367 F. Supp. 3d 996 | D. Alaska | 2019
I. MOTIONS PRESENTED
At docket 49, Defendants NEA-Alaska, National Education Association, and Matanuska-Susitna Education Association ("Union Defendants") move to dismiss all of Plaintiffs' claims against them. They argue *1000that Plaintiffs' claim for prospective relief with respect to compulsory payments to unions must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. They argue that Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim and Alaska tort claims for retrospective monetary relief in relation to these compulsory payments must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. They argue that Plaintiff Kathryn McCollum's claim challenging Alaska's system of exclusive representative collective bargaining and asking for prospective relief and treble damages must also be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
At docket 53, Defendant Matanuska-Susitna Borough School District ("School District") joins the Union Defendants' motion to the extent it addresses the more limited claims against it. Plaintiffs only seek prospective relief against the School District with respect to its collection of compulsory union payments and with respect to its exclusive collective bargaining activities.
Plaintiffs
The Union Defendants reply at docket 58. The School District replies at docket 59. Oral argument was heard February 15, 2019.
II. BACKGROUND
Alaska's Public Employment Relations Act ("PERA") authorizes bargaining units of public employees to choose to be exclusively represented by a labor union for purposes of bargaining with public employers as to employment terms.
*1001Matanuska-Susitna Education Association ("MSEA") is the union that represents a bargaining unit of the School District's employees. Plaintiffs McCollum and McKee are employees in that bargaining unit. The agreement between the School District and the employees includes a fair-share provision that required the School District to deduct fees from its payments to non-union members and remit them to MSEA. Plaintiff McCollum was not a union member at the time Plaintiffs filed their complaint; therefore, she was required to pay fair-share fees. Plaintiff McKee was a union member at the time. She alleges that she has long opposed the union but chose to remain in it because she otherwise would have had to pay a fair-share fee "and the difference in money between the full membership dues and the [fair-share fees] would not have been worth the loss of [her] vote and ... influence ... in collective-bargaining matters."
The other plaintiffs are current or former public school teachers that worked in other school districts and were represented by NEA-Alaska affiliate unions for collective bargaining purposes. Plaintiffs Ness and Christopherson were compelled to pay non-union member fair-share fees to their representative union. Plaintiff Carmen was not a union member but was compelled, as a religious objector under AS 23.40.225, to pay fees to the union for charitable purposes. Plaintiff Liston is a retired teacher who had been a union member during his career but, like Plaintiff McKee, alleges that he only became one because he otherwise would have been required to pay fair-share fees.
On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Janus v. AFSCME ,
On August 2, 2018, Plaintiffs filed suit under
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's claims. In reviewing such a motion, "[a]ll allegations of material fact in the complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."
*1002
To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to " 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' "
In deciding whether to dismiss a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court is generally limited to reviewing only the complaint, but may review materials which are properly submitted as part of the complaint and may take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record that are outside the pleadings.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Prospective relief with respect to compulsory union fees
Plaintiffs concede in their response brief that they cannot seek injunctive relief against the Union Defendants and the School District to prevent the future collection of compulsory union fees because *1003there is not a current controversy to be resolved on this point.
B. Monetary relief with respect to compulsory fees collected pre- Janus
Plaintiffs ask for monetary damages under § 1983 for the Union Defendants' collection of fair-share fees pre- Janus. They assert that the court's Janus decision is retroactive under Harper v. Virginia Department of Transportation.
As private defendants acting under the color of state law, the doctrine of qualified immunity from § 1983 suits is not available to the Union Defendants. The Supreme Court in Wyatt v. Cole
Plaintiffs argue that Clement contradicts a prior Ninth Circuit case, Howerton v. Gabica.
Plaintiffs also argue that only private individuals, as opposed to private companies, can invoke good faith to protect themselves from § 1983 liability. They base such an argument on the fact that qualified immunity only applies to individual officials, not government entities. Again, however, qualified immunity is not the same as a good-faith affirmative defense. The rationale for qualified immunity-protecting individual officers from the threat of personal monetary liability for carrying out their duties-is admittedly not transferrable to private entities. However, other rationales, such as principles of equity and fairness, support the application of the defense to private entities in certain circumstances.
