382 F.3d 587 | 6th Cir. | 2004
DAVID A. NELSON, Circuit Judge. This appeal shows S ALARIED E MPLOYEES O F
(cid:45) that the distinction between law and equity can still have G REAT N ORTHERN P APER I NC . (cid:45) consequences. (“The forms of action we have buried,” and B OWATER , (cid:45) Maitland observed in a very different context, “but they still I NCORPORATED , (cid:45) rule us from their graves.” [1] ) (cid:45) Defendants-Appellants. (cid:45) The plaintiff, a participant in a retirement plan governed by (cid:78) the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 832, claimed that the plan administrator
Appeal from the United States District Court had acted improperly in using a pre-retirement mortality for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids. discount factor when calculating lump sum pre-retirement No. 01-00683—Richard A. Enslen, District Judge. benefits. As a result, the plaintiff asserted, he was paid a benefit that fell $5,249.08 short of what he was entitled to
Argued: April 20, 2004 receive. Invoking § 502(a)(3) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. Decided and Filed: September 9, 2004 Before: BOGGS, Chief Judge; NELSON and SUTTON, Circuit Judges. If we assume, for purposes of analysis, that the defendants administrator for what he described as “equitable and had no discretion to use the mortality discount factor in injunctive relief.” At the heart of the plaintiff’s prayer for making the benefit calculation, the fact remains that ERISA relief was a request for recovery of additional lump sum § 502(a)(3), which authorizes only suits for injunctive or benefits.
other equitable relief, does not, in most situations, authorize After a wave of motions had been filed, the district court an action for money claimed to be due and owing. An action entered an order granting class certification, granting in which the plaintiff complains that the defendant owes him summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and the class, money and has refused to pay the debt is, of course, the locus ordering a recalculation of lump sum pre-retirement benefits classicus of an action at law; if we were to say that such an without the mortality discount, and requiring the defendants action qualifies as a suit in equity, we should be giving the “to immediately refund [the] under-payments . . . .” words used by Congress in § 502(a)(3) a meaning that Great-
West and Mertens teach they will not bear. The challenged For the district court to order the defendants to “refund” judgment will therefore be reversed. ( i.e. to pay) the difference between the amount calculated without a mortality discount and the amount actually received I was to grant a form of relief not typically available in equity. The individual plaintiff, Frank J. Crosby, was a participant Such relief, we conclude, was thus not available under the in an ERISA retirement plan administered by defendant statutory provision on which the plaintiff elected to base his Bowater Incorporated, the parent corporation of Mr. Crosby’s action. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson ,
sometime employer, Great Northern Paper, Inc. Before he reached his normal retirement age, but after his pension rights had vested, Mr. Crosby lost his job as a result of Great [2] As codified in Title 29 of the U.S. Code, ERISA § 502(a)(3) Northern’s having been sold to another company. The
provides as follows: termination of Mr. Crosby’s employment accelerated his right to receive benefits under the retirement plan.
