Crego v. Coleman

Mich 248 248 463 v CREGO COLEMAN Argued 8, (Calendar 4). No. Docket 113485. March 2000 No. Decided July 31, 2000. 1978, Phyllis Wayne Crego brought In R. Cir- action in the Court, alleging cuit Kermit L. the her that Coleman was father of daughter. 1980, parties In the reached a nonmodifiable settlement agreement, weekly through agreed pay the which defendant support, acknowledge paternity. child but did not The trial court approved 722.713; the terms of the settlement under MCL MSA 25.493, pay weekly support, pend- and ordered defendant child ing a the formal recommendation from friend of the court. The complaint determining pater- was dismissed without the issue of nity. receiving support In after the friend the court’s rec- ommendation, permanent the court the trial entered order. In early 1990s, plaintiff modify sought order, the the but court, Battani, J., plaintiffs the trial Marianne O. dismissed ground judicata. Appeals, motion of res The Court of D. E. P.J., J., affirmed, dissenting), J. and (Griffin, Jr., Holbrook Reilly, holding binding that nonmodifiable settlement was additionally parties. rejected plaintiffs on the It claim that MCL 722.713; equal protec- MSA 25.493 was unconstitutional denial App (1993) (Crego I) tion to children. 201 Mich (Docket 1995, however, 139068). Thomas, No. In Dones App Appeals (1995), opposite Mich Court of reached the conclusion, holding that statute did violate the constitutional guarantees equal protection because it authorized nonmodifiable paternity actions, awards while child always response awards in divorce remain In actions modifiable. plaintiff Dones, the her renewed motion for modification of child support, granted motion, concluding and the trial court required appeal, was to follow the decision in Dones. On the Court P.J., Appeals, JJ., and Mackenzie and held Doctoroff, Griffin, except that it would find the statute unconstitutional that it was doing 7.215(H)(1), requiring barred from so MCR the Court to Crego I, regardless App follow of the Dones decision. 226 Mich 815. (1997) (Crego II) 192798). special panel, (Docket No. A Neff, J., concurring, and JJ. and (Fitzgerald, Sawyer, McDonald, Murphy, PJ., J., affirmed, dissenting), holding Hoekstra, Whitbeck, Crego v Coleman 722.13; a violation of the was unconstitutional as MCL MSA 25.493 Michigan protection equal guarantees Con- of the United States App (Crego III). (1998) defendant stitutions. 232 Mich appeals. by by joined opinion Justices Justice Markman, an In Taylor, Supreme the Court held: and Young, Corrigan, equal protection 722.713; 25.493 did not violate MCL MSA guarantees. Paternity repealed at issue established section of the Act 1. The support agreements enforcing nonmodifiable child a means of The was relevant under certain circumstances. filed, paternity agreements where a action was the nonmodifiable voluntarily agree- putative into an and father entered child’s mother support judicial regarding in of a determination of ment child lieu agree- paternity, court made a determination that the the circuit needs, adequate provision the for the child’s and ment secured modify language preserving the failed to include support levels at a later time. Equal States and Michi- 2. Protection Clauses of the United prohibit distinguishing gan the state from Constitutions do not merely require persons, that are but that the distinctions between equal protection arbitrary Where an made not be or invidious. illegiti- alleges of treatment on the basis claim unconstitutional may macy, that a state States Court has held the United by invidiously denying against illegitimate children discriminate generally. benefits accorded children them substantial scrutiny applies rational-basis review or intermediate 3. Whether statutorily depends of created classifi- on the characterization the pater- the basis of whether cations. A stаtute differentiates on review; nity rational basis a statute has been ascertained warrants illegitimacy on the basis of warrants intermedi- that differentiates scrutiny. here. Neither characterization is ate unreasonable plaintiff argue statute is uncon- 4. does not that the Because constitutionality face, be determined “as on its its must stitutional application, applied.” an it offered addi- At the time of statute’s support voluntary optional obtaining method of child tional and support. prove in no child failure to would result where Paternity controversy, Act, provision like the overall 5. The underlying goal providing to children who advances support. Regardless might of the charac- left without otherwise be statute, it does not classifications created terization of the equal protection guarantees of the law. violate the constitutional merely Viewing on the basis of as one that differentiates the statute rationally ascertained, related to has been whether 463 Mich legitimate ensuring state interest of that minor children bom provided Viewing out of wedlock are and education. distinguishes illegiti- the statute as one that children on the basis of macy, purpose providing support its children is important, cotnpelling, that, and even state interest and one applied, substantially directly by provid- advances that interest ing problems proving paternity, an avenue to avoid associated with providing while still for the child. judicially approved agreements 6. Parties to order their conduct agreements. parties Allowing reliance on those to avoid settle- agreements technology ment on the basis of advances in will system. legal Further, undermine agree- confidence in the if such may technological ments be modified wherе advances are utilized prove paternity, technological may then those same advances disprove paternity also be putative utilized to eliminate support obligation, undermining goal father’s obtaining support. Reversed and remanded. joined by dissenting, Justice Justice stated that Kelly, Cavanagh, Paternity Act, being amended, impermissibly before discrimi- against illegitimate

