A natural gas leak led to an explosion in Bowie, Maryland on 23 March 1996. As a result of the explosion, Lee James Crews, the foreman of a gas line repair team sent to the scene of the gas leak by his employer, Washington Gas Light Company (Washington Gas), was injured seriously. Mr. Crews and his wife, Theresa, (Petitioners) filed a complaint, sounding in negligence and strict liability, in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County seeking damages against numerous parties, Respondents here, 1 claimed to have played roles in causing the gas leak. After ruling that Petitioners were barred from recovery by the principles of the doctrine of assumption of the risk, the Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. 2 We granted Petitioners’ request for a writ of certiorari 3 to consider the following questions posed by Petitioners:
1) Did Petitioner, Lee James Crews, assume the risk of a gas explosion merely by virtue of his occupation?
2) Does Maryland apply the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk to employees of the gas company?
3) Does the doctrine of assumption of the risk apply to this matter?
4) Does the Petitioner benefit from the “rescue doctrine”?
FACTS
On 23 March 1996, John Hollenbach, Sr. (Hollenbach), an employee of Honcho & Sons, Inc. (Honcho), was excavating land located near 11405 Trillium Lane, Bowie, Maryland. Honcho was a sub-contractor of Excalibur Cable Communica *634 tions (Excalibur). Excalibur was engaged by Maryland Cable Partners, L.P. (Maryland Cable) to carry out a cable installation project. The area that Hollenbach excavated was marked previously by Byers Engineering Company (Byers), pursuant to the “Miss Utility” statute, to facilitate the excavating contractor’s avoidance of known buried utility lines. 4
Despite Byers’ markers, Hollenbach struck a buried natural gas line owned by Washington Gas. The strike created a leak in the line. Neither Hollenbach nor anyone at the scene immediately contacted anyone regarding the leak, and natural gas released freely into the air and ground for a period of time. Two hours later, a resident, located approximately one mile from the leak, recognized the smell of gas in the air and notified the fire department. The governmental authorities evacuated the surrounding neighborhood. Washington Gas was contacted and dispatched a repair crew to the scene of the leak. Mr. Crews, a Washington Gas employee for over twenty years, was the foreman in charge of the crew. Upon arrival at the scene, Mr. Crews and his co-employees commenced the process of dissipating the gas that had permeated the ground. While he and his crew were engaged in closing off the leak, the gas ignited and an explosion occurred. Mr. Crews was injured severely. The cause of the spark that ignited the gas was unknown, but no allegation was made that Respondents were the cause of the ignition source.
*635 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On 1 August 1997, Petitioners filed a twenty-count complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County against Respondents. The causes of action asserted by Mr. Crews ranged from various themes of negligence, including negligent hiring and negligent supervision, to strict liability for the abnormally dangerous activity of Respondents “shooting a hole in the vicinity of utility lines.” Mrs. Crews joined her husband in a loss of consortium claim.
Excalibur filed a motion to dismiss on 3 November 1997. In the motion and accompanying memorandum, Excalibur argued that the doctrine of so-called “primary” assumption of the risk barred Petitioners’ suit because Mr. Crews’s injuries resulted from a risk that was inherent in his employment. Excalibur asserted that Mr. Crews necessarily appreciated the dangerous nature of his occupation and knew, upon arrival at the scene of the gas leak, that he was to confront a hazardous situation. Excalibur reasoned that Mr. Crews “cannot recover for an alleged negligent act for which he was specifically employed to correct.” On 19 December 1997, Maryland Cable filed a motion for summary judgment incorporating the legal arguments of Excalibur’s motion to dismiss. By order docketed 6 February 1998, the Circuit Court denied Excalibur’s motion to dismiss. On 3 March 1998, the Clerk of the Court sent to the parties written notice that a hearing on Maryland Cable’s motion for summary judgment would be held on 24 April 1998.