Plaintiffs alternatively argue that if the defense is indeed available to private defendants in § 1983 cases, its application is nonetheless limited. They argue that under Wyatt the defense can only be applied to a constitutional claim if the claim is analogous to a common law tort that would have conferred similar defenses when § 1983 was enacted. They argue that the most analogous tort in this situation is conversion, and because conversion does not include an intent element, the good faith defense cannot apply. Like the other three district courts in the Ninth Circuit to consider this argument, the court disagrees with Plaintiffs' construction of the defense.
Clement did not interpret the defense in this limited manner. It applied the *1005defense to a § 1983 claim without considering whether the common law would have conferred the defense with respect to an analogous tort. The court was clearly more "concerned about the inequities of holding the private towing company liable" when it subjectively and reasonably believed it was following the law.
Even if the court must find a common law analogue, conversion is not the most closely related tort. "The core element of Plaintiffs' First Amendment claim ... is not that the Unions acquired property. Instead, [it] is premised upon their right not to be compelled by the government to associate with the Unions' expressive activities."
There are other common law torts with scienter elements that can be analogized to Plaintiffs' claim. Tortious interference with a contract is one such cause of action:
The wages from which Plaintiffs' agency fees were deducted were a contractual debt owed to Plaintiffs by their employer under the collective bargaining agreement. In 1871, such a debt could not provide the basis for a conversion claim. Instead, a plaintiff would have had to pursue a claim based on the third party's interference with the employer's satisfaction of its contractual obligations--- and malice or lack of justification was an element of [that tort] at common law.39
Abuse of process is also analogous to Plaintiffs' First Amendment claim. It is a "cause of action against private defendants for unjustified harm arising out of the misuse of governmental processes."
Plaintiffs also assert that the defense is further limited in that it should only protect defendants from legal claims, as opposed to equitable ones. Plaintiffs argue that because they seek repayment from the Union Defendants based on equitable considerations, the defense cannot apply here. Plaintiffs' position is unavailing under the case law. Furthermore, as the Union Defendants persuasively argue in their reply brief:
Plaintiffs had no expectation of receiving the fair share fees paid to the Unions, and Plaintiffs already have received the benefits of collective bargaining representation paid for with those fees. Requiring the Unions to pay those funds to Plaintiffs as an equitable remedy would 'stand[ ] that remedy on its head.' "42
Plaintiffs' argument is also flawed in that the relief they seek does in fact sound in law. Their fair-share fees paid for ongoing costs of representation the Union Defendants provided on their behalf. There is no segregated fund to which Plaintiffs' payments can now be traced, and therefore any relief would be paid from the Union Defendants' general assets. A "personal claim against the defendant's general assets ... is a legal remedy, not an equitable one."
Given that the good faith defense is indeed available to private defendants in § 1983 cases, the court must consider whether it in fact shields the Union Defendants from monetary liability here. In line with the three other district courts that have applied the defense under nearly identical facts, the court concludes that it does. As discussed above, "traditional principles of equity and fairness ... underpin the [good faith] defense."
Plaintiffs argue that the good faith defense should not apply to the facts here because the Union Defendants should have known that the Supreme Court was poised to overturn Abood given dicta in the Court's cases over the past six years. They argue it was beyond question that the Court had "grave misgivings about the constitutionality of public-sector agency shops" and the Union Defendants should not have continued to collect fees pursuant to these arrangements in the face of such uncertainty, which therefore precludes any argument that they collected fees in good faith.
*1007Plaintiffs argue that, if nothing else, it is improper to dismiss a claim based on the good-faith defense pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). They assert that the defense is a subjective one that requires evidence of the defendant's actual state of mind. Therefore, they believe they need an opportunity to gather evidence as to what the Union Defendants subjectively believed about the continued lawfulness of such fees; that is, whether they understood such fees to be "constitutionally dubious."
