156 Ga. 185 | Ga. | 1923
(After stating the foregoing facts.) There are two questions presented by the record. The first is whether the judges of the superior court of Fulton county have the power to change the amount of the salary of the judge of the juvenile court of Fulton county during the term of his appointment and after it has been once fixed; and the second is whether it is necessary that the salary .of the judge of the juvenile court of Fulton county be audited and approved by the county commissioners of Fulton county. We shall consider these questions in reverse order.
Section 39 of the act of 1915 (Acts 1915, p. 49) provides that “All expenses incurred by the court in complying with the provisions of this act shall be paid out of county funds.” The salary of the judge is necessarily one of the items of expense in operating the court. There is only one way in which the salary of the judge can be paid, and this is from the funds of the county. To hold that the county commissioners, by withholding their approval of the payment of such sums that might be fixed by the judges of the superior court, could defeat the provision for the payment of the judge of the juvenile court, would be, to leave to the discretion of the county commissioners the question whether a juvenile court could exist; and evidently this view of the case was not in the minds of the General Assembly at the time of the passage of the act. From a reading of the act of 1915 (Acts 1915, p. 35) it seems clear that the juvenile court was created by law, and the judge appointed by law, and his compensation was fixed by law, and the method of payment was provided by law, to wit, from the “ county funds ” of Fulton County.
For the reasons above stated, we hold that there is no necessity for any audit or approval of the salary by the county commissioners nor any requirement that a formal warrant be issued. Clark v. Eve, supra. The salary of the judge of the juvenile court of Fulton county is a fixed charge to which the funds of the county are subject, and proof of payment suffices to enable the county commissioners to legally account for such portion of the public funds as is disbursed in extinguishment of this charge.
For the purpose of this case it may be conceded that the law attaches a salary to an office as an incident thereof, and not by force of contract. 29 Cyc. 1427, par. 3; 22 R. C. L. 532-533, § 227; Collins v. Russell, 107 Ga. 423 (33 S. E. 444); Tucker v. Shoemaker, 149 Ga. 250-252 (99 S. E. 865). And in 22 R. C. L. 524-525, § 216, it is said that “ Such salary as may be attached to any office is not given to the incumbent because of any duty on the part of the public to confer emoluments on him, but to enable him the better to perform the duties of the office; for without adequate compensation it cannot be expected that he will be able to give due attention to his official duties. In all cases the right to such compensation is such only as may be given by law; and whether it is an annual salary or a per diem allowance, or consists of particular fees for particular services, depends on the will of the lawmakers. Hence it is that the courts are uniform in asserting that the right of a public officer for compensation for the performance of duties imposed on him by law does not rest on contract, either express or implied. Even the measure of compensation is arbitrary with the legislature, and it is not necessarily determined by the value of the officer’s services. A distinction should be drawn between compensation for past services rendered and services to
Plainly it could not have been intended by the legislature that the judge of the superior court could, as a mere matter of his volition and for any reason which might appeal to him, diminish the salary fixed at the time of the appointment as a means perhaps of relieving himself and the county of the services of a judge of the juvenile court whose services might be unsatisfactory; and if there is any power to alter the salary, the judge of the superior court would have as much right to cut the salary down to a mere 'nominal sum as to increase it. For the very reasons stated in Clark v. Eve, supra, and upon the principle that the salary is a fixed charge which the county authorities are obliged to pay, it would never do to hold that the judge of the superior court was authorized to use a sliding scale, operating only at his volition, and by the application of which the salary of the judge of the juvenile court could be $300 one month and $600 another, according to ephemeral exigencies due to variable circumstances affecting the amount of business transacted in the juvenile court, etc.
While the county commissioners must pay the sum fixed by the judges of the superior court, these officials must have a “ fixed ” sum to use as a guide in levjdng the taxes necessary to provide that sum. Any other rule would lead to probable deficiencies in the county revenue which might be necessary to supply the salary
We have been unable to find a Georgia case in which the word “fix” has been judicially defined, but in other jurisdictions the use of the word “ fix ” implies finality. “ Fix ” is defined by the Standard Dictionary as “to decide definitely, make sure, settle, determine; as, ‘ His fate will be fixed to-night.’ ” Ft. Miller Pulp &c. Co. v. Bratt, 119 App. Div. 685 (104 N. Y. Supp. 350, 356). “ Under Laws 1903, p. 64,- § 9, requiring a public improvement ordinance to fix- the time the work shall be completed, . . an ordinance, requiring the work to be completed within a specified time provided the days’ work lost because of injunction, court proceedings, bad weather, strikes, etc., shall be added to the days specified, is invalid, because it fails to fix a time for the completion of the work, the word “fix” meaning immovable or definite; to determine or settle definitely.” Rackliff v. Peters, 136 Mo. App. 168 (115 S. W. 503, 504). The word “fix” is defined in Bouvier’s