“A civil action m ay be b rought — * * * The Bowater plan was of the “cash balance” variety, a (3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any species of the “defined benefit” genus. The plan gave Mr. act or practice w hich vio lates any p rovisio n of this subchapter or the terms o f the plan, or (B) to obtain other ap propriate Crosby a hypothetical “Personal Account,” and his benefits equ itable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce
were to be a function of the balance in that account. The any provisions o f this subchapter or the terms of the plan.” balance reflected credits geared to Mr. Crosby’s monthly 29 U.S.C. § 11 32(a)(3) (emphasis supplied). compensation and a specified rate of interest. The Personal Account was nothing more than a computational construct,
A separate provision, § 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 113 2(a)(1)(B ), authorizes a p articipa nt to bring suit “to re cover benefits and benefits were to be paid from the plan’s general assets. due to him under the term s of his plan. . . .” The plaintiff in this case did not invoke § 502(a)(1)(B). No. 03-1044 Crosby v. Bowater Incorporated 5 6 Crosby v. Bowater Incorporated No. 03-1044
Retirement Plan, et al. Retirement Plan, et al. If Mr. Crosby had been able to retire from Great Northern to normal retirement age, (2) dividing the resultant age-65 at age 65 — the “normal retirement age” specified in the plan account balance by the annuity factor prescribed in the plan, — a joint-and-survivor annuity would have been payable as and (3) discounting the age-65 annuity to its present value. long as he or his wife continued living. The amount of the Bowater acceded to this request, notwithstanding that the annuity would have been determined by taking the balance in Internal Revenue Service had approved the plan provision Mr. Crosby’s Personal Account at age 65 and dividing it by pegging the lump sum entitlement to the amount credited to a prescribed annuity factor. And had Mr. Crosby died before the participant’s Personal Account. Mr. Crosby was advised age 65 while still employed by Great Northern, a death that his claim for a larger benefit had been granted and that benefit would have been payable in an amount equal to the his lump sum entitlement had been recalculated. The then present value of his accrued retirement benefit. resulting figure was $52,013.90. We presume that this
amount was paid in full. When Mr. Crosby ceased to be an employee of Great Northern, not having retired or died on the job, he became In a detailed explanation of how it arrived at the eligible, under the terms of the plan, for a distribution of his $52,013.90, Bowater told Mr. Crosby, among other things, retirement benefit. Mr. Crosby, who was 43 years old at the that it had used a pre-normal-retirement-age mortality time, elected to take his distribution in a lump sum. discount factor in its present-value calculation. When it
determined the present value of an age-65 annuity, in other Bowater, as plan administrator, [3] told Mr. Crosby that the words, Bowater took into account the possibility that Mr. lump sum would be $48,732.14. That was the balance in Crosby might die before reaching the age at which he would Crosby’s Personal Account. (Article XII of the plan provided be entitled to start receiving annuity payments. that a participant’s accrued benefit could only be distributed in a form of payment selected by the participant from a list of Mr. Crosby objected to the use of the mortality discount options incorporated in § 12.2 of the plan. The second option, factor, filing an appeal with Bowater in which he made the set forth in § 12.2(b), was “[a] single lump sum payment following argument: equal to the amount credited to the Participant’s Personal “This discount factor is not consistent with the Account as of the end of the month preceding his Benefit calculation method described in IRS Notice 96-8. Commencement date.”)
Further, I believe this discount reduces my accrued Claiming that the relevant statutory law, as interpreted by benefit, and, thus, is not allowed under ERISA.” the Internal Revenue Service in IRS Notice 96-8 (IRB 1996- Bowater’s Pension Administration Committee denied the 6, Feb. 5, 1996), entitled him to receive more than the amount appeal, issuing a five-page explanation of its decision to do credited to his Personal Account, Mr. Crosby asked Bowater so. to recompute his lump sum by (1) projecting interest credits
Mr. Crosby then sued the Bowater plan and Bowater Incorporated in the United States District Court for the [3] Western District of Michigan. The complaint alleged, among Except where the context indica tes otherwise, all references in this opinion to “Bowater” should be read as mea ning Bowater in its plan- other things, (1) that “when Bowater discounted Crosby’s adm inistrator capa city. No. 03-1044 Crosby v. Bowater Incorporated 7 8 Crosby v. Bowater Incorporated No. 03-1044
