33 N.Y.S. 947 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1895
October 21, 1891, the plaintiff passed northerly on Oak street, until she reached the north side of East Washington
2. By several motions for nonsuit, and by objections and exceptions to evidence, the appellant raised the question upon the trial as to the sufficiency of the notice of her claim given to the city, which the statute requires as a condition precedent to the right to maintain the action.
In chapter 535 of the Laws of 1884, at page 649, the ninty-ninth section of the charter of the appellant was amended so as to read as follows:
“All claims against the city for damages or injury alleged to have arisen from the defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of any street, highway, bridge, culvert, sidewalk or crosswalk of or in said city, or from negligence of the city authorities in respect to any such street, highway, bridge, culvert, sidewalk or crosswalk, shall, within three months after the happening of such damage or injury, be presented by or in behalf of such claimant to the mayor or city attorney in writing, signed by the claimant or his agent or representative attorney and duly verified by one of such parties, describing the time and location of the place where such injury occurred, cause and extent of the damage or injury. The omission to present such claim as aforesaid within said three months shall be a bar to any action or proceeding therefor against the city.”
“The notice must, to be sufficient, be so reasonably specific as to time, place, and cause as to be o£ substantial assistance to the proper authorities in investigating the question o£ their liability.”
And the conclusion reached in the Paddock Case was that a substantial compliance by the plaintiff with the provisions of the statute was required.
In Sullivan v. City of Syracuse, 77 Hun, 442, 29 N. Y. Supp. 105, a notice that had been given fell under consideration, and it was in effect held that a substantial compliance by the plaintiff with the provisions of the statute was sufficient.
In Werner v. City of Rochester, 77 Hun, 35, 28 N. Y. Supp. 226, where a similar question was presented, Haight, J., said:
*950 “This statute should receive a reasonable construction. The time, place, and circumstances should be given with reasonable accuracy, so as to enable the officers charged with the duty of investigating the circumstances to determine whether the claim is meritorious. We do not think this statute contemplates that a person injured should be required to give the exact time when it occurred, for this, in many cases, would be quite impossible. Neither do we think that the statute contemplates that he should be put to the expense of employing a surveyor to accurately locate the place where the accident occurred.”
In view of all the circumstances disclosed by the evidence, we are of the opinion that the ruling of the trial judge to the effect that the notice was sufficient ought not to be disturbed.
3. We think the evidence presented a question of fact for the jury to determine whether the injuries which the plaintiff received caused traumatic synovitis. While there was a conflict relating to the question as to whether the condition in which she was weeks and months after the injury was attributable to the injuries which she received, or whether it arose by reason of her being afflicted with rheumatism, we think the question of fact was one proper to be determined by the jury, and was carefully presented to the jury by the trial judge, and that their verdict on that subject should be approved.
4. Prior to the accident, the plaintiff, a woman of about 33 years of age, was apparently in a healthy condition, following an occupation- in which she was able to earn, by her manual labor, wages. Assuming, as we must, that, according to the finding of the jury, the injuries which she received caused the suffering which she was called upon to endure by reason of the loss of the use of her knees, and causing them to be swollen, and her legs to be comparatively useless, after suffering from treatment at home and in hospital, and the necessary expense in procuring the same, and being subjected repeatedly to blisters and cauterizations, which have been found insufficient to work restoration to her of the usefulness of her limbs, leaving her in a condition that she has been obliged to Use crutches, and is incapable of standing upright to ascend stairs, or to stoop or to bend her knees, and compelling her to lose her employment and opportunity to earn wages, as was shown by the evidence, we are of the opinion that the court properly refused to grant a new trial on the ground that the damages were excessive. Vail v. Railway Co., 6 Misc. Rep. 20, 26 N. Y. Supp. 59; Morris v. Railroad Co., 73 Hun, 560, 26 N. Y. Supp. 342; Demond v. Railroad Co., 8 Misc. Rep. 610, 29 N. Y. Supp. 318; Fox v. Railroad Co., 7 Misc. Rep. 285, 27 N. Y. Supp. 895; Wilson v. Railroad Co., 8 Misc. Rep. 450, 28 N. Y. Supp. 781; Walsh v. Railroad Co., 78 Hun, 1, 28 N. Y. Supp. 1097; Stephens v. Knitting Co. (Sup.) 20 N. Y. Supp. 916; Gale v. Railroad Co., 13 Hun, 1; Scott v. Association, 74 Hun, 284, 26 N. Y. Supp. 690.
Judgment and order affirmed, with costs. All concur.