181 P. 252 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1919
The action was brought to recover damages for breach of contract in relation to the shipment of three separate and distinct consignments of grapes from three different points in California to Tampa, Florida. Briefly stated, the damage claimed was due to imperfect refrigeration, rough handling of the fruit, and unnecessary delay in transportation. The court found in favor of plaintiffs, and the appeal is taken from the judgment on a bill of exceptions. Only one question is open for consideration in this court, and that is, What is the measure or standard by which the amount of compensation is to be determined? Every other question was waived by appellant in the court below, and, of course, on principle as well as authority, we must accord full significance to that waiver.
[1] The controversy revolves about this provision in the bill of lading: "The amount of any loss or damage for which any carrier is liable shall be computed on the basis of the value of the property (being the bona fide invoice price, if any, to the consignee, including freight charges, if prepaid) at the place and time of shipment under the bill of lading . . . whether or not such loss or damage occurs from negligence."
There is no dispute that the transaction involved interstate commerce or that appellant had filed with the interstate commerce commission its schedule of rates, fares, and charges for transportation as required by the interstate commerce law. Nor is it claimed that any fraud or want of good faith characterized the execution of the contract between the parties *605 for the shipment of the fruit. Respondents, however, do make the contention that said provision is void because against sound public policy.
A detailed consideration of the various objections to the legal operation and effectiveness of the provision is not required, since the validity of such contract has been so directly and positively affirmed by the courts, including the supreme court of this state and the United States supreme court, that the question is no longer open to discussion. Of course, the circumstances and conditions of each particular case must be regarded in the interpretation of the contract, but it cannot be regarded as unlawful or inoperative.
In Kansas City S. R. Co. v. Carl,
In Georgia etc. Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling Co.,
In Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Olevit Bros.,
Gulf etc. Ry. Co. v. Texas Packing Co.,
The court declared: "We think that in taking this sum as the basis of computing damages the trial court did but enforce the stipulation in the bills of lading. . . . We think the court properly charged the jury to take the difference between the invoice price and the value of the poultry at the time the same was delivered in Chicago in arriving at the amount of *607
damages. . . . Apart from the stipulation of these bills of lading, the ordinary measure of damages in cases of this sort is the difference between the market value of the property in the condition in which it should have arrived at the place of destination and its market value in the condition in which, by reason of the fault of the carrier, it did arrive. (New Yorketc. R. R. Co. v. Estill,
The case of Boston Maine R. R. v. Piper,
In no decision to which our attention has been called has the subject received more careful and thorough consideration than in Zoller Hop Co. v. Southern Pacific Co.,
In 10 Corpus Juris, 57, it is said: "Before the enactment of the Carmack amendment the greatest confusion existed as to whether a limitation of the carrier's liability for loss or injury to a specified value was valid in case the shipment was lost or injured by reason of the negligence of the carrier . . . The effect of the Carmack amendment is, of course, to make the rule uniform in all jurisdictions of the United States, so far as interstate shipments are concerned, and to render valid a limitation of the character under consideration, whether the loss or injury was due to the carrier's negligence or not."
Furthermore, it is said that even in states where such a contract is held void under statutes prohibiting carriers from limiting their common-law liability, "a contract for an interstate shipment, made in a state where such a statute is in force, is valid under the Carmack amendment, inasmuch as the decisions of the federal courts prior to the amendment held such contracts valid."
Our own supreme court has also directly upheld the validity of such agreement.
In Pierce v. Southern Pacific Co.,
The question was fully considered in Donlon Bros. v. SouthernPacific Co.,
[2] Nor do we understand how this covenant in the contract is affected in the least by the fact that there was a *609 separate and distinct charge for the refrigeration. The charge was distinct, but the refrigeration itself was inseparably connected with the transportation of the fruit and was an essential part of the transaction. The loss from imperfect refrigeration was damage for which the carrier was liable on that bill of lading and the condition to which we have reference applied "to any loss or damage for which the carrier is liable." The fact that there was only one rate for the refrigeration does not derogate from the validity of the contract, since the difference in the rate for the transportation would be a sufficient consideration to uphold it.
Another important question is involved in the construction and application of this provision of the contract.
As to the first count in the complaint the court found that the grapes were sold to the best advantage for the sum of $980; that the amount of the freight charge was $496.12 and of the refrigeration was $95; that the invoice value was $783; that if the fruit had arrived in time and uninjured, it could have been sold for $1,957.50. The court concluded that the plaintiffs suffered damage to the extent of the difference between said $1,957.50 and $980, to wit, the sum of $977.50, for which judgment was allowed.
As to the second count, the court found that the fruit was sold for the sum of $1,097.75, and that if it had been received on time and in a marketable condition it would have brought the sum of $1,860. It was also found that the invoice price was $930, the freight charge $494.97, and the refrigeration charge the sum of $95. The damage allowed was, therefore, the sum of $762.25.
In reference to the third shipment, it was found that it was sold for $1,133.75, that if there had been no breach of the contract, it could have been sold for $2,557.50; that the invoice price was $1,255.50, the charge for transportation was $494.97, and for refrigeration was $95. The court allowed as damages the difference between the selling price and what it would have brought, to wit, the sum of $1,423.75.