Mr. Crews was deposed by Respondents on 21 April 1998. 5 In the course of the deposition, Respondents initially established that Mr. Crews was not down in the hole repairing the gas leak on 23 March 1996, but rather was standing apparently on the edge of the excavation supervising the members of his crew who were in the hole attempting to repair the leak. Accordingly, Mr. Crews was not wearing a fire retardant hood *636 at the time as he had been trained this was necessary only when one was “in the hole working with the gas.” The following exchanges then occurred between Mr. Crews and counsel for Maryland Cable:
Q. Okay. Now, you told us earlier that there was a heavy smell of gas in the area?
A. At that particular area.
Q. Well, you mean in the area that you were working?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. Is there a point that you recognize the gas smell to be so heavy that you know that it’s dangerous?
A. Well, we always are taught that any type of gas leak or odor is always dangerous.
Q. All right.
A. And we always try to work it in a safe manner.
Q. Okay. So—
A. And we understood that.
Q. So when you smelled that heavy smell of gas that day on the job, you know that—you knew that the atmosphere was dangerous?
A. Well, yeah. We knew that that area that we was working in could be dangerous.
Q. Okay. And you knew that that danger included the danger that a fire would start, correct?
A. We were aware that fire will start behind natural gas.
* * * $ *
A. ... But anything can set [the gas] off, [sparks] from gravels or rocks that hit together, hitting metal. That could set it off.
Q. For instance, the metal bucket of your backhoe striking a rock as you were digging—
A. That’s correct.
Q. —you knew that that could create a spark?
A. We knew that.
*637 Q. And you knew that if the spark occurs, you could have a tire and an explosion, correct?
A. That’s correct, but as I said before, that it have to be worked, regardless. You know what I mean? It have to be repaired.
It’s a chance you have to—that we go through. Then again, there’s the other exception to the rale, too.
% %
Q. You know that there is this risk of fire, correct?
A. That’s correct.
Q. But you also know that part of your job is accepting that risk, correct?
sj; ij: % ❖ #
THE WITNESS: To the circumstances, yes. But on this occasion that it happened, it didn’t have to be this way.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. Because if the person, I’ll say, that dug—that did that had moved in the proper procedure their way, I wouldn’t have had to have been there to get into this thing.[ 6 ] You know what I mean?
Q. Sure. I mean, if nobody ever hit a pipe that then required repair, you might not even have to work for Washington Gas, isn’t that true?
A. No.
Q. They wouldn’t need you, would they?
A. Well, I don’t—I’ll say, well, true—yes and no. You know what I mean?
Q. All right. But once something like that has happened, regardless of the reason, once damage has occurred to a gas pipe and you’re called out there to make the repair as part *638 of your job, you know that there is a risk of fire and you know that it’s part of your job to accept that risk, correct?
* * i{i * *
THE WITNESS: Yes. I accept that responsibility when we first got hired, but there is a control of gas that we usually deal with.
On 23 April 1998, Excalibur filed a supplemental memorandum in support of a renewed motion to dismiss or alternatively, a motion for summary judgment. In addition to reasserting that Petitioners’ claims were barred by “primary” assumption of the risk, Excalibur stated that “[i]t is also undisputed that [Mr. Crews] knew of the risk of fire and explosion on the day that he was working to repair the gas leak, yet he voluntarily encountered the risk. His claim is barred by assumption of risk.” From this, it may be inferred that Excalibur also was contending that Petitioners’ claims were barred by the conventional doctrine of assumption of the risk as recognized previously in Maryland common law. Excalibur attached to its motion the partial transcript of Mr. Crews’s deposition, which included the above quoted exchanges, in support of its motion.
After hearing arguments on 24 April 1998 from the parties regarding the applicability of any theory of assumption of the risk, the trial court granted Excalibur’s and Maryland Cable’s motions for summary judgment, as well as oral motions for summary judgment submitted by Byers, Honcho, and Hollenbach at the hearing. The judge explained:
[Mr. Crews] was an expert gas repair technician, and he was sent to the property where the gas leak had occurred for the specific purpose of inspecting and addressing the problem. That was his job. That he knew what he was doing and appreciated the risks associated with doing his job is clear in this case. And that he specifically assumed the risk of his job is also clear ... Accordingly, I see no issue with respect to Mr. Crews going to this jury ...
