250 Conn. 476 | Conn. | 1999
Lead Opinion
Opinion
This case is before us on a writ of error brought by the named plaintiff in error, Leonard M. Crone (plaintiff), an attorney, who seeks reversal of an order of the trial court disqualifying him from any further representation of his client, the plaintiff in error, Alvin Lopes, in Lopes’ pending criminal case. We conclude that the plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the disqualification order and, accordingly, we dismiss the writ of error.
The relevant facts and procedural history are undisputed. In 1993, the plaintiff instituted a civil action on behalf of Dana Crim in Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury (Waterbury Superior Court). The
Subsequently, in an unrelated criminal case, Lopes was charged with the May 11,1997 assault and stabbing of Crim. The plaintiff thereafter filed an appearance on behalf of Lopes in that criminal case, which was pending in Waterbury Superior Court.
On June 12,1998, assistant state’s attorney Eva Lenczewski moved to disqualify the plaintiff from representing Lopes in light of the plaintiffs prior representation of Crim. The named defendant in error, Judge Charles Gill (trial court), held a hearing at which he canvassed both Crim and Lopes. Lopes expressed his desire to have the plaintiff continue as his attorney despite the plaintiffs prior representation of Crim. Crim, however, expressed discomfort at having his former attorney represent Lopes, and refused to waive the plaintiffs duty of confidentiality. In recognition of a serious potential for a conflict of interest, the trial court, on June 16, 1998, issued an order disqualifying the plaintiff from representing Lopes in the pending criminal matter.
Seeking a reversal of the trial court’s order, the plaintiff brought this writ of error,
The plaintiff contends that he has standing to challenge the trial court’s disqualification order because he has suffered both a loss of income and harm to his reputation. The plaintiff contends that, because the trial court’s disqualification order impaired his protected right to engage in the practice of law, he is entitled to appellate review of that order. The defendants concede that an attorney has a generalized “interest” in practicing law, and that such an interest vests an attorney with certain due process protections. The defendants contend, however, that an attorney’s interest in practicing law does not include the right to represent a particular client or to hold a particular position. The defendants caution that, in order to ensure that an attorney’s personal interest in challenging a disqualification order does not trump the client’s best interests, the right to appeal from a disqualification order must vest in the client alone. We agree with the defendants that an attorney has no cognizable right to represent a particular client and, therefore, lacks standing to challenge a disqualification order.
“Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless [one] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stamford Hospital v. Vega, 236 Conn. 646, 657, 674 A.2d 821 (1996). “Standing is established by showing that
The plaintiff maintains that he has satisfied the first prong of the aggrievement test because he has a specific personal and legal interest in his continued representation of Lopes. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that he has a financial interest in lost fee income and an interest in his reputation that allegedly has been damaged by the trial court’s disqualification order. The plaintiff has offered no specific proof, however, as to how, or to what extent, his reputational or pecuniary interests have been affected by the disqualification order. “Allegations and proof of mere generalizations and fears are not enough to establish aggrievement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Water Pollution Control Authority v. Keeney, 234 Conn. 488, 496, 662 A.2d 124 (1995). Moreover, even if the plaintiffs allegations of harm had been more specific, we have doubts about whether the injury that he allegedly has suffered as a result of his disqualification would be sufficient to
The plaintiff asserts that he has satisfied the second prong of the aggrievement test because his alleged reputational and financial interests are protected under his general right to engage in the practice of law. We disagree. The plaintiff cites no authority, and we have found none, for extending the general right to practice law to include the right to represent a particular client in a particular case or to hold a particular job. In fact, the relevant precedent is to the contrary. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895-96, 81 S. Ct. 1743, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1230 (1961) (denial of opportunity to work at one place “most assuredly” does not implicate “right to follow a chosen trade or profession”); Edelstein v. Wilentz, 812 F.2d 128, 131-32 (7th Cir. 1987) (statute precluding attorneys from participating in one aspect of practice of law does not limit any right attorneys may have to earn livelihood and practice their profession); cf. Johnson v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 248 Conn. 87, 106-107, 726 A.2d 1154 (1999) (suggesting that investigation and administrative review of attorney’s alleged professional misconduct, although potentially harmful, did not constitute denial of attorney’s
The defendants argue that we should follow the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 105 S. Ct. 2757, 86 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1985), in which that court concluded that the right to contest a disqualification order should rest solely with the client, and not with the disqualified attorney. See id., 435. In Richardson-Merrell Inc., the plaintiff challenged an order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia disqualifying her attorneys for misconduct. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the District Court’s disqualification order; Koller ex rel. Koller v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 737 F.2d 1038, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1984); relying in part on the attorneys’ “interest ... in correcting what they [claimed was] an erroneous finding of misconduct.” Id., 1053. In thereafter reversing the Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme Court concluded that an order disqualifying an attorney is not subject to immediate appeal under the “collateral order” exception to the federal final judgment rule.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has since expounded on the reasoning of Richardson-Merrell Inc. in another appeal that, like this one, was brought directly by a disqualified attorney. See generally Law Offices of Seymour M. Chase, P.C. v. Federal Communications Commission, 843 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Chase).