nated denying opportunity them the legitimate agreements provid- accorded children for modification of ing support. for their equally apply It is not reasonable to the rational basis standard apply scrutiny § review to 3 heightened as to an intermediate or scrutiny heightened applies standard. Intermediate or to claims of disparate legitimacy treatment illegitimacy based on the or of a person. It is unreasonable to find anything that the statute did except distinguish the treatment legiti- of children on the basis of macy. Although illegitimate disparate not all children received reality treatment illegitimate § under the dominant is that chil- dren, they alone, disparate and though received treatment. Even § 3 every illegitimate child, did not scrutiny include intermediate must apply any where right paren- the statute affected child’s to receive support illegitimacy. tal on Accordingly, the basis of intermediate heightened scrutiny only or should be the standard used in consid- ering constitutionality §of 3. In scrutiny, order to survive intermediate a statute that results in complained substantially the treatment of must be related to an important government objective. While the state’s interest in enhancing opportunity illegitimate sup- for children to obtain port important objective, from their fathers is an § 3 is not substan- tially purpose. related to that illegiti- § Statutes such as 3 violate an equal right protection mate child’s actually of the law. Section 3 support opportunities illegitimate receive for children to limited the any opportunity sup- putative foreclosing for from fathers their beyond agreed port to under con- what was orders to be modified likely very It is mother and child. unfavorable to both ditions entered into at the onset to believe that unreasonable accurately anticipate provide for all the life can and of a child’s Thus, reaching contingencies will face until adulthood. that child substantially against related to the worked and failed to be § 3 support illegitimate procuring adequate for child state’s interest illegitimate children, and, accordingly, right of children violated the equal protection under the law. 722.713; dissenting, MSA stated that MCL Chief Justice Weaver, illegitimacy that cannot based on 25.493 creates a classification scrutiny. heightened withstand illegitimate 722.713; MSA 25.493 affects MCL support children, precluding obtaining additional them from parties changing a settlement where the have reached meet needs By contrast, agreement pursuant are no cir- to the statute. there legitimate be foreclosed which a child would cumstances under support. petitioning There- for future modification of child from illegitimacy fore, and classifies children on the basis the statute legally determined. of whether has been not on the basis subject heightened illegitimacy are Classifications based scrutiny. heightened scrutiny, classification must withstand To objective. important substantially governmental be related to an 722.713; Contrary majority’s conclusion, MSA 25.493 is MCL to the providing substantially governmental interest of related to the problems proving pater- financial for children. The nity legitimate illegitimate in claims for children sufficiently provide justification do not uphold substantially weighty related to the limitation to MCL or equal protection. 722.713; under Nor are the state’s MSA 25.493 finality justify a classifica- in settlement and sufficient to interests illegitimacy. tion based on support, operate as an additional mechanism Rather than by restricting imposes illegitimate children a burden on ability adequate support. possibility that chil- their to obtain may need for circumstances that alter their dren encounter vary legitimate children. Both does not between may give for increased rise to a need encounter circumstances they may children, support. Yet, in the case of support deprived opportunity on the basis to seek increased of the parents agree- changed entered an because their circumstances statute, precludes ment, pursuant that modification. to the 463 Mich op Opinion the Court Kobliska'), & EC. Mathew for Kobliska, (by Robés plaintiff-appellee. defendant-appellant. M.

