59 Mo. App. 493 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1894
The plaintiff, by its authorized agent, entered into a contract with the defendant which is evidenced by the following bought and sold note:
“January 7, 1891.
“We herewith agree to furnish you with 50 grain white wine vinegar, free from assit, and guaranteed strictly pure, at 10 cents per gallon true (sic) the year 1891, not less than 25 barrels to be taken.
“Sold by F. C. Fender and bought by H. Wehrs.”
The plaintiff was ready and willing to deliver the twenty-five barrels of vinegar at any time within the
It is evident that the trial court was of the opinion, that upon breach of an executory contract of sale, the vendor’s measure of damages is limited to the difference between the contract price and the market value of the goods at the time when the vendee was bound to receive them. As there was no evidence of such difference in this case, the court was of opinion that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover at all. We need not discuss the question which was mooted upon the argument here, whether in that view of the law, and under the statement and evidence, the plaintiff would not have been entitled to recover nominal damages at least, because we are of opinion that the view of the law entertained by the court was not correct, and hence the plaintiff is entitled to relief on more substantial grounds.
In Dobbins v. Edmonds, 18 Mo. App. 307, Judge Phillips, delivering the opinion of the Kansas City
It will appear on reflection that this rule is a just one, both to the vendor and vendee. The aim of the law is compensation and a practical way to secure it. To establish-the market value of the goods by a resale puts the vendor to additional inconvenience, for which the law gives him no compensation, and very often results in a serious loss to the vendee, particularly in eases where there is no ready market at the place of delivery. What possible harm can there be in holding parties to the performance of their contracts deliberately entered into. It is done daily in contracts touching the sale of real estate, and there can be no difference in principle, whether the property be real or personal. Where the vendor, as in the present case, is at the same time the manufacturer of the goods, he probably has manufactured the goods in reliance upon sales for future delivery already made, and suffers unavoidable loss, for which the law furnishes him no compensation, unless he can enforce the sale in the manner above stated.
In Black River Lumber Company v. Warner, 93 Mo. 374, Judge Black, after stating the rule adopted in many states, namely, “that the vendor, having tendered the goods and done all the contract requires him to do, may treat them as the property of the vendee, hold them for him, and subject to his order, and recover the contract price,” adds: “This rule, in its broad sense, has not met the approval of some courts, nor are we prepared to say it should be applied in cases of sales of ordinary goods, wares and merchandise.” But he also adds: “This case does not call for the expression of an opinion upon that question;” thus conceding that, while the court does not pass on
There is, therefore, nothing in any of the decisions of the supreme court opposed to the rule as stated by us in Stumpf v. Mueller, and by the Kansas City court of appeals in Dobbins v. Edmonds, supra, and as that rule has been followed by us since, and is, in our opinion, a just rule, we are not prepared to recede from it, unless by following it we are brought in direct conflict with the supreme court.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.