Cropper v. People

CROPPER, Petitioner David Lee of the State of

The PEOPLE

Colorado, Respondent.

No. 09SC828. Colorado,

Supreme Court of

En Bane. 14, 2011.

March April

Rehearing Denied Wilson, Defender,

Douglas K. Re- Public Defender, Freyre, Deputy R. Public becea Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner. General, Suthers, Attorney Debo- John W. Pratt, Isenberg Attorney rah Assistant Gen- Colorado, eral, Denver, Attorneys for Re- spondent.

485 procedural requirements in section 16-3- Opinion of the Justice RICE delivered 309(5) resulted in a waiver of Court. his confronta rights. tion we review the constitutionali this (2010), 16-3-309(5), as ty of section C.R.S. Analysis II. petitioner, Cropper.1 David Lee applied to that, Hingjos-Mendoza v. hold based on We Right A. The to Confrontation (Colo.2007), Cropper P.3d 662 People, 169 and Section and, rights his confrontation there waived The Confrontation Clause of the fore, ap as the statute was gives United States Constitution a criminal plied. Accordingly,we affirm the decisionof defendant "to be confronted with appeals. the court of against the witnesses him." U.S. Const. Likewise, amend. VI. the Colorado Constitu Proceedings Below I. Facts and provides a criminal defendant the trial, jury Cropper After a was convicted against "to meet the witnesses him face to degree burglary and theft. Pursu of second II, § face." art. Although Colo. Const. 16. trial, 16, prior prosecu P. ant to Crim. fundamental, it is not without provided Cropper a list of the witnesses limit, People Mojica-Simental, 15, v. 73 P.3d experts call at trial planned that as Melendez, (Colo.2003), waived, 19 and can be chemistry. Included in the area of forensic Diaz, n. A 129 S.Ct. 2584 defendant's prepared the list was a technician who may counsel waive his client's confrontation report showing that a left on a Ilinois, 400, right. Taylor 418, v. entry door that had been kicked in to obtain (1988) ("the 98 L.Ed.2d 798 type could have been from the same of shoe accept consequences client must of the Cropper wearing apprehended.2 when he was lawyer's forgo decision to cross-examina objected Cropper At tion"); Curtis, People v. 511 the admission of this because the tech (Colo.1984) ("[Dlefense counsel stands as prepared nician who it was not available to captain ship. of the ... [Dlecisions commit testify family emergen an out due to of state ted to ... counsel include whether and how cy. Cropper contended introduction of (internal to conduct ..." cross-examination from the techni omitted)). quotations And, and citations prepared rights cian who it violated his instances, some defense counsel's inaction confrontation and cross-examination. alone is sufficient to constitute a waiver. Relying procedures set forth in Melendes-Diaz, ("The 129 S.Ct. at 2534 n. 3. the trial court found that course, may, to confrontation be had not notified the waived, including by object to the ten-day within the stated limit that he wished ..."). offending evidence. and, for the technician to for this reason, report. admitted the the aid of impli With The Confrontation Clause is hearsay cated when testimonial is admitted supplemental briefing regarding the then re cently against decided Melendez-Diaz v. Massachu a criminal defendant. To -- setts, --, S.Ct. Clause, with the Confrontation testimonial (2009), appeals up hearsay may only L.Ed.2d 814 the court of if be admitted the declar- shoe-print report, held the admission of the ant is unavailable and the defendant has had holding Cropper's prior opportunity failure to follow the to cross-examine the de- granted ultimately 1. We certiorari to determine: The detective who about the testified shoe-print analysis appeals stated that a erroneously is not like Whether the court of con- fingerprint analysis unique cluded counsel's inaction under section 16-3- 309(5) where there are petitioner's Instead, a valid constituted waiver prints for each individual. he testified rights state and federal confrontation under [the indicated that "it could be Hinojos-Mendoza, this Court's decision con- shoe}, because, course, same there are other trary to well established federal and state law ... shoes like that out there that could have concerning the waiver of constitutional made the same mark." Mojica-Simental. and this Court's decision in 486G omitted). (citation Specif tionally. Id. at 20 Washington, 541 U.S.