*639 Invited by Petitioners’ counsel to clarify whether he was applying the fireman’s rule to this case, the trial judge declined, stating that he thought his oral ruling spoke for itself.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court’s judgment. After reviewing the policy basis underlying so-called “primary” assumption of the risk (as recognized by jurisdictions other than Maryland), the fireman’s rule, and so-called “secondary” assumption of the risk, the intermediate appellate court concluded that the risk of an explosion was within the scope of dangers that Mr. Crews assumed when he accepted employment as a gas leak repairman. Specifically, the court held that:
[Mr. Crews] ‘accepted] that responsibility when ... [he] first got hired.’ Clearly, there was a direct causal relationship between the performance of [Mr. Crews’] duties as a gas leak repairman and the cause of his injuries. Because [he] knew that his occupation carried with it certain risks, he may not now be heard to complain when one of those job-related foreseeable risks materialized.
Crews,
ANALYSIS
I.
Petitioners urge us to reverse because, in their view, the Circuit Court applied “primary” assumption of the risk, a subspecies of the generic doctrine of assumption of the risk not recognized by this Court. Petitioners assert that “Maryland has never applied the doctrine of primary assumption of risk to [bar suit by] a private citizen” and “the Fireman’s Rule cases are the only cases in Maryland where the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk has been applied [as a bar].” Petitioners reason that because Mr. Crews was not a fireman, *640 police officer, or any of the other types of similar professional rescuers compensated by government, the Circuit Court’s application of the fireman’s rule and/or the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk was improper. 7
Petitioners’ analysis is correct in part. We agree with them that the fireman’s rule does not apply to this case. For a different reason than offered by Petitioners we also shall decline to recognize and apply the so-called doctrine of “primary” assumption of the risk as a basis to affirm the judgment. For reasons we shall explain below, we hold that the Circuit Court correctly ruled that Petitioners’ suit, under the undisputed material facts presented to that Court, is barred otherwise by the doctrine of assumption of the risk.
Assumption of the risk serves as a complete bar to a plaintiffs recovery.
See ADM Partnership v. Martin,
[the defense] rests upon an intentional and voluntary exposure to a known danger and, therefore, consent on the part of the plaintiff to relieve the defendant of an obligation of *641 conduct toward him and to take his chances from harm from a particular risk.
Rogers,
This Court has not parsed the doctrine of assumption of the risk into primary and secondary categories. Treatise writers and a few other state supreme courts, however, have addressed such a distinction. The perceived doctrinal differences between the two defenses were discussed in Harper, James and Gray, The Law of Torts § 21 at 187-89 (1986) as follows:
The term assumption of risk has led to no little confusion because it is used to refer to at least two different concepts, which largely overlap, have a common cultural background, and often produce the same legal result. But these concepts are nevertheless quite distinct rules involving slightly different policies and different conditions for their application. (1) In its primary sense the plaintiffs assumption of a risk is only the counterpart of the defendant’s lack of duty to protect the plaintiff from that risk. In such a case plaintiff may not recover for his injury even though he was quite reasonable in encountering the risk that caused it. Volenti non fit injuria. [There is no injury to one who consents.] (2) A plaintiff may also be said to assume a risk created by defendant’s breach of duty towards him, when he deliberately chooses to encounter that risk. Hereafter we shall call this ‘assumption of risk in a secondary sense.’
Id.
(footnotes omitted). As Harper, James, and Gray see it, the legal application of the two defenses is quite different. In applying “secondary” assumption of the risk, a court inquires as to whether a plaintiff assumed a particular risk based on a case-by-case or risk-by-risk analysis.
See Flowers v. Sting Sec., Inc.,
Assumption of the risk in its “primary” sense, on the other hand, is a judicially-crafted policy decision, recognized in some states, 8 designed to limit the duty of care that the public owes to certain classes of plaintiffs. See Harper, James and Gray, § 21, at 199-200. The duty owed to the plaintiff is limited based on the nature of the plaintiffs occupation and the relationship between his or her occupation and paramount interests of the general public.
