Case Information
*0 FILED IN 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 1/16/2025 2:25:45 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk *1 ACCEPTED 15-24-00051-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 1/16/2025 2:25 PM No. 15-24-00051-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK __________________________________________________________________
I N THE C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE F IFTEENTH J UDICIAL D ISTRICT A USTIN , T EXAS
__________________________________________________________________
C ROWLEY I NDEPENDENT S CHOOL D ISTRICT , A PPELLANT , V .
C ARL S TONEHAM AND M IKE M ORATH , IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS C OMMISSIONER OF E DUCATION OF T EXAS , A PPELLEES . __________________________________________________________________
O N APPEAL FROM THE TH D ISTRICT C OURT OF T ARRANT C OUNTY N O . 048-336026-22, H ON . C HRIS T AYLOR , J UDGE P RESIDING __________________________________________________________________
C ARL S TONEHAM ’ S R ESPONSE TO A PPELLANT ’ S M OTION FOR R EHEARING __________________________________________________________________
I. I NTRODUCTION
Jurisdictional issues may be raised for the first time on appeal—even at the Motion for Rehearing stage. E.g. , Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. LLC v. Chaparral
Energy LLC , 546 S.W.3d 133, 138 (Tex. 2018). But here, the District’s
jurisdictional argument fails. It is telling that the basis of this jurisdictional argument
( i.e. , Mr. Stoneham’s declaratory judgment claim) arose from the District’s creative
attempt to recover after its loss at the Commissioner of Education. And in its Motion
for Rehearing, Crowley ISD again resorts to clever means to mitigate the impact of
this Court’s opinion. [1] But Crowley ISD initiated these legal proceedings, has been
ably-represented by experienced legal counsel, and has never argued that the courts
lack jurisdiction over any part of this matter. In fact, this Court has jurisdiction, and
the Motion for Rehearing should be denied.
II. B RIEF B ACKGROUND
Mr. Stoneham’s request for a declaration sought only to resolve the District’s pre-emptive and sly attempt to cut off its obligation to provide Mr. Stoneham back
pay when he prevailed at the Commissioner. [2] That is, the attempted resignation was
sent to, and rejected by , the District on April 13, 2022, the day before the Board met
to consider (and act upon) Mr. Stoneham’s termination. CR 1767-68, 1771, 1775-
76, 1778-81. Pursuant to Texas Education Code § 21.301, Mr. Stoneham appealed
*3 his termination to the Commissioner of Education. The Commissioner reversed the
board’s termination of his contract, entitling Mr. Stoneham to reinstatement with
back pay, by order dated June 15, 2022. CR 1703-20. Only after the unlawful
termination was reversed by the Commissioner, did the District hatch a plan to
abbreviate Mr. Stoneham’s back pay. And by letter dated August 17, 2022, CISD’s
Superintendent purported to “accept” the attempted resignation it had previously
(and unequivocally) rejected. CR 1805. The District filed suit in the trial court
August 30, 2022, availing itself of the courts for judicial review of the
Commissioner’s decision. CR 6. In that suit, Mr. Stoneham sought and received a
declaration from the Trial Court that the resignation was null and void based on the
District’s rejection.
The District, not Mr. Stoneham, initiated court proceedings for judicial review. The issue of the resignation was quite apparently also in dispute. The two
issues were (and are) within the jurisdiction of the court, arising from the same
transaction or occurrence (Mr. Stoneham’s termination), involving the same two
parties, and largely based legal review of undisputed facts.
*4 III. S CHOOL D ISTRICT I NITIATES L EGAL P ROCEEDINGS
The Supreme Court of Texas has recognized that, “a governmental entity’s immunity from suit does not extend to a situation where the entity has filed suit.”
Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas , 197 S.W.3d 371, 375 (Tex. 2006). “By filing
suit in court, a government makes clear that it has chosen to pursue justice (and
presumably not just for itself) through litigation, at least in that particular case.” Id.
at 382 (Brister, J., concurring). Where the governmental entity files suit in the first
place, the Court has characterized it as “fundamentally unfair,” to allow the entity to
thereafter claim immunity as to the defending party’s claims against it. See id. at
375-76; see also C. Borunda Holdings, Inc. v. Lake Proctor Irrigation Auth. , 540
S.W.3d 548, 550 (Tex. 2018) (“As an initial matter, we are not concerned here with
whether governmental immunity bars Borunda’s counterclaims. Under Reata , it
clearly does not because those counterclaims were germane to, connected to, and
properly defensive to Lake Proctor’s affirmative claim for breach of contract, and
*5 sought only to offset any damages Lake Proctor might recover.”); Hughes v. Tom
Green Cty. , 573 S.W.3d 212, 219 (Tex. 2019) (holding that “governmental entities
that elect to pursue affirmative claims ‘are bound to participate in the litigation
process as an ordinary litigant.’”).
In its Motion for Rehearing, the District cites to the well-established general rule that a party may not use the declaratory judgment statute to enlarge the trial
court’s jurisdiction. But the cases cited by the District all involve suits against the
government initiated by private parties . The key difference in this case, under
Reata , is that the governmental entity has initiated the suit. And applying the
principles set forth in Reata , the District plainly lacks immunity for Mr. Stoneham’s
declaratory judgment claim.
Principles of immunity “assume[,] that the government is an unwilling litigant, haled into court by a private plaintiff.” Hughes , 573 S.W.3d at 218. The
Texas Supreme Court recognizes that these principles “do not apply equally when
the government invokes the jurisdiction of the courts to assert its own claims.” Id. ;
see also id. at 217 (characterizing the holding in Reata , not as a waiver of immunity,
*6 but “a limitation on the ‘contours of immunity’ itself”). The entity does not enjoy
immunity to opposing claims which are germane and connected to the entity’s
claims—so long as the claims are an offset to the governmental entity’s claims.
The Texas Supreme Court has further described principles of immunity, starting with the general reason for immunity—to prevent “government paralysis,”
which may be caused by endless litigation, letting the Legislature determine when
to abrogate immunity for a specific purpose. Hughes , 573 S.W.3d at 218. Further,
immunity restrains courts from acting on matters left to other branches. Id. But
these policy justifications for immunity do not apply equally when the government
invokes court jurisdiction for its own purpose. Id. Although waivers of immunity
are a matter of legislative action, a determination of whether immunity exists is the
province of the courts. Id. at 218-19.
Here, the Crowley ISD first invoked the trial court’s jurisdiction, filing an original petition seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision. C.R. 6-12. Plainly,
it is the school district, not Mr. Stoneham, who first availed itself to the courts. Once
it did so, it was “bound to participate in the litigation process as an ordinary litigant.”
*7 Hughes , 573 S.W.3d at 219 (citing City of Dallas v. Albert , 354 S.W.3d 368, 377
(Tex. 2011)); see also Harris Cty. v. Park at Westcreek, LP , 606 S.W.3d 267, 275
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (applying Reata in a suit involving a
declaratory claim, and counterclaims of the governmental entity requesting
declaration—“we do not read Reata as holding that its reasoning can only apply to
suits for money damages”).
It was the District’s action during the pendency of this case ( i.e. , its scheme to resurrect the resignation) which gave rise to Mr. Stoneham’s request for
declaration. The requested declaration was part and parcel of the District’s appeal
to District court, and it conserves judicial resources for the courts to adjudicate the
District’s preemptive ploy to avoid paying Mr. Stoneham back pay along with the
review of the Commissioner decision initiated by the District. Without question,
Crowley ISD was a voluntary litigant and became bound by the litigation process in
initiating that litigation—at least as to claims which are germane, connected, and
properly defensive and offsetting to its own claim—as the declaration was here.