clarant. Crawford might there be a consti ically, we stated that 36, 68, a defendant does problem "[if tutional and the United this Court Both determined Supreme Court have actual notice States have hearsay notify reports statute, mistakenly pros are testimonial the forensic lab fails to requirements. clause confrontation subject to these the technician to have ecution 2582; ndez-Diaz, at Mele also listed a testify...." Id. at 20-21. We at 666-67. 169 P.8d Hinojos-Mendoza, might court factors that a trial series of as the Therefore, report such for a forensic a valid if there was to determine consider case to be analysis at in this issue Id. right of confrontation.3 waiver of the time, must, admitted, at some defendant the the Hinojos-Mendoza, In we reaffirmed the to cross-examine opportunity have an 16-8-809(5) constitutionality of section and it. prepared who technician acknowledged Mojica-Si- in that the dicta 16-8-309(5) recognizes this re- Section misplaced mental was because it was based that: It states quirement. assumption mistaken a defen- findings copy thereof or the report or Any right can waive his of confronta- dant laboratory shall be the eriminalistiecs of knowing, personally if makes a vol- he court, any prelimi- in in received evidence 169 P.3d at untary, intentional waiver. and in grand jury proceeding nary hearing, or Instead, confirmed that defense we and with the same force the same manner counsel can waive a defendant's employee if or technician and effect as the prepared who a fo- confront the technician laboratory who accom- of the criminalistics by complying pro- with the rensic comparison, analysis, requested the plished in cedural section person. had testified or identification attorney if unaware of the stat- even is employee may request that such Any party ("where requirements. at 670 ute or its at a crimi- person or technician counsel, represented by ... is a defendant state before a trial on behalf of the mal statutory pre- court, notifying the wit- jury or to the 16-8-809(5) waives the requisites of section days party least ten other at mess and confront the witness defendant's eriminal trial. the date such of before just forgo eross-examina- as the decision added). on (emphasis § Based right"). trial would waive that tion at statute, may invoke a criminal defendant this ar- Hinojos-Mendosa, pros- In right by notifying the his confrontation days prior to the date of at least ten was vio- gued ecution that his of confrontation opportuni- trial that he wishes to exercise his opportunity lated when he was denied pre- ty the technician who prepared to cross-examine a technician who cross-examine report. pared the prosecution entered into lab The defendant's attor- evidence. Id. at 664. Mojica-Simental, found that ney not follow the set forth did burden procedure impose does not an undue failed to and protects a adequately and on the defendant opportunity for cross-examination before an right of confrontation. defendant's unaware of the statute trial because he was Thus, we held that section 16-3- at 18-20. requirements. Id. Be- procedural and its 309(5) Id. at 18. constitutional on its face. is that an at- of our stated dicta, cause But, that section 16-3- we cautioned 309(5) rules, unconstitutionally if applied applicable procedural torney knows the could be counsel's failure to re- we held that defense right of confrontation was the defendant's was quest testimony from the technician voluntarily, knowingly, and inten not waived witness; significance to presence Specifically: report and of the the case of the litigant pro or a se actual- whether technician; any required would be elicited from the ly he knew that opposing party pertinent of his desire to have witness circumstances. other why present; notice was late or reasons Mojica-Simental, 73 P.3d at 21. all; difficulty acquiring given was not a valid waiver of the defendant's confronta- Mojica-Simental Court's dicta in which stat- though even ed that: knowledge actual have of section 16-3- 16-3~809(5) might be best utilized 309(5)'s requirements. Id. at 670. if proponent the lab notifies opposing party that it intends to intro- B. Melendez-Diaz and Notice- duce the lab without a foundational and-Demand Statutes witness, lab technician unless advised ten supporting classify its decision to fo days before trial that presence the witness' reports hearsay, rensic lab as testimonial desired, parties and the discuss the mat- category Court discussed a ter, at pre-trial opportunity, some to en- statutes, state which it labeled as notice- sure that parties agreement all in are as to statutes, provide proce and-demand that whether the witness will present. be dures similar to in those 73 P.3d at 21. disagree We and hold that ndez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2540- Mele providing the defense with a forensic lab stated, 41. "[mlany As the Court States report through discovery is put sufficient to (or permit ... to assert for that, the defendant on notice absent specif- a silence) feit his Confrontation Clause ic under section the re- receiving after prosecu notice of the port can be introduced without live testimo- analyst's tion's intent to use a forensic re ny. (citations omitted). port." It clarified always that a "defendant has the burden of Application C. to this Case raising objection [a] Confrontation Clause case, In this although Cropper did not notice-and-demand simply [and] statutes specific have notice that prosecution in- govern the time within which [a defendant] proceed tended to without testimony, live he must do so." Id. at 2541. It then cited did have notice prosecution that the intended Hinojos-Mendoza for proposition that it to introduce the shoe-print report. Pursuant permissible require is to a defendant to ex- I(a)(1){III), Crim. P. prosecutor Part a ereise his Confrontation Clause be required provide is "[alny defense with parenthetical fore trial with a stating that reports or experts statements of made in ap- "discuss[ed] and particular case, connectionwith the including provied Colorado's of] notice-and-demand tests, results of ... scientific experiments, or provision." Despite its discussion of Hi- comparisons." prosecution provide must nojos-Mendoza, Supreme Court did not reports practicable these "as soon as but not 16-8-809(5).4 pass judgment on section thirty days later than before trial." Crim. P. Although Cropper bring does not a I(b)(8). Part challenge, argues facial he that section 16-3- 309(5) is different The record prosecu reflects that the than the notice-and-de mand statutes the Supreme provided Court dis Cropper shoe-print with the favorably cussed in Melendes-Diaz early because discovery process. Al require prosecution give does not though prosecution included the techni cian in experts pre-trial notice of its intent its list of expected who "are introduce forensic lab without testimony. live in the area of forensic chemistry," difference, contends, Cropper This only introduced the with incompatible makes it with the dicta from out the technician because he was out of Melendez-Diaz, goes but against also family state due to a emergency.6 Regard 4. Court denied Cropper object certiorari in Hino- did not or claim bad jos-Mendoza just days four after it released its faith as to the failure of the to make Hinojos-Mendoza any decision in of the Melendez-Diaz. other witnesses available. -- Colorado, --, original In addition to the witness list that prosecution provided pursuant to Crim. P. that, list, Cropper argues based prosecution provided "good on this he faith witness expected testify. Only day the technician to one of list" the of trial that contained the name of actually the six witnesses from that list Cropper argues testified the technician. prosecu- that the (citation prosecu procedure. 169 P.3d at 670 omit any representations less of testify, ted). Today, that the technician would tion made apply Hinojos-Mendoza's presence had notice of the holding recognize attorney that an is adequate opportunity expected proc report and had an to know the rules Further, rights and re Cropper's confrontation edure.8 we assume when assert attorney procedural fails to for quest the technician be rules set forth cross-examination. attorney has made decision to waive defen essentially the The facts in this case are regardless dant's of confrontation Thus, Hinojos-Mendoza. same as those whether the knew of or understood reach our decision in this we need requirements.9 the statute or its Because reasoning apply look to and the same Cropper's attorney did not these follow Hinojos-Mendoga. employed that we cedures, Cropper's right of she waived con avail herself of Cropper's frontation. Cropper's confron opportunity to assert rights by objecting to the introduction

