188 Mass. 16 | Mass. | 1905
After a verdict óf a jury in the Supreme Judicial Court, by which they affirmed that the alleged will presented for probate was “ procured to be made through fraud or undue influence,” the person named as executrix moved to set aside the verdict cm the ground that it was against the law and the evidence. The last part of the motion was that, if the verdict is not set aside, “ the cause stand for further hearing before the court, and the will be approved and allowed by the court, notwithstanding said verdict and answer to the third interrogatory.” This motion was denied after a hearing, and a decree afterwards was entered setting aside the will and remanding the case to the Probate Court. At the hearing on this motion no request was made to report the questions raised by the motion, nor the facts, nor the evidence, if the decision thereon should be £> adverse to the executrix. The motion was denied on July 13, 1904, and the decree was entered on September 7, 1904. On
The appellant relies upon the rule of practice in equity cases in the English courts and in some of the courts of this country, to treat the verdict of a jury upon issues of fact, in a suit in equity or a probate appeal, as not necessarily conclusive upon the matters decided, but as a part of the proceedings, to be given weight or not, as the judge may think proper in making his decree. But a different practice has prevailed and has become well established in this Commonwealth. In Franklin v. Greene, 2 Allen, 519, the principal point decided relates to issues of fact submitted to a jury in a suit in equity, and, referring to the procedure in such cases, Mr. Justice Chapman says in the opinion: “ When a verdict is rendered, and not set aside for good cause shown, it will be regarded as settling the facts in issue conclusively.” The rule thus established has been followed uniformly ever since. In Burlen v. Shannon, 99 Mass. 200, Mr. Justice Foster, after referring to the practice in England and in many American courts, in probate appeals and in suits in equity, to treat a verdict without setting it aside as not binding upon the judgment of the court, says, “ This practice has never been
Probate appeals, both by statute and decision, are upon the equity side of the court, and are governed by thé rules of practice in equity, so far as they are applicable. Gen. Sts. c. 113, § 14; c. 117, § 14. Pub. Sts. c. 151, § 14; c. 156, § 11. R. L. c. 162, § 15 ; c. 159, § 20, The statute authorizing the making of rules for practice in equity cases was held to include probate appeals. Gen. Sts. c. 113, § 26. Wright v. Wright, 13 Allen, 207, 209. By Rule 37 of the Supreme Judicial Court in Chancery, found in 14 Gray, 360, it is provided that, “ The foregoing rules [being all of the rales in chancery] shall apply to hearings upon probate
There is no good reason for a different rule in the trial of issues to a jury in a probate appeal from that which applies to suits in equity. In this respect, so far as we have known, the practice in this Commonwealth has been uniform. Issues are framed only in eases which present questions of fact peculiarly proper for determination by a jury. When such issues are framed, and until they are disposed of by the court, they carry with them the ordinary methods of trial by jury in an action at common law. The verdict may be set aside for good cause, as a verdict may in an action at law. Whether the issues are in an ordinary suit in equity or in a probate appeal, the judge, in dealing with a motion for a new trial, exercises his discretion, as he does in an action at common law. Perry v. Shedd, 159 Mass. 200. Capper v. Capper, 172 Mass. 262. But if the verdict is allowed to stand, it is a determination of the facts in issue by the tribunal which was. chosen by the court, because of its peculiar fitness, to deal with them. Our statutes expressly author
In many cases it would be impracticable to apply the appellant’s proposed rule, and it would be difficult in all cases. Issues may be sent to the Superior Court for trial. R. L. c. 159, § 36; c. 162, § 25. The judge of that court has no jurisdiction except to try the issues framed by the Supreme Judicial Court. He' may set aside the verdict if there is ground for it, but he can do nothing else but transmit the verdict to the Supreme Judicial Court. There is no provision for a report of the evidence from the Superior Court to the Supreme Judicial Court. The testimony taken by the official stenographer of the Superior Court may be used in different ways under the statute, but it has no place in the Supreme Judicial Court upon a hearing of facts before a justice there. R. L. c. 165, § 85. Upon the appellant’s theory, the justice of the Supreme Judicial Court might be called upon to hear all the evidence de novo, disregarding the verdict, and then to have it reported for the full court, to be used on an appeal to that court. Nothing would be gained by a trial of issues to a jury under such a practice.
We are of opinion that the justice could not properly enter a decree at variance with the finding of the jury, so long as their verdict was allowed to stand.
If the decision of this question were different, it would not follow that the motions of the appellant, filed a long time after the entry of the final decree, should have been granted. There are other good reasons why they should have been denied, which we need not consider.
All of the justices agree in the conclusion reached but a minority of the court do not agree with the reasoning.
Decree affirmed.