Cromer v. Borders Coal Co.Cromer v. Borders Coal Co.
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Cooke
delivered the opinion of the court:
The Borders Coal Company, the appellant, owns and operates a coal mine, known as Borders Mine No. I,’ at Marissa. Charles Cromer had been employed in this mine as a miner and mule driver from the time it was opened until April 18, 1907. For a period of a month or more prior to that date he had been employed as a mule driver and was engaged in breaking a new mule to the work of hauling empty and loaded cars in the mine. On that date he met with an accident in the mine which resulted in his death. He left surviving him Elizabeth Cromer and two infant children., Elizabeth Cromer, as administratrix of the estate of Charles Cromer, appellee, brought this action against appellant in the circuit court of St. Clair county to recover damages on account of the death of her husband. The case was tried twice in the ^circuit court, the first trial resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff for $1500. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which was confessed by the plaintiff, and upon the second trial a verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $7500. A motion for a new trial was overruled, judgment entered on the verdict and an appeal perfected to the Appellate Court for the Fourth District, where the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. The case is brought to this court by appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court upon a certificate of importance.
• The accident happened in what is known as the main north entry in appellant’s mine. This entry extends north from the bottom of the shaft, and for a distance of something over one hundred feet has laid in it a double track, upon which the coal cars are run to and from the shaft. The east track, known as the “loaded track,” is used to convey the loaded trips to the bottom of the shaft and is elevated somewhat above the west or empty track, the highest point of elevation, referred to as • the “knuckle,” being
One of the defenses interposed was that Cromer had assumed the risk, and there is evidence tending to support this defense. The court gave to the jury the following instruction on behalf of appellee:
“The court instructs the jury that if you find, from- the evidence in the case, that the plaintiff has made out her case, as set forth and alleged in her declaration, by a preponderance of the evidence, then you should find for the plaintiff and against the defendant company.”
This was a peremptory instruction to find for the plaintiff if the jury should find that she had made out her case as set forth and alleged in the declaration, and it is objected to
The declaration consists of one count, and that part of it which applies to this phase of the case is as follows: “Plaintiff further says that her said intestate, while driving said mule in the hauling of cars in said mine and over said portions of said track, observed the said condition of said mule and the existence of said holes and excavations in the surface of said track and the uncovered ties thereof, and fearing danger of injury to his person by reason thereof he complained to the defendant’s pit boss on, to-wit, on or about the 17th day of April, 1907, who was then and there in charge of the operation of said mine and clothed with the power and authority to order and direct plaintiff’s intestate, and told the said pit boss of said condition of said mule and the uncovered ties, holes and excavations in the surface of said track and that he was likely to be injured if the said ties were not covered and the said holes and excavations filled; that thereupon the said pit boss promised plaintiff’s intestate that he would cover said uncovered ties and fill said holes and excavations, and then and there ordered and directed plaintiff’s intestate to continue driving said mule in said entry and over said track until the same was repaired, as aforesaid, whereupon it then and there became and
Having notified appellant of the dangerous condition and having secured a promise to repair, Cromer was entitled to continue in his work as a mule driver until appellant was given a reasonable time in which to have the repairs made without assuming the risk of injury, unless the danger was so imminent that a reasonably prudent man would quit the service rather than incur the danger. There is evidence in the record which could be fairly regarded as tending to show that the danger was so imminent that it became the duty of the deceased to quit the service or to refuse to proceed with his work until the repairs were made. It can be seen that the declaration does not, by express terms or by fair implication, negative the.fact that the deceased assumed the risk. By no allegation is it stated, and from none can it be inferred, that the danger was not so imminent that the deceased should have quit the service rather than incur the risk, and it is not denied by any averment that deceased remained in the employment for an unreasonable time after the promise to repair. On the contrary, by the allegation that it then and there became the duty of appellant to fill said holes and excavations within a reasonable time after said promise, but that, contrary to its duty in that behalf, appellant had carelessly and negligently failed and omitted to fill said holes or excavations, although by the exercise of ordinary care and caution it could have done so between the time of the promise to repair and the death
Appellant complains of the giving of another of appellee’s instructions, it being, in part, as follows: “The court instructs the jury that whenever the death of an individual is caused by the negligence or carelessness of a person, company or corporation, and is not, the result of his own negligence or carelessness, then and in eyery such case the company, person or corporation guilty of such negligence or carelessness is liable to an action for damages, and the amount recovered in such case is for the widow and next of kin of such deceased person,” etc. The remainder of the instruction consists of an application of this abstract proposition of law to the facts in this case. This proposition of law, pretending to be complete in itself, is not correct as it entirely omits the dement of assumed risk, and while the question of assumed risk is incidentally mentioned in the remainder of the instruction in making the application to the particular facts of this case, that does not cure the error and the instruction should not have been given.
Appellant assigns as error the refusal of the court to give the peremptory instruction to find the defendant not guilty. The evidence was sufficient to require the cause to be submitted to the jury and the peremptory instruction
The judgments of the Appellate Court and circuit court are reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.
Reversed, and remanded.
Hand and Carter, JJ., dissenting.