tation III. Conclusion testimo 16-8-809(5)'s ten-day time ny within section hold that section We consti- limit she did not understand section because applied Cropper. tutional as it was to He 16-3-309(5), requirements, applicab its or its received notice of sufficient the existence of ility.7 shoe-print report potential and the that it ap attorney's Cropper's decline that we would be introduced at trial. His We 16-8-309(5)'s ignorance require- as to section Mojica-Simental and ply the dicta from ments does not alter our decision. There- thereby requirements relax the of section 16- fore, we affirm the decision of the court 3-309(5) of the defendant not "d[id] because appeals. have actual notice of the

statute, mistakenly or to failled] dissents, present to have the technician to Justice MARTINEZ and Chief testify...." Hinojos- joins 73 P.3d at 20-21. Justice BENDER in the dissent. Mendoza, presume we stated that "we MARTINEZ, dissenting. Justice attorneys applicable proce know the rules of disagree applica respectfully majority's dure" and found section I despite the fact that the defendant's at that defense misun- ble counsel's torney applicable derstanding rules of of section did know C.R.S. by including potential acted in bad faith the techni- the destruction of evidence and the justified cian on that list and that he was to have for the defendant access to that evi- reliance, regardless relying Certainly on this list. This dence. this is not the situation validity, Cropper's any its did not affect failure to where there's inclination that Mr. Mar- 16~3-309(5). with section Because tinez, could not think comply that-I that's our day list was delivered the it would not primary objection. ability timely Cropper's to make a have affected day, Cropper's attorney The next elaborated on present. demand for the technician to be objection explained her in chambers and that: When the Court had asked me if I filed a subsection, Cropper's attorney objected required by 7. After to the intro- motion I will tell report, explained the Court that I had no whatsoever duction of the she her under- inclination standing judge: the statute to the ten-day requirement there was that I obligation basically had an affirmative de- to, My understanding is that that refers like a Attorney produce mand that the District their preliminary hearing and at trial we have a witnesses. right, especially confrontational as to concluso- ry by statements wilnesses. important It is also to note that section 16-3- 309(5) is not a new statute. It has been in effect context talks about the de- of 16-3-309 since 1984. struction of evidence as as the defendant's far ability to have access to it. say that a would not have a This is not client malpractice against We think it's not because we believe colorable claim for his or statute, basically attorney. particular, is-refers her

