OPINION
FINDINGS OF FACT
Before the court are the defendant’s motions for partial judgment on the pleadings in the two above-captioned cases. The defendant brought its motions in both cases pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC). The defendant seeks to dismiss that part of each of the plaintiffs’ claims for compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000), for time spent commuting between home and work in government-owned vehicles (hereafter, the “driving time” claims). Plaintiffs in the two above-captioned cases are current and former Diversion Investigators employed by the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”). Plaintiffs in Crusan v. United States, Case No. 07-434C, include Matthew J. Crusan, Robert J. Donnelly, David M. Hargroder, and Sharon A. Lynn, all of whom have been employed by the DEA since at least 2004. Plaintiffs in Federico v. United States, Case No. 08-44C, include Kathy L. Federico and James W. Graumlieh, both of whom have been employed by the DEA since at least 2005. Crusan and Federico are two of a large number of similar cases brought in this court, on behalf of numerous plaintiffs, mostly filed by the same plaintiffs’ counsel. The cases have been assigned to various judges, as discussed below. The larger set of cases are filed against the DEA, as well as multiple other government agencies, by government employees seeking compensation under the FLSA for allegedly having been improperly classified as FLSA exempt by their employers and, therefore, denied compensation to which FLSA non-exempt employees can claim entitlement. Many of the cases, including the two above-captioned eases, include the “driving time” claims.
On June 27, 2007 and January 18, 2008, plaintiffs in Crusan and Federico, respectively, filed virtually identical complaints in this court alleging that since at least 2004 for the Crusan plaintiffs and at least 2005 for the Federico plaintiffs, the defendant “wrongfully and wilfully” violated the FLSA and various sections of Title 5 of the United States Code.
The plaintiffs state that they “seek to recover from the defendant back pay, liquidated damages, interest, attorneys fees and costs pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.” The parties have resolved and filed joint stipulations of dismissal on all of the other remaining claims in Crusan and Federico. By agreement of the parties, the only issue before the court at this time in both cases is whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for their “driving time” to and from work in government-owned vehicles.
DISCUSSION
With respect to the “driving time” issue, pursuant to RCFC 12(c), defendant moves for partial judgment on the pleadings. The court’s rule, RCFC 12(c), is identical to Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed.R.Civ.P.).
After the defendant filed its motions for partial judgment on the pleadings on the “driving time” issue, the plaintiffs responded and the defendant replied. Subsequent to this exchange, the plaintiffs filed a “Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority and Supplemental Authority,” offering for consideration the 1974 United States Supreme Court decision, Scheuer v. Rhodes,
When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test. Moreover, it is well established that, in passing on a motion to dismiss, whether on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or for failure to state a cause of action, the allegations of the complaint should be construed favorably to the pleader.
In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson,355 U.S. 41 , 45-46,78 S.Ct. 99 ,2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).
Scheuer v. Rhodes,
The court finds plaintiffs’ supplemental submission curious, and not particularly helpful. The “literal terms” of Conley were abrogated by the majority opinion of the United States Supreme Court in the 2007 case of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
[T]here is no need to pile up further citations to show that Conley’s “no set of facts” language has been questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough.... [A]fter puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its retirement. The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint. See Sanjuan [v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc.], 40 F.3d [247, 251 (7th Cir.1994), as amended on denial of reh’g (7th Cir.1995), cert. denied,516 U.S. 1159 ,116 S.Ct. 1044 ,134 L.Ed.2d 191 (1996), reh’g denied,518 U.S. 1034 ,116 S.Ct. 2582 ,135 L.Ed.2d 1096 (1996)] (“once a claim for relief has been stated, a plaintiff ‘receives the benefit of imagination, so long as the hypotheses are consistent with the complaint.’ ”). . . . Conley, then, described the breadth of opportunity*419 to prove what an adequate complaint claims, not the minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern a complaint’s survival.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
The defendant in Crusan and Federico not only correctly argues that Twombly discredits the plaintiffs citation to the Scheuer and Conley standard, but also asserts that even if Scheuer and Conley had not been discredited, plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief because “[plaintiffs’ complaint allege[d] no facts concerning plaintiffs’ home-to-work driving, much less facts that might distinguish their driving claims from the driving claims that were held not compensable, [by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit] in Adams v. United States,
The plaintiffs have the burden to establish that their “driving time” claim is compensa-ble under the FLSA and not subject to an exception in the statute, including the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub.L. No. 80-49, 61 Stat. 84 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (2000)), which amends the FLSA, or exceptions contained in provisions of the regulations interpreting the FLSA. See Adams v. United States,
The FLSA requires that employers compensate employees for all hours worked. See 29 U.S.C. § 207.