Retirement Plan, et al. Retirement Plan, et al. age-65 annuity to present value, it should not have used a use of a mortality discount factor for the period before normal mortality discount for the period before normal retirement retirement age. Joinder of such a large number of individuals age;” (2) that “[i]f Bowater had utilized the . . . mortality was said to be impracticable, and the complaint stated that discount factors for the period after normal retirement age Mr. Crosby “seeks both equitable and injunctive relief for the only, Crosby’s lump sum entitlement . . . would have been Class, as permitted under ERISA § 502(a)(3).” $57,262.98” instead of the $52,013.90 produced by the The complaint’s prayer for relief asked the court to enter a method Bowater in fact used; and (3) that “Bowater’s use of judgment ordering the defendants to “[r]e-compute any and a mortality discount for the period before normal retirement all lump sum benefits previously paid,” using the age caused a partial forfeiture of Crosby’s accrued benefit, thereby violating ERISA § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a).” [4] methodology followed in the recomputation of Mr. Crosby’s
lump sum entitlement “ but without any mortality discount for The complaint stated that Mr. Crosby brought his claim the period before normal retirement age .” The court was “under ERISA § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a), and the further asked to (1) order the defendants to “[p]ay all Plan enabling statute, ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).” participants or their beneficiaries who previously received a As noted above, Mr. Crosby did not bring his claim under lump sum distribution . . . the difference between the amount ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) — the section that authorizes a party [so] computed . . . and the lump sum amount the participant to sue for “benefits due to him under the terms of his or beneficiary received from the Plan, plus pre-judgment and plan. . . .” (Under the language of the plan, Mr. Crosby was post-judgment interest on this amount;” to (2) “[e]njoin entitled to less than he had already been paid — a defendants from utilizing a mortality discount for the period circumstance that explains the decision not to invoke before normal retirement age when computing a lump sum § 502(a)(1)(B). [5] )
distribution from the Plan in the future;” and to (3) order the defendants to “[p]ay . . . reasonable attorney’s fees and costs
The complaint alleged that approximately 350 plan . . . .” The prayer for relief also included a request that the participants or beneficiaries were in the same boat as Mr. court “impose a constructive trust over the amount of plan Crosby — i.e. , they were victims of Bowater’s insistence on assets necessary to pay the amounts determined . . . and award
any other equitable relief this Court deems appropriate.” The defendants responded to the complaint with a motion [4] Section 203(a) sets forth rules on the extent to which accrued to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P. The first and
benefits are nonforfeitable. As Mr. Crosb y subsequently reiterated in a second numbered paragraphs of the defendants’ motion read brief filed with the district co urt, “Cro sby’s claim is for violation of . . . as follows: the anti-forfeiture rules unde r ER ISA § 20 3(a).” “1. Crosby purports to bring this action under Section [5] In his brief on appeal, Mr. Crosby tells us that he “ could not bring
502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income Security his claim und er ER ISA § 50 2(a)(1)(B) because the Plan ’s lump sum Act of 1974 (‘ERISA’), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), and provision contemplates paym ent of an amo unt equal to the particip ant’s styles it as an action to enforce Section 203(a)(2)(A) of Personal Account . . ., the amo unt Bowater initially offered Crosby. Consequently, if Crosby had brought his claim under § 502(a)(1)(B), he ERISA. would be entitled to no relief at all . . . .” W e intimate no view as to whether this propo sition is correct. No. 03-1044 Crosby v. Bowater Incorporated 9 10 Crosby v. Bowater Incorporated No. 03-1044
Retirement Plan, et al. Retirement Plan, et al. 2. Crosby sues to recover an increased lump sum The response was accompanied with a cross motion for distribution of his retirement benefit under the Plan, a summary judgment based on the complaint as filed; at no time retirement benefit plan sponsored and administered by did Mr. Crosby seek leave to amend the complaint. Bowater. In particular, Crosby claims that in calculating In due course, after Mr. Crosby had filed a motion for class the present value of his retirement benefit, defendants certification, the district court ordered briefing on the incorrectly used a mortality discount for the part of that appropriateness of the requested equitable remedies in the calculation dealing with the time before Crosby had event the plaintiff succeeded on his summary judgment reached age 65.”