IV. E XHAUSTION OF A DMINISTRATIVE R EMEDIES N OT R EQUIRED
As to Mr. Stoneham’s request for declaration, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required for at least two reasons. First, the declaration requested
The District has not asserted a failure to exhaust administrative remedies in its Motion for Rehearing. However, given that immunity and exhaustion often go
hand-in-hand, Mr. Stoneham adds this argument and authorities for the Court.
involved a pure question of law. Second, even to the extent that the declaration
involved something other than a pure question of law, administrative remedies are
not available to Mr. Stoneham in this situation.
It is well settled that exhaustion is not required when the case is “controlled by pure questions of law.” Clint Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Marquez , 487 S.W.3d 538, 545–
46 (Tex. 2016). There is no dispute as to the facts underlying the request for
declaration in this case. The District has not disputed any of the evidence, and the
request for declaration presents a straightforward question of contract common law
that can be determined based on that undisputed evidence.
Even if the request for declaration involved something other than a pure question of law, “[f]or administrative remedies to be available, [the party] must be
aggrieved by either (1) the school laws themselves or (2) a school board’s violation
of the school laws.” McIntyre v. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. , 499 S.W.3d 820, 826
(Tex. 2016). See also Tex. Educ. Code § 7.057(a). Here, as in McIntyre , Mr.
Stoneham meets neither condition. Mr. Stoneham’s request for declaration does not
present an aggrievement of the school laws themselves. In fact, the issue of teacher
resignations involves an application of common-law contract-law principles. See
Cantu v. Cent. Educ. Agency , 844 S.W.2d 565, 566 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no
pet.). See also Appellee Comm’r of Educ. Br. at 39 (arguing that common-law
contract principles apply to Mr. Stoneham’s resignation, which are unfettered by the
Texas Education Code section cited by CISD in its briefing). It is not enough that a
claim might simply “relate to” school laws, the school law must actually “aggrieve”
a party to implicate a requirement to exhaust. See McIntyre , 499 S.W.3d at 826.
The school laws of the state do not aggrieve Mr. Stoneham in his claim for
declaratory relief. And naturally, Mr. Stoneham is not complaining of the school
board’s violation of the school laws in his request for declaration. The request arises
from the District’s superintendent’s attempt to “accept” the resignation, which
violated common-law contract principles. For these reasons, Mr. Stoneham is not
bound to exhaust administrative remedies on his declaratory judgment request.
V. J URISDICTION OVER C OMMISSIONER A PPEALS
The District does not dispute this Court’s jurisdiction over the substance of its own appeal of the Commissioner decision. The Texas Education Code makes clear
that the courts have jurisdiction over appeals of a Commissioner of Education
decision. Tex. Educ. Code § 21.307. The District only raises the jurisdictional issue
related to Mr. Stoneham’s request for a declaration. See C.R. 17. Thus, any ruling
on the issue of immunity raised in the Motion for Rehearing should be limited to the
request for declaration.
*10 CONCLUSION AND PRAYER For the foregoing reasons, Appellee Carl Stoneham asks the Court to overrule Appellant Crowley Independent School District’s Motion for Rehearing, and
maintain its prior orders and opinion issued in all respects.
Respectfully submitted, THE ORTIZ LAW FIRM 1304 West Abram Street, Suite 100 Arlington, Texas 76013 817-861-7984 Telephone 817-861-8909 Facsimile By: ___ /s/ Giana Ortiz ______ GIANA ORTIZ State Bar No. 24053824 gortiz@ortizlawtx.com DANIEL A. ORTIZ State Bar No. 15323100 dortiz@ortizlawtx.com ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE CARL STONEHAM *11 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that this Brief was produced on a computer using Microsoft Word 365 and
contains 2,247 words, as determined by using the computer software’s word-count
function and excluding the sections of the document listed in Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1).
Signed this 16 th day of January, 2025.
____/s/ Giana Ortiz_________ Giana Ortiz
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE In accordance with Tex. R. App. P. 9.5, the undersigned certifies that a copy of this Brief was served on the following counsel of record on January 16, 2025,
through the electronic filing manager to the email address on file with the electronic
filing manager for counsel for Appellant Crowley Independent School District,
David Campbell; and counsel for Appellee Commissioner of Education, Martin
Cohick.