The FLSA was enacted to “give specific minimum protections to individual workers and to ensure that each employee covered by the Act would receive ‘[a] fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work’ and would be protected from ‘the evil of “overwork” as well as “underpay.” ’ ”
Kavanagh v. Grand Union Co., Inc.,
In 1947, Congress passed the original Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262, which amended the FLSA, and included a provision that employers are not required to compensate employees for time spent traveling to and from work. See 29 U.S.C. § 254(a). The Portal-to-Portal Act was enacted by Congress as a response to the Unit
Specifically, the Portal-to-Portal Act now states:
(a) Activities not compensable
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq.], the Walsh-Healey Act [41 U.S.C.A. § 35 et seq.], or the Bacon-Davis Act [40 U.S.C.A. § 276a et seq.], on account of the failure of such employer to pay an employee minimum wages, or to pay an employee overtime compensation, for or on account of any of the following activities of such employee engaged in on or after May 14, 1947—
(1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is employed to perform, and
(2) activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal activity or activities,
which occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which such employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at which he ceases, such principal activity or activities. For purposes of this subsection, the use of an employer’s vehicle for travel by an employee and activities performed by an employee which are incidental to the use of such vehicle for commuting shall not be considered part of the employee’s principal activities if the use of such vehicle for travel is within the normal commuting area for the employer’s business or establishment and the use of the employer’s vehicle is subject to an agreement on the part of the employer and the employee or representative of such employee.
29 U.S.C. § 254(a).
The defendant’s present motions for partial judgment on the pleadings are based on two precedential decisions decided initially by the United States Court of Federal Claims and affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Adams v. United States,
The United States Court of Federal Claims is required to follow the precedent of the United States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and the predecessor court to the
In Bobo, the plaintiffs were a group of Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), border patrol, agent, canine handlers, whose “principal duties include[d] attending to immigration-related calls requiring the aid of their dogs....’’ Bobo v. United States,
The INS agents in Bobo brought suit against the government seeking compensation for their commuting time pursuant to the FLSA. Id. The United States Court of Federal Claims granted summary judgment in favor of the government and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, based upon the fact that the required duties of the plaintiffs while driving in their government issued cars were de minimis (i.e., of “infrequent [and] trivial aggregate duration, and administratively impracticable to measure.”). Id. at 1468. The Federal Circuit in Bobo concluded that, “as a matter of law, they [the restrictions on the INS agents] do not give rise to a valid or even triable claim for compensation under the FLSA.” Id. at 1468. The Federal Circuit found:
Viewing the pleadings and submissions in the light most favorable to the INS Agents, we accept as true that the restrictions placed upon the INS Agents’ commutes are compulsory, for the benefit of the INS, and closely related to the INS Agents’ principal work activities. However, the burdens alleged are insufficient to pass the de minimis threshold.
Id.
In Bobo, the Federal Circuit also offered guidance regarding the de minimis test. First, the Bobo court quoted the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Reich v. New York City Transit Authority, as follows:
The more the preliminary (or postliminary) activity is undertaken for the employer’s benefit, the more indispensable it is to the primary goal of the employee’s work, and the less choice the employee has in the matter, the more likely such work will be found to be compensable.... The ability of*422 the employer to maintain records of such time expended is a factor. And, where the compensable preliminary work is truly minimal, it is the policy of the law to disregard it.
