Crowe v. GastonCrowe v. Gaston
Joel Crowe seeks review of a trial court order granting defendants Oscar‘s and Kevin Rettenmeier‘s motions for summary judgment. At issue is whether Oscar‘s can be liable for alcohol-related injuries to Crowe when Oscar‘s sold alcohol to a minor who shared it with another minor who then injured Crowe. We find that Oscar‘s can be held liable and reverse the trial court‘s order granting Oscar‘s motion for summary judgment.
Also at issue is whether Kevin Rettenmeier, the minor who bought the alcohol, can be found liable for Crowe‘s injuries for supplying alcohol to the minor who then injured Crowe. We conclude that he cannot and affirm the trial court‘s order granting Rettenmeier‘s motion for summary judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 11, 1994, Kevin Rettenmeier, age 17, met Joe Schweigert and two of Schweigert‘s friends, Brad Rosenquist and Adam Fitzpatrick, all of whom were under 21, and agreed to buy them beer. They all proceeded to Oscar‘s, Rettenmeier traveling in a separate car. When they arrived, Schweigert and his friends gave money to Rettenmeier, who then entered the store and purchased beer while the others stayed in their car out of sight. It is not clear from the record how much beer was purchased. Rettenmeier purchased either twenty-four twelve-ounce cans plus two 40 ounce bottles, twelve twelve-ounce cans, or four to possibly seven 40 ounce bottles of beer. Rettenmeier gave all the beer he purchased to Schweigert and his friends.
Afterward, the group decided to go over to the house of another acquaintance, Steve Dean. At Dean‘s house they were joined by Joel Crowe and others. The group drank beer and played pool; however, Crowe claims he did not drink any beer. Later that evening, Crowe accepted a ride home by an intoxicated Fitzpatrick. During the ride, Fitzpatrick drove off the road and hit a tree, causing injuries to Crowe.
Crowe sued Oscar‘s and Rettenmeier, among others, for damages. Crowe claimed that Oscar‘s and Rettenmeier were liable for his injuries because they had furnished the alcohol that caused Fitzpatrick‘s intoxication. The trial court granted Oscar‘s and Rettenmeier‘s motions for summary judgment. Crowe appealed the trial court‘s order to the
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appellate court engages in the same review as the trial court when reviewing a summary judgment order. Reynolds v. Hicks, 134 Wash.2d 491, 495, 951 P.2d 761, 763 (1998). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. If, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion, then the motion for summary judgment will be granted. Id.
VENDOR LIABILITY
The issue presented in this case is whether Oscar‘s, a commercial vendor, can be liable for injuries to Crowe which resulted from Oscar‘s illegal sale of alcohol to Kevin Rettenmeier. Crowe bases his claim of negligence on Oscar‘s violation of
In order to prove an actionable claim for negligence, Crowe must show (1) the existence of a duty to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) a resulting injury, and (4) the breach as the proximate cause of the injury. See Reynolds, 951 P.2d at 763. Oscar‘s argument in this case is two-fold. First Oscar‘s contends that it did not owe a duty of care to Crowe. Second, Oscar‘s asserts that, even if it owed a duty of care to Crowe, it was not the legal cause of Crowe‘s injuries.
A. Duty of Care
We turn first to whether Oscar‘s owed a duty of care to Crowe. The existence of a legal duty is a question of law. Schooley v. Pinch‘s Deli Market, Inc., 134 Wash.2d 468, 951 P.2d 749, 752 (1998). Washington courts have recognized that a legislative enactment may prescribe a standard of conduct required of a reasonable person that when breached may be introduced to the trier of fact as evidence of negligence. Id., 951 P.2d at 751-52; Purchase v. Meyer, 108 Wash.2d 220, 737 P.2d 661 (1987). To determine whether a defendant owes a duty of care to a complaining party based upon a statutory violation, this court has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 2863 which, among other things, requires the injured person to be within the class of persons the statute was enacted to protect. Schooley, 951 P.2d at 752-53. Oscar‘s argues that this prong of the Restatement test is not satisfied.
Citing our decisions in Young and Purchase, Oscar‘s contends that Crowe is not a member of the protected class because only minor purchasers and third persons injured by the minor purchaser are protected by the statutes in question. See Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wash.2d 655, 663 P.2d 834, 672 P.2d 1267 (1983) (a minor purchaser‘s estate had an action in negligence for the minor‘s alcohol-related death against the tavern owner who sold alcohol to the minor); Purchase, 108 Wash.2d 220, 737 P.2d 661 (a third person injured by an intoxicated minor purchaser had a cause of action against the tavern owner who sold alcohol to the minor). However, in our recent decision in Schooley, we found the protected class was not so limited.
