84 Va. 927 | Va. | 1888
delivered the opinion of the court.
■ The plaintiff in error, W. F. Crump, was, on the 28th day of September, 1886, indicted for a criminal conspiracy, by a grand jury, empanelled in the hustings court of the city of Eichmond. The indictment was against the said Crump and others—his co-conspirators—and it contained two counts. A general demurrer was filed to the indictment and to each count thereof, which was sustained as to the second count; but was overruled as to the first count, which charges that “ there is, and for more than twelve months last past there has been, in the city of Eichmond, a certain trades’ union or association, called and known ■ as Eichmond Typographical Union, No 90; that there is in said city, and has been for more than twelve months last past, a mercantile firm or partnership composed of Gf. H. Baughman, E. A. Baughman and C. C. Baughman, who do business under the firm name and style of Baughman Brothers, as printers and stationers ; that there is in the said city, and has been for more than twelve months last past, another trades’ union or labor association, called the Khights of Labor; that the’said partnership of Baughman Brothers have a lawful right to follow and pursue their said business as printers and stationers, without being molested or interfered with by any one, so long as they peaceably pursue the same according to the laws of the land. That the trades’ union or association called Eichmond Typographical Union, No. 90, is composed of about 100 members, most of whom are to the grand jurors unknown. That the said trades’ union or labor association called the Knights of Labor is composed of several thousand members, most of whom are to the grand jurors unknown. That Joseph M.
The defendant, W. F. Crump, thereupon pleaded not guilty, and, electing to be tried separately, he was so tried; and the jury, on the 13th day of May, 1887, found him guilty, by their verdict, and fined him $5; which verdict the court, upon, motion of the defendant, refused to set aside and grant a new trial, but approved the said verdict and entered up the judgment here complained of.
Upon the trial, the defendant excepted to the rulings of the court giving the instruction asked for by the commonwealth, and refusing to give the instructions asked for by him; and he also excepted to the overruling by the court of his motion to set aside the verdict and grant to him a new trial.
The first error assigned, is the action of the court in overruling the demurrer to the first count of the indictment. It is objected that the indictment does not charge a conspiracy to do any unlawful act, and does not particularly state the means to be used by the conspirators to break up and destroy the business of Baughman Brothers, and show that the means to be used were unlawful. The objection cannot be sustained— it is wholly groundless and gratuitous ; as is plainly manifest by the first count in the indictment (which we have, purposely, set out in full), to which the defendant pleaded, and upon which the issue was made up and tried, and under which the defendant was found guilty. It charges, directly, that the defendant and others “ did unlawfully and maliciously, wickedly and corruptly, knowingly and intentionally, combine, conspire and confederate together, to injure, ruin, break up and destroy, Baughman Brothel’s in their business as printers and stationers;” and that they did this by unlawfully, wickedly, maliciously, knowingly, intentionally and corruptly making threats to a great number of persons mentioned, and others unknown to the grand jurors, all of whom had been, and were
This specially and exactly charges a criminal conspiracy unprovoked, wanton, and unlawful, both as to the end aimed at and the means used to accomplish it. It charges a combination of this defendant and his co-conspirators to ruin, break up, and destroy the business of Baughman Brothers, and it charges the means used, and the success of the unlawful endeavor operated upon the peaceful and honest industries of the customers and patrons of Baughman Brothers.
A conspiracy or combination to injure a person in his trade or occupation is indictable. In the case of Sex v. JEJecles, 1 Leach, 274, several persons were indicted for conspiring to-impoverish a tailor, and to prevent him, by indirect means, from carrying on his trade. They were convicted; and, upon a motion in arrest of judgment, it was objected (as in this case) that the indictment ought to have stated the acts that were committed to impoverish the tailor and prevent him from carrying on his trade, in order that the defendants might thereby have had notice of the particular charges they were called upon to answer. But Lord Mansfield, without hearing the prosecutionj said: “The conspiracy and object of it, are both stated in the indictment, but it is contended that the means by which the intended mischief was effected, ought also to have been particularly set forth, as in the case of Rex v. Sterling; but this is certainly not necessary, for the offence does not consist in doing the acts by which the mischief is effected, for they may be perfectly indifferent, but in conspiring with a view to effect the intended mischief, by any means.