Bobo v. United States,
The Federal Circuit, in Bobo, also discussed the factors articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Lindow v. United States,
Subsequently, in Adams v. United States, the Federal Circuit relied on the reasoning in Bobo to review claims brought by law enforcement officers with the United States Secret Service, United States Customs and Border Protection (formerly United States Customs Service), the Internal Revenue Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the Drug Enforcement Agency. Adams v. United States,
Relying on the Portal-to-Portal Act, the Federal Circuit in Adams found that the plaintiffs’ commuting time was not compensable because the activities conducted for the benefit of the plaintiffs’ agency employers could not overcome the de minimis threshold articulated in Bobo. Id. at 1328. The court in Adams quoted the Portal-to-Portal Act and concluded:
The Portal-to-Portal Act speaks specifically to vehicular travel:
For purposes of this subsection, the use of an employer’s vehicle for travel by an employee and activities performed by an employee which are incidental to the use of such vehicle for commuting shall not be considered part of the employee’s principal activities if the use of such vehicle for travel is within the normal commuting area for the employer’s business or establishment and the use of the employer’s vehicle is subject to an agreement on the part of the employer and the employee or representative of such employee.
29 U.S.C. § 254(a). Therefore, merely commuting in a government-owned vehicle is insufficient; the plaintiffs must perform additional legally cognizable work while driving to their workplace in order to compel compensation for the time spent driving. The question in this appeal is whether the requirements and restrictions placed on plaintiffs’ commutes rise to that level.
Id. at 1325. The court also noted that:
the plaintiffs in this case had the burden of showing that their drive time was compen-*423 sable work for FLSA purposes and of showing that it does not fall into the set of activities excluded from the definition of compensable work by the Portal-to-Portal Act as interpreted by our [the Federal Circuit’s] precedent.
Id. at 1326.
The Federal Circuit, therefore, affirmed the Court of Federal Claims’ grant of judgment for the defendant in Adams, as a matter of law, because no distinctions advanced by the Adams plaintiffs were sufficient to persuade the court that there should be a different result from that previously reached in Bobo. Id. at 1328. As was the case in Bobo and Adams, the defendant’s motions for partial judgment on the pleadings in the cases currently before this court pertain only to time solely spent driving between home and work. As stated in Adams, “[t]his case does not require us to decide what FLSA mandates in the particular instances when plaintiffs are actually called on to respond to an emergency or otherwise deviate from their normal commutes. We address only plaintiffs’ basic argument: that their normal commutes, without more, constitute compen-sable work.” Adams v. United States,
In their responses to the defendant’s motions for partial judgment on the pleadings, the plaintiffs in Crusan and Federico advance a number of arguments to attempt to distinguish their cases. Plaintiffs try to suggest that stare decisis does not apply and therefore, that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Adams, adopting Bobo, is not dispositive of the issues presented in the current motions. Plaintiffs quote from Avenues in Leather v. United States, to assert that “the doctrine of stare decisis applies to only legal issues and not issues of fact.” Avenues in Leather v. United States,
The plaintiffs’ reference to Avenues in Leather v. United States,
Undeniably, this court is bound by the holdings of the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and cannot, as the plaintiffs wish, simply disregard the precedent found in Bobo and Adams when no material factual differences even have been alleged. See Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States,
Stare decisis plays an important role “in preserving the rule of law and in ensuring that its evolution is not subverted by arbitrariness.” Wilson v. United States,917 F.2d 529 , 537 (Fed.Cir.1990), [opinion modified on denial of reh’g (Fed.Cir.), reh’g denied (Fed.Cir.1990), cert. denied,501 U.S. 1217 ,111 S.Ct. 2825 ,115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991) ]. “Stare decisis in essence ‘makes each judgment a statement of the law, or precedent, binding in future cases before the same court or another court owing obedience to its decision.... It deals only with law, as the facts of each successive case must be determined by the*424 evidence adduced at trial.’ ” Mendenhall v. Cedarapids, Inc.,5 F.3d 1557 , 1570 (Fed.Cir.1993) (quoting 1B James Wm. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ G401 (2d ed.1993)), [reh’g denied, in banc suggestion declined (Fed.Cir.1993), cert. denied,511 U.S. 1031 ,114 S.Ct. 1540 ,128 L.Ed.2d 192 (1994) ]. A prior precedential decision on a point of law by a panel of this court is binding precedent and cannot be overruled or avoided unless or until the court sits en banc. Sacco v. Dep’t of Justice,317 F.3d 1384 , 1386 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citing Newell Co. v. Kenney Mfg. Co.,864 F.2d 757 , 765 (Fed.Cir.1988), [reh’g denied (Fed.Cir.), suggestion for reh’g en banc declined (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied,493 U.S. 814 ,110 S.Ct. 62 ,107 L.Ed.2d 30 (1989) ]).
