580 N.E.2d 1170 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1990
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *251 Plaintiff Darlene Cudlin sought to recover damages for false arrest, malicious prosecution, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress from her former husband, Matthew Cudlin, Sr., his mother Judy Cudlin, and *252 his grandparents, Steve and Josephine Lawrence ("the family"). Cudlin asserted the same state law claims as well as a violation of her civil rights, pursuant to Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code, against the city of Westlake ("the city") and Detective Henry Cowles. The trial court granted motions by all defendants for summary judgment. In a timely appeal, the plaintiff alleges, in a single assigned error, that the adjudication of her claims in this fashion was erroneous. For the reasons which follow, we affirm summary judgment on the state law claims. We are compelled, however, to reverse the court's judgment on Cudlin's civil rights cause.
On June 14, 1985, in response to a citizen's complaint, Detective Cowles visited Deborah Leake at her residence. Leake informed the officer that, three months earlier, she observed Cudlin sexually abuse her three-and-one-half-month-old infant son. Leake explained that she did not report the incident until she heard that one of the infant's great-grandparents witnessed a similar occurrence. Judy Cudlin later gave the detective some photographs which purportedly supported Leake's allegations.
After his initial investigation, Cowles notified the Cuyahoga County Welfare Department ("welfare") as required by R.C.
In her sole assignment of error, Cudlin controverts the application of R.C.
Summary judgment may be rendered only when no genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated and when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Civ.R. 56(C); Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978),
Cudlin first argues that the immunity afforded those who report instances of alleged child abuse is not absolute. She maintains that only good faith reporters of child injury or neglect are entitled to statutory protection.
R.C.
"(B) Anyone, who has reason to believe that a child under eighteen years of age or a physically or mentally handicapped child under twenty-one years of age has suffered any wound, injury, disability, or other condition of a nature that reasonably indicates abuse or neglect of the child, may report or cause reports to be made of that knowledge or suspicion to the children services board, the county department of human services exercising the children services function, or to a municipal or county peace officer."
The immunity provision of R.C.
"(G) Anyone or any hospital, institution, school, health department, or agency participating in the making of reports under this section, or anyone participating in a judicial proceeding resulting from the reports, shall be immune from any civil or criminal liability that otherwise might be incurred or imposed as a result of such actions. * * *"
This court recently held that the statute grants absolute immunity to those who make reports of child abuse to child welfare authorities or to a municipal or county peace officer.Criswell v. Brentwood Hosp. (1989),
In resisting summary judgment, Cudlin claimed that the family alleged the same child abuse in reports to members of Congress and the media. She maintained further that the family made similar false statements to private businesses and organizations which were not entitled to the protection of R.C.
Cudlin next reiterates her constitutional challenge to the immunity provisions of the child abuse reporting statute. She claims that the statute violates *254
Section
Our analysis of the question of whether R.C.
The immunity provisions of the child abuse reporting statute are limited to those persons who report alleged abuse to specific government agencies. See R.C.
Accordingly, we hold that R.C.
We next review R.C.
The Due Process Clause of the
Section
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay."
A legislative enactment will withstand a challenge on due process grounds "* * * if it bears a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public and if it is not unreasonable or arbitrary."Benjamin v. Columbus (1957),
As we already noted, the legislature enacted R.C.
Furthermore, we find the legislative grant of immunity is not arbitrary or unreasonable. The due process or due course of law provisions of the Ohio Constitution require that all courts be open to every person who is injured. Mominee, supra. We do not believe that upholding R.C.
Our ruling today is not unique. Construing a similar immunity statute in light of a constitutional provision guaranteeing every person a right to a remedy for any injury, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld a similar immunity provision of its child abuse reporting statute as a constitutional means to *256
discover and end child abuse. Harris v. Montgomery (Ala. 1983),
We hold that R.C.
Finally, as to the city and Detective Cowles, the plaintiff correctly posits that summary judgment was improperly granted on her claim for a violation of her civil rights pursuant to Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code.
In their motion for summary judgment, Cowles and the city claimed absolute immunity pursuant to R.C.
Cowles and the city now claim that qualified immunity shielded them from civil liability for actions they took performing discretionary governmental functions. Our review of their summary judgment motion indicates that they did not raise the issue of qualified immunity when they sought judgment, nor did they submit evidentiary materials in support of such a claim.
The defendant bears the burden of raising the qualified immunity defense and must plead facts that, if true, would establish entitlement to that defense. Poe v. Haydon (C.A.6, 1988),
Accordingly, the plaintiff's sole assignment of error is well taken, in part.
The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment accordingly.
MATIA and PRYATEL, JJ., concur.
AUGUST PRYATEL, J., retired, of the Eighth Appellate District, sitting by assignment.