motion. In the brief filed pursuant to the court’s direction, The brief accompanying the motion pointed out that the Mr. Crosby reiterated he had brought his claim under statutory provision on which Mr. Crosby purported to sue did § 502(a)(3), “which authorizes ‘appropriate equitable relief.’” not authorize a suit for the relief he was seeking: Arguing that the relief he sought was “equitable” as well as
“appropriate,” Mr. Crosby cited Great-West Life & Annuity “Although what he really seeks is an award of Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 634 U.S. 204 (2002), as “suggest[ing] additional benefits, a claim properly brought under that if the relief requested does not seek to impose liability for E R I S A § 5 0 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( B ) , 2 9 U . S . C . a contractual monetary obligation, it is probably an § 1132(a)(1)(B)[footnote omitted], Crosby purports to appropriate equitable remedy.” The district court was told that sue under ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). “Crosby does not seek to impose liability on defendants for That provision only authorizes Crosby to bring an action any contractual obligation to pay money.” to ‘enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of [ERISA] or the terms of the plan.’” After the completion of briefing, and having dispensed with
oral argument, the district court entered a final judgment in Mr. Crosby filed a response to the 12(b)(6) motion in which which the court granted class certification; denied the he admitted the substance of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the defendants’ motion to dismiss; granted the plaintiff’s motion: summary judgment motion; enjoined the defendants “to recalculate the lump sum benefits of class members who had
“1. Crosby agrees that he brought this action under previously received lump sum benefits, in accordance with § 203(a)(2) and § 502(a)(3) of the Employee the Court’s Opinion, and to immediately refund under- Retirement Income Security Act (‘ERISA’). payments, plus pre-judgment and post-judgment interest;” 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2) and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). and to “calculate lump sum benefit payments for class members who have not yet received any lump sum benefits in
2. Crosby agrees that (a) he is suing to recover accordance with the Court’s Opinion.” additional lump sum benefits; (b) the Plan is sponsored and administered by Bowater; and (c) he
The opinion itself — a comprehensive and well-crafted claims that Bowater incorrectly utilized a mortality analysis of a variety of issues, some of which are not in discount for the period before age 65 when it contention on appeal — reasoned that because the plan computed his lump sum.” provided for payment of a pre-retirement death benefit in the amount of the then-vested present value of the participant’s
No. 03-1044 Crosby v. Bowater Incorporated 11 12 Crosby v. Bowater Incorporated No. 03-1044 Retirement Plan, et al. Retirement Plan, et al. accrued benefit, the death benefit was not “incidental” to the to a party who prevailed in a court of equity (injunctive relief, participant’s accrued benefit and the plan administrator thus e.g. ) were far from identical to the remedies the prevailing lacked discretion to use a mortality discount factor in party could obtain in a court of law. Although, in most reducing the projected age-65 annuity to its present value. jurisdictions, the same courts have long administered both
law and equity, [6] the unified courts have been administering The bottom line, in the district court’s view, was that the lump sum payment to which Mr. Crosby claimed to be what Professor Geldart described as “distinct bodies of law,
governed largely by different principles.” [7] entitled — $57,262.98, as the court noted — should not have undergone the mortality reduction that resulted in a lump sum Against this background, we return to the text of ERISA payout of only $52,013.90.
§ 502(a)(3), the statutory section under which plaintiff Crosby The defendants perfected a timely appeal. Much of the brought his suit. Under § 502(a)(3), as codified at 29 U.S.C. argument they present to our court is a defense of the merits § 1132(a)(3), Mr. Crosby could institute a proceeding “(A) to of the plan administrator’s decision to take pre-retirement enjoin any act or practice which violates [ERISA] or the mortality risk into account. The defendants argue further that terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable the decision should have been reviewed under an arbitrary- relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any and- capricious standard, and that the district court was provisions of [ERISA] or the terms of the plan.” (Emphasis required to uphold the decision as reasonable. We do not supplied.) Section 502(a)(3) does not authorize a plan reach these issues, because — as the defendants also argue — participant to sue for recovery of benefits due to him under the primary relief sought by Mr. Crosby did not qualify as the terms of the plan. That is the office of § 502(1)(B) — a “equitable relief” of the sort authorized by ERISA section with which Mr. Crosby has always insisted he will § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). have nothing to do.
II But what if the benefits are not claimed to be due under terms of the plan, strictly speaking, but under the terms of a The present opinion is not the place for a history lesson on statute — in this case ERISA § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) the development of the parallel systems of jurisprudence — setting forth requirements that the plan must satisfy? The known as “law” and “equity.” It will suffice, we trust, to answer, we believe, depends on whether the claim for benefits remind the reader that courts of law — in which the common allegedly due under the statutory requirements is or is not, at law of the English speaking peoples had its principal growth bottom, a claim for injunctive or other equitable relief. No — were for a number of centuries separate and distinct from matter how well founded it may be as a matter of substantive chancery courts (originally the court of an ecclesiastical person appointed by the king to be his chancellor); that the rules of decision followed in chancery courts were not [6] common law rules, but rules of equity; that chancery courts In England, for example, this has been true since 1875. See W.M. Geldart, Elements of English Law (5th Ed. 1953) at p. 22. In some ( i.e. courts of equity) likewise had their own procedures —
American jurisdictions — New Jersey, for example — the fusion took procedures under which, for example, the chancellor place within living memory. See N.J. Const., Art. 11, §4, ¶ 3 (1947). performed the fact-finding rôle that in courts of law would be performed by a jury; and that the remedies typically available [7] Geldart, id.