In that case, Lori Schooley became intoxicated from alcohol obtained from another minor purchaser and injured herself. Schooley,
In this case, similar to the situation in Schooley, Kevin Rettenmeier purchased alcohol which he gave to a number of other minors. One of those minors then drove while intoxicated causing injuries to Crowe. Thus, we find that Crowe is part of the protected class.
The alcohol vendor, of course, is only responsible for the foreseeable consequences of his actions. Id. at 754; see also Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash.2d 381, 395, 755 P.2d 759 (1988). In this way, foreseeability serves to limit the scope of the duty owed by the alcohol vendor to Crowe. See Schooley, 951 P.2d at 754. Whether or not it was foreseeable that the minor purchaser would share the alcohol with others resulting in the injury to Crowe is a question of fact for the jury. See id. at 754. The trier of fact may consider the amount and character of the alcohol purchased, the time of day, the presence of other minors on the premises or in a vehicle, and statements made by the purchaser to determine whether it was foreseeable the alcohol would be shared with others. Id.
Oscar‘s asks this court to find, as a matter of law, that the circumstances of the sale of beer to Rettenmeier could not put the seller on notice that the beer would be shared with others and that they would then drive while intoxicated. We will decide issues of foreseeability as a matter of law only where reasonable minds cannot differ. Schooley, 951 P.2d at 754. Based on the facts of this case, however, we decline to find that Crowe‘s injuries were not foreseeable.
First, in Schooley we determined that reasonable minds could conclude that a minor purchasing substantial quantities of alcohol would share it with other minors. Id. at 754. Second, and more important, there is a genuine issue of material fact in this case concerning how much beer was actually purchased. Thus, it is for the trier of fact to determine how much beer was actually purchased and if the amount purchased would indicate that it would be shared with others.
Additionally, we find that reasonable minds could conclude that minors who obtain alcohol from another minor purchaser would then drive while intoxicated. The question is whether “‘[t]he harm sustained [is] reasonably perceived as being within the general field of danger covered by the specific duty owed by the defendant.‘” (Quoting Hansen, 118 Wash.2d at 484, 824 P.2d 483). Id. at 754. We have previously recognized that the general harm encompassed by this duty is that of alcohol-induced driver error. Christen v. Lee, 113 Wash.2d 479, 495, 780 P.2d 1307 (1989). In fact, a minor is guilty of driving under the influence in Washington if the minor has a breath test reading of .02 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
B. Legal Causation
Next, Oscar‘s argues that it was not the legal cause of Crowe‘s injuries. Legal
As the petitioner did in Schooley, Oscar‘s argues that Crowe‘s injuries are too remote from the initial sale and that legal consequences of the sale cannot extend that far. See Schooley, 951 P.2d at 755. Oscar‘s bases this argument solely on the policy concern of unlimited liability. In Schooley, however, we found this argument unpersuasive noting that other legal principles such as foreseeability, superseding causation, and contributory negligence serve to dispel these fears. Id. at 755-56. We found that the policies behind legislation prohibiting the sale of alcohol to minors outweighed Petitioner‘s concerns. Id. at 755-57.
This is especially so where the duty involved is not onerous. The alcohol vendor is simply required to check the buyer‘s identification. Additionally, if, after the purchaser presents identification, the vendor still has doubts about the purchaser‘s age the vendor can fill out and have the purchaser sign a certification card complying with
In this case we find the injuries to Crowe are not so remote as to preclude liability. The policy consideration behind the legislation prohibiting vendors from selling alcohol to minors are best served by holding vendors liable for the foreseeable consequences of the illegal sale of alcohol to minors. Thus, we conclude that legal cause is satisfied in this case.
