J. Roy CRUTCHFIELD, d/b/a Crutchfield Fertilizer Company, Appellant, v. ASSOCIATES INVESTMENT COMPANY, Appellee.
No. 16296.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Dallas.
Jan. 3, 1964.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 21, 1964.
375 S.W.2d 957
BATEMAN, Justice.
We are of the opinion that the trial court properly sustained the plea in abatement.
“Parties having any matter of dispute among them arising under provisions of the school laws of Texas, or any person or parties aggrieved by the actions or decisions of any Board of Trustees or Board of Education, may appeal in writing to the Commissioner of Education who, after due notice to the parties interested, shall examine in a hearing and render a judgment without cost to the parties involved. However, nothing contained in this Section shall deprive any party of a legal remedy.”
“The legislature may properly make use of administrative agencies in exercising state control over property and pursuits—particularly in the fields of commerce and industry and in the professions—that affect the well-being of the public. The tendency of the courts has been to sustain acts creating and conferring authority upon such agencies as against objections on constitutional grounds, such as that they violate the guaranty of due process.”
It is settled law in this State that a school superintendent who has been discharged must first exhaust his right to appeal to the higher school authorities before resorting to the courts. Mission Independent School Dist. v. Diserens, 144 Tex. 107, 188 S.W.2d 568, 161 A.L.R. 877; Daniel v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., Tex. Civ. App., 351 S.W.2d 356; Murray v. San Augustine County Board of School Trustees, Tex. Civ. App., 307 S.W.2d 622; Hinojosa v. San Isidro Ind. School Dist., Tex. Civ. App., 273 S.W.2d 656; Bear v. Donna Ind. School Dist., Tex.Civ. App., 74 S.W.2d 179.
It is true that here James has not yet been discharged, but the court has even less jurisdiction, if possible, to enjoin his discharge. The court cannot presume that the Board of School Trustees will illegally and wrongfully discharge James. But even if it does, this Court would have no jurisdiction of the matter until James has exhausted his administrative remedies by an appeal to the higher school authorities. Bear v. Donna Independent School District, supra.
The judgment of the trial court sustaining the plea of abatement is affirmed.
Gassaway, Allen & Norman, Borger, John F. Tomlin, Pecos, Johnson & Dionne, Fort Stockton, for appellant.
Robert R. Cole, Dallas, Campbell, Brock, Wright & Waters, Lubbock, McGown, Godfrey, Logan & Decker, Fort Worth, for appellee.
Crenshaw, Dupree & Milan, Lubbock, Strasburger, Price, Kelton, Miller & Martin and Royal H. Brin, Jr., and Irion, Cain, Cocke & Magee, Dallas, Lynch & Chappell, Midland, Amici Curiae.
Appellee obtained a summary judgment for debt based upon written contract by which appellant contracted for the purchase of certain tanks and accessories from Superior Manufacturing Company, which assigned the contract to appellee the same day it was made.
Appellant‘s one “point of appeal” is: “The trial court erred in granting Appellee‘s motion for summary judgment, there being one or more genuine issues as to material facts raised by the pleadings and affidavits.” Appellee objects to our consideration of this point of error because it is too general to comply with the requirements of
His position seems to be that the contract sued upon was procured and induced by fraudulent representations that the tanks he contracted to purchase were manufactured and delivered to another, to whom appellant had agreed to lease the same, but
Appellant does not contend that he was prevented from knowing, or that he did not know, the contents of the contract he signed; and appellee says that he is estopped from defending on the ground of fraud, as against appellee, because of the following statements contained in that contract:
“(3) Said property is now in possession of the Mortgagor and shall not be removed from its present location without the written consent of Mortgagee; that said property is now and shall at all times be kept in good condition and repair; that said property shall not be used in violation of any State or Federal law; that said property may be inspected by the Mortgagee from time to time as it may demand.”
* * * * * *
“(8) The Mortgagee may assign this mortgage and in event of such assignment the Mortgagor shall perform all promises herein contained to such assignee as the owner hereof and the Mortgagor agrees that after such assignment, the Mortgagor will settle all claims against the Mortgagee directly with it and agrees not to set up any claim which the Mortgagor may have against the Mortgagee as a defense, set-off, cross-complaint, or otherwise to any action for the purchase price or possession of said property brought by the owner hereof.”
Regardless of whether appellant‘s answer or affidavit raised material fact issues in connection with his alleged defenses, it is our view that appellant was estopped by the above quoted contractual provisions to assert such defenses and that, as a matter of law, he is indebted to appellee for the debt sued for and that if he has any right of redress against anyone it is against Superior Manufacturing Company, with which he contracted. Therefore the summary judgment was correct and is affirmed.
Affirmed.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellant now argues, for the first time on his motion for rehearing, that
The public is not interested in, or in any wise affected by, the contract in question. If public policy is involved, it is that public policy which “permits the utmost freedom of contract between parties of full age and competent understanding and requires that their contracts, when freely and voluntarily entered into, shall be held sacred and enforced by the courts * * *” 10-A Tex.Jur. 204, CONTRACTS, § 103; St. Regis Candies v. Hovas, 117 Tex. 313, 3 S.W.2d 429; Reef v. Mills Novelty Co., 126 Tex. 380, 89 S.W.2d 210.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.