Admittedly, the subjective state of mind of a party asserting good faith is a common inquiry in cases discussing the defense.... But applying the subjectivity standard to this case results in a perverse outcome, if followed to its logical conclusion. Assuming that the Union Defendant (or, more accurately, an employee of the union), subjectively believed the Supreme Court would not overrule Abood , the Union Defendant's collection of [fair-share] fees, up until Janus , would be shielded by the good faith defense, but not so if the same employee instead subjectively believed (correctly) that the Supreme Court would overrule Abood .... Inviting discovery on the subjective anticipation of an unpredictable shift in the law undermines the importance of observing existing precedent and ignores the possibility that prevailing jurisprudential winds may shift.... The good faith defense should apply here as a matter of law.50
It is indisputable that the Union Defendants' collection of fair-share fees was lawful under state statute and then-binding Supreme Court precedent. No amount of discovery would prove otherwise.
Relatedly, Plaintiffs argue that dismissal is premature because the Union Defendants have not shown that its pre- Janus collection of fees from non-union members complied with Abood's restriction on the use of these fees for non-ideological activities only. They assert that discovery is needed on this compliance issue before the Union Defendants can establish a good-faith defense. Their argument is without merit. As noted by the Union Defendants "Plaintiffs do not allege the Unions failed to comply with Abood. Instead, Plaintiffs seek a refund of all fees the Unions received in reliance on Abood. "
C. Monetary relief for union dues collected pre- Janus
Plaintiffs McKee and Liston were union members who paid union membership dues rather than fair-share fees. They allege that they only became members because they otherwise would have been forced to pay fair-share fees and the difference between the amount of the membership dues and the amount of the fair-share fees "would not have been worth the loss of their vote and whatever little influence they might have been able to exert in collective bargaining matters."
Other reasons support denial of the union members' claims. First, they admit that they made a decision to pay union membership dues in exchange for certain benefits: a right to vote in union elections and the ability to influence collective bargaining efforts. This voluntary choice precludes an argument that they were compelled to subsidize the Union Defendants' private speech. Indeed, "Janus says nothing about people who join a union, agree to pay dues, and then later change their mind about paying union dues."
Second, Plaintiffs McKee and Liston's agreement to become union members in exchange for benefits created a contract between them and their unions that remains enforceable after Janus.
D. Monetary relief under Alaska common law
Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to a refund of pre- Janus fair-share fees and dues under state tort law, specifically conversion and trespass to chattels, as well as "replevin, unjust enrichment, restitution, and any other legal or equitable cause of action that offers relief for the unlawful seizure of their personal property."
Plaintiffs argue that because the statute is now unconstitutional it can no longer "confer immunity on otherwise tortious conduct."
E. Exclusive representative collective bargaining
Plaintiff McCollum uses the Supreme Court's issuance of Janus as an opportunity to challenge not only the Union Defendants' past collection of fair-share fees but also to more broadly challenge Alaska's system of exclusive representative collective bargaining. She contends that the Janus decision calls into doubt the constitutionality of exclusive union bargaining.
Despite the dicta set forth in Janus that enticed Plaintiff McCollum to bring such a First Amendment challenge, binding Supreme Court precedent flatly rejects her position. In Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight ,
Plaintiff's antitrust theory is that collective bargaining agreements stemming from Alaska's PERA are anti-competitive because they require compensation based on union-imposed pay scales and prevent individual employees from negotiating compensation based on individual performance and merits. Plaintiff fails to cite any case authority for her position. Indeed, it does not stand to reason that *1010" federal antitrust law prohibits Alaska from structuring labor relations for its public-sector employees in the same way that Congress structured labor relations for private-sector and federal government employees and that approximately 40 other states have structured their public employee labor relations."
Several exemptions and doctrines of federal antitrust law bolster this court's conclusion that Plaintiff's claim falls outside the ambit of federal antitrust law. First, antitrust laws do not "restrain a state or its officer or agents from activities directed by its legislature."