Petitioners suggest that this Court has applied a semblance of the doctrine of “primary” assumption of the risk in our fireman’s rule cases. Under our common law, the fireman’s rule bars firefighters (and police officers) from recovering tort based damages inflicted by a negligently created risk that required their presence on the scene in their professional capacity.
See Tucker v. Shoemake,
The instant case shall not serve as a vehicle for this Court to recognize in Maryland a. category of the doctrine of assumption of the risk to be known as primary assumption of the risk. This is so because this matter may be decided based on existing Maryland jurisprudence that makes no such distinction.
II.
Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace Ltd.,
Flowers
was based, in part, on certain public policy considerations that are not present in this case. In particular, we explained in
Flowers
that the unique relationship between firefighters and the public serves as a basis of the fireman’s rule.
Flowers,
We further noted in
Flowers
that firefighters are entitled to enhanced compensation and benefits in the form of special disability pay, workers’ compensation, and retirement benefits and that this special compensation is charged to the taxpayers.
See id.
at 447,
Because Mr. Crews was a privately-compensated gas line repairman at the time he suffered his injuries, it is evident the foregoing public policy considerations do not apply to the present case and, hence, the fireman’s rule is inapplicable as such. We are not inclined to fashion a private employee variation, a private fireman’s rule, as it were, for the present case. This does not mean, however, that we shall not find instructive in the present case other aspects of our fireman’s rule jurisprudence in our assumption of the risk analysis that follows.
Our task in a conventional assumption of the risk analysis is to determine whether the plaintiff 1) had knowledge of the risk of danger; 2) appreciated the risk; and 3)
*644
voluntarily exposed himself or herself to that risk.
9
ADM Partnership,
As to the element of voluntariness, we seek to ascertain whether the plaintiff freely exposed herself or himself to a known danger.
ADM Partnership,
there [was] no restriction on the plaintiffs freedom of choice either by the existing circumstances or by coercion emanating from the defendant. This is so because ... [e]ven where the plaintiff does not protest, the risk is not assumed *645 where the conduct of the defendant has left him no reasonable alternative. Where the defendant puts him to a choice of evils, there is a species of duress, which destroys the idea of freedom of election.
Id. (quoting Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 68 at 490-91 (5th ed.1984)). Using these principles as our guide, we shall resolve whether the Circuit Court erred in granting summary judgement on the record before it in this case.
A. KNOWLEDGE OF THE RISK
Mr. Crews plainly knew of the risks inherent in working on the gas leak on 23 March 1996. At his 21 April 1998 deposition, Mr. Crews admitted that he was aware of the heavy smell of gas near the gas leak. In response to a question asking whether there was a point when he recognized the smell of gas to be so heavy that he knew it was dangerous, Mr. Crews responded, “Well, we always are taught that any type of gas leak or odor is always dangerous.” Later Mr. Crews conceded again that “we knew that [ ] the area we were working in could be dangerous.” The forgoing acknowledgments establish that Mr. Crews possessed the requisite knowledge that risks were present while he worked at the scene of the gas leak.
B. APPRECIATION OF THE RISK
Petitioners argue that although Mr. Crews may have been aware of the dangers involved in working with gas leaks generally, his deposition statements show that he did not appreciate the specific risks involved in addressing the gas leak that ultimately contributed to his injuries. Petitioners highlight the following excerpt to support their position:
Q. And that static electricity problem you know could cause sparks, correct?
A. No.
Q. No?
A. The only time electric-it causes sparks when you deal with the pipe itself. As I stated before, that’s why we have *646 to use what they call a spray on the pipe before you put a squeeze on it, because when you squeeze the pipe off, that’s when—almost gets shut off, that’s when the electronic takes over.
