144 Iowa 685 | Iowa | 1909
3d. Third, I desire and bequeath to my father, Jacob Harter, all my property, personal, real estate, money or notes that I may have at time of my death, for him to use for his special benefit and his maintenance only, and for no other use, if used in any other way or for any other person this third clause is null and void.
4th. Fourth, should my father be dead at the time of my death, then my property, personal, real estate, money or notes what I die possessed of shall go as hereafter stated.
5th. Fifth, I desire and bequeath that after my funeral is paid, as heretofore stated, then my property, personal, real estate, money or notes, or whatever I may die possessed of, shall go to Anna Cassel, my sister, now of Norton, Norton County, Kansas.
This will was duly probated, and Jacob Harter, his
We think the court was right in decreeing that Jacob Harter took but a life estate under the will. The third clause thereof clearly íimits the devise to Jacob Harter for his use and maintenance during his life, and the failure to devise the remainder after his death can not overcome the certain and positive devise contained in the third clause. Koonz v. Hempy, 142 Iowa, 337; Shaw v. Shaw, 115 Iowa, 193; In re Proctor’s Estate, 95 Iowa, 172.
Relying upon the construction given the will and the conduct and statements of the plaintiff, the appellee filed a resistance to the application to sell the property, and offered to provide a home for the plaintiff as long as -he lived. She also filed objections to the claim of the plaintiff. In resisting the application to sell and the claim filed, the defendant employed counsel at considerable expense and incurred the expense of three trips from her home in Norton, Kan., to Ottumwa, Iowa, a distance of about six hundred miles. The application to sell for support was finally abandoned by the plaintiff, and he went to Kansas to live with his daughter, the defendant, Anna Cassel, in accordance with the offer of support made by her. He remained there only a few weeks, however, and subsequently prosecuted the present action.
We think the proven facts are sufficient to estop the plaintiff from now claiming to be the absolute owner of the property under the will. It is apparent from the entire record that the statements and acts of the plaintiff induced the defendant to assume burdens which she would not otherwise have taken upon herself. A party may not deny that which he has solemnly ’asserted to be true when such denial will prejudice one who has relied upon his former
The facts in this case bring it within the rule of the cases cited, and the judgment will be affirmed on the ground of an estoppel. Affirmed.