195 Tenn. 659 | Tenn. | 1953
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The complainant filed her original bill in the Chancery Court of Garter County for an injunction restraining the Beer Board of the county from revoking her permit to sell beer which had been lawfully issued two years prior to the commencement of this action.
The bill charges that complainant had at all times conducted her business in strict conformity to the law and had invested a considerable sum of money in the business, all of which would be a total loss if the Beer Board’s action should be upheld; that she has no remedy at law adequate to protect her in her lawful rights.
The relief sought is based on the charge that the Quarterly County Court of Carter County was called to meet in a special session for .a specific purpose, to wit ‘ ‘ of accepting offer made by the City of Elizabethton on a lot for the Health Department Building, or for buying a suitable site for said building. Also to consider any other business that might come before said call session of the Quarterly County Court.” It is further charged that the action of the Quarterly Court in electing a Beer
The defendants, Carter County and the Beer Board, demurred to the bill on several grounds: (1) it was a collateral attack upon the election of the Beer Board, and (2) the complainant’s sole remedy was by petition to the Circuit Court for the common law writ of certiorari and the writ of supersedeas. The Chancellor sustained the demurrer and from his action the complainant appealed to this Court.
The assignments of error are as follows:
“1. The learned Chancellor erred in holding that Complainant had an adequate remedy at law, by certiorari to the Circuit Court, and in holding that Code Section 1191.14 of the Tennessee Code to be applicable in this case.
“2. The learned Chancellor erred in denying the injunction, and holding that his Honor was without jurisdiction, as the Chancery Court is the sole Court to enjoin the action of the Quarterly County Court in exceeding the special purpose for which it was called into session.
“3. The learned Chancellor erred in holding that this proceeding constituted a collateral attack against the Beer Commission, and in holding that any .action of the Beer Commission was presented to the Court for review, and holding same to be a*662 de facto commission, as the action was a direct attack against the void action of the Quarterly Court, and not an election contest.”
The .authorities relied on by complainant have no application to the actions of Beer Boards in issuing or revoking permits to sell beer. The authorities cited are McDaniel v. Monroe County, 10 Tenn. App. 109, and cases cited in that opinion; also Sections 814, 815 and 818, Gibson’s Suits in Chancery, which deal with the general jurisdiction of the Chancery Court to enjoin rights claimed under void or voidable decrees, or where the court has no jurisdiction of the person or the subject matter.
We think the Chancellor was correct in holding and decreeing that the complainant’s remedy was under Code Section 1191.14 which reads in part as follows:
“No judge of any court shall have authority to supersede, stay or enjoin any order of .a revoking agency made under the authority of this act, except after reviewing the transcript of the proceedings before the revoking agency and after a hearing of which due notice has been given the revoking agency, and no writ of supersedeas, writ of injunction, stay order or other extraordinary process shall issue for such purpose unless herein expressly authorized.”
It is further provided in said statute:
‘ ‘ The remedy provided by this section shall be the only method of reviewing orders of quarterly courts, governing bodies or municipal corporations, boards or committees revoking licenses issued under this act. ’ ’
While complainant contends that the bill only attacks the legality of the Quarterly Court in exceeding its authority under the special “call”, it is an attack upon the
The assignments of error are overruled and the Chancellor’s decree is affirmed.