Preminger v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs,
As part of their further attempt to oppose the defendant’s motions for partial judgment on the pleadings and to distinguish the facts in the cases before the court, the plaintiffs make a variety of additional arguments. The plaintiffs argue that because the plaintiffs in Adams were not Diversion Investigators, the claims of the current plaintiffs, who are, were not addressed by Adams. It is not clear in Adams, from either the Federal Circuit Opinion,
Plaintiffs also try to suggest that, as Diversion Investigators, their driving between home and work constituted “field work,” was undertaken for an official purpose, and, thus, should be compensable, citing 31 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000)
For purposes of any determination under chapter 81 of title 5 or chapter 171 of title 28, an individual shall not be considered to be in the “performance of duty” or “acting within the scope of his or her office or employment” by virtue of the fact that such individual is receiving transportation services under this subsection. Nor shall any time during which an individual uses such services be considered when calculating the hoims of work or employment for that individual for purposes of title 5 of the United States Code, including chapter 55 of that title.
31 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(4).
The plaintiffs in Adams, who were represented by the same counsel as are the plaintiffs currently before this court, similarly have attempted to distinguish their particular facts from the facts earlier presented in Bobo. In Adams, the Federal Circuit found that the plaintiffs were unable to articulate material facts to distinguish their “driving time” claims from those of the plaintiffs in Bobo. See Adams v. United States,
The plaintiffs also have asserted that the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Long Island Care at Home v. Coke,
Although the plaintiffs contend that the OPM regulations found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 551.401 and 551.422(a)(2) entitle them to compensation in spite of Adams and Bobo, these regulations do not appear to be in contradiction with Adams and Bobo, nor do they automatically entitle the plaintiffs to FLSA compensation for time solely spent driving between home and work in a government owned vehicle. The provisions at 5 C.F.R. § 551.401 establish “Basic Principles,” including that the time spent by an employee working for the benefit of, or under the control of, an agency is considered work. They do not address other regulations or court decisions which further develop that concept. Driving to and from work also can be distinguished from compensable overtime when an employee is “suffered or permitted” to continue work at the end of the shift, discussed and cited by the plaintiff in Doe v. United States,
In Coke, the United States Supreme Court was asked to determine which of two conflicting Department of Labor regulations applied to a domestic worker who provided companionship services to the elderly and infirm. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. at -,
The plaintiff in Coke brought suit for overtime wages under the FLSA and a New York State statute. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. at —,
In Easter v. United States, a factually similar case to the cases before this court, raising similar “driving time” claims, the court stated that:
Coke dealt specifically with whether or not a certain DOL regulation (not involving commuting time) was valid and enforceable. The court does not perceive how the disposition of Coke has any bearing upon the substantive law of whether or not driving a[n] employer’s vehicle between home and work constitutes compensable work under the FLSA and the Portal-to-Portal Act. Coke is simply not, as plaintiff suggests, a source of substantive change in the “law applicable to ‘time worked’ under [the] FLSA ... since Adams [II].”