In the ease of the State v. Donaldson, 32 N. J. L., 157, it was held to be an “indictable conspiracy for several employees to combine and notify their employer that unless he discharges certain enumerated persons, they will in a body quit his employment.” In his opinion in that case Chief-Justice Beasley said, “there are a number of cases in which neither the purpose intended to be accomplished, nor the means designed to be used, were criminal, which have been regarded to be criminal”—quoting State v. Norton, 3 Zab., 44; and citing Rex v. Lord Gray, 3 Hargrave’s State Trials, 519; Rex v. Sir Francis Deleval, 3 Burr., 1434. He says: “These are all cases, it will be noticed, in which the act, which formed the foundation of
The next error assigned, is, the action of the court in giving the instruction asked for by the Commonwealth, as follows : “If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant, Crump, entered into an agreement with one or more of the defendants whereby they undertook to coerce the firm of Baughman Brothers to discharge from their employment, against the will of the said firm, certain persons then in their employment, and to take into their employment certain other persons that the said Baughman Brothers did not wish to take into their employment, then they are instructed that said agreement was unlawful;. and if they believe further from the evi
The instructions which were asked for by the defendant and refused by the court, were properly refused, as they did uot correctly expound the law, and were unwarranted by the evidence. And, more than the defect of having no predication in the evidence, they utterly and adroitly ignore the facts proved of the evil intent of the defendant and his confederates to do a wanton, causeless injury and ruin, to compel and coerce Baughman Brothers to give up the control and conduct of their own long established, useful and independent business, to the absolute dictation and control of a combination of the defendant and others styling themselves “ Richmond Typo
Is “ boycotting,” as resorted to and practiced by the conspirators in this case, allowable under the laws of Virginia?
Bor a legal definition or explanation of the meaning and practical efiect of the cabalistic word, as well as for a pertinent exposition of the law applicable to the facts of this case, we refer to the admirable opinion of Judge Wellford of the circuit court of the city of Richmond, in the case of Baughman Brothers v. Askew, Va. Law J., April Ho. 196, and also to the decision of the supreme court of Connecticut in the case of State v. Glidden, 55 Conn., 76. In that case the court says: “We may gather some idea of its (boycotting) real meaning, however, by a reference to the circumstances in which the word originated. Those circumstances are thus narrated by Mr. Justice McCarthy, an Irish gentleman of learning and ability, who will be recognized as good authority: ‘ Captain Boycott was an Englishman, an agent of Lord Earne, and a farmer of Lough Mark, in the wild and beautiful district of Connemara. In his capacity as agent he had served notice upon Lord Earne’» tenants, and the tenantry suddenly retaliated, etc., etc. His life appeared to be in danger; he had to claim police pro
In the case of State v. Donaldson, 82 N. J., L., 151, Chief Justice Beasley, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: “ It appears to me that it is not to be denied that the alleged aim of this combination was unlawful; the effort was to dictate to this employer whom he should discharge from his employ. This was an unwarrantable interference with the conduct of his business, etc. If the manufacturer can be compelled in this way to discharge two or more hands, he can, by similar means, be coerced to retain such workmen as the conspirators may choose to designate. So his customers may be proscribed, and. his business, in other respects, controlled. I cannot regard such a course of conduct as lawful.”
Chief Justice Shaw, in the case of Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met., 111, said: “ The law is not to be hoodwinked by color-able pretences; it looks at truth and reality through whatever disguises it may assume. It is said that neither threats nor intimidations were used; but no man can fail to see that there may be threats, and there may be intimidations, and there may be molesting, and there may be obstructing (which the jury are quite satisfied have taken place, from all the evidence
Upon the trial of boycotters in Yew York, Judge Barrett said : “ The men who walk up and down in front of a man’s shop may be guilty of intimidation, though they never raise a finger or utter a word. Their attitude may, nevertheless, be that of menace. They may intimidate by their numbers, their pleadings, their methods, their circulars, and their devices.”
It matters little what are the means adopted by combinations formed to intimidate employers, or to coerce other journeymen, if the design or the effect of them is to interfere with the rights, or to control the free action of o'thers. Yo one has a right to be hedged in and protected from competition in business ; but he has a right to be free from wanton, malicious and insolent interference, disturbance or annoyance. Every man has the right to work for whom he pleases, and for any price he can obtain; and he has the right to deal with and associate with whom he chooses; or, to let severely alone, arbitrarily and contemptuously, if he will, anybody and everybody upon earth. But this freedom of uncontrolled and unchallenged self-will does not give or imply a right, either by himself or in combination with others, to disturb, injure or obstruct another, either directly or indirectly, in his lawful business or occupation, or in his peace and security of life. Every attempt by force, threat or intimidation, to deter or control an employer in the determination of whom he will employ, or what wages he will pay, is an act of wrong and oppression; and any and every combination for such a purpose is an unlawful conspiracy. The law will protect the victim and punish the movers of any such combination. In law, the offence is the combination for the
A wanton, unprovoked interference by a combination of many with the business of another for the purpose of constraining that other to' discharge faithful and long-tried servants, or to employ whom he does not wish or will to employ, (an interference intended to produce and likely to produce annoyance and loss to that business) will be restrained and punished by the criminal law, as oppressive to the individual, injurious to the prosperity of the community, and subversive of the peace and good order of society.