No. 03-1044 Crosby v. Bowater Incorporated 13 14 Crosby v. Bowater Incorporated No. 03-1044 Retirement Plan, et al. Retirement Plan, et al. law, a claim for benefits is not cognizable under § 502(a)(3) We do not find this line of argument persuasive. It is true of ERISA unless it is a claim for “equitable relief.” that Mr. Crosby requested the district court to impose a
constructive trust over the amount of plan assets necessary to As used in § 502(a)(3), the Supreme Court has repeatedly pay his claim — and over the separate assets of Bowater held, “equitable relief” refers to “those categories of relief that Incorporated, if necessary — but we do not read Harris Trust were typically available in equity (such as injunction, as suggesting that such a request for securitization of the debt mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory damages).” can transmogrify Mr. Crosby’s claim for a money judgment Mertens v. Hewitt Associates , 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993); cf. into an essentially equitable claim. A glance at the facts of Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson , 534 U.S. Harris Trust explains why. 204, 210 (2002). And “[a]lmost invariably . . . suits seeking (whether by judgment, injunction, or declaration) to compel In Harris Trust a retirement plan had purchased certain the defendant to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff are suits motel interests from a company that the plan had been using for ‘money damages,’ as that phrase has traditionally been as a stockbroker. Because the stockbroker was a “party in applied, since they seek no more than compensation for loss interest,” as the Supreme Court assumed, the purchase of the resulting from the defendant’s breach of legal duty.” Bowen motel interests was prohibited under § 406(a)(1)(A) of v. Massachusetts , 487 U.S. 879, 918-19 (1988) (Scalia, J., ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(A). Invoking the “equitable dissenting), as quoted with approval in Great-West , 534 U.S. relief” provision of ERISA § 502(a)(3), the trustee and the at 210. “And ‘[m]oney damages are, of course, the classic administrator of the retirement plan sued the stockbroker for form of legal relief.’” Id . (quoting Mertens , 508 U.S. at 255). rescission of the purchase of the motel interests; restitution of
the purchase price, with interest, from the stockbroker; and Mr. Crosby acknowledged in the court below that suits disgorgement of any profits the stockbroker had made with seeking to compel the defendant to pay a sum of money to the the purchase money. plaintiff are “almost invariably” excluded from the category of suits seeking relief typically available in equity, according The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded to the Supreme Court. Citing Harris Trust and Savings Bank that as a non-fiduciary, the stockbroker could not be held v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc. , 530 U.S. 238 (2000), however, liable under § 502(a)(3) for participating in a transaction Crosby argued that “‘[a]lmost invariably’ does not mean prohibited by § 406. See Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Salomon Brothers Inc. , 184 F.3d 646, 653 (7 th Cir. 1999). The ‘always’ . . . .” (Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Request for Equitable Relief, at page 29.) Because he is seeking Supreme Court reversed, holding that the stockbroker’s non- imposition of a constructive trust (an equitable remedy) on fiduciary status did not insulate it from claims for equitable property that he says “truly and equitably” belongs to him, relief under § 502(a)(3). see Harris Trust at 250-51, and because “restitution [another
Referring to the law of trusts — one of the main branches equitable remedy] may be awarded for any ‘ill-gotten plan of equity jurisprudence — the Harris Trust court observed assets or profits,’” see id . at 253, Mr. Crosby argued that his that individual claim for the wrongfully withheld $5,249.08 was not a claim for legal relief, but a claim for the sort of
“it has long been settled that when a trustee in breach of “equitable relief” spoken of in § 502(a)(3). his fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries transfers trust No. 03-1044 Crosby v. Bowater Incorporated 15 16 Crosby v. Bowater Incorporated No. 03-1044 Retirement Plan, et al. Retirement Plan, et al. on assets so conveyed. [8] And he is not seeking disgorgement property to a third person, the third person takes the property subject to the trust, unless he has purchased the of profits made by a third party on ill-gotten assets. Harris property for value and without notice of the fiduciary’s Trust , as we see it, is thus inapposite. breach of duty. The trustee or beneficiaries may then While Harris Trust is readily distinguishable from the case maintain an action for restitution of the property (if not now before us, Great-West , in our judgment, is not. It is true already disposed of) or disgorgement of proceeds (if that the plaintiffs in Great-West sought to impose personal already disposed of), and disgorgement of the third liability on the defendants for a contractual obligation to pay person’s profits derived therefrom.” Harris Trust , 530 money, whereas here the plaintiff insists that the asserted U.S. at 250.