It is the claim of appellant that, in any event, under said provision of the bill of lading the extent of the recovery is measured by the actual loss, which is determined by the difference between the invoice price with the freight and refrigeration charge added, and the selling price, and that it was entirely improper for the court to consider what the fruit *610 might have sold for at the point of destination. Under this view, for the first mentioned shipment, the account would stand as follows:
Actual cost of fruit ...................... $783.00 Freight paid .............................. 591.12 --------- $1,374.12 Fruit brought ............................. 980.00 --------- Loss ................................. $394.12 For the second cause of action we would have: Cost .................................... $930.00 Freight paid ............................ 589.97 --------- $1,519.97 Fruit brought ........................... 1,097.75 --------- Loss ................................. $422.22 The third would stand as follows: Cost .................................... $1,255.50 Freight paid ............................ 589.97 --------- $1,845.47 Fruit brought ........................... 1,133.75 --------- Loss ................................. $ 711.72
[3] Another view of the construction of said provision, which supports the conclusion of the lower court, suggested by respondents, is that said invoice price simply provides themaximum amount to be recovered in case of loss, but does not prevent the recovery of the difference between the selling price and what the goods could have been sold for if there had been no injury, provided such difference does not exceed said invoice price. Such seems to be the view taken by the supreme court of this state in the very recent case of Olcovich v.Grand Trunk Ry. Co.,
In the Pierce case, supra, it is to be observed that the bill of lading provided "that the actual invoice cost at point of shipment will be taken as measure of damages," language of somewhat different import from that to be construed herein. It was also held that it was error for the lower court to permit the market value of the trees at Riverside, the point of destination, to be shown, and that the injury should have been limited to what was the value in Florida, the shipping point. It was, therefore, in effect held that the value in Florida was not only the measure of the damages that could be recovered, but that it was the only basis upon which such damage could be computed. It may be added that obviously it would have made no difference in the result in that case whether said value was considered as the measure of the recovery or the basis upon which the damages should be computed, since there was a total loss.
In Corpus Juris, supra, the rule is stated as follows: "The parties may, by express provisions to that effect, stipulate that in case of partial loss, the damage shall be proportioned on the basis of the sum named as the maximum limit; but where this is not done the question becomes one of construction and very generally the view is entertained that such stipulations are to be considered as permitting recovery for the damages actually done, the amount recoverable not to exceed the amount agreed on as compensation for a total loss."
As stated in Sutherland, supra, "where a statute authorizes a limitation of liability by contract and a contract is made limiting liability for loss of livestock to the actual cost at point of shipment and in no event to exceed a stipulated sum *612 per head, the measure of damages for injuries to the animals in transit due to negligence is the amount that each has depreciated in value, but in no event to exceed the actual cost at point of shipment as shown by the market value there or the stipulated value."
An examination of the cases cited by Corpus Juris and Sutherland, supra, in support of the text shows that the phraseology of the respective bills of lading is somewhat different from the language involved herein, and it lends itself more easily to the construction that the invoice price was intended to be the measure rather than the basis of the amount recoverable.
It may be said, also, of the Olcovich case, supra, that it arose prior to the adoption of the uniform bill of lading in 1908. The corresponding provision, though, in the bill of lading involved in said case was: "The amount of loss or damage for which the carrier becomes liable shall be computed at the value of the property at the place and time of shipment," being substantially the same in that respect as the bill of lading herein. Said decision undoubtedly, therefore, favors the conclusion of the trial court in this case, since the damages awarded for each shipment are less than the amount of the invoice value and freight.
However, we cannot reconcile this view with the decision of the United States supreme court in the Texas case, in 244 U.S.,supra.
The interpretation of the uniform bill of lading issued in accordance with the schedule of freights and fares filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission in pursuance of the act of Congress and relating to an interstate shipment, and the consideration of the liability of the shipper thereunder, involve federal questions concerning which the decisions of the federal courts are supreme. (Southern Ry. Co. v. Prescott,
In the Prescott case it is said: "Viewing the contract set forth in the bill of lading as still in force, the measure of liability under it must also be regarded as a federal question. As it has often been said, the statutory provisions manifest the intent of Congress that the obligation of the carrier *613 with respect to the services within the purview of the statute shall be governed by uniform rule in the place of the divers requirements of state legislation and decisions," citing a large number of cases.
The case of Detroit M. Ry. Co. v. Fletcher Paper Co.,
Therein the suits were brought to recover the difference between the rates fixed by the Michigan Railroad Commission on logs carried wholly within the state and the higher rates that the defendant actually charged. The court held that the determination of the merits of the controversy depended upon the construction of the state laws, as to which the state "has the last word." It was expressly stated that the cases did not involve interstate commerce.
We see no escape from the conclusion that under the decisions of the highest court of the land the award of the trial court was too high.
To state it sententiously: The United States supreme court holds that under this form of contract the shipper can recover only his actual loss instead of his full compensatory damage.
It is not necessary, though, to reverse the case, since the findings of fact are complete. The judgment is modified so as to provide that "plaintiffs do have and recover of and from the Southern Pacific Company, a corporation, the defendant, the sum of $1,528.06, with interest thereon at the rate of seven per cent per annum, as follows: On the sum of $394.12 from the twenty-first day of October, 1913; on the sum of $422.22 from the twenty-third day of October, 1913; and on the sum of $711.72 from the fourteenth day of November, 1913," and, as thus modified, the judgment is affirmed.
Chipman, P. J., and Hart, J., concurred.
A petition to have the cause heard by the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on June 5, 1919.
All the Justices concurred. *614