94 P. 1114 | Ariz. | 1908
— Appellant brought suit in the court below against appellee as the administrator of the estate of J. H. Tevis, deceased, to recover upon two promissory notes, executed within this territory, which became due, respectively, on September 20 and October 20, 1900. The complaint was filed November 20, 1905. It alleged that Tevis, the maker of the notes, died on the twenty-ninth day of August, 1905, and that appellee was appointed administrator of his estate and qualified as such administrator on the thirteenth day of October, 1905. The appellee in bar of the action pleaded the four-year statute of limitations in force at the time the suit was brought. Upon the trial it was stipulated by the parties that all the allegations of the complaint should be admitted as true, and that the sole issue to be determined by the court should be whether the notes sued upon were barred by the provisions of paragraph 2954, Eevised Statutes of 1901, in force at the time the complaint was filed. Under the issue as thus submitted, the trial court held that the notes were barred by the statute of limitations found in said paragraph 2954, and entered judgment accordingly. From this judgment this appeal was taken. Upon the record thus presented the sole question raised and argued by counsel is whether the statute of limitations in force at the time the notes matured or the statute in force at the time the suit was brought is to be applied.
The legislature of 1901, in revising the statutes, repealed title 44 (paragraphs 2247-2334), entitled “Limitations,” of the Eevised Statutes of 1887, and re-enacted the same, except that new provisions were added and other provisions changed. Among the changes provided by the Eevised Statutes of 1901 the'time within which an action for debt might be brought where the indebtedness is evidenced at the time “by any contract in writing executed within the territory” was shortened from five years to four years. Eev. Stats. 1901, par. 2954.
Both sections under consideration are in accord in denying to amendments to statutes of limitation a wholly prospective effect. They differ seemingly as to the retrospective effect of such amendments on existing causes of action. The former leaves such causes of action to be controlled by the preexisting statutes, and the other, if it does not directly so declare, certainly implies the contrary. The latter section is the more general in character, since its application is not restricted to statutes of limitation, strictly so called, in that it extends to and embraces statutes appertaining to the acquisition of rights, in addition to those appertaining to the barring of remedies by the lapse of time. The former section applies exclusively to those amendments which may have been made to the law on the subject of limitations of actions found in title 41 (paragraphs 2935-2974) of the Revised Statutes of 1901. The latter does not in its terms refer merely to amendments to pre-existing statutes, but also to those which may have been re-enacted by the Revision of 1901, and therefore covers all re-enacted or amended statutes appertaining to the acquisition of rights and to the barring of remedies by the lapse of time. Among the latter not included in said title 41 may be mentioned our lien statutes, and those on the subject of actions for injuries resulting in death. Therefore the former section in its relation to the latter is rather special than general, and certainly is the more explicit and certain in its meaning and intent. While, therefore, they may appear in conflict when viewed as to their application to amendments made to the general law of limitations as found in title 41, they are not in conflict when applied to those sections re-enacted but not amended, or to amendments made to other statutes affecting the acquisition of rights or the barring of remedies not found in said title 47. We may therefore give paragraph 2974 full effect, without nullifying or destroying the force and effect of paragraph 4243 in its general application. Bearing in mind the rule that a special statute will control a general statute on the same subject, we interpret the two sections to mean that any cause of action founded upon any contract in writing evidencing an indebtedness executed within this territory which had accrued prior to ■September 1, 1901, when said title 41 took effect, became
It follows, therefore, that the promissory notes sued upon were not barred at the time this action was brought, and the judgment of the court was erroneous, and is therefore reversed.
KENT, C. J., and CAMPBELL and NAVE, JJ., concur.