Easter v. United States,
Plaintiffs also cite to National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services,
In yet another attempt to defeat the defendant’s motions to dismiss the “driving time” issue from the plaintiffs’ cases, the plaintiffs devote several pages of their opposition briefs to the Federal Circuit’s decision in Billings v. United States,
Another of the plaintiffs’ unpersuasive arguments can be found in an attempt to rely on Singh v. City of New York,
The Crusan and Federico plaintiffs assert, in their opposition briefs, that they can distinguish their situations from the facts presented in Singh. They allege that, “plaintiffs can and will demonstrate that their driving has been controlled and directed by defendant and has been engaged in exclusively for its benefit” and that “personal activities that might benefit the plaintiffs are prohibited.” To support their argument, plaintiffs in the Crusan and Federico cases assert that engaging in personal activities, such as those the Singh plaintiffs engaged in on their commutes, would subject the current plaintiffs to punishment “under federal law by suspension and discharge.” The plaintiffs assert that the Singh case “makes clear that the invocation of Adams by defendant is insufficient to support its motion for judgment on the pleadings, and that plaintiffs are entitled to litigate their driving claims herein unimpeded by the Federal Circuit’s Adams decision.” Once again, the plaintiffs’ argument is flawed. Not only does Singh not assist the plaintiffs’ general allegations, because no distinguishable facts have been alleged in the plaintiffs’ complaints, but the plaintiffs cannot rely on a case from another Circuit, which is not binding on this court, when there exists clear case law on point in the Federal Circuit, which is binding precedent on this court.
CONCLUSION
The only issue currently before this court on the defendant’s motions is the issue of time solely spent driving a government-owned vehicle to and from work, which also was the precise issue decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Adams and Bobo. Therefore, this court and the Crusan and Federico plaintiffs are obliged to follow the Federal Circuit decisions as binding, legal precedent. In the general allegations presented in the complaints currently before the court, the plaintiffs have not submitted facts even minimally
Defendant’s motions for judgment on the pleadings are granted. Plaintiffs’ “driving time” claims, therefore, are dismissed from the complaints of all the plaintiffs in the Crusan and Federico cases included in the above-captioned complaint. There has been unanimous agreement in all the decisions issued in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the United States Court of Federal Claims on the “driving time” issue. The plaintiffs are urged to accept the decision of the five appellate Judges and now seven trial court Judges. As counsel also in Adams, the plaintiffs’ current counsel should realize, perhaps reluctantly, that it is time to accept the uniform rulings of these courts. Just prior to publication of this opinion, the parties resolved all of the remaining claims and filed joint stipulations of dismissal of all claims but the “driving time” claims. The parties are to be commended for working together to resolve those outstanding issues. Accordingly, all claims contained in the plaintiffs’ complaints in both Crusan and Federico are, hereby, dismissed. The clerk’s office shall enter judgment consistent with this opinion, and dismiss in their entirety the Crusan and Federico cases.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
. At publication, the plaintiffs’ counsel appears to have filed over 250 FLSA cases in the United States Court of Federal Claims; some have been consolidated. Pursuant to RCFC 40.2(b), the plaintiffs’ counsel has filed notice indicating that at least 58 of the cases are indirectly related to Adams v. United States,
. RCFC 12(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) provide that: "After the pleadings are closed — but early enough not to delay trial — a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”
. For ease of reference, this court, as did the defendant, will cite to the case as Twombly.