Steven Jentzen case, J. In this we are asked to consider Markman, a constitutionality repealed of the section Paternity Act, 722.713; per 25.493,1 MCL MSA which a mitted a mother of child bom out of wedlock enter into a nonmodifiable child putative with her child’s father. We conclude that the in question equal did not protection violate guarantees.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In 1978, plaintiff action, October a paternity filed plaintiff’s alleging daughter defendant fathered who was bom in In August parties 1978. 1980, the a reached agreement, complaint settlement and the was dismissed having without determined issue of paternity. Through the settlement defen- agreement, dant pay weekly agreed child did but paternity. acknowledge required by As 722.713; MCL 25.493, MSA approved the trial court of the terms settlement and pay sup- ordered defendant $20 port of a week, pending a formal recommenda- tion from the A court. second was friend order entered, later increasing $35 week, and providing that the order was “not modifiable.” Moreover, provided this order second matter “shall stand settled, discontinued, and dismissed” as Court of Thomas, Legislature Appeals Mich decision App 674; repealed finding the statute NW2d 221 Dones v statute unconstitutional. effective June (1995). 1997, after 253 Crego op Opinion the Court January receiving the after 1981, In defendant. support recommendation, the court’s Mend requiring “permanent” order, trial court entered eigh pay $50 the child’s a week until defendant to birthday of the court.2 or until further order teenth modify plaintiff early 1990s, filed a motion In the dismissed the the trial order, but court judicata. panel ground A divided of res motion on the Appeals dismissal, hold- affirmed of the Court of ing was settlement that the nonmodifiable App parties. binding 443, 447; 506 on the 201 Mich Additionally, (Crego I). (1993) the Court NW2d 568 rejected plaintiff’s 722.713; MCL MSA claim that equal protec- unconstitutional denial 25.493was an citing 446, Hisaw v children. Id. at tion to App (1984). Hayes, NW2d 302 639, 642; Mich 350 133 case, the Court of however, in an unrelated 1995, In opposite Appeals when it held conclusion reached violated the constitu- 722.713; MSA25.493 that MCL equal protection guarantees because the stat- tional support awards in nonmodifiable child ute authorized child awards in actions, while always Dones v divorce actions remain modifiable. App (1995). 210 Mich 534 NW2d Thomas, its earlier deci- did not make reference to The Court plaintiff Crego response Dones, I. In sion support, for modification of renewed her motion concluding granted motion, trial court and the required in Dones, decision it was to follow the Crego I. The that decision conflicted even where parties held that would be trial court also attorneys signed parties, nor did their order was not This opinion express regard- approve no or substance. We the order as to form ing of this circumstance. effect 463 Mich

Opinion of the Court opportunity any afforded an to resolve issue regard- ing they the use of dna through testing if so desired.

Qn appeal, Appeals the Court of held that it would except find the statute unconstitutional that it was doing 7.215(H)(1), requiring barred from so MCR Crego regardless the Court to I, follow of the Dones App (1997) (Crego II). decision. 226 Mich A panel conflict was convened to resolve the conflict Crego 7.215(H)(3),3 between I and II, MCR panel held 722.713; that MCL MSA 25.493 was equal protection unconstitutional as a violation of the guarantees Michigan of the United States and Consti App (1998) tutions. 232 Mich 591 NW2d 277 (Crego III). granted appeal. We leave to 461 Mich 896 (1999).

II. CONFLICTING STATUTORY CHILD SUPPORT PROVISIONS repealed Paternity section of the Act at issue enforcing here established a means of nonmodifiable support agreements child under certain circum- stances: (a) agreement compromise An by or made the mother or by person

child or some authorized on their behalf with the concerning father the and education of the child binding upon shall be only the mother and the child when jurisdiction having compel the court and educa- tion of the child adequate provi- shall have determined that follow the rule of law established reversed or modified Court of Court of MCR Appeals Appeals 7.215(H)(1) issued on provided requires that, the or after November in this “A aby rule.” Court, panel prior published of the or 1, 1990, Court of a special panel that has not been decision of the Appeals of the must Opinion of Court the and reasonably by payment or otherwise secured is

sion compromise. agreement approved the or has compromise, agreement performance or (b) The mother aрproved, bar other remedies so shall when the child. and education [MCL child or added).] 722.713; (emphasis 25.493 MSA challenged important recognize stat that the isIt agreements to nonmodifiable was relevant ute present: (1) following elements were all where (2) filed; the child’s mother was action voluntarily agreement putative into an entered father4 judicial support, regarding determi lieu paternity; (3) a deter court made circuit nation “adequate provi agreement secured that the mination (4) needs; sion” for the child’s preserving language to include failed modify support at a later time. levels expressly agreed parties case, instant