liability is not contractual in nature. [9] But if we accept, for The Court went on to explain that purposes of analysis, plaintiff Crosby’s representation that he, unlike the plaintiffs in Great-West , has no claim for breach of “[o]nly a transferee of ill-gotten trust assets may be held contract, we think that the distinction between the Great-West liable, and then only when the transferee (assuming he case and this one is a distinction without a difference. has purchased for value) knew or should have known of the existence of the trust and the circumstances that The statutory origin of Bowater’s asserted obligation to pay rendered the transfer in breach of the trust.” Id . at 251. Mr. Crosby an additional $5,249.08, with interest, does not
mean that a breach of the obligation to pay is redressable And — making an obvious point that has obvious significance for us — the Supreme Court observed that a suit against a transferee for tainted plan assets, in addition to [8]
M r. Cro sby does ask for imposition of a constructive trust over satisfying the “appropriateness” criterion, sufficient assets to assure that his claim will be paid, thereby putting him in a better position than he wo uld occupy as a general credito r. But
“is also ‘ equitable ’ in nature. See Mertens , 508 U.S., at Crosby has no basis for obtaining such a priority, as far as we can see, and 260 (‘[T]he “ equitable relief ” awardable under he is clearly not asking for application of the principle applied in Ha rris Trust — the principle tha t trust property transferred to a third party in § 502(a)(5) includes restitution of ill-gotten plan assets breach of the trustee’s fiduciary duty is impressed with a trust “unless [the or profits . . .’); ibid . (explaining that, in light of the third party] has purchased the property for value and without notice of the similarity of language in §§ 502(a)(3) and (5), that fiduciary’s breach of duty.” Harris Trust , 530 U.S. at 250. language should be deemed to have the same meaning in [9] both subsections).” Id . at 253 (emphasis supplied).
On its face, as we have seen, the language of the retireme nt plan’s lump sum provision contemplates payment of an amount equal only to the In the case at bar, of course, Mr. Crosby is not seeking participant’s Personal Account — an amount less than Bowater has already voluntarily paid . In add ition to p ointing this out, Mr. Crosby restitution to the plan of assets wrongfully conveyed to a third notes that among the plan’s miscellaneous provisions is the following: party. He is not seeking to have a constructive trust imposed “The adoption and maintenance of this Plan shall not be deemed to constitute a contract, expressed or implied, between the Company and any Employee or to be a consideration for, or inducement or condition of, the employment of any person .” It thus seems clear that M r. Cro sby wo uld have had no claim for breach of contract absent ERISA, whatever the situation may be in light of ERISA.
No. 03-1044 Crosby v. Bowater Incorporated 17 18 Crosby v. Bowater Incorporated No. 03-1044 Retirement Plan, et al. Retirement Plan, et al. through a suit in equity rather than an action at law. mortality discount factor in computing future lump sum Historically, an action in debt was no less an action at law distributions. Assuming that such relief might be beneficial than an action in covenant. See F.W. Maitland, The Forms of to someone, however, it could only benefit members of the Action at Common Law 63, 64 (A.H. Chaytor & W. J. class other than Mr. Crosby. In the next (and concluding) part Whittaker eds., 1948). And an action of assumpsit (a form of of this opinion we address the question whether Mr. Crosby trespass on the case) to redress the breach of a statutory can maintain the present suit on behalf of other class members obligation to pay a sum certain was likewise an action at law. who might arguably receive some benefit from the equitable See G.C. Cheshire and C.H.S. Fifoot, Law of Contract 15 (3rd relief sought for them. ed. 1952); Marley v. Bankers’ Indemnity Insurance Co. , 166 III A. 350, 351 (R.I. 1933) (holding that trespass on the case is the appropriate action to enforce a statutory right).
