63 Fla. 119 | Fla. | 1912
— The Naval Stores Company recovered judgment upon a note given by the Lumber Company. The declaration is in the usual statutory form, alleging endorsement by the payee R. J. Knight to the plaintiff, for value before maturity. The note attached bears date at White Springs, Florida, and is payable at Valdosta, Georgia.
After general appearance the defendant demurrer upon two grounds, the first being that the declaration fails to show jurisdiction of the parties or cause of action, .and the second that it does not appear that the action accrued in Hamilton County, or that the defendant had an office there for the transaction of its customary business. The first ground may be almost ignored, the parties were before the court, voluntarily so far as we know, and the amount involved exceeded five thousand dollars.
The second ground is predicated upon Section 1386 of the General Statutes, which provides: “Suits against domestic corporations shall be commenced only in the county (or Justice’s district) where such corporation shall have or usually keep an office for the transaction of its customary business, or where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is; and in the case of companies incorporated in other States or counties, and doing business in this State, suits shall ■be commenced in a county or justice’s district wherein such company may have an agent or other representative, or where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is situated.”
At the trial before a referee, the plaintiff offered in evidence the note over the objection that there was a variance between the note offered and the copy attached to the declaration. The only plea interposed was that of payment to the payee and notice thereof before assignment to this plaintiff of the note. If the objection be open upon that issue, it is founded on too narrow a foundation, the only possible variance being that in the copy of the note, following the signature, the words “Treasurer, Assistant Treasurer” were omitted. . It is evident that these were mere printed forms to be used for convenience, according to the officer who happened to sign the note; the only possible material point being the authority of the one signing the corporate name.
There are several assignments based upon the refusal to allow certain questions propounded on cross examination to R. J. Knight, the payee, who testified for the 'plaintiff that he assigned the note before maturity and
The judgment rendered was the only one possible upon the evidence to be rendered, and it is affirmed.