In the stipulation support. Specifically, the nonmodifiable parties provided that the “it the intent of the that, is pro- modifiable,” and further order attached settled, stand discontin- that, “this matter shall vided against and dismissed” defendant. ued, challenge on the her Plaintiff bases constitutional interplay providing mecha- between several statutes support may support. obtaining Child child nisms categories sup- through one three be established Although reached “the the statute referred to support, language concerning be to child should read mean father” paternity provision applied “putative disputed when a father.” The yet filed, paternity a had not been made. been but determination suit had “putative requires language mean to read this to Common sense us paternity paternity father,” has made when a as no determination of been appears initially Additionally, complaint use the statute filed. interchangeably “putative with “father.” term father” 463 Mich

Opinion Court port (1) pursuant orders: those entered to a divorce (2) pursuant paternity action; those entered to a paternity action in whiсh has been established (through methods); one a number of available (3) pursuant stipulation those, here, entered to a paternity determining dismiss a action before paternity. category,

In the first children bom or conceived during marriage marriage,5 a are deemed issue of the support agreements and child entered divorce always depending upon modifiable, actions changed remain through

circumstances. This is made clear separate statutory provisions. the text of three MCL 552.455(1); explains 25.222(5)(1) process MSA predivorce through temporary support which orders may 552.17(1); 25.97(1) modified; MCL MSA explains process through which orders pursuant may entered to divorce be modified parties; motion of the MCL 552.517; MSA provides 25.176(17) postjudgment modifications may pursuant orders be made to friend of provisions, the court recommendations. These consid together, modify ered allow circuit court all child support agreements pursuant reached to a divorce action. category,

In the second orders remain modifiable where a final determination has by way been reached of a formal action. may through variety Such a determination be made statutory of methods. In the first of two methods, the Paternity seq.] seq., MCL Act, 722.711et MSA25.491et presumption Paternity applicable This is rebuttable. The Act is where presumption successfully has been rebutted. Opinion of the Court where an of filia- in cases order allows modification tion has entered: jurisdiction proceedings continuing over has

The court the amount brought to increase or decrease under this act 7(3) subject (4), or to section the order of filiation fixed provisions for, change, of the provide and enforce and to custody parenting relating of or or order 25.500(1).] 722.720(1);MSA with the child. time [MCL statutory аlso found category, second seq.\ seq., MSA 25.491 et Paternity Act, MCL 722.711 et acknowledg- in cases where an allows modification been paternity ment of has obtained: signed this establishes acknowledgment under act An may paternity, acknowledgment be the basis for and the support, custody, parenting or time court ordered child paternity adjudication act ... . further under without subject acknowledgment shall who The child is sign- relationship man same mother and the bear the during a mar- ing the father child bom or conceived as as a status, rights, and duties riage and shall have the identical of effective from birth. a child bom in lawful wedlock [MCL 722.1004; MSA 25.604.] by law, Except provided as a mother and otherwise pre- sign acknowledgment who is filed

father general, personal consenting scribed in section 5 are to the jurisdiction regarding of of this state the courts record support, custody, parenting time the issues 722.1010;MSA the child. [MCL 25.610.] statutory establishing category It the third is pursuant orders entered through — voluntary stipulation to dismiss action is at issue determining before —that statutory Only in this are non- category instant case. permitted. impor- It support agreements modifiable 463 Mich 248 Opinion of the Court note, however, tant to that this third of child category includes both modifiable nonmodifiable require support agreements. The statute does not that such permits nonmodifiable; merely orders be orders, provided nonmodifiable that the court deter- parties’ mines that agreement adequately provides for the child.

HI. EQUAL CLAUSE PROTECTION Equal The of Protection Clauses the United States Constitution and the provide Michigan Constitution that person no shall be equal denied the protection of the law. US Const, Am XIV; 1963, 1, Const art 2.§ This Court has equal found Michigan’s protection pro- vision coextensive Equal with the Protection Clause of the federal constitution. Sеe, e.g., v Nehls, Frame 171, 452 Mich 183; 550 NW2d 739 (1996) (“[t]he Mich- igan and federal Equal Protection Clauses offer simi- v lar Dep’t Doe Services, Social protection”); 439 of 650, Mich 670-671; 487 NW2d (1992) 166 review (“a of the ‍​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‍jurisprudence history and constitutional of this state . . suggests . that our Equal Protection Clause was intended to duplicate the federal clause and to offer similar protection”). Equal

