5 N.E.2d 387 | Ill. | 1936
This appeal is from a judgment in favor of defendants, the appellees, in an ejectment suit in the circuit court of Moultrie county. In that court, on November 4, 1931, the appellee bank obtained two judgments against John S. Smith, in the first of which his wife, Addie M. Smith, was also a judgment debtor. Appellant, Crowder, obtained a *89 judgment against Smith in the same court five days later. The three judgments were obtained in vacation, and executions were issued on all three judgments within one year. The bank also had an execution issued on its judgment for $3028.57 on April 4, 1934, and an execution issued on March 21, 1934, on its judgment for $10,766.50. Both these executions were in the hands of the sheriff at the time of the levy upon and sale of the lands in question on June 2, 1934. The bank bid $100 and received a certificate of sale covering this real estate. The sale was under the executions on both the bank judgments. The appellant, as a judgment creditor, redeemed from the sale on June 3, 1935, and received a redemption certificate. That day the bank also redeemed and received a redemption certificate. Both the bank and Crowder caused the premises to be advertised for sale after these redemptions and there were two sales of the property. Both the bank and Crowder later received sheriff's deeds to the land in question. At the sale pursuant to his redemption Crowder bid only the redemption money and costs but under its sale the bank bid $4000. The stipulation of facts presents the single question, viz., Did the Scott State Bank have the legal right to redeem the lands in question from its own sale?
Section 20 of "An act in regard to judgments and decrees, and the manner of enforcing the same by execution, and to provide for the redemption of real estate sold under execution or decree," approved March 22, 1872, (Laws of 1871-72, p. 505; 77 S.H.A. 20; State Bar Stat. 1935, chap. 77, par. 20;) provides that if the debtor does not redeem, "any decree or judgment creditor, his heirs, executors, administrators or assigns may, after the expiration of twelve months and within fifteen months after the sale, * * * redeem the premises in the following manner," etc. Section 24 of the same act deals with preferences in redemption and gives the first right to redeem to "the creditor having the senior judgment or decree" for the first *90 two days next following the expiration of twelve months from the date of sale. Other creditors are next given the right of preference to redeem for a similar time in the order of seniority of their judgments and decrees. It is also provided that where two or more judgments or decrees bear equal date the creditor first paying the redemption money shall have preference. These judgments were obtained in vacation, before section 13 of the above mentioned act was amended in 1933. The bank's judgments were obtained on the same day and were therefore equal, but they were prior to Crowder's judgment, which was obtained five days later.
In Tewalt v. Irwin,
In Sweezey v. Chandler,
In Strause v. Dutch,
In support of his contentions appellant relies on Seligman v.Laubheimer,
Appellant also relies on Sweezey v. Chandler,
Appellant's sale resulted only in a bid of the redemption money paid by him. The debtor, Smith, obtained no credit thereby on the debt due Crowder or any other creditor. Following redemption at its sale the bank bid $4000. Smith, the debtor, for whose benefit, in part at least, the redemption statutes were enacted, is entitled to have the benefit of this additional $4000 in satisfaction of his debts. The Scott State Bank's judgments, although satisfied in part by the earlier sales of personal property and real estate, remained senior to the judgment of Crowder. The bank had the priority in right to redeem within the first two days *93 following the expiration of twelve months from the sale of the land in question, and having redeemed and re-advertised this land for sale and having become the purchaser at the second sale, it obtained the title when the sheriff made it the deed to the land.
The judgment of the circuit court of Moultrie county is therefore affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.