Cromwell v. RipleyCromwell v. Ripley
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Orth
delivered the opinion of the Court.
An action brought against a dead man is a nullity.
Burket v. Aldridge, Adm’r.,
241 Md. 423, 430;
Hunt v. Tague,
205 Md. 369, 378-79. This case was a farrago of questions from the initiation of the suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to the denial of the court to vacate a judgment in favor of the appellee for costs. The questions arose in large measure because appellant brought an action against a man who had been dead for almost ten months. The declaration filed on 3 May 1968 by Eldred A. Cromwell, appellant here and plaintiff below, alleged that the negligence of Ralph P. Ripley, the defendant therein designated, caused an accident on 18 August 1966 between a car driven by Cromwell and a car driven by Ripley. Cromwell sought $150,000 for personal injuries, damages, losses and expenses. However, Ripley had died on 29 June 1967
1
and the writ of
Since appellant dismissed the appeal from the judgment the question whether the judgment was properly entered is not before us. The appeal here is from the refusal to vacate the summary judgment and the law governing the case was set out in Clarke Baridon v. Union Co., 218 Md. 480 at 483, and quoted with approval in Ryan v. Johnson, 220 Md. 70, 73-74, Hamilton v. Hamilton, 242 Md. 240, 242-243, and Abrams v. Gay Investment Co., 253 Md. 121, 123:
“After the judgment properly was entered, the question of whether it should or should not be vacated in whole or in part was within the sound discretion of the trial court for the ensuing thirty days. The decisive point no longer was whether there existed a genuine dispute as to a material fact, but rather whether the court was satisfied that there had been shown a reasonable indication of a meritorious defense or other equitable circumstances that would justify striking the judgment — that is, whether the court entertained a reasonable doubt that justice had not been done.” 5
Appellant was faced with two deadlines in the commencement of his action. Code, Art. 57, § 1 prescribes that all actions on the case, except for libel and slander, shall be commenced within 3 years from the time the cause of action accrued. See
Mumford v. Staton,
254 Md. 697. Code, Art. 93, § 112 as applicable to the case here provided in relevant part that executors and administrators shall be liable to be sued in any court of law or equity, in any action (except slander) which may have been maintained against the deceased, provided that such action must be commenced within six calendar months after the date of qualification of the executor or administrator of the testator or intestate; “except that such action against the estate of a testator or intestate may be instituted after the expiration of slix months but within the statute of limitation in the evént the deceased was covered by an existing insurance policy at the time of the occurrence, the existence of such insurance coverage not being admissible at the trial of the case and the recovery in the event of á judgment against the estate to be limited to the extent of shch existing insurance.”
6
Since Ralph P. Ripley had pied
With regard to the three year period of limitations the reason for the delay between the presentation of the motion to amend the declaration and the filing of the amended declaration is significant, for in the interim, three years had elapsed from the time the cause of action accrued. An affidavit by appellant’s counsel, made in support of the answer to the motion for a summary judgment set out that “on or about July 5, 1969, he filed with the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, on behalf of the Plaintiff* his Motion for Leave to File Amended Declaration together with his Amended Declaration and that subsequent thereto, he discovered on August 29, 1969, upon searching the file of this case at the office of the Clerk, that the said Motion for Leave to File Amended Declaration was pinned to’ the ba!ck of said file together with the said Amended Declaration; that he promptly effected the official marking of the said Motion as filed and left the said Court file with the Clerk, as instructed, for transmittal to the Court for its consideration; that he received notice on September 3, 1969, that [the] court had entered its Order allowing the filing of the previously submitted Amended Declaration.”
We agree that limitations were not tolled by the deposit of a motion for leave to amend the declaration in the Clerk’s office. Unlike Piersma v. Seitz, 10 Md. App. 439 there was no rule covering this situation whereby the Clerk was directed to take action “as a matter of course.” It was the obligation of appellant, in order to toll the Statute of Limitations, to commence an action within the three year period. The action originally commenced was a nullity because the sole defendant had predeceased the filing of the narr. The declaration substituting a defendant was filed too late. See Ferrucci v. Jack, 255 Md. 523. We note that as the original action was a nullity, appellant did not have to obtain permission to amend the declaration. He could have simply commenced a new action by filing a declaration against the proper defendant as far as the three year limitation was concerned. Had he done this on July 3rd or 5th whichever was the date he left the motion to amend in the Clerk’s office, the three year period would have been tolled. But he did not do so, and, the procedure he followed resulted in a late filing of the declaration. In the circumstances the action was barred.
Even if appellant had satisfied the 3 year period, there was still the 6 month period. At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment appellant’s counsel observed: “We are faced with a statute of limitations which is the six-month period of limitations within which the administrator must be sued.” But he actually never pursued that issue. Later he told the court that appellee “of course is relying on the six-month period of limitations within which the administration must be sued and I feel, Your
In the light of the above discussion we have no difficulty in determining that the lower court could properly find that no colorable meritorious defense to the bar of limitations was interposed by appellant. We think it was demonstrated that appellant did not exercise “the ordinary diligence required of a person seeking to toll the running of the statute” of limitations. Id. at 525. We find it clear from the court’s comments in ruling on the motion to vacate the summary judgment that it was satisfied that there had not been shown a reasonable indication of a meritorious defense or other equitable circumstances that would justify striking the judgment. Therefore the lower court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to vacate the judgment in favor of appellee for costs and we so hold.
Order affirmed, with costs.
Notes
. There is in the record before us a certification by the Register of Wills for Montgomery County that “a Petition for Letters Testamentary was filed July 11, 1967 in the Estate of Ralph P. Ripley, who died on June 29, 1967, leaving a will dated July 24, 1957. Letters Testamentary were granted July 11, 1967 and that the first and final account was filed on February 17, 1969 and passed on March 27, 1969. No publication against Creditors was required under the then existing Article 93, since no real estate was involved. No claims were ever filed in the Register of Wills Office.” The certification does not state to whom the Letters were granted but it is not disputed that they were granted to Merle L. Ripley.
. Appellant’s counsel on appeal told the lower court that he did not come into the case until the middle of June 1969.
. “An amendment shall not be made without leave of court * * Rule 320 d 1 b.
. Rule 8. The last day of the 30 day period for appeal was a Sunday.
. Rule 625 a provides:
“For a period of thirty days after the entry of a judgment, or thereafter pursuant to motion filed within such period, the court shall have revisory power and control over such judgment. After the expiration of such period the court shall have revisory power and control over such judgment, only in case of fraud, mistake or irregularjty.”
. This was the law as enacted by ch. 642, Acts 1966,/effective 1 Juno 1966. It was repealed by § 1, ch. 3, Acts 1969, effective 1 January 1970. Prior to 1 June 1966 there was no exception in the event of insurance coverage and the six month limitation applied only to an action for injuries to the person. Effective 1 January 1970 the law is:
“Except as otherwise expressly provided by Statute with respect to claims of the United States and the State of Maryland, all claims against a decedent’s estate, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, orother legal basis, shall be forever barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and legatees, unless presented within six months after the date of the first published notice to creditors, or if notice to creditors has not been published, -within the expiration of the period of limitations otherwise applicable.” Code, Art. 93, § 8-103 (a).
See Art. 93, § 12-102 (a).