489 (2010), consequent comply explained and with the defendant must take affir- a valid requirements, its constituted waiver steps right mative to activate the compel right Cropper's fundamental to confronta- presence present and the testimony of Accordingly, tion. because 400, witnesses. 484 U.S. 108 S.Ct. 98 (1988). confrontation, I right waive his conclude applied was not con- right compel presence [The and stitutionally in the case. instant pro- of witnesses Generally, the U.S. Court has may vides the defendant with a sword that presume refused to waiver of a fundamental employed be to rebut right from a defendant's inac case. The employ decision whether to it in Zerbst, tion. In Johnson v. the Court de particular solely case rests with the de- the waiver of a fundamental constitu fined very fendant. nature of the relinquishment tional as "an intentional requires that its preceded effective use be privilege." or abandonment of a known planning deliberate and affirmative con- 458, 464, 30 duct. (1938). Cochran, Carniley L.Ed. Id. at Accordingly, 108 S.Ct. 646. be- explained the Court further cause in Taylor had failed to show, record must or there be [tlhe must discovery requiring rule pre- show, allegation and evidence which witnesses, trial disclosure of defense that an accused was offered counsel but Court concluded that the defendant had intelligently understandingly rejected failed to exercise his under Compul- Anything the offer. less is not waiver. sory Process Clause. Id. The Court thus 506, 516, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 approved preclud- of the trial court's sanction Due to these for a ing the testifying defendant's witness from waiver, steadfastly valid the Court has re 418, trial. Id. at 108 S.Ct. 646. presume fused to waiver of a defendant's Massachusetts, In Melendez-Diaz v. constitutional from inaction alone. See reasoning Taylor Court relied on the in Arizona, 436, 475, e.g.,. Miranda v. 384 U.S. support position its that a defendant must (1966) ("[A] 86 16 S.Ct. -- exercise the to confrontation. U.S. presumed simply valid waiver will not be --, 2527, 2541, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 from the silence of the accused after [Mi (2009). emphasized The Court that "[the warnings given simply ] randa are from always defendant has the raising burden of the fact that a in confession was fact eventu objection|.]" his Confrontation Clause Id. obtained."); Alabama, ally Boykin v. 395 {emphasis original). in sug The Court then 238, 242-43, 89 23 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d gested that certain notice-and-demand stat (1969) (requiring 274 an "affirmative show they "simply utes are constitutional because ing" in guilty plea the record that a govern the time within which" the defendant Thus, knowing voluntary). and in Barker v. must raise his to confront a witness. Wingo, "presuming the Court held that waiv (emphasis original). Id. Crucial to the er of a fundamental from inaction is [] reasoning Court's simple was the fact that pronounce inconsistent with this Court's statutes, notice-and-demand unlike the vari rights." ments on waiver of constitutional 514, 525, ety of receiving statutes 33 L.Ed.2d notice-and-demand el,10 require lab 101 vide the defendant with actual notice. has, however, required The Court affirma- part tive conduct on of the defendant to form, simplest In their notice-and-demand rights. require exercise certain provide For statutes Illinois, example, Taylor v. the Court motice to the its intent to use defendant of 10. Commentators have identified at least four Clause, 110 Colum. L.Rev. 161, 182-86 (2010) types (identifying simple different of statutes that receive the notice- notice-and-demand Sokoler, and-demand label. See Jennifer B. statutes, statutes, notice-and-demand anti- "plus" Note, statutes, cipatory subpoena Between Substance and Procedure: A Role demand and defense Scope statutes). States' in the Interests for Confronta-

