64 Wis. 253 | Wis. | 1885
The question to be determined on this appeal’ is fairly stated in the brief of counsel to be whether the court has power to allow alimony to the wife and provide for the support of a child, subsequent to the judgment of divorce, where no provision was made in either case in such judgment. The appellant obtained a judgment of divorce from the bond of matrimony, on the ground of desertion, in June, 1879. The respondent was sérved with process, entered an appearance in the action, and answered. Judgment was .finally taken against her, .by default, either through some misunderstanding between her and her counsel as to when the cause would be tried, or on account of her not having means to make a defense. She states in her petition that she was not aware a divorce had been granted until the month of October, 1881, when she engaged counsel to take steps to secure for her proper alimony. But her application to the court for that purpose was not actually made until November, 1884. The important question, therefore, in the case is whether, under the circumstances, the court had power to modify its judgment and make an allowance for her support. The question is a new one in this court, and but little aid can be derived from the decisions in other states, owing to the great dissimilarity in their statutes regulating the subject of divorce and giving alimony. The question must depend for its solution upon the construction of our own statute and the decisions which have been made under it. If the judgment of divorce had allotted alimony to the -wife, or provided for the support of the child, it is clear the judgment in that regard might be subsequently modified or changed. This is the express .language of the statute (sec. 2369, E. S.), and such is the doctrine of our adjudications where the question has arisen.
The tendency of the decisions to which we have referred clearly is that the court has the statutory power to award ahmony though the judgment for divorce, long since rendered, does not mention it. For it is conceded, if only one dollar alimony had been given in the first instance the court would have the power “ to revise and alter such judgment respecting the amount,” and make such judgment in regard thereto as it might have made in the original action.
It appears from the respondent’s petition that she had a female child prior to her marriage with the appellant. This child, she states, was begotten by the appellant; that he recognized its paternity, and treated it in all respects as his own child after the marriage. All this is denied by the appellant. The learned circuit court ordered that the cause be placed on the calendar for a hearing as to the amount of alimony to be allowed the respondent; and for the purpose of taking proofs as to whether the appellant is the father of the child, admitted its paternity, and recognized and treated it as his own, after marriage, in order to determine the proper allowance for the support of the child in case it should be found that the appellant was its father and had recognized its paternity. This last branch of the order we deem erroneous. "We think it was improper, on this application for alimony, to go into an inquiry as to the paternity of the child. The statute makes ample provision for ascertaining the paternity of a bastard, and the parties should be left to that remedy. No provision should be made on this application for the support of the child.
The last branch of the order is therefore reversed; the rest of the order is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
By the Oourt. — It is so ordered.