40 N.E.2d 423 | Ohio | 1942
Lead Opinion
Both the Common Pleas Court and the Court of Appeals held that the order of the commission denying further compensation as shown by its order of December 5, 1934, was on a non-jurisdictional ground. Both courts held that the order did not entitle the plaintiff to a rehearing, and that the commission was not authorized to grant the same. The Common Pleas Court held that the commission could grant a rehearing only after denial of compensation on a jurisdictional ground; that an appeal to the court could be taken only after such denial following a legally granted rehearing; and that, since there had been no valid order of rehearing, there could be no right of appeal from the denial of compensation after such rehearing, and, consequently, no jurisdiction in the Common Pleas Court on appeal.
The Court of Appeals took the position that an appeal to the Common Pleas Court from an order of the Industrial Commission is made from the order entered upon rehearing and not from the order made in the original hearing before the commission, and that, since the order made in this case upon rehearing was one *386 denying the claim of the plaintiff upon a jurisdictional ground, it furnished a proper basis for an appeal to the Common Pleas Court.
The question then presented to this court is whether the position of the Common Pleas Court or that of the Court of Appeals, as above stated, is to be approved.
This court has heretofore held that the Common Pleas Court acquires no jurisdiction of the subject-matter on appeal from an order of the Industrial Commission unless there had been a rehearing allowed by the commission as required by Section 1465-90, General Code (111 Ohio Laws, 227). IndustrialCommission v. Ramsey,
Can the lack of authority on the part of the Industrial Commission to grant a rehearing be cured by an appeal from an order upon such rehearing on the theory that the last order vacates all previous orders valid or invalid? If so, it would, in effect, give the Common Pleas Court the authority to make a new order for the commission on a phase of the proceedings in which the commission alone and not the court has jurisdiction. The Common Pleas Court has no power or authority to make findings and orders on matters exclusively delegated by law to the commission, and, therefore, cannot do so indirectly on the theory that the appeal to the court cures the errors of the commission in ordering a rehearing.
Specifically, the commission found in its original order of December 5, 1934, that the claimant had been *387
fully compensated for his injury. Since the finding of the commission as to the extent of disability and the amount of the award is final (Section 1465-90, General Code; State, ex rel.Depalo, v. Industrial Commission,
It must be apparent, from a study of Section 1465-90, General Code, that the granting of the rehearing as provided by the statute vacates the original order only when such order denies the claim on jurisdictional grounds, and not when the claim is denied on a ground upon which the commission has complete and final jurisdiction such as that the claimant has been fully compensated for all disability he had suffered as a result of the injury sustained.
The Common Pleas Court was authorized to consider and review all previous orders of the commission. State, ex rel. Randolph, v. Industrial Commission,
Under this view, the judgment of the Court of Appeals *388 is reversed and that of the Common Pleas Court affirmed.
Judgment reversed.
WEYGANDT, C.J., TURNER and MATTHIAS, JJ., concur.
WILLIAMS, and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., dissent.
BETTMAN, J., not participating.
Dissenting Opinion
Dissents for the reason that in his opinion the Industrial Commission possessed the power to grant a rehearing, under Section 1465-90, General Code; that the order on the rehearing is controlling and since upon such rehearing the claim was denied on a jurisdictional ground, the claimant had a right of appeal.
WILLIAMS, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.
