403 A.2d 1103 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1978
In this paternity action the court found the defendant to be the father of a child born to the plaintiff on May 16, 1972. After making this finding on the paternity issue, the court continued the case for a further hearing upon the financial issues required to be determined under General Statutes
Whatever merit the defendant's argument might have if the judgment for past support of the child had been rendered in favor of the named plaintiff, in the case before us the judgment runs solely in favor of the state, the defendant having been ordered to reimburse the state for the full amount which it *632
had expended in support of the child to the date of judgment. In a paternity action brought by the mother the statute authorizes the entry of such a judgment for past support, "if a town or the state has paid such expense." General Statutes
In fashioning his attack upon
From colonial times our statutes dealing with illegitimate children, formerly known as bastardy statutes, have contained in substance the provision presently found in
We can see no unlawful discrimination based upon sex in the amendment of the statute which presently authorizes the state to obtain a judgment against the defendant which corresponds with his liability as a parent under 17-83e. No one has ever *637
suggested that the right of a creditor to obtain a judgment for the full amount of the debt against one of several debtors who are jointly liable violates the principle of equal protection of the laws. As a joint debtor the defendant would be entitled to contribution from the mother for any payments made in reduction of their joint obligation. Azzolina v. Sons of Italy,
The fact that the statute appears to authorize the mother of an illegitimate child to obtain a judgment against the father for the full amount of support which she has previously furnished is the basis for the defendant's challenge of its validity. Were we dealing with such a judgment, we would find it difficult to deny this challenge. The judgment before us, however, rests upon separable statutory provisions inserted by an amendment which was enacted for the purpose of making the obligation owed to the state by the father of an illegitimate child coincide with that of the father of a legitimate child. This legislative objective ought not to be frustrated simply because another provision of the same statute, affording relief to a different claimant where other considerations of public policy would apply, is of doubtful validity. Kellems v. Brown,
Although the point has not been raised by counsel, one aspect of the judgment before us which might be thought to bear consequences beyond those imposed by 17-83e upon the parents of legitimate children or upon the complainant mother is the order for weekly payments upon the amount of the obligation for past support of the child found to be owed by the defendant. Section
The defendant urges that the finding of ability to pay is really a conclusion inconsistent with the subordinate facts found, which indicate that his *639
expenses at the time of the hearing exceeded his income. It is clear from the form in which the two paragraphs are set forth in the finding that they were intended to stand as subordinate facts, because reference is made to supporting evidence on certain pages of the transcript. In his brief the defendant has not pressed his assignment of error that these paragraphs were found without evidence, so we may regard that assignment as abandoned. The finding of ability to pay the amounts ordered is not inconsistent with the fact that the defendant's expenses exceeded his income at the time of the hearing. Some of those expenses might well have been reduced, such as the loan payment or the rental payment, which was approximately double the amount allowed for shelter of the complainant mother and her child by the state welfare department. The defendant had sufficient cash to pay the order for about ten weeks in any event. In entering a support order the court need not regard as sacrosanct the style of living to which a defendant may be accustomed or give priority to the creditors he has chosen to pay. The support orders entered in this case are well within the limits of reasonable discretion vested in the trial court with respect to such matters. Turner v. Richardson,
The defendant has also challenged the conclusion of the court that the complainant mother was indigent, which was based upon the fact that she was a recipient of state welfare. In the absence of other facts — and the defendant seeks to add none to the finding — her eligibility for state welfare was a sufficient basis to support such a conclusion. Another conclusion under attack is that the defendant's ability to pay need not be considered in order to render a civil judgment. It is obvious that this statement referred to the total amount of the liability *640 imposed by the judgment and not to the periodic orders which did take into consideration the financial circumstances of the defendant.
There is no error.
In this opinion PARSKEY and SPONZO, Js., concurred.