The essence of the Protection Clauses is that the government persons not treat differently on account of certain, largely innate, characteristics that do justify disparate treatment. Miller v Johnson, 900, 919; 515 US 2475; 115 S Ct 132 L Ed 2d 762 Dep’t El Souri v Social Services, 429 Mich (1995); 203, 414 207; NW2d 679 (1987). Conversely, Equal Protection Clauses prohibit disparate do not treat- respect ment with on individuals of other, account presumably more genuinely differentiating, character- 259

Opinion of the Court Co v Seat- Light City Power Puget Sound & istics. L Ed (1934). 78 1025 619; 542; US 54 S Ct tle, Protection Clauses Moreover, Equal where the even prohibit far as to they do not so implicated, go are merely persons, but distinguishing from between state are made not distinctions “the require Co, Texas, Midland v Avery arbitrary or invidious.” L Ed (1968). S Ct 2d 45 1114; US protection chal- equal party When a raises viable three apply one of required court lenge, nature depending on the review, levels of traditional highest level classification. of the alleged law scrutiny,” or is invoked where the review, “strict “suspect” factors in classifications based results ethnicity, or none national race, origin, such Plyler Doe, are in this case. implicated which 72 L Ed 2d 786 202, 216-217; 2382; (1982). 102 S Ct US suspect catego- implication highly of these Absent either equal challenge requires ries, protection an intermediate, or an “heightened review rational-basis scrutiny” review. APPLIES

A. WHERE RATIONAL BASIS uphold leg- will review, rational-basis courts Under rationally is related legislation as that long islation Wil- Dandridge v purpose. a legitimate government 491 liams, 1153; 90 25 L Ed 2d 471, 485; 397 US S Ct stan- highly To under this deferential prevail (1970). legis- show that the review, challenger must dard a rational wholly unrelated in “arbitrary lation Employ- Smith v way objective to the the statute.” Comm, 231, NW2d Security 271; Mich 301 ment 410 basis reviewed on this A classification (1981). 285 judg- the legislative if constitutional muster passes 463 Mich Opinion op the Court supported by any facts, ment is set of either known reasonably or which assumed, could even if such may Attorney General, facts be debatable. Shavers 554, 402 Mich 613-614; (1978). NW2d Rational- wisdom, basis review does not test or need, appropriateness of the legislation, or whether classification is made “mathematical or nicety,” it inequity even whether results in some put when practice. into O’Donnell v Farm State Mut Automo- 524, bile Ins 404 Mich Co, 542; 273 NW2d 829 (1979). Rather, presumed the statute is constitutional, party challenging heavy bears burden of rebutting presumption. Shavers, supra. WHERE

B. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY APPLIES The United States Court recognized has an intermediate review, level of between strict- scrutiny and review, rational-basis under which a statutory challenged upheld only classification will be “substantially if it is important related govern- objective.” mental v Jeter, 486 US 461; Clark S Ct 100 L Ed 2d 465 (1988). This “heightened scrutiny” standard has been applied to legislation cre- ating classifications on such bases as illegitimacy and gender. standard recognizes that, may while there be certain immutable distinctions, for example, between men and women or between legitimate and illegitimate children, justify differing legislative treatments under circumstances, some the Legisla- authority ture’s to invoke those distinctions should not be viewed as “impenetrable an barrier that works to shield otherwise invidious discrimination.” Gomez Perez, 535, 538; v 409 US L 872; 93 S Ct 35 Ed 2d 56 also, See (1973). Clark, supra; e.g., Mills v Hab- 261

