195 P.2d 609 | Kan. | 1948
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This was an action for divorce and division of property. The appeal involves only the order of the court respect
The parties made separate income tax returns. The testimony showed that these represented their respective incomes. Plaintiff’s income for 1942 was $1,318.64; for 1943, $1,048.35; for 1944, $151.29; for 1945, less than $500, and for 1946, about $600. Defendant’s statement showed income from the salary and rents prior to selling the duplex, for 1942, $1,527; for 1943, $1,886.32; for 1944, $2,626.78; for 1945, $2,577.80; for 1946, $2,283.53. •
The decree of the court granted plaintiff the divorce and restored her to her maiden name. It provided that the residence, the furniture and the beauty shop be appraised by three appraisers, who were named by the court, and that either party willing to take the residence, the furniture, or the beauty shop at the appraised value, might do so by paying the other party one-half of the appraised value thereof, and if not, the property was to be sold and the proceeds to be paid into the office of the court. The plaintiff was ordered to cash the $750 bond and other bonds she might have in her possession and deposit the proceeds with the clerk of the court, and defendant was ordered to pay to the clerk the sum of $1,366 which he had drawn from the joint bank account shortly before the suit was brought, and defendant to sell the automobile and deposit the proceeds of that with the clerk of the court. It was decreed that of the sums so deposited with the clerk there should be paid the costs, including a named attorney fee for plaintiff’s attorney and for defendant’s attorney, and that the remainder should be divided equally between the parties.
Nothing was said in the decree about the boat and the engine for it which was bought by defendant. Presumably the title to that is in defendant and the court intended it should so remain.
Second, appellant contends the court erred in providing for the sale of the residence property. On her behalf it is argued that the first payment was made with the plaintiff’s money from the sale of the beauty shop and that the deed was taken in her name when it was purchased. We think it clear that the court regarded the earnings of the parties during their marriage as jointly accumulated property, that the down payment was made as much from the property of the defendant as it was from the property of the plaintiff, and that the payments on the mortgage upon the residence property were made almost entirely from defendant’s property. Counsel for appellant point to some of our cases in which it was held that when property is purchased and taken in the name of one spouse title for all purposes was presumed to be invested in the spouse having title, and the money the other spouse placed in that property was regarded as a gift. Where the defendant’s money went into the home to assist in making the down payment, to repair it, and to pay the monthly payments upon it, if designed by defendant to be a gift to his wife, might depend upon many factors. Certainly there is nothing here that compels that conclusion. The trial court took the view expressed in its decree. We see no reason to disturb it.
Third, appellant contends the court erred in requiring her to cash the $750 bond and other bonds she had in her possession and turn them into the clerk to be divided. Her counsel argue that since they had a joint bank account the plaintiff could draw for her own use any of the money that was in the account and invest it in some property in her own name and deprive her husband of any interest in it. That contention is not well taken. The court considered the joint bank account, shortly before the action was brought, as
It has been held repeatedly that the trial court in a divorce action has wide discretion in the division of property. (See Wittig v. Wittig, 151 Kan. 440, 99 P. 2d 750; Leiter v. Leiter, 152 Kan. 287, 103 P. 2d 809; Gates v. Gates, 160 Kan. 428, 163 P. 2d 395; Walno v. Walno, 164 Kan. 620, 192 P. 2d 165, and cases there cited.) It cannot be said here that the court was unfair to the appellant in making the division of property.
The decree of the court was erroneous only in that it did not give to the appellant the items of household goods owned by her at the time of the marriage and which she still had at the time of the divorce. It should be modified so as to do so and as so modified the decree should be affirmed. It is so ordered.