Crook v. WalkerCrook v. Walker
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Mabry
Appellants, Clarence Crook and Bessie Crook, his wife, petition for the adoption of Billy Dee Hogue, a two year old minor. Upon hearing and objection of natural mother, Geraldine Walker, appellee, the petition was denied, and petitioners appealed.
Appellants filed their petition for adoption, alleging in substance that the child, Billy Dee Hogue, was an illegitimate and abandoned child; that they then had the care and custody of said child and were able to provide a suitable home for it; and that it was for the best interest of said child that the petition for adoption be granted. There had been no prior adjudication that the child was neglected or abandoned, nor was any consent to adoption obtained from the natural mother. Appellee, the natural mother of said child, filed her answer denying that the child was abandoned, and alleging that she was able and willing to furnish proper care and support, and prayed the petition be denied and that she be awarded the custody of the child who for some three or four weeks had been in the custody of petitioners with her consent. The cause was referred to the Bureau of Child Welfare in due course, and the Bureau submitted its report to the court recommending that petitioners be allowed to adopt. It does not appear that the bureau investigated the conditions surrounding the natural mother, but their report only went to the suitableness of the home of petitioners, and in support of petitioners’ claim that they were fit and proper persons to have the child through adoption. The case was tried by the court, and the court made findings of fact, some of which appellants contend were hard to reconcile with the decree of the court in denying petitioners’ prayer. It appears from the testimony that appellee had been employed by the appellants at a small weekly wage; that they gave her room and board for herself and child for a month or more; that shortly after the employment began appellee left appellants’ home, leaving the child there, and she was not heard from by appellants for approximately three weeks, and that appellants during that time had the care and custody of the child, appellee contributing nothing to its support; that appellants were fond of the child and gave it every care and attention during the
It is well settled that this court will not disturb findings of fact of the trial court which are supported by substantial evidence. Crosby et ux. v. Harral et ux., 35 N.M. 575, 4 P.(2d) 655; Pra v. Gherardini, 34 N.M. 587, 286 P. 828.
We think appellants misinterpret the trial court’s findings of fact. Appellants interpret the findings as requiring judgment allowing adoption. We do not believe that the court’s findings, when taken as a whole and read together in connection with the testimony, justify such construction. Appellants point out that the trial court must have decided the issues here against appellants and in favor of appellee, the mother of the child, because of the ties of blood and relationship rather than under the rule that the paramount issue should be and is the best interest and welfare of the child.
Appellants call our attention to the case of Crosby et ux. v. Harral et ux., 35 N.M. 575, 4 P.(2d) 655, 656, where Mr. Justice Hudspeth said in sustaining the lower court’s judgment in an adoption matter: “The trial court properly made the welfare of the child the loadstar of his decision.” But we find there no inconsistency with our holding here. The welfare of the child is not to be determined by and does not rest altogether upon economic and financial considerations and factors.
Isolated excerpts from the court’s findings, which were informal and dictated into the record during and at the close of the case, would in a measure support appellants’ contention, but’ a careful reading of all the findings and statements of the court in explanation of the judgment it gave nullifies such interpretation. The
Appellants rely upon the case of Pra v. Gherardini, supra. In that case the natural mother of the child voluntarily delivered and gave her child to her sister and brother-in-law when it was about one month old.’ The mother contributed nothing by way of food, clothing, or money toward the support of the child. She always treated it as though’ it were the son of her sister; it was some nine years later that the mother’ decided she wanted the child and made her first claim to it. The foster parents had become greatly attached to the child in these years. The trial court held, and was by this court sustained, that even a natural mother, though otherwise a fit and proper person, under the circumstances of that case, could not get back her child, saying, “The best interests of the child requires that he be left with respondents.” We there disapproved of the rule sought to be invoked, viz., that if the mother he a fit and proper person she , would have the paramount right to the child, notwithstanding the best interests of the child demand otherwise. And this doctrine still stands undisturbed. But in the case at bar we have a different situation, and a case that carries none of the compelling reasons that supported the opinion in the Pra Case.. We have here no voluntary parting with possession or gift of the child; there are no long years of custody in appellants who, by the conduct of the natural mother, had been led to believe that the child they had nourished, fed, .clothed, and loved from its very infancy would never be snatched from the cradle of their affections. Three weeks is scarcely time enough for a stranger’s love and attachment to become so great that the rights of the natural mother, though poor and jobless, but otherwise a fit and proper person, should be denied.
This court has heretofore said a parent has no properly right in their children, and the paramount issue is the welfare of the child. Ex parte Wallace, 26 N.M. 181, 190 P. 1020; Crosby et ux. v. Harral et ux., 35 N.M. 575, 4 P.(2d) 655;
“Very few of us but that somebody could come along and say, T am in a whole lot better position to give that child educational advantages and training than the mother or father. * * * ’ They might take some of your children. * * * They might have taken mine, because I know of men with better facilities who might be superior intellectually, morally, etc., to raise a child, but the ties are not the same.”
The court’s finding therefore that ‘the natural mother, appellee, at the time of the trial has a home for the child with her sister and brother-in-law, and that they are amply able to assist the mother in caring for the child, and there being findings as to her general and moral fitness, leads us to the conclusion that the court in using the term “welfare of the child” used it in the sense and had in mind the economic and financial aspect or definition only.
Finding no merit in appellants’ contention, the judgment will be affirmed.
It is so ordered.
HUDSPETH, C. J„ and SADLER, BICKLEY, and ZINN, JJ., concur.