Ronald E. CUETO, Appellant, v. JOHN ALLMAND BOATS, INC., Etc., Appellee.
No. 75-1147.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
March 17, 1976.
Rehearing Denied July 6, 1976.
334 So.2d 30
Adams, George, Wood, Lee & Schulte, Miami, for appellee.
Before BARKDULL, C.J., and HAVERFIELD and NATHAN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals a final judgment awarding him a total of $3,056.46 in this action to recover commissions allegedly owed him for sales which he had secured following notification of termination of employment.
In 1968 plaintiff-appellant, Ronald E. Cueto, was hired by the defendant, John Allmand Boats, Inc., to represent the defendant in a particular assigned territory, and on January 7, 1970 the parties entered into the fоllowing employment agreement which reads in pertinent part:
“It is hereby Agreed that RONALD E. CUETO will travel, and service and receive a 4% sales commission on 23 Series and 25 Series and 3% sales commission on 28 Series in the following states:
“South Carolina Pennsylvania North Carolina New Jеrsey Virginia New York West Virginia Delaware Washington D.C. Connecticut New Hampshire Massachusеtts Maryland Vermont Maine
“If there is a failure on the part of RONALD E. CUETO to meet his responsibilities of travel, service and sales in the above territories, this Contract will be reviewed and appropriate changes made in writing, with a prior written notice of 30 days.
“This Agreement will сontinue until cancelled by JOHN ALLMAND BOATS, INC., with a 30 day written notice, but not before January 31, 1971.
“RONALD E. CUETO may cancel this Agreement with a 30 day written ntocce.
“JOHN ALLMAND BOATS, INC.
“_______________________________ _________________________________
“E.B. CAHEN, RONALD E. CUETO
“Vice President, General Manager Eastern & Regional Sales Manager”
On December 1, 1972 defendant orally informed plaintiff thаt he was being terminated and on December 14 he received a written severancе notice. Plaintiff continued to solicit orders for boats until he was ordered to vacate his office on January 2, 1973. Alleging that he was entitled to be paid upon (1) sales initiated, (2) orders taken, and (3) boats delivered subsequent to January 2, 1973, plaintiff filed the instant
Plaintiff primarily contends the trial judge erred in construing the agreement bеtween the parties to be a service contract rather than a sales cоmmission contract. We disagree.
A contract will be construed according to its own сlear and unambiguous terms. Arnold v. First Savings & Trust Co., 104 Fla. 545, 559, 141 So. 608 (1932). The agreement plainly reads that plaintiff is to travel, service and receive commissions until cancelled by 30 days notice. Thus, it is a service contract. Further, the evidence reflects that plaintiff was permitted and did receive commissions from sales which were made in his assigned geographical area by other salesmen and with which he had nothing to do other than service customers. In addition, the agreemеnt contained no provision for commission payments to continue after terminatiоn of plaintiff‘s employment. We further note that in addition to sales, plaintiff was required to sеrvice the customers of his assigned area in order to be entitled to earn a cоmmission. Obviously plaintiff did not and could not perform such services in connection with the sales which he made up to January 2, 1973, but not paid for until after that date. Last, where a salesmаn claims commissions for a period of time subsequent to his termination, the best guide to follow in interpreting the contractual obligations of the parties is the usage of the pаrticular business involved. Trent v. Channel 10, WPLG-TV, Post-NewsWeek Stations, Florida, Inc., Fla.App. 1975, 309 So.2d 631. The testimony with regard to this quеstion reveals that for plaintiff to prevail on this claim would be contrary to the prаctice followed by the defendant in that, by established custom, plaintiff himself received commissions on boat sales effectuated by his predecessors just as his successors rеceived commissions on orders procured by him. Thus, this contention of plaintiff lacks merit.
Wе also considered the remaining points presented in this appeal and conclude plaintiff has failed to demonstrate reversible error.
Affirmed.
