Crudele v. CookCrudele v. Cook
The appellant, plaintiff in the trial court, seeks review of a final summary decree dismissing his complaint for injunctive relief.
The aрpellant, prior to 1962, operated what was known as the “Red Road Dump“. In August, 1961 [pursuant to the then applicable provisions of the Metropolitan Code] upon agreeing to certain conditions promulgated by the Zoning Directоr and upon the posting of a bond to secure the performance of said conditions, he was issued a permit tо operate, which permit was for an annual period and contained the following provision:
“12. That the permit shall be effective for a period of (1) year from the date of its issuance, and shall be subject to automatic renewal if all conditions of the permit and this agreement have been complied with in every respect during the year‘s operation prior to renewal date.”
Subsequently, in May, 1962, Metropolitan Dade County repealed the originаl ordinance upon which the appellant operated and enacted a new ordinance [§ 33.13(e)],1 the effect of which was to require that a public hearing should be held prior to the issuance of any use and occupanсy permit to operate a business such as the appellant‘s. Notwithstanding the provisions of the ordinance enacted in May, 1962, upon application for renewal of the certificate or permit in August, 1962, the appellant was issued a use and occupancy permit to continue the operation of his business by administrative officials of thе County under the repealed ordinance.
In November, 1962, the respondent Cook revoked the appellant‘s permit because of alleged violations of the conditions of the original permit issued in 1961 and renewed in 1962. Immediately thereafter, without appealing the ruling of the respondent to the Board of County Commissioners, the appellant filеd his action seeking to enjoin the activities of the respondent in revoking his permit and interfering with the operation оf the “Red Road Dump“.
The cause came at issue and both sides moved for a summary decree. The chancellor entered the decree here under review and dismissed the appellant‘s action. It is apparent that the аction of the chancellor was correct upon several theories. And, if his action can be sustained under any theory, even if not stated in his order, such action will not be interfered with by an appellate court. See: Abshier v. Etter, Fla.App. 1958, 102 So.2d 853; Berkman v. Miami National Bank, Fla.App. 1962, 143 So.2d 535; 2 Fla.Jur., Appeals, § 297.
The respondent is an administrative official of Metropolitan Dade County, and before actions of administrative officials may be tested by judiciаl proceedings they must first be brought to the attention of the Board of County Commissioners. See: Code of Metropolitan Dade County, § 33.316.2 Therefore, whether or not the permit, as issued in 1961, was validly issued is not material to the fact that the appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review. See: Wyszynski v. City of Philadelphia, 370 Pa. 632, 89 A.2d 355. It is not a denial of due process of law for an administrative official, in the exercise of the “police power“, to summarily revoke a business permit as long as there is a right of review within the administrative framework subsequent to the order of revocation. See: Thornhill v. Kirkman, Fla. 1953, 62 So.2d 740; Larson v. Warren, Fla. 1961, 132 So.2d 177. The activities of the respondent, as a director of the Metropolitan Dade County Building & Zoning Department, in regulating the operation of a “dump” is an exercise of “police power“. See: City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So.2d 364; 23 Fla.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 131; 35 Fla.Jur., Zoning Laws, § 8.
Examining the record in light of the principles above enunciated, it does not appear thаt the chancellor erred in the entry of the final summary decree here under review. Therefore, same is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.