The Supreme Court has held that a class action may proceed despite the dismissal of the named plaintiff’s claim, If it be argued that Mr. Crosby’s position should be likened if the class has been certified and at least one class member to that of a beneficiary of a trust, who could invoke the has a live claim. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin , 500 jurisdiction of an equity court to enforce a right to receive U.S. 44, 51-52 (1991), and Sosna v. Iowa , 419 U.S. 393, 399- money from the trust, the short answer is that just such an 403 (1975). But these decisions in no way detract from the argument has been explicitly rejected by the United States principle that the judicial power of Article III courts extends Supreme Court. See Great-West , 353 U.S. at 219:
only to the “cases and controversies” specified in that article. “These trust remedies are simply inapposite. In Mertens , If the class action is to be maintained, therefore, there must be we rejected the claim that the special equity-court powers “a named plaintiff who has such a case or controversy at the applicable to trusts define the reach of § 502(a)(3).” time the complaint is filed and at the time the class action is
certified.” Sosna , 419 U.S. at 402. Where the named It remains to be mentioned that Mr. Crosby does request a plaintiff’s claim is one over which “federal jurisdiction never form of equitable relief in asking that the defendants be attached,” there can be no class action. See Walters v. Edgar , ordered to recompute — without any mortality discount for 163 F.3d 430, 432-33 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied , 526 U.S. the period before normal retirement age — “any and all lump 1146 (1999). sum benefits previously paid to Plan participants,” including Mr. Crosby. As far as Crosby’s individual claim is For reasons already explained, we do not believe that Mr. concerned, however, such a recomputation by the defendants Crosby ever had a justiciable claim under ERISA § 502(a)(3), is unnecessary; Mr. Crosby or his advisors have already the particular statutory provision on which he elected to sue. performed the recomputation themselves, and Crosby’s Our caselaw teaches — perhaps surprisingly — that federal complaint specifies the amount claimed to be due him down subject matter jurisdiction is lacking in such a situation. Thus to the last penny. Equity, as the pertinent equitable maxim in QualChoice, Inc. v. Rowland , 367 F.3d 638, 650 (6th Cir. tells us, does not require the doing of a vain act. 2004), we affirmed the dismissal, on jurisdictional grounds,
of an action that sought essentially legal relief under Mr. Crosby’s complaint also asks for equitable relief in the § 502(a)(3). In Community Health Plan of Ohio v. Mosser , form of injunction against use of a pre-normal-retirement-age 347 F.3d 619, 624 (6th Cir. 2003), similarly, we held that an No. 03-1044 Crosby v. Bowater Incorporated 19
Retirement Plan, et al. action seeking legal relief under § 502(a)(3) must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Community Insurance Co. v. Morgan , 54 Fed. Appx. 828, 831-33 (6th Cir. 2002), and Sheet Metal Local #24 v. Newman , 35 Fed. Appx. 204, 207 (6th Cir. 2002), are in accordance with that holding. If these decisions mean what they say, federal jurisdiction never attached to Mr. Crosby’s claim in the case at bar. It follows that there is no class action. See Walters , 163 F.3d at 432-33.
The judgment entered by the district court is VACATED and the case is REMANDED with instructions to DISMISS Mr. Crosby’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
NOTES
[1] F.W . Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law 2 (A.H. Chaytor & W .J. Whittaker eds., 1948). 1 No. 03-1044 Crosby v. Bowater Incorporated 3 4 Crosby v. Bowater Incorporated No. 03-1044 Retirement Plan, et al. Retirement Plan, et al. § 1132(a)(3),
[2] and purporting to act on behalf of a class of 534 U.S. 204 (2002), and Mertens v. Hewitt Associates , 508 approximately 350 plan participants said to be similarly U.S. 248 (1993). situated, the plaintiff brought suit against the plan and its