19 P.2d 635 | Nev. | 1933
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.]
We suggest that district court rule XLV is a complete bar to any consideration of the motion by the trial court, in view of the fact that six months have elapsed after the judgment was rendered. Lindsay v. Lindsay,
The court will observe in this instance that the judgment entry corresponds with the judgment rendered. In such a case there can be no modification after the expiration of the time limit. Sweeney v. Sweeney,
The general rule is laid down in 34 C.J. 240, and is exhaustively treated in Freeman on Judgments (5th ed.), vol. I, pp. 269 to 280, paragraphs 141-144.
See, also, O'Brien v. O'Brien (Cal.),
The right of the court to make a judgment speak what the court intended is not barred or controlled by district court rule XLV. Lindsay v. Lindsay,
The respondent court declined to assume jurisdiction of the application to vacate and set aside the decree in question.
To the petition herein the respondent filed a general demurrer. We think the demurrer should be sustained.
1. District court rule No. XLV provides that no judgment, order, or other judicial act shall be vacated, amended, modified, or corrected unless notice of the application shall be given within six months after such judgment was rendered, order made, or action or proceeding taken. See Scheeline Banking Trust Co. v. Stockgrowers Ranchers Bank,
It is clear that the notice to vacate the decree was not given within the time limit.
2. It was argued that the petitioner seeks to have the respondent court correct the decree entered. Such action was not contemplated by the notice given, and the petitioner is bound by the limitations of the notice; however, we may say that we are of the opinion that petitioner would be in no better position had she given notice of an application to have the decree corrected in the manner argued before us. The rule limits corrections to six months, as well as orders vacating a proceeding.
But authorities are cited from other jurisdictions to the effect that a court has inherent power to make its records and decrees speak the truth whenever it may be discovered that they do not do so. We recognized that rule in Lindsay v. Lindsay,
We think the ruling of the respondent was right, and that these proceedings should be dismissed.
It is so ordered.