__/s/ Giana Ortiz________ Giana Ortiz
Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Daniel Ortiz on behalf of Daniel Ortiz
Bar No. 15323100
dortiz@ortizlawtx.com
Envelope ID: 96313832
Filing Code Description: Response
Filing Description: Stoneham's Response to CISD's Motion for Rehearing
(1-16-25)
Status as of 1/16/2025 2:57 PM CST
Associated Case Party: Crowley Independent School District
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
David Campbell dcampbell@808west.com 1/16/2025 2:25:45 PM SENT
Kathryn French kfrench@808west.com 1/16/2025 2:25:45 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: Mike Morath
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Meridith Fischer Meridith.Fischer@oag.texas.gov 1/16/2025 2:25:45 PM SENT
Elizabeth Chipelo elizabeth.chipelo@oag.texas.gov 1/16/2025 2:25:45 PM SENT
James Z.Brazell james.brazell@oag.texas.gov 1/16/2025 2:25:45 PM SENT
Martin Cohick Martin.cohick@oag.texas.gov 1/16/2025 2:25:45 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: Carl Stoneham
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Daniel Ortiz dortiz@ortizlawtx.com 1/16/2025 2:25:45 PM SENT
Giana Ortiz gortiz@ortizlawtx.com 1/16/2025 2:25:45 PM SENT
[1] The Court has requested a response to the Motion for Rehearing, limited to the issue of immunity raised in Appellant’s Motion. This Response is so limited. In the meantime, Appellee Stoneham is in receipt of Appellee Commissioner of Education’s Motion to extend his time to file a response. The Commissioner’s Motion suggests that he may respond in support of immunity. To the extent that the Court considers any other aspect of the Motion for Rehearing, and/or to the extent that the Commissioner files briefing on any legal issue not already addressed in this Response, Appellee respectfully requests an additional opportunity to submit briefing.
[2] There is no other feasible explanation for the District’s attempt to accept the resignation one hundred and twenty-six days after Mr. Stoneham’s “offer” to resign. See generally Appellee Comm’r of Educ. Br. at 38-39 (describing the situation in terms of an “offer” to resign which was rejected by the District).
[3] By law, when the Commissioner of Education reverses a school board decision, he must order reinstatement and order the school district to “pay the teacher any back pay and employment benefits from the time of discharge or suspension to reinstatement.” Tex. Educ. Code § 21.304(e).
[4] The First Court of Appeals has discussed whether a claim is “germane” in this context by applying factors considered in testing for a compulsory counterclaim. See Archer Grp. LLC v. City of Anahuac , 472 S.W.3d 370, 376 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.). The factors include whether “(1) [the claim] is within the jurisdiction of the court; (2) [the claim]is not at the time of filing the answer the subject of a pending action; (3) the claim is mature and owned by the defendant at the time of filing the answer; (4) [the claim] arose out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim; (5) [the claim] is against an opposing party in the same capacity; and (6) [the claim] does not require the presence of third parties over whom the trial court cannot acquire jurisdiction.” Id. All these factors are present in this case.
[5] Counsel for Mr. Stoneham does not find authority procedurally identical to the immunity issue raised by the District here— to wit , a governmental entity appealing an agency decision, faced with an equitable counterclaim for declaration. However, the policy reasons set forth in Reata , and its progeny, are procedurally much closer to the instant case than the general declaratory judgment cases cited by CISD in its Motion for Rehearing.
[6] Mr. Stoneham recognizes that this doctrine calls into question his claim for attorney fees—which under the principles set forth in Reata , may exceed the equitable relief that is sought by both the District and Mr. Stoneham in their opposing claims. The primary purpose of the declaratory relief Mr. Stoneham requested was to bring legal closure to the matter of the resignation—not to claim attorney fees. Thus, Mr. Stoneham respectfully withdraws his claim for attorney fees.
[8] Indeed, the superintendent’s action occurred four months after the local record was made (and closed) by way of the hearing in which the board terminated Mr. Stoneham.