Opinion the Court 770 L Ed 2d 1549; 71 S Ct 91; 456 US 102 luetzel, 505-506;96 S Ct (1982); 427 US Lucas, v Mathews applying heightened (all (1976) L Ed 2d 651 2755; scrutiny illegitimacy). based classifications alleges protection equal uncon- claim where an Thus, illegitimacy, the basis of on the treatment stitutional may not invidi- “a State has held that Court against ously children discriminate denying accorded benefits them substantial supra where a generally.” However, at 538. Gomez, impor- substantially challenged to an related upheld. Mills, be should interest, the statute state tant supra 98-99. IN IV. PROBLEMS CHARACTERIZATION PROBLEMS IN CHARACTERIZATION A. GENERAL height- or uses a rational-basis the Court Whether depends scrutiny on the review standard of ened statutorily created classifica- characterization supra Legislation, e.g., at 504. Mathews, See, tions. typically classifications, nature, intrinsic creates its resulting defined classes. in benefits or detriments e.g., Massachusetts Personnel Administrator See, Feeney, L Ed 2282; Ct 256, 271-272; 99 S 442 US v Virginia, Royster (1979); Guano Co F S 2d 870 may (1920). It L Ed 989 S Ct 412, 415; US outside the realm at least difficult, sometimes scrutiny” in terms of a law review, to define “strict constitutionally imper- countenancing it is whether persons merely classifying or classification missible differently. genuinely are situated who equal protection sense, because, in one This is persons simultaneously are two asserts claim similarly level, such that, at another situated, also but 463 Mich 248

Opinion the Court of persons similarly not similarly are situated. The assertion that predicate the two are forms situated the for argument notwithstanding similarity, that, the they such being differing

are treated in a manner some regard. similarly The assertion that the two are not a situated is function of the fact that there some allegedly unshared characteristic that the forms basis differing Consequently, for the treatment. because an equal protection implicates claim sometimes this ten similarity sion the between assertions of and dissimi larity, may its success sometimes rise fall on or the basis of a court’s characterization of the clаssifica by particular tions created statute.6 B. SPECIFIC IN PROBLEMS CHARACTERIZATION surprisingly, Not defendant characterizes this case properly as one in which different treatment has been similarly afforded to children who were not, fact, paternity Rather, situated. children whose had been differently ascertained were treated than children whose had not been This ascertained. is not an unreasonable characterization. The children putative (1) affected statute were those: whose Feeney, supra, example, In Court faced the difficul- plaintiffs ties in challenged the characterization of a when female preferences granting regard a law veterans to state civil service hir- ing operated overwhelmingly decisions. 442 US 259. Because the law advantage plaintiffs applicants, of male prefer- characterized impermissibly creating ence gender. a classification on the basis However, ultimately preference the Court chose to characterize the as one creating a classification on the basis one’s status as a In veteran. other words, that, though significantly the Court determined even more men being granted preference, than were women a benefit the law was properly granting veterans, regardless gender, characterized as one persons distinguishing benefit over nonveterans. Rather than between gender, job distinguished applicants the basis of the law between on the nongender basis of considerations.

Opinion of the Court by signing admitted had not father putative (2) acknowledgment; had not father whose through adjudicated an order natural father been (3) able not been mother had whose filiation; and stipulation, through a modifiable obtain, agreement. challenge defendant’s here, from

The сonstitutional perspective, in Frame that raised unlike is not sought grandfather supra. visita- a Frame, In Nehls, grandchild. illegitimate Under the rights his tion standing grandparents had statute, relevant pendency during cus- of a “child seek visitation tody dispute.” was a action Because custody statutory dis- of a “child definition within the standing, pute,” grandfather he chal- and lacked equal protection grounds, claim- lenged on the statute unconstitutionally ing between differentiated that it legitimate children. and Appeals Court of case, the As in the instant challenged agreed created statute Frame illegitimacy, and it basis of on the classifications equal of denial unconstitutional statute an found the App protection. 412, 416; 208 Mich Nehls, Frame disagreed, (1995). However, this Court NW2d 773 distinguish holding did not classification illegitimacy. Rather, of on the basis between standing grandparents pointed had out that this Court legiti- regardless pursue child’s visitation example, parents macy a child bom where, Conse- later divorced. married, then wedlock out of quently, did not that the concluded this Court illegitimacy. 452 the basis of on classifications create Mich 186-187. 463 Mich 248

Opinion the Court variety statute, Under this there are a of situations under which children receive the same fully dur modifiable as children bom a ing marriage. First, putative where father has an signed acknowledgment paternity, any child fully order entered regarding the child is modifiable, because that was, is, child and accorded the “identical and status, rights, duties of a child bom in lawful wedlock.” MCL 722.1004; MSA 25.604. Sec ond, putative where a father has adjudicated been natural father court, circuit order filia any tion has entered, been child order regarding was, entered that child is, modifiable MCL 722.720; under MSA 25.500. Finally, where the parties to a agree action have reached an ment regarding support, that modi as long fiable as the support order language includes allowing modification. Consequently, is not unrea sonable conclude that the statute has not created a classification on the of illegitimacy, basis rather but has created a classification the basis of whether paternity had been legally determined. This clas is a sification that distinguishes between categories of illegitimate children, not between the categories legitimate and children. Under this inter pretation, upheld statute should be as long as it is rationally related to permissible legislative object See Dandridge, supra & ive.7 at Manistee Bank 485; 7 A classification based on whether has been determined implicates inherently class, suspect neither a fundamental or an nor recognized has it been or this Court States United Court deserving any heightened parties Moreover, standard of review. provided category suspect have no reason we now should create a new class. 265