Q. How about if you get into close proximity of the pipe or touch the pipe with the metal bucket of a backhoe?
A. No, it would not.
Q. Are you sure?
A. Well, I never knew it could set off like that.
Petitioners suggest that these statements demonstrate that he did not have “the appreciation of danger that is contemplated by Maryland law.” We disagree.
As we stated above, “[i]n determining whether a plaintiff had ... appreciation of the risk, [the] plaintiff will not be heard to say that he did not comprehend a risk which must have been obvious to him.”
ADM Partnership,
The record here shows that Mr. Crews, a gas line repairman with over twenty-years experience, was dispatched along with his repair crew, to the scene of the gas leak. Although the record does not disclose how far Mr. Crews traveled to reach the scene of the leak, we know that he was not present when the underground gas line was struck. Therefore, he had to travel some distance to reach the scene. For whatever period he was in transit, natural gas escaped freely into the air. The surrounding neighborhood was evacuated by the fire department. Upon arrival at the scene, Mr. Crews noticed a heavy smell of gas in the area that he was working and he knew that “any type of gas ... odor is always dangerous.”
We have approved the observation that “there are certain risks which anyone of adult age must be taken to
*647
appreciate: the danger of slipping on ice, of falling through unguarded openings, of lifting heavy objects ... of inflammable liquids ... and doubtless many others.”
Prosser and Keeton on Torts
§ 68 at 490-91 (5th ed.1984). Accord
ADM Partnership,
Mr. Crews’s deposition statements support our conclusion that he appreciated the specific risks involved in using a backhoe to excavate near the gas leak, a possible ignition source. At his deposition, Mr. Crews acknowledged his understanding that the gas leak could lead to an explosion. Immediately following the excerpt quoted above, which Petitioner offered to show that Mr. Crews “had no idea that being in close proximity to a leaking gas pipe with a backhoe could cause an explosion” the following exchange occurred in the deposition:
Q. How about if you get into close proximity of the pipe or touch the pipe with your backhoe?
s|í $
A. I’m not saying it won’t, but I never knew it to do that before. But anything can set [the gas] off, [sparks] from gravels or rocks that hit together, hitting metal. That could set it off.
Q. For instance, the metal bucket of your backhoe striking a rock as you were digging—
A. That’s correct.
Q. —you knew that that could create a spark?
A. We knew that.
Q. And you knew that if the spark occurs, you could have a fire and an explosion, correct?
A. That’s correct, but as I said before, that it have to be worked, regardless. You know what I mean? It have to be *648 repaired. It’s a chance you have to—that we go through. Then again, there’s the other exception to the rule, too.
Q. So you know that there is this risk of fire, correct?
^ ^
A. That’s correct.
Mr. Crews statements show that he knew that there was a risk of fire when he confronted the gas leak and it is axiomatic that the dangers associated with fire are understood by an adult of average intelligence. Therefore, it is clear to us that Mr. Crews appreciated the risk of confronting the gas leak.
See Schroyer,
C. VOLUNTARY EXPOSURE TO THE RISK
The record in this case shows that Mr. Crews responded to the scene and began to confront the gas leak, but this alone is not enough to conclude that he acted voluntarily. Our cases illustrate that if a person was compelled to act and had no freedom of choice regarding whether to act, we will not say, as a matter of law, that he or she acted voluntarily.
See ADM Partnership,
In ADM Partnership, the plaintiff, a delivery driver, sued the owners of a building for injuries she sustained by falling on ice while attempting to deliver copies of blueprints in the *649 defendants’ building. The Circuit Court, at trial, granted the defendants’ motion for judgment at the end of the plaintiffs case based on its finding that the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk by choosing to walk across an icy parking lot. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that the question of whether the plaintiff acted voluntarily should have been submitted to the jury because the plaintiff testified that she feared her employer would fire her if she failed to make the delivery. We granted the defendants’ petition for writ of certiorari to resolve the issue of whether the plaintiffs assumption of the risk was voluntarily when her actions were motivated by the responsibilities of her employment.