A440 Ann. (citing approval with Ga.Code report as evidence at analyst's

an given period (2006); is a the defendant § Tex.Code Crim. Proc. after which 35-3-154.1 (Vernon 38.41, 2005); Ann., § Art. may object to the he in which of time 2925.51(c) (West § Ann. the ana- Ohio Rev.Code the evidence absent admission 2006)). Noticeably absent from the Court's trial. live at lyst's appearance is section 16-3- approved statutes list added). actual notice re- This (emphasis Id. 309(5). Thus, by refusing approve stat explained, the Court quirement, requirement, an actual notice utes that lack silence) (or forfeit to assert the defendant reasoning in Melendes-Diaz ac the Court's right after receiv- Clause his Confrontation constitutionality of tually casts doubt intent to use ing notice 16-8-309(5) and other notice-and-de section Thus, analyst's report." because forensic require prose- fail statutes that mand actual notice of receives actual notice to defense provide ecutionto object pre-trial and requirement counsel. witness, the Court to confront simple notice-and-demand suggested misplaced to majority is further requiring the are no different from statutes ap implies that Melendes-Diaz extent Clause to raise a Confrontation defendant of waiver from a proved presumption of a reasoned objection. light, In this Court procedural to follow the defendant's failure statutes "shift simple notice-and-demand 16-8-309(5). My. of section no burden whatever." Hinojos-Mendoza People, op. at 487. In however, majority, fails to address the can infer from the this court stated that "we simple notice- key distinction between procedural require favorably in discussed and-demand statutes ments that the made decision and Colorado's notice-and- Melendez-Diaz right at issue." 169 P.3d to exercise the 16-3-309(5). found at section demand statute (Colo.2007). This of waiver clear, 16-3- Maj. op. at 437. To be underlying presumption- depended upon 309(5) simple not a notice-and-demand is namely that an knows the law and Melendez, type approved statute of statutory thus has notice of the problem The fundamental see Diaz. Id. at requirement eliminates underlying presumption It was this prosecution to attorney's that allowed the court to treat the report pretrial of its intent to admit a lab Hinojos-Mendoza as a decision to inaction analyst. testimony from the As without live In the waive the to confrontation. result, anticipate, prior the defendant must majority Hinojos- the relies on instant notice, actual possibly trial and without presumption that defense Mendoza for the to exercise the to confront whether requirements counsel was aware of the 16-8-809(5) like witness. Statutes section 16-3-809(5) made an in and thus emphasis in incompatible are thus Cropper's right waive formed decision to need for actual notice Melendez-Diaz on the Maj. op. at confrontation. "permit[s]" the defendant to exercise his that pretrial. to confrontation not, however, approve did Melendez-Diaz fact, articulated in Kennedy, presumption of waiver In his dissent Justice Melendes-Diaz, Melendez-Diaz, FHinojos-Mendoza. singled see out Colorado's 16-8-309(5) holding violating Hinojos-Mendoza for its potentially the Court cited as testimonial, Kennedy criticized that crime lab Clause. reports are Confrontation again n. 11. cited at 2540 The Court 16-38-809(5) S.Ct. burden-shifting "a as give early Finojos-Mendoza requiring the defendant to proposition that a statute for the compelled to exercise his analyst." defendant can be notice of his intent to confront dissent). trial. Id. (Kennedy, Clause before at 2558 J. The Court Confrontation however, point, did the Court Kennedy's by narrow at 2541. At no responded to criticism presumption approve Hinojos-Mendoza's ly simple notice-and-demand approving of provide actual notice. waiver. statutes Melendes-Diag contrary,

