10 N.Y.S. 781 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1890
This action is brought to obtain a judicial construction of certain provisions of the will of Fhebe Jane Cross, deceased, which creates certain trusts in the defendant over $700,000 of railroad mortgage bonds, now in the hands of the trust company. The testator had her domicile in Rhode Island. She made her will there, and it is in all its provisions valid by the law of that state. When the testatrix died, in 1878, her will was probated in Rhode Island, and for seven years the plaintiff executors themselves administered these trusts under the supervision of the courts of that state. It is conceded that the trusts, though valid under the laws of Rhode Island, are in part or wholly void under the laws of the state of New York., The fund, consisting entirely of personal property, is in the possession of the trust company, a New York corporation. Is the validity of the provisions of the will, as to property thus held, to be governed by the laws of this state or those of Rhode Island?
It may be stated as a general rule of law, sustained by numerous decisions, that the law of domicile governs in the disposition of personal property. In the case of Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 424, the question was whether a charitable bequest of personal property by a citizen of New York
In Draper v. College, supra, Justice Yan Yorst says of the bequests to the trustees of the college: “The college being legally authorized to take the gifts, the question as to the validity of the directions and conditions imposed by the testator as to holding, investing, accumulating, and applying
The trust here involved, as before stated, relates solely to personal property, and was created in Rhode Island, pursuant to the laws of that state, by one domiciled there, who appointed as her trustee a Hew York corporation. Although the trust is valid in Rhode Island, it is claimed that as the provisions thereof contravene our. statute against perpetuities, and the fund and trustee are here, it becomes necessary to declare the same void, and decree a distribution under the laws of Hew York. It would seemingly be a harsh rule of law that a citizen of another state, who had made a valid will according to the law of that state, should, by selecting a trustee in another state, to whom the personal property was sent, render the will void, and entail the penalty of having the property distributed, not according to the terms of his will, but under the laws of the foreign state, as though he had died therein intestate. That the courts of this state will not administer the estate of a foreign citizen here, in contravention of the laws of this state, is true, and, from reasons of policy and principle, will apply its own laws to questions affecting real estate here is equally true; but, in reference to personal property and the testamentary disposition thereof, it will remit all questions relating thereto, and, in case of necessity, the property itself, to the domicile of the testator, to be there dealt with under the lex domicilii. It will be thus seen that I do not agree with plaintiffs’ contention that the case of Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, supra, is controlling upon the case at bar.
This case, both in its facts and in principle, is more like Despard v. Churchill, 53 N. Y. 198. As therein said: “The testator had his domicile in the state of California. He made his will there. Ho question is made but that it is in all its provisions valid by the law of that state. • It, however, by its terms, disposes of certain property in this state, and by provisions which are invalid here, inasmuch as they run counter to our statute law. 1 Rev. St. p.