At the outset of our analysis, we explained that “an employee’s act becomes voluntary when the employee is given a clear and reasonable choice either to act or not to act, and then chooses willingly to act.”
ADM Partnership,
The only evidence in the record that supported the plaintiffs argument was her own testimony regarding her belief that her employment was at risk. We determined that her subjective testimony, without more, was not enough to create an issue for the jury. We stated that:
[determining whether [the plaintiff] acted voluntarily when she encountered the ice covered walkway or was responding to economic necessity requires proof of her state of mind. Ordinarily, that proof is supplied by direct evidence, i.e., testimony by the person whose state of mind is at issue, or by circumstantial evidence, i.e., testimony concerning facts and circumstances from which the state of mind may be inferred. While the testimony of the affected person ordinarily is sufficient, without more, to support a verdict and thus to generate a jury question ... where the proof of the *650 state of mind itself depends upon the proof of another fact, the witness’s testimony alone will' not suffice. There must, in addition, be some evidence of that critical fact [and] there is not a shred of evidence from which [the plaintiffs] concern for her job if the delivery were not made can be inferred.
Id.
at 100-01,
In our analysis of
ADM Partnership,
we relied upon
Burke v. Williams, 244
Md. 154,
At the close of the plaintiffs case, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for judgment based, in part, on its finding of the plaintiffs voluntary assumption of a known risk. On appeal, the plaintiff asserted that once he arrived at the delivery site his actions were involuntary because the defendant provided him with only one means of ingress and egress to the house via the wooden plank path and, if he did not complete the delivery, he would have been discharged from his job. His argument, in essence, was that he was constrained
*651
by the economic necessity of keeping his job. We affirmed the trial court’s judgment because the plaintiff offered no evidence that the defendant or his employer ever demanded that he make the delivery across the pathway into the house and, on the record of the case, the defendant was free to leave the sinks at the entrance of the house.
See id.
at 158,
[t]he rule is that when a plaintiff in a personal injury action becomes aware of a previously created risk and voluntarily chooses to put up with the situation-where as here a workman confronted with a slippery walkway nevertheless chose to use it-then his willingness to take a chance is implied and he would be barred from recovering for a risk he chose to assume.
Id.
To similar effect, in
Brady v. Parsons,
On appeal, the estate asserted that the deceased’s assumption of the risk was not voluntary because he was faced with a choice between encountering the risk of using the incomplete scaffolding or losing his job. We held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict because there was evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the deceased opted for a faster, yet more dangerous, method of
*652
completing his task. Thus, the jury verdict on the assumption of the risk ground was proper because the estate provided no evidence that the deceased could not have insisted on the use of a safe platform to use while attaching the aluminum sheet.
See id.
at
The defendant contended that, due to the plaintiffs vast experience as a ship’s carpenter, he “took the chance of risks incident” to his employment, thereby relieving the shipping company of the duty to protect him.
See Bull S.S. Line,
In our more contemporary fireman’s rule cases, a secondary rationale for existence of the rule is found which is particularly relevant to this case. It focuses not on the public policy considerations of a firefighter as a public servant, but on firefighting as an inherently dangerous occupation. The fireman’s rule is based in part on the notion that when an occupation exists wholly or partially for the purpose of confronting dangers posed to the public, it is inappropriate to allow the worker to recover for injures resulting from the very purpose for which he or she is employed.
See Flowers,
308
Md.
at 447-48,
Based on the above cases, the record before us here, and Petitioner’s argument notwithstanding, we conclude that Mr. Crews voluntarily assumed the risk in the present case. Petitioners contend that Mr. Crews was compelled by the exigency of the facts in this case to repair the leak to prevent serious harm to the people and property of the surrounding neighborhood. They argue that Mr. Crews was “faced with the choice of either abandoning the leak and staying in safety, or approaching the pipe and going into danger.” Petitioners reason that opting not to act was not a reasonable alternative under the circumstances, therefore he was compelled to address the gas leak. 11
To be sure, there are ordinarily greater private and public imperatives in repairing a serious gas leak than in the delivery of blueprints (ADM Partnership) or sinks (Burke), the installation of a roof on a rail line stop (Brady), repositioning misaligned stacked cartons (Imbraguglio), or loading a ship (Bull S.S. Line). Although commending Mr. Crews’s apparent initiative here, we cannot find in this record any evidence that he was forced to make those efforts or what the larger implications may have been had he not acted.