. The Bobo trial court concluded that plaintiffs went "too far” when they claimed that "their constant state of vigilance while commuting converts their commutes into compensable work. In short, plaintiffs are contending that they are required to drive with their eyes and ears open.” Bobo v. United States,
. § 1344. Passenger carrier use
(a)(1) Funds available to a Federal agency, by appropriation or otherwise, may be expended by the Federal agency for the maintenance, operation, or repair of any passengér carrier only to the extent that such carrier is used to provide transportation for official purposes. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, transporting any individual other than the individuals listed in subsections (b) and (c) of this section between such individual’s residence and such individual’s place of employment is not transportation for an official purpose.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), transportation between the residence of an officer or employee and various locations that is—
(A) required for the performance of field work, in accordance with regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, or
(B) essential for the safe and efficient performance of intelligence, counterintelligence, protective services, or criminal law enforcement duties,
is transportation for an official purpose, when approved in writing by the head of the Federal agency.
31 U.S.C. § 1344.
. § 102-5.30 What definitions apply to this part?
Field work means official work requiring the employee’s presence at various locations other than his/her regular place of work. (Multiple stops (itinerant-type travel) within the accepted local commuting area, limited use beyond the local commuting area, or transportation to remote locations that are only accessible by Government-provided transportation are examples of field work.)
41 C.F.R. § 102-5.30.
. Hamilton and Stocum were decided by Judge Margaret M. Sweeney; Boyer, Wolfen, and Antonsen were decided by Judge Lynn J. Bush; Forbes was decided by Judge Charles F. Lettow; Morgan was decided by Judge George W. Miller; Redd was decided by Judge Christine O.C. Miller; Gamer and Easter were decided by Chief Judge Emily C. Hewitt. The court notes that in Adams and each of the repetitive cases in the United States Court of Federal Claims, listed above, as well as in the instant case, the plaintiffs were represented by the same counsel. Additionally, in the trial court, Adams was decided by Judge Lynn J. Bush and Bobo was decided by Judge Christine O.C. Miller.
. The driving time claims were disposed of as follows: in Gamer as an RCFC 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings; in Hamilton as an RCFC 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings; in Stocum as an RCFC 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings; in Boyer as an RCFC 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings; in Wolfen as an RCFC 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings; in Antonsen as an RCFC 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings; in Forbes as RCFC 56 cross-motions for summary judgment; in Morgan as an RCFC 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings; and in Redd as an RCFC 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, however, by Order dated October 21, 2008, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration to the limited extent of vacating the judgment insofar as it dismissed the entire case, rather than only the home-to-work driving claim. The court, however, reaffirmed its dismissal of the driving claim in Redd. Easter was decided as an RCFC 56 motion for summary judgment, because the plaintiffs offered evidence outside of the pleadings. The Adams and Bobo trial court Opinions were decided as RCFC 56 cross-motions for partial summary judgment.
. § 551.401 Basic principles.
(a) All time spent by an employee performing an activity for the benefit of an agency and under the control or direction of the agency is "hours of work.” Such time includes:
(1) Time during which an employee is required to be on duty;
(2) Time during which an employee is suffered or permitted to work; and
(3) Waiting time or idle time which is under the control of an agency and which is for the benefit of an agency.
5 C.F.R. § 551.401.
. § 551.422 Time Spent Traveling
(a) Time spent traveling shall be considered hours of work if:
(1) An employee is required to travel during regular working hours;
(2) An employee is required to drive a vehicle or perform other work while traveling; (3) An employee is required to travel as a passenger on a one-day assignment away from the official duty station; or
(4) An employee is required to travel as a passenger on an overnight assignment away from the official duty station during hours on nonworkdays that correspond to the employee’s regular working hours.
(b) An employee who travels from home before the regular workday begins and returns home at the end of the workday is engaged in normal "home to work” travel; such travel is not hours of work. When an employee travels directly from home to a temporary duty location outside the limits of his or her official duty station, the time the employee would have spent in normal home to work travel shall be deducted from hours of work as specified in paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) of this section.
5 C.F.R. § 551.422.
. The Second Circuit noted that the plaintiffs in Singh were permitted to engage in personal activities during their commute such as “reading, listening to music, eating, running errands, or whatever else the plaintiffs choose to do.” Singh v. City of New York,