The collective bargaining agreements between the Union Defendants and school districts, which are a result of this legislatively authorized system, likewise cannot be challenged under antitrust laws. Although non-state actors, the Union Defendants and school districts are undoubtedly carrying out the state's regulatory scheme through their collective bargaining, and the agreements that stem therefrom, and consequently enjoy state-action immunity from federal antitrust laws as to this conduct.
Plaintiff argues that state immunity cannot be applied to dismiss her antitrust claim under Rule 12(b)(6) because the Union Defendants, as private actors, cannot avail themselves of the state-action immunity defense unless, in addition to carrying out state policy, they are actively supervised by the state in carrying out that policy, which is an issue not discernible on the face of the complaint. The active supervision requirement, however, is inapplicable here because the *1011other party to the challenged collective bargaining agreement is the School District. "[U]nlike private parties, [local government] entities are not subject to the 'active state supervision requirement' because they have less of an incentive to pursue their own self-interest under the guise of implementing state policies."
Second, the labor of a human being cannot be a commodity whose price is protected under federal antitrust regulation.
Third, the court is persuaded that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine also shields collective bargaining agreements from a federal antitrust challenge. Under the doctrine, efforts to convince the government to act in an anticompetitive manner are protected by the First Amendment. Federal antitrust law therefore does not "regulate the conduct of private individuals in seeking anticompetitive action from the government."
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the preceding discussion, the motions at docket 49 and 53 are GRANTED. Plaintiffs' complaint is hereby dismissed in its entirety.
Plaintiffs in this case at this time include Timothy Christopherson, Kathryn McCollum, David Ness, Carol Carman, Dolores McKee, and Donn Liston. The lead Plaintiff in the case caption, Tracey Crockett, has been terminated from the case. If the parties wish to remove Plaintiff Crockett from the court's official caption, a motion to amend the caption must be filed with the court.
AS 23.40.100(b).
AS 23.40.110(b).
AS 23.40.225.
Under Abood , payments may be compelled from non-union members for collective bargaining activities but not for "ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining."
Doc. 44 at ¶ 38.
--- U.S. ----,
Vignolo v. Miller ,
Starr v. Baca ,
Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't ,
Lee v. City of Los Angeles ,
Ashcroft v. Iqbal ,
Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv. ,
Levitt v. Yelp! Inc. ,
See Gonzalez v. First Franklin Loan Services ,
Branch v. Tunnell ,
Doc. 56 at p. 41.
See Timbisha Shoshone Tribe v. Dep't of Interior ,
Clement v. City of Glendale ,
Doc. 56 at p. 16.
See Wyatt ,
See Danielson ,
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc. ,
Doc. 58 at pp. 8-9.
Doc. 58 at p. 11.
Doc. 58 at p. 11. See also Danielson ,
Wyatt ,
Doc. 58 at p. 12.
Doc. 58 at p. 18 (citing Gilpin v. AFSCME ,
Montanile v. Board of Trustees , --- U.S. ----,
Cook ,
Doc. 56 at p. 25.
Cook ,
Doc. 56 at p. 25.
Danielson ,
Doc. 58 at p. 17.
Doc. 44 at ¶ 38.
Belgau v. Inslee , No. 18-5620,
Fisk v. Inslee , No. C16-5889,
Doc. 50 at p. 33; Coltec Indus., Inc. v. Hobgood ,
Doc. 44 at ¶ 58.
Doc. 50 at p. 36. See AS 01.10.010 ("So much of the common law not inconsistent with ... any law passed by the legislature of the State of Alaska is the rule of decision in this state."); City of Homer v. Gangl ,
Doc. 50 at p. 37.
Doc. 56 at p. 32.
See doc. 50 at pp. 37-40; Doc. 58 at pp. 21-22 for reasoning that the court adopts herein.
Doc. 44 at ¶ 50.
Doc. 44 at ¶ 49.
Doc. 58 at p. 23.
United Farm Workers of Am. v. Ariz. Agric. Emp't Relations Bd. ,
Parker v. Brown ,
N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC , --- U.S. ----,
See Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle ,
FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys. Inc. ,
Hallie ,
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader ,
Bodine Produce, Inc. v. United Farm Workers Org. Comm. ,
City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc. ,
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. ,