13 Barb. 424 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1852
There is no allegation in' the complaint that the judgment was obtained upon a fraudulent or invalid consideration, or that the demand upon which it was founded was not a just one. It is not alledged or pretended that the defendant in that action had a good defense to it, of which he, the committee, could'not avail himself, by reason of fraud or accident, or by the act of the opposite party. The only allegation tending towards such an averment is, that the defendant “ intentionally concealed from the committee, the fact that the action was commenced.” There is no evidence to support that charge, except that the action was commenced against the lunatic alone, and that the committee resided four or five miles from the village of Ballston Spa where the lunatic and defendant and ‘justice resided. It does not appear that he had positive notice of the proceedings, except from the fact that his counsel knew that the suit was commenced, and he had previously been informed of the claim, and that the -lunatic would he prosecuted, unless it was settled. I am not only not satisfied from the evidence, that the commencement of the suit was intentionally concealed from the committee, but I think the fair inference is otherwise. But if it was, unless the committee had a good defense to the action, of which he was deprived by reason of his ignorance of it, that fact alone would not aid him here, unless he should be permitted to say that he was prevented from applying to the proper court, for an order to restrain the defendant’s proceedings. But for that he had ample opportunity, as will be shown hereafter.
The question then presented for consideration is whether an action can be maintained by the committee of a lunatic to recover the value of property, levied upon and sold under a judgment and execution obtained by regular process of law, against the lunatic alone, after the appointment of a. committee, on a demand not alledged to have been dishonest, but for aught that appears fairly and honestly due, and to which it is not claimed or proved there was any defense. Or in other words, whether a judgment recovered against a lunatic after the appointment of a committee of his person and estate, without leave of the court is void, and the party acting under it a trespasser. It was not
If he is prosecuted at law without permission, the remedy of the party is to proceed for contempt, as the cases before cited show. The court has ample power not only fully to restrain all proceedings, but to indemnify the committee as well as to punish the party guilty of the contempt. It may be argued that a lunatic may be proceeded against secretly, and a judgment and execution obtained against him, and his property be sold, without the knowledge of the committee, so as to afford him an opportunity of applying to the court for relief; and that while his committee 'may apply to the court for the exercise of its power in a summary way, where the facts come to his knowledge in season so to do, he is not required to pursue that course, but may bring his action in equity, asking relief; and especially when as in the present case, the judgment has been collected, and satisfied on execution. I know there is a class of cases, where equity will relieve from the effects of a judgment at law. Thus in Foster v. Wood, (6 John. Ch. 87,) it was said that chancery will relieve against a judgment at law, w'here the defendant was ignorant of the fact in question, pending the suit; or where it could not have been received as a- defense; or where the party was prevented from availing himself of the defense by fraud, or accident, or the act of the opposite party, unmixed with negligence or fault on his part. So in Huggins v. King,
While, therefore, a court of equity has the power, and it is its right and duty to set aside a judgment for fraud, in cases of the nature which I have been considering, yet it is believed they have never interfered to disturb a judgment recovered against a lunatic by due process of law, unless the consideration has been impeached, and no other remedy has existed. How what are the facts on which the present action is based? A judgment has been recovered against the plaintiff, Almon Crippen, by due and regular process of law, after commission found and a committee appointed. There is no allegation in the complaint, or evidence offered, to impeach the consideration of that judgment. It is not contended that it was for an invalid or unjust claim; or that any defense existed against it. The process of the court is claimed, because the party was guilty of a contempt in his proceedings, by which it is argued that the judgment is void. The committee had full opportunity to have applied for an order restraining the proceeding of the defendant, if not before obtaining his judgment, at least before a sale under the execution, as he was informed of it and was requested to pay it. Instead of making application "to stay the sale, and for the proper punishment of the party for his contempt, he states to the officer holding the process, that the lunatic has property sufficient to pay the judgment, on which a levy can be made, and
C. L. Allen, Justice.]
The power there was ample, and could have been exercised to a much fuller extent than the present action would warrant, even if it should be sustained. The court could have granted all the relief necessary after sale of the property. It could and would have fully compensated the committee by imposing a fine to a sufficient amount to have covered the value of the' horse, and to have indemnified him for all damages and costs. The relief asked for in the complaint certainly could not be granted, in any event. In the first place the complaint asks that the defendant may be adjudged to return the horse to the control and custody of the committee, and to pay all damages consequent upon the taking and detention of the said horse, to the amount of $50, or to pay in money the value of the horse. The horse was sold under the execution, and passed from the possession and control of the defendant before the action was commenced. The complaint also asks to set aside the judgment, the consideration of which is not impeached, and which has been paid and satisfied. The only relief that could be granted would be for the value of the horse, and the action amounts, then, to virtually trover or trespass, though claimed to be for equitable relief. I think it cannot be maintained. It might be said that this being an equitable action, the plaintiff cannot claim equity until he does equity; that he should either have impeached the consideration of the judgment, or offered to pay the defendant’s just demand. But I do not deem it necessary to dwell upon this; as the other view which I have taken disposes of the case, without considering the other points which have been presented.
There must be judgment of nonsuit entered for the defendant, or the complaint must be dismissed with costs.