The recent case of State v. Glidden, already referred to, decided by the supreme court of Connecticut, is both in principle and features identical with the case under review. The Carrington Publishing company had in their employ a number of printers known as “ non-union men," or “ rats." The Typographical Union, the Knights of Labor, the Trades’ Council, the Cigar-makers’ Union, and other affiliated secret organizations, waited upon the company and demanded that their office be made a “union office" within twenty-four hours. Upon the refusal of the company to make their office a “union office,” a boycott was instituted against them, which, though not openly published, as in this case, was fully proved. The court in its opinion said: “ If the defendants have the right which they claim, then all business enterprises are alike subject to their dictation. Ko one is safe in engaging in business, for no one knows whether his business affairs are to be directed by intelligence or ignorance—whether law and justice will protect the business, or brute force, regardless of law, will control it, for
The defendant lays great stress upon the case of State v. Hunt, 4 Met., 111, as authority to sustain the legality of boycotting; but there is an obvious distinction between that case, and that of this defendant. That was a club or combination of journeymen boot-makers simply to better their own condi
The evidence in this case shows, that, while Baughman Brothers were engaged in their lawful business, as stationers and printers, the plaintiff in error and the other members of the Biehmond Typographical Union, Bo. 90, conspired to compel Baughman Brothers to make their office a “ union office,” and to compel them not to employ any printer who did not belong to the said union; that upon the refusal of Baughman Brothers to make their office (or business) a “ union office,” the plaintiff in error and others composing the said Biehmond Typographical Union, Bo. 90, conspired and determined to boycott the said firm of Baughman Brothers, as they had threatened to do, and sent circulars to a great many of the customers of the said firm informing them, that they had, “with the aid of the Knights of Labor, and all the trades’ organizations in this city (Biehmond), boycotted the establishment of Messrs. Baughman Brothers”; aud, formally, notifying the said customers, that the names of all persons who should persist in trading, patronizing, or dealing with Baughman Brothers, after being notified of the boycott, would be published weekly in the “Labor Herald” as a “ black list,” who, in their turn,
The length of this opinion will preclude the mention of even a tithe of these incendiary publications, week after week for months; but not only Baughman Brothers and their employees and their customers, but the hotels, boarding-houses, public schools, railroads and steamboats conducting the business travel and transportation of the city, were listed and published under the obloquy and denunciation of the “ black list.” One or two specimens will suffice: “Boycott Baughman Brothers and all .who patronize them.” “Watch out for Baughman Brothers ‘rats’ and find out where they board. It is dangerous for honest men to board in the same house with these creatures. They are so mean that the air becomes contaminated in which they breathe.” “ Boycott Baughman Brothers every day in the week.” “ Boycott Baughman Brothers because they are enemies of honest labor.” “ Boycott Baughman Brothers’ customers wherever you find them.” “ The Lynchburg boys will begin to play their hand on Messrs. Baughman’s boycotted goods in a short time. The battle will not be fought in Bichmond only, but in all Virginia and North Carolina will be raised the cry, ‘ Away with the goods of this tyrannical firm.’ ” “ Let our friends remember it is the patronage of the Chesapeake and Ohio; Bichmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac; Bichmond and Danville, and Bichmond and Alleghany railroads that is keeping Baughman Brothers up.” “We'are sorry to see the Exchange Hotel on the black list.
It was proved, that the conspirators declared their set purpose and persistent effort to “ crush” Baughman Brothers; that the minions of the boycott committee dogged the firm in all their transactions; followed their delivery wagon; secured the names of their patrons; and used every means, short of actual physical force, to compel them to cease dealing with Baughman Brothers—thereby causing them to lose from one hundred and fifty to two hundred customers and ten thousand dollars of net profit. The acts alleged and proved in this case are unlawful, and incompatible with the prosperity, peace, and civilization of the country; and, if they can be perpetrated, with impunity, by combinations of irresponsible cabals or cliques, there will be the end of government, and of society itself. Freedom— individual and associated—is the boon and the boasted policy and peculium of our country; but it is liberty regulated by law; and the motto of the law is: “Sic utere tuo, ut alienum non leadas.”
The plaintiff in error was properly convicted; and the judgment of the hustings court complained of is affirmed.
Judgment aeeirmed.