In reviewing the Circuit Court’s grant of summary judgment we shall draw any reasonable inferences from the facts in Petitioners’ favor.
See Liscombe,
... but as I said before, that it have to be worked, regardless. You know what I mean? It have to be repaired. It’s a chance you have to—’that we go through.
This enigmatic statement, standing alone as it does, fails to explain adequately what actual factors may have forced Mr. Crews to take action. Without greater elaboration, we cannot conclude that his actions were involuntary for purposes of our assumption of the risk analysis.
See ADM Partnership,
Of greater influence on our conclusion, however, is the undisputed evidence that the danger Mr. Crews encountered on Trillium Lane in Bowie on 23 April 1996 is the very danger that he accepted the risk of confronting when he became an employee of Washington Gas some twenty years earlier. In his own words, he accepted that responsibility when he was hired. Thus, the aspect of his job duties that involved fixing gas leaks, a clearly dangerous endeavor, and which he continued to confront for more than twenty years, constitutes a voluntary assumption of “those risks which might reasonably be expected to exist” on 23 April 1996 in Bowie. It seems to us, on this record, that the risk that led to Mr. Crews’s injuries was reasonably identifiable and inherent in his job both when he was first hired and on 23 April 1996. Accordingly, we find no error of law in the Circuit Court’s grant of summary judgment, on this record, in favor of Respondents.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONERS.
Notes
. The Respondents to this appeal are: John Hollenbach, Sr., Excalibur Cable Communications, Honcho & Sons, Inc., Maryland Cable Partners, L.P., and Byers Engineering Company.
.
Crews v. Hollenbach,
.
Crews v. Hollenbach,
. The "Miss Utility” statute is now codified in Maiyland Code (1998 & 1999 Cum.Supp.), Public Utility Companies §§ 12-101-12-317. The purposes of the "Miss Utility” statute are to protect public service companies and other similarly situated entities from the destruction of their underground facilities and to prevent personal injuries during proposed excavation projects.
See
§ 12-102. In general, a person proposing to perform an excavation in Maiyland must, at least 48 hours before starting the excavation, provide notice to the owners of underground facilities of its intention to excavate.
See
Public Utility Companies § 12-108.
See also Board of County Comm’rs of Garrett County v. Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc.,
. At the time of the hearing before the Circuit Court on 24 April 1998, only a partial transcript of this deposition (ordered by Respondents) was available and offered to the Court.
. The reasonable inference drawn from this response, viewed in a light most favorable to Petitioners, is that Mr. Crews was referring to Respondents’ assumed primary negligence which created the gas leak that occasioned his presence at the scene on 23 March 1996.
. As noted supra, the trial judge’s oral opinion in support of his grant of summary judgment was couched in language broad enough to permit an interpretation that his explanation engulfed any theory of assumption of the risk.
.
See State v. Turcotte,
. Because the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Respondents, our review on appeal is focused on whether there was generated a genuine dispute as to any material fact and, if not, whether the Respondents were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
See
Maryland Rule 2-501. We must construe all reasonable inferences drawn from the facts of this case in the light most favorable to Petitioners and against Respondents.
Liscombe,
. We most recently relied on
Bull S.S. Line
in
Imbraguglio,
. As a subpart of their "secondary” assumption of the risk argument before us, Petitioners contend that "the doctrine of assumption of the risk is not available due to the applicability of the rescue [doctrine]." Because Petitioners contend essentially that Mr. Crews was compelled by the urgency of the Bowie gas leak to take action, we resolve Petitioners’ rescue doctrine argument by our analysis of whether Mr. Crews voluntarily assumed the risk in this case.