Opinion the Court 655, 232 NW2d 636 McGowan, 668; v Mich Trust 394 (1975). “[i]t is unreasonable

The concludes dissent except distinguish anything did find that the statute legitimacy.” on the basis of the treatment of children post dissenting); also at 293- at see (Kelly, J., Post 284 dissenting justices dissenting). The (Weaver, C.J., “illegitimate children, because, reach conclusion this disparate they Post at received treatment.” alone, post dissenting); at 294 see also J., (Kelly, dissenting). facts in the However, the (Weaver, C.J., Geduldig v unlike the facts in instant case are not they example, alone, Aiello, women, where for disability benefits were certain insurance denied policy pregnancy. excluded benefits because the (1974).8In 2485; S 41 L Ed 2d 256 484; 417 US 94 Ct response argument challenged provi that the to the gender it the basis of because sion discriminated on argument analogous only to the women—an affected Court in the instant case—the dissents’ conclusion stated: pregnant is true that women can become

While it every legislative concern- classification does not follow ing .... pregnancy is a sex-based classification potential recipients program into two divides [insurance] persons. groups pregnant nonpregnant While women and — exclusively female, group is the second includes the first benefits of The fiscal and actuarial members of both sexes. sexes. program to members of both thus accrue [Id. 496, n 20.] Newport Shipbuilding Dry & News Superseded by statute as noted EEOC, 2622; (1983). 2d Co S Ct 77 L Ed

Dock 462 US 463 Mich 248 Opinion of the Court only illegitimate Likewise, “[w]hileit is true” that chil being pater dren face the risk of unable determine nity legal certainty, every “it not does follow that legislative concerning” classification the determina illegitimacy-based tion of is classifica Rather, in case, tion. each the fundamental classifica may appropriately tion be more distin identified as guishing larger between subclassifications of the group only pregnant, women who are ille — gitimate paternity.9 children who have not determined surprisingly,

Plaintiff, like dissents, and also not challenged creating characterizes the statute as one statutory illegitimacy. classification on the basis of reasonably although And we could conclude that the merely statute differentiated on the basis of whether acknowledge had been ascertained, we also plaintiff’s characterization of the is statute not acknowledg unreasonable. First foremost is our applies, only ment statute, that the where it affects apparent children. There is no set cir legitimate cumstances under which a would object of an enforceable, nonmodifiable agreement.10 dispositive And while we do find not this regarding the “correct” characterization statute, emphasize again necessarily disagree We we do not with the dis- reasonably may sents that statute also be characterized as one that illegitimacy. Rather, merely creates classifications on the basis of we acknowledge that, just is as it unreasonable characterize statute relating pregnancy manner, than one more is not unreasonable to characterize the more than here one manner. we Because find statute, applied, that the either characteriza- was under constitutional tion, we need not which decide of these characterizations more appropriate. Paternity applies during Act to children bom wedlock who are marriage. Thus, later deemed not to issue be the these children “illegitimate.” 722.713; would be classified also as MCL MSA 25.493. Opinion of the Court certainly provides Geduldig, supra, see the does create that statute conclusion a reasonable ‍​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‍illegitimacy-based classifications. Paternity noteworthy Act itself, the that

We find it unquestionably between ille- differentiates face, on its legitimate gitimate it is an act Indeed, children. and illegitimate solely apply children, created opportunity to obtain child children an afford those legitimate always has been available that surely argue plaintiff the would not that Yet, children. merely equal protection of act itself is violative unique recognizes the circumstances of the because it illegitimate illegitimate act, for this child. But sup- clearly obtaining no enforceable means of had provision port The fathers. individual from their specific controversy merely of act, the one element provision, itself, overall act advances and like the that providing support underlying goal to children the of support. might left without that who otherwise be repeatedly has The Court United States differentiating illegiti- of on the basis examined laws supra, macy. example, Clark, and in Mills For Pennsylvania limiting laws Court examined Texas period during illegitimate children could which required paternity. Texas that statute establish year within after the be filed one actions Pennsylvania illegitimate and the statute birth, child’s required filed within six actions be years As in the child’s birth. after challenged ille- statutes affected case, instant gitimate However, also to the instant similar children. Pennsylvania challenged statutes case, Texas illegiti- ultimately only a subclassification affected pater- establish who failed to mate children—those 268 463 248 Mich