C. Superseding Causation
Finally, Oscar‘s argues that the intervening intentional misconduct of Rettenmeier, the minor purchaser, and Fitzpatrick, the driver, serve to break the chain of causation in this case. A finding of proximate causation is premised upon the proof of cause in fact, as well as the legal determination that liability should attach. Maltman v. Sauer, 84 Wash.2d 975, 981, 530 P.2d 254 (1975). Cause in fact requires proof that “‘there was a sufficiently close, actual, causal connection between defendant‘s conduct and the actual damage suffered by plaintiff.‘” Id. (quoting Rikstad v. Holmberg, 76 Wash.2d 265, 268, 456 P.2d 355 (1969)). A defendant‘s negligence is the cause of the plaintiff‘s injury only if such negligence, unbroken by any new independent cause, produces the injury complained of. Id. at 982, 530 P.2d 254. Where an intervening act does break the chain of causation, it is referred to as a “superseding cause.” Id.
“‘Whether an act may be considered a superseding cause sufficient to relieve a defendant of liability depends on whether the intervening act can reasonably be foreseen by the defendant; only intervening acts which are not reasonably foreseeable are deemed superseding causes.‘” Cramer v. Department of Highways, 73 Wash.App. 516, 520, 870 P.2d 999 (1994) (quoting Anderson v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Corp., 48 Wash.App. 432, 442, 739 P.2d 1177 (1987)). An intervening act is not foreseeable if it is “‘so highly extraordinary or improbable as to be wholly beyond the range of expectability.‘” Christen, 113 Wash.2d at 492, 780 P.2d 1307 (quoting McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist. 128, 42 Wash.2d 316, 323, 255 P.2d 360 (1953)). The foreseeability of an intervening act, unlike the determination of legal cause in general, is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. Cramer, 73 Wash.App. at 521, 870 P.2d 999. Thus, in this case it is for the jury to decide whether the acts of Rettenmeier and Fitzpatrick break the chain of causation, thus, relieving Oscar‘s from liability.
SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY
Crowe also asserts that Rettenmeier is liable for his injuries because Rettenmeier
Plaintiff contends that
In Reynolds, we emphasized our reluctance to hold social hosts liable to the same extent of commercial vendors. “‘Social hosts are not as capable of handling the responsibilities of monitoring their guests’ alcohol consumption as are their commercial and quasi-commercial counterparts.... [T]he commercial proprietor has a proprietary interest and profit motive, and should be expected to exercise greater supervision than in the (non-commercial) social setting.‘” Id. at 764 (alteration in original) (quoting Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash.2d 381, 386-87, 755 P.2d 759 (1988)).
Additionally, we found that
We also noted that the Legislature provided alcohol vendors with a means by which they can immunize themselves from civil liability for alcohol-related injuries resulting from the sale of alcohol to a minor, but did not provide the same protection for social hosts. Id. at 765;
Thus, in the present case, Rettenmeier owed no duty of care to Crowe.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court‘s order granting Oscar‘s motion for summary judgment and affirm the trial court‘s order granting Rettenmeier‘s motion for summary judgment.
GUY and ALEXANDER, JJ., concur.
DURHAM, Chief Justice (concurring).
I agree with the majority that a commercial vendor‘s duty to refrain from selling alcohol to minors extends to all minors and
DOLLIVER, J., concurs.
JOHNSON, Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
For the reasons articulated in my dissent in Reynolds v. Hicks, 134 Wash.2d 491, 951 P.2d 761 (1998) (Johnson, J., dissenting), I must reaffirm my position and concur in part and dissent in part. The facts of the present case involve a commercial alcohol vendor who sells alcohol to a minor, who transfers alcohol to another minor, who becomes intoxicated, and injures another person. In this single case we are confronted with commercial alcohol vendor liability, the issue in Schooley v. Pinch‘s Deli Market, 134 Wash.2d 468, 951 P.2d 749 (1998), and social host liability, the issue in Reynolds.
The majority‘s position that commercial alcohol vendors are liable when they illegally sell alcohol to minors is consistent with our decision in Schooley, however, the majority continues to justify the illegal conduct of providing alcohol to minors when the person providing the alcohol is a social host. I have clearly stated my position on this issue in my dissent in Reynolds and in Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wash.2d 476, 824 P.2d 483 (1992). Under
SMITH and TALMADGE, JJ., concur.
SANDERS, Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I would affirm the trial court‘s dismissal of claims against Oscar‘s for the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in Schooley v. Pinch‘s Deli Market, Inc., 134 Wash.2d 468, 951 P.2d 749 (1998). I concur with the majority that the claim against Rettenmeier must be dismissed based on Reynolds v. Hicks, 134 Wash.2d 491, 951 P.2d 761 (1998).