OPINION
This court’s former opinion and judgment dated July 27, 2017, are withdrawn. This court’s opinion and judgment dated October 5, 2017, are substituted therefor. The motion for rehearing filed by Evelyn Cuevas, individually and as next friend of Clarisa Cuevas and Esequiel Cuevas, minor children, and on behalf of the Estate of Angel Cuevas, Jr., and Melanie Molina, as next friend of Belen Cuevas, a minor (Appellants/Plaintiffs Evelyn Cuevas and Melanie Molina) is granted in part and denied in part.
This summary judgment appeal concerns an application of Chapter 95 of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code to •claims brought by the survivors of the decedent, Angel Cuevas, Jr. Cuevas was fatally injured while working on a drilling rig that was drilling a well on a lease owned and operated by Endeavor Energy Resources, L.P. Appellants
Background Facts
Endeavor is an owner/оperator of oil and gas leases located in Midland County. Endeavor contracted with Big Dog Drilling to drill a well on Endeavor’s mineral lease. Cuevas was an employee , of Big Dog Drilling. On June 25, 2011, Cuevas and other rig hands were working on Big Dog Drilling' Rig No. 17, The accident occurred while the Big Dog crew was “rigging up” the rig in preparation for drilling operations. Cuevas was working in the substructure arеa of the rig, known as the cellar, trying to repair a cellar jet line. The cellar jet line is a pipe that works as a vacuum to remove fluid from the cellar.
Cuevas and the other rig hands were using a rope known as a catline, which was attachéd to a pulley system known as a cathead, to lift the cellar jet line in order to make the repairs. During this process, the catline became unexpectedly caught on the cathead, which- caused the cellar jet line to rise abruptly and strike Cuevas in the head, ultimately resulting in his death. No Endeavor employees were- present at the location when the accident occurred.
' In the Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, they alleged that Endeavor owned and operated the job site and that .Endeavor was an occupier of the premises.
Endeavor filed a motion for summary judgment asserting traditional and no-evidence grounds regarding Appellants’ original negligence and premises liability claims. Endeavor’s traditional summary judgment grounds alleged that Chapter 95 applied. to plaintiffs’ claims against Endeavor, and Endeavor’s no-evidеnce ground asserted that plaintiffs had no evidence satisfying the requirements of Section 95.003. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a supplemental petition alleging negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claims against Endeavor, Plaintiffs alleged that Endeavor was negligent in hiring Cuevas’s employer, Big Dog Drilling, to drill a well on its lease and that Endeavor was negligent in failing to properly supervise Big Dog Drilling, as it performed work on the lease. Endeavor did not amend or supplement its motion for summary judgment to address these new claims.
After a hearing, the trial court granted Endeavor’s motion for summary judgment on all claims asserted by Appellants. Collectively, Appellants present two issues on appeal.
The Original Premises Liability and Negligence Claims
We review a summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim,
We note at the' outset that the parties agree that Chapter 95 applies to Appellants’ original premises liability and negligence claims as alleged in Plaintiffs’ Original Pеtition. Accordingly, Endeavor’s traditional summary judgment ground is not being challenged on appeal as it applies to Appellants’ original claims. Instead, Appellants’ first issue focuses on Endeavor’s no-evidence ground asserting that Appellants had no evidence to establish a claim under Section 95.003.
After adequate time for discovery, a party may move for summаry judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial. Tex. R. Crv. P. 166a(i). A no-evidence summary judgment motion under Rule 166a(i) is essentially a motion for a pretrial directed verdict; it requires the nonmoving party to present evidence raising a genuinе issue of material fact supporting each element contested in the motion. Id.) Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish,
Section 95.003 provides that:
A property owner is not liable for personal injury, death, or property damage to i-.-.'an employee of a contractor ■or subcontractor who - constructs, repairs, renovates,'or modifies an improvement to real property, including personal injury, death, or property damage arising from the failure to provide a safe workplace unless:
(1) the property owner exercises or retains some control over the manner in which the work is performed, other than the right to order the work to start or stop or to inspect progress or receive reports; and
(2) the property owner had actual knowledge of the danger or condition resulting in the personal injury, death, or property damage and failed to adequately warn.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. § 95.003. When Chapter 95 applies to a claim, “it is the plaintiffs ‘sole means of recovery.’ ” Ineos,
We begin our analysis with the actual knowledge component. “Because evidence of actual knowledge triggers an exception to the protection that Chapter 95 otherwise provides, the plaintiff has the burden to prove the owner’s actual knowledge.” Id. at 568 (citing Vanderbeek v. San Jacinto Methodist Hosp.,
Appellants premise their actual knowledge contention on the assertion that Endeavor and Big Dog Drilling had common ownership. Based upon this contention, Appellants assert that Endeavor had actual knowledge that the use of the cathead spools on a drilling rig was a recognized danger, which was evidenced by cathead spools being replaced with air hoists on other Big Dog Drilling rigs prior to the incident. Conversely, Endeavor, asserted that general knowledge of the use of cat-heads on Big Dog Drilling rigs did not constitute actual knowledge of the danger or condition resulting in the death of Cue-vas. Endeavor asserts that no еmployee of Endeavor knew that the cellar jet line needed repair or that the cathead and catline would be used by Big Dog Drilling to lift it for repair. In this regard, the deposition testimony of Cuevas’s coworkers indicated that no employees of Endeavor were present at the time of the accident and no employee of Endeavor was aware of the problem with the cellar jet line or the manner that was used to attempt to repair it.
