Pеtitioner, Joel A. Cross, appeals from a final agency order of the Industrial Commission of Utah denying his claim for workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988). We affirm.
I. FACTS
The facts in this case were stipulated to by the pаrties. On June 4, 1988, at approximately 2:00 p.m., Joel Cross was driving home from work in his 1973 Ford Econoline van on 1-80 near the Salt Lake/Tooele County border when the van exploded into flames. As a result of the fire, Cross sustained severe burns over a considerable portion of his body and consequently incurred substantial medical expenses. Cross claimed that he was in the course of his employment at the time of the incident and filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The Industrial Commission denied Cross’s claim.
At the time of the incident, and since February 1988, J.D. McNeil Construction (McNeil) employed Cross as a laborer. Approximately one month prior to the incident, McNeil assigned Cross to a jоb site in Coalville, Summit County, Utah. On the day of the fire, Cross drove from his home in Tooele to his foreman’s home in Salt Lake City. He left his van there and traveled to the Coalville work site in another vehicle. Later that day, when work had ceased, Cross returned to Salt Lake City, where he picked up his van and proceeded toward his home in Tooele. The fire occurred en route from Salt Lake City to Tooele.
Prior to Cross’s transfer to the Coalville site, Cross hаd been assigned to a job in Delle, Tooele County, Utah. Because the Delle site was illuminated at night, Cross had been requested on certain occasions to check the lights at the site and replace the batteries as required. To this end, Cross had carried batteries for the lights in his vehicle. Cross was never called to check the lights after he was transferred to the Coalville project; in fact, Cross’s supervisor recalls directing Cross that he would be relieved of that duty because a new foreman was assuming responsibility for the Delle project. Cross did not return the batteries prior to the incident and continued to transport them in his van. However, the batteries were not the cause of the fire.
Seeking compensation for his sustained injuries, Cross filed an application for a hearing with the Industrial Commission of Utah on June 2, 1989. The claim was heard by an administrative law judge and denied. Cross thereafter filed a request fоr review by the Industrial Commission, which request was also denied.
The sole issue presented for review is whether the Industrial Commission properly denied Cross workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1988) of the Utah Administrativе Procedures Act (UAPA) provides:
*1204 The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency’s record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
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(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law.
With the adoption of UAPA, deference to an agency’s statutory construction should be given only “when there is a grant of discretion to the agency conсerning the language in question, either expressly made in the statute or implied from the statutory language.”
Morton Int’l v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm’n,
The relevant portion of the statute at issue here, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988), reads:
Each employee ... who is injured ... by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, ... shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury ... and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medicines....
Since § 35-1-45 does not expressly or impliedly grant discretion to the Industrial Commission in construing the specific languаge of the statute, we review the commission’s interpretation of § 35-1-45 for correctness.
III.. ANALYSIS
Cross argues that the injuries he sustained while traveling home from the Coal-ville project site arose out of and in the course of his emplоyment for McNeil, and are therefore compensable under § 35-1-45. We disagree.
The well established rule is that “an employee is not deemed to be within the course of his employment for [workers’] compensation purpоses when he furnishes his own transportation and is injured while going to or coming from his place of employment.”
Higgins v. Industrial Comm’n,
The major premise of the “going and coming” rule is that it is unfair to impose unlimited liability on an employer for conduct of its emрloyees over which it has no control and from which it derives no benefit. Therefore, the major focus in determining whether or not the general rule should apply in a given case is on the benefit the employer receives аnd his control over the conduct.
Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.,
Cross argues that he is excepted from the “going and coming” rule because he conferred a substantial benefit on his employer by traveling long distances to and from temporary construction sites. According to Cross, McNeil received a benefit because it was relieved of the necessity of hiring local crews for each new construction job.
In support of the proposition that considerable travеl to temporary work sites is relevant in determining whether an accident arises out of and in the course of one’s employment, Cross cites a line of “oil drilling” cases, namely,
Loffland Bros. v. Baca,
In the present case, McNeil did not undertake the responsibility of providing transportation for Cross. Nor did McNeil commit to paying Cross’s transportation expenses to and from the Coalville project. The ridе-sharing arrangement between Cross and his foreman was arranged out of mutual convenience, rather than at the direction of McNeil. The only understanding between Cross and McNeil was that Cross would be able to provide his own transрortation to the job sites, which understanding is implied between almost any employer and employee. The nature of the construction business is not atypical and thus deserving of special treatment like the oil drilling industry. Transportatiоn to a job site is not integral and necessary to employment as a construction worker, and the only benefit conferred upon the employer by such travel is the employee’s arrival at the work site.
See Loffland Bros.,
Cross also cites dicta from several other cases in an attempt to fit within other exceptions to the “going and coming” rule; however, all are distinguishable. In
State Tax Comm’n v. Industrial Comm’n of Utah,
In another case cited by Cross,
Hinojosa v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Bd.,
[W]hen a business enterprise requires an employee to drive to and from its office in order to have his vehicle available for company business during the day, accidents on the way to or from the office are statistically certain to occur eventually, and the business enterprise having required the driving to and from work, the risk of such accidents are risks incident to the business enterprise.
Id.
Likewise, Cross does not fit within this rationale. Cross has never alleged that his employment required travel between job sites during the work day; rather he acknowledges that his employer required only that he provide his own transportation to and from work. For that reason, Hinojosa provides no direction in this case.
Additionally, Cross argues that the Commission erred in failing to find that he was an “on call” employee and therefore subject to the exception found in
Bailey v. Utah State Indus. Comm’n,
Cross claims that he fits within this exception because at the time of his accident, he was carrying batteries in his vehicle to service the lights at McNeil’s site in Delle, Utah. However, the fact that Cross had the batteries in his vehicle is not sufficient to demonstrate that Cross’s automobile was necessary to his employment. Cross had not checked the lights at the Delle project since he had been transferred to the Coalville site. Moreover, Cross’s supervisor at the Delle site had advised Cross that he would no longer be required to check the lights because a new foreman had beеn assigned to the project. Thus, the mere fact that Cross was carrying work implements in his van, which implements were leftover from his previous job assignment, is insufficient to qualify him for the Bailey exception.
Lastly, since travel distance is not the focus of, or even а factor in, the “going and coming” rule, Cross’s argument that considerable travel to temporary work sites is relevant in determining whether an accident arises out of and in the course of one’s employment is not persuasive. To hold that employees who travel long distances to work are outside the purview of the rule would essentially allow the exception to swallow the rule. It would also tend to discourage employers from hiring outside a local area, and in cases like the instant one, to jettison long-term employees when a work site is relocated. It is the employee’s individual choice to secure remote employment, and it does not follow that such a decision inherently confers a benefit on one’s employer. Accordingly, we reject Cross’s argument that he is not subject to the “going and coming” rule and hold that Cross’s accident did not arise out of and in the course of his employment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Cross’s claims on appeal are without merit. We, therefore, affirm the Industrial Commission’s final agency order denying Cross workers’ compensation benefits.
BILLINGS and ORME, JJ., concur.