment may be renewed "at any time prior to the expiration of ten years from the first docketing of such judgment.”).
. This one-page exhibit lists the amount Cul-hane argues she is owed for back alimony, past due child support, medical expenses, and tuition. The following is the breakdown shown for tuition:
[oldest daughter] school years $ 700.00 Sept. 1986 - May 1988 (2)
$350/year
[youngest daughter] school years $2524.00 Sept. 1986-May 1992 (7)
$350/year X 5
$450/yearX 1
$450/year X 1
. This tuition report indicates the following was paid to St. Agnes for those school years:
1986-1987 School Year $350.00
1987-1988 School Year $425.00
1988-1989 School Year $425.00
. Michels cites as authority for his request SDCL §§ 25-8-7, 9, and 12. These statutes authorize testing to establish paternity for support purposes, not to retrospectively challenge a child’s presumptive legitimacy.
See Commonwealth v. O’Brien,