To the teaches vided defense counsel with a witness en in Hinojos-Mendozo dorsement list that included the shoe-print that an knows the law is no substi technician. Neither of prosecutorial these tute for actual prosecution's notice of the actions, however, notified defense counsel of intent report introduce a lab without live prosecution's intent to offer the lab re testimony. above, As noted Melendes-Diaz 16-8-809(5).12 port pursuant to section Ac only approved simple notice-and-demand cordingly, defense counsel did not have actu statutes where the defendant has actual no al notice that she needed to ask for prosecution's tice of the intent to introduce a opportunity to cross-examine the technician report testimony. By without live refus lab ing and thus her failure to make approve of other statutes that lack an constitutionally was not a sufficient communi actual requirement, notice implied the Court cation of waiver. the mere existence of a statute is an presume insufficient basis to that an fact, the record demonstrates that de- made an informed forego decision to fense counsel was unaware of statutory right to confrontation. Accordingly, to the of section When Hingjos-Mendoza extent creates a presump prosecution moved to introduce the re- inaction, tion of waiver from that presump port without testimony live from the techni- Melendes-Diag tion is limited to those cian, defense counsel expressed surprise and circumstances where the stated that she had not provided been vides the defendant with actual notice of its notice that the technician appear would not intent to introduce a report lab without live at trial. Defense counsel explained further analyst.11 is, That Hinojos- believed, that she albeit mistakenly, that see- Mendoza teaches that a defendant's failure did apply to the exercise to confrontation at issue. The record thus reflects that de- amounts to a constitutionally sufficient com fense actually counsel was unaware of the munication of waiver where the defen of section thereby dant has received actual notice of prose rebutting majority's reliance on un- cution's intent to submit a lab derlying presumption EHinojos-Mendora testimony. that defense counsel knows the In the instant though, case the record procedure. rules of demonstrates Nonetheless, though even defense counsel provide defense pre-trial counsel with notice was unaware of section of its intent to introduce the lab with lacked notice of testimony. out live Early in intent discovery introduce the lab process, without live prosecution testimo provided defense copy counsel with a ny, report analyz majority lab presumes still waiver from ing shoe-print. prosecution also defense counsel's with see People Mojica-Simental, 11. v. expressed we put cient to the defendant on notice of section 16-3-309(5) our concern 16-3-309(5). Maj. op. at 437-38. The disclo- did not contain requirement. an actual notice 73 P.3d report pursuant sure of a lab to Crim. P. 16 does (Colo.2003). Accordingly, urged not, however, provide a defendant with an indi- proponent of a lab opposing cation of whether the will or will not counsel intended to offer the lab expert prepared call report. who testimony without live of the author. Id. Melen- other words, unlike notice-and-demand simple importance confirms the dez-Diaz fundamental statutes, nothing requires in Crim. P. 16 emphasis Mojica-Simental of our on actual identify reports those it intends to notice. In a case where the defendant receives 16-3-309(5) offer to section pursuant versus prosecution's actual notice of the intent to intro- reports those it intends to introduce with the live duce a lab testimony analyst. Accordingly, providing analyst, permit would the court to Melendez-Diaz reports defense through counsel with lab presume waiver from the defendant's inaction. discovery process equivalent is not to the actual majority 12. The providing required by simple believes that notice defen- notice-and-demand report through dant discovery lab favorably is suffi- statutes discussed in Melendez-Diaz. majori effect of tion Colorado, of the State an irrebuttable The PEOPLE to create ty's conclusion is hold see Plaintiff-Appellee, and thus of waiver13 16-3-309(5) every applic however, runs logic, Its strained ation.14 VIGIL, Defendant- Richard James the record and facts in contrary to the Appellant. refusal Court's steadfast Barker, inaction. See from presume waiver No. 06CA0991. 2182; also see at 92 S.Ct. 407 U.S. Appeals, Court Colorado 1602; 475-76, Miranda, at Div. VII. 1709. at Boykin, 395 U.S. 27,May 2010. and in accord Instead, the record based on precedent, I con Supreme Court with U.S. July Rehearing Denied inaction that defense counsel's clude Cropper's right a valid waiver amount to however, was, de

to confrontation. the technician to confront

nied a crucial report formed

whose identifying case

part of the suspect at the seene of

Cropper as a that see Accordingly, I conclude

burglary. unconstitution applied was Hence, respect I ally case.15 in the instant

fully dissent. that Chief Justice

I to state am authorized joins in this dissent.

BENDER My that section conclusion Hinojos-Mendoza, 671-75 13. See also dissent) (Martinez, J., majority unconstitutionally (criticizing for this case is in ac- applied presumption that an at- creating an irrebuttable Mojica-Simental, stat- our cord with analysis torney the record in law even when knows the ing that ignorance). attorney's actual the case reflects does not have actual notice a defendant statute, mistakenly unanimously Mojica-Simental, held facially consti- that section have the tech- fails to applied constitution- it could be significant tutional because testify, there is nician ally at 20-21. The with a valid waiver. 73 P.3d may failure to act possibility that a defendant's decision, however, effectively majority's reads voluntary his funda- waiver of not constitute holds sec- and, result, as a out this requirement mental to confrontation." every in- at 20-21. cases, one, cluding where there is like this those waiver. an invalid

Case Details

Case Name: Cropper v. People

Court Name: Supreme Court of Colorado

Date Published: Mar 14, 2011

Citation: 251 P.3d 434

Docket Number: 09SC828

Court Abbreviation: Colo.