The Texas Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Ineos addresses the actual knowledge issue. The claimant in Ineos was the employee of an independent contractor that was working to replace a valve on a furnace heater in a pеtrochemical plant. Id. at 559. He suffered burns when a burst of gas exploded out of a pipe that he was working on. Id. The claimant in Ineos asserted that the owner of the plant had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition because it had knowledge of the presence of explosive gases and hydrocarbons in the plant. Id. at 568-69. The court determined thаt the presence of gas at the plant was not the danger or condition resulting in the claimant’s injuries, but rather it was the presence of gas in the specific line upon which the claimant was actually 'working that resulted in the claimant’s injuries. Id. at 569.
Appellant’s contention that Endeavor had knowledge that the use of catheads and catlines on drilling rigs is potentially dangerous is similar to the contention by the claimant in Ineos that the propérty owner had knowledge of a potentially dangerous situation on its property. The court in Ineos rejected the contention that general knowledge of a potentially dangerous condition constituted actual knowledge of the dangerous condition that resulted in the claimant’s injury. Id. In this cоntext, the dangerous condition that resulted in Cuevas’s death was the specific use of the cathead and catline to lift the cellar jet line for repair, and there is .no evidence that Endeavor had actual knowledge that the cathead and catline were being used in this manner. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding that Appellants did not raise a fact issue on the actual knowledge requirement of Section 95.003(2). We overrule Appellants/Plaintiffs Evelyn Cuevas’s and Melanie Molina’s first issue, Appellant/Intervenor. Erika Messer’s first issue, and Appellant/Inter-venor New Hampshire Insurance Company’s sole issue on appeal.
Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision Claims
Appellants/Plairitiffs Evelyn Cuevas and Melanie Molina and Appellant/Intеrvenor Erika Messer assert in their second issues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Appellants’ negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claims because Endeavor did not amend or supplement its motion for summary judgment to include those later-filed claims. A defendant who does not amend or supplement its motion for summary judgment to address claims asserted in a plaintiffs amended or supplemental pleading is generally not entitled to a summary judgment on the plaintiffs entire case. See Blancett v. Lagniappe Ventures, Inc.,
An amended or supplemental motion for summary judgment is not always necessary, however, when a ground asserted in a motion for summary judgment conclusively negates a common element of the newly and previously pleaded claims, or when the original motion is broad enough to encompass the newly asserted claims. See Blancett,
In Abutahoun, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the types of claims covered by Chapter 95. The court held that Chapter 95 applies “to all negligence claims that arisе from either a premises defect or the negligent activity of a property owner or its employees.” Abutahoun,
The Texas Supreme Court concluded that Chapter 95 applies to contemporaneous negligent acts of the property owner. Abutahoun,
Endeavor additionally cites G & H Tоwing Co. v. Magee for the proposition that the harmless error rule applies where the trial- court grants more relief than- the summary judgment motion requested. G & E Towing Co. v. Magee,
We overrule in part, the second issues of Appellants/Plaintiffs Evelyn Cuevas, and Melanie Molina and Appellant/Intervenor Erika Messer with respect to their supplemental claims of negligent retention and supervision. We sustain in part the second issues of Appellants/Plaintiffs Evelyn Cue-vas and Melanie Molina and Appellant/In-tervenor Erika Messer with respeсt to their supplemental negligent hiring claim,
This Court’s Ruling
We reverse’the judgment of the trial court with respect to the negligent hiring claim of Appellants/Plaintiffs Evelyn Cue-vas and Melanie Molina and Appellant/In-tervenor Erika Messer and remand same for further proceedings consistent, with this opinion. We affirm the remainder of the trial court’s judgment.
Notes
. The Appellants consist of: (a) Plaintiffs Evelyn Cuеvas, individually and as next friend of Clarisa Cuevas and Esequiel Cuevas, minor children, and on behalf of the Estate of Angel Cuevas, Jr., and Melanie Molina, as next friend of Belen Cuevas, a minor; (b) Interve-nor Erika Messer, as next friend of Kristina Cuevas, a minor;, and (c) Intervenor New Hampshire Insurance Company. The three sets of Appellants have filed separate briefs challenging the trial court's summary judgment.
. Big Dog Drilling is not a party to this appeal. After granting Endeavor’s motion for summary judgment, the .trial court entered an order severing Appellants’ claims against Big Dog Drilling.
. The intervenors have essentially adopted the plaintiffs’ pleadings and arguments in this case,
. Appellant/Intervenor New Hampshire Insurance Company only presents a single issue on appeal complaining of the matter alleged by the other Appellants as their first issue.