To conclude otherwise would permit an attorney to obtain interlocutory judicial review of a disqualification order even in circumstances in which the delay caused by the appeal would be inimical to the interests of the client, the opposing party and the public. Generally, piecemeal review of trial court decisions that do not terminate the litigation should be avoided in the interests of the efficient operation of our judicial system;
“[Furthermore,] [a]s the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a speedy trial indicates, the accused may have a strong interest in speedy resolution of the charges against him.
We acknowledge that our decision today effectively eliminates the plaintiffs opportunity to obtain judicial review of the trial court’s disqualification order. Although Lopes retains the right to challenge the disqualification order upon appeal from an adverse final
The writ of error is dismissed.
In this opinion CALLAHAN, C. J., and BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ and MCDONALD, Js., concurred.
Because we conclude that the plaintiff does not have standing to challenge the trial court’s order, we lack subject matter jurisdiction over his claim. Consequently, we do not reach the merits of the plaintiffs contention that the trial court improperly disqualified him from his continued representation of Lopes.
Lopes joined the plaintiffs writ of error.
Hereinafter, we refer to both defendants in error collectively as the defendants.
On November 3, 1998, this court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the writ of error as to Lopes.
We also ordered the parties to brief a second issue, namely: “When an attorney seeks review of an order disqualifying him from representing a particular client, is the order a final judgment?" Because we conclude that the plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the trial court’s disqualification order, we need not address the final judgment issue.
The plaintiff claims that his reputation has been injured because his disqualification by the trial court, was tantamount to a finding of professional misconduct. The trial court, however, cast no aspersions on the plaintiffs conduct or on his professional integrity. Rather, the trial court explained that, in its view, the plaintiffs disqualification was necessary to avoid any future problems stemming from his cross-examination of his former client, Crim. In such circumstances, it is difficult to see how the plaintiffs reputational interest has been harmed. Furthermore, although the plaintiff claims a general pecuniary interest in his continuing representation of Lopes, he has not specified how that interest has been impaired as a result of this case.
The federal final judgment rule is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For an order to come within the purview of the “collateral order” exception to the final judgment rule, it must “conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, supra, 472 U.S. 431. See generally Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S. Ct. 1221, 93 L. Ed. 1528 (1949).
Chase was decided by a divided three judge panel. In addition to the opinion announcing the judgment, which was authored by then Circuit Judge, now United States Supreme Court Justice, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, there also was one concurring opinion and one dissenting opinion.
The plaintiff cites the concurring opinion in Chase to support his claim of standing to bring the writ of error. Law Offices of Seymour M. Chase, P. C. v. Federal Communications Commission, supra, 843 F.2d 522 (Williams, J., concurring). Our review of the concurring opinion, however, reveals no support for the plaintiffs claim. Although Judge Williams wrote that “counsel’s reputational interest surely satisfies the constitutional minimum”; id., 523 (Williams, J., concurring); he went onto conclude that counsel’s interest did not fall within the zone of interests protected by the statute in question and, therefore, that the plaintiff lacked standing to appeal the commission’s order. Id., 523-24 (Williams, J., concurring).
This policy restricting interlocutory appeals is embodied in this state’s final judgment rule. See General Statutes § 52-263.
Lopes’ criminal trial currently awaits our resolution of this appeal. Presumably, Lopes has consented to the delay, but that does not mean that the delay necessarily is in his best interests. Indeed, as we have indicated, it is of questionable propriety for a client to be placed in the position of
Concurrence Opinion
concurring. A substantial quantum of stigma is often associated with a trial court’s decision that it will not permit a particular attorney to represent a particular client. I am troubled by the thought of counsel suffering this stigma without any recourse to judicial review. Nevertheless, I agree with my colleagues in the majority that — absent extraordinary circumstances — an attorney does not possess a right to assert an immediate appeal from his or her own disqualification in order to vindicate his or her pecuniary and reputational interests. I write separately for two interrelated reasons.
First, the majority opinion contains dicta that is of concern to me. The majority emphasizes that a criminal defendant “retains the right to challenge the disqualification [of his counsel] upon appeal from an adverse final judgment” — that is, after the completion of trial. In my view, a criminal defendant will never have an incentive to exercise this right. If the defendant is acquitted, then of course he has no reason to assert an appeal. If he is convicted, he still has little reason to
Correlatively, I want to reiterate my belief that a criminal defendant may assert an immediate appeal from the disqualification of his attorney in order to vindicate his right to counsel of his choice. Earlier this term, I explained that “[t]he right to counsel in a criminal prosecution is not only embodied in our state constitution; Conn. Const., art. I, § 8; it has also been richly embellished in the history of this state. Not only was Connecticut the first state to adopt the public defender system; State v. Hudson, 154 Conn. 631, 635, 228 A.2d 132 (1967); but the right to counsel was secured to criminal defendants in this state long before the mandate of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 [(1962) (holding that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel)]. . . . Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 566-67 n.2, 362 A.2d 871 (1975). The United States Supreme Court has turned to the historical experience of Connecticut in expanding the right to counsel under the federal constitution. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 827, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975); Powell v. Alabama, [287 U.S. 45, 62-63, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932)]. State v. Stoddard, 206 Conn. 157, 165, 537 A.2d 446 (1988).
“It is imperative that a criminal defendant should have his or her choice of counsel unless there are compelling reasons to thwart this choice. In a criminal trial, the enormous coercive power of the state and the outrage of the community are both pitted against a lone individual. Defense counsel is often the only person