Opinion of the Court nity statutory period within limitations.11 See Lalli, 259; also Lalli v US S Ct L 518; 58 Ed 2d (1978) (upholding New York statute imposing proof requirement children who would inherit from their fathers); Gordon, Trimble v 430 US 97 Ct L 1459; S 52 Ed 2d 31 down (1977) (striking Mitts and Clark created a were to Mills and Clark Cotut, statute creates an ferences between those cases and the instant case that same court to agreement. Consequently, nonmodifiable distinguishable from the instant case on their facts. Court reached a basis of whether contrast, from sake, ized as ascertain gitimate statute created classifications on the find the dissenter’s reaches this macy.” because the Court Court was basis of whether the in neither of those cases did the Court address the threshold did find Neither Mills nor Clark access that the statutes in Mills and Mills and Clark Post creating challenged legitimacy. children. Unlike the statute before agree paternity the instant statute created examining children — to conclusion, challenged support agreement, 285-286, that such opposite classifications either on imposed requirement decision that paternity statute created a classification on illegitimacy-based classification; here created classifications on the basis of within the allotted examined analysis The dissent support. statutory periods prove paternity n do not because the Court a results. statutes implicit mandatory prerequisite had been even we were (Kelly, flawed. In both Mills and requires So even the it require did not states, if Specifically, statute under intermediate actually decision J., Clark, or even obtain a modifiable determined, though us to reach the conclusion that the options prove paternity, time dissenting). However, within the “I conclude that the on all a conclusion that the expressly address, of limitation basis the created classifications on the frame basis making us, to applied, — we illegitimate the statutes expressly the statutes agree conclude, there period illegitimacy, or be forever to child those illegitimacy was applicable the basis Clark, could that the are cases of limitation. decided that the binding children —either could and even if we support significant for challenged challenged [Clark] Justice the scrutiny. illegitimacy; challenged are argument’s but rather precluded character- to all ille- or on the obtain a Supreme lead question on this readily illegiti- for all Court Kelly dif- We By in importantly, Even point more the Clark Court was careful to out that statutory illegitimacy designed punish classifications based on the con- parents statutory duct of were than different classifications based ille- gitimacy designed paternity proof problems to address in the con- supra Clark, disputed here, text. at 461. The statute that the extent it differently legitimate children, treated children than addressed is, сhallenged provided the latter issue. That statute an alternative obtaining support means of a child where was uncertain.

Opinion of the Court allowing legiti- Illinois statute an as unconstitutional pre- but parents from both inherit mate children from inheriting from children cluding illegitimate fathers). their present case

V. RESOLVING SATISFIED BASIS A. RATIONAL ques- the statute claim that does not plaintiff The Consequently, on its face. is unconstitutional tion ren- application statute’s unless the must fail claim that a claim faced with When unconstitutional. ders it unconstitutional, statute renders of a application to the applied” statute “as analyze the must the Court 447 Mich People Lino, v See, e.g., case. particular level of the (1994). Regardless 570-571; 527 NW2d challenge equal protection scrutiny employed, findings: governmental make two requires us to enactment, and how legislative purpose behind wé view If purpose. law is to closely related the merely differenti- as one challenged been estab- has whether ates on the basis statute is whether the then determine lished, we must interest. See state legitimate rationally related to at 485. Dandridge, supra Paternity Act is purpose underlying marriage bom outside that minor ensure Whybra and education. provided are (1961). 112 NW2d 503 396, 400; Mich Gustafson, 365 govern- permissible is a that this beyond dispute It is review, the under rational-basis Thus, purpose. ment nonmodifi- allowing unless upheld should has not paternity where support agreements able wholly unrelated “arbitrary and been ascertained securing of” objective way to the a rational 463 Mich op Opinion the Court Employment Security for children. Smith Comm, supra at 271. sup-

In the context a law created secure child port is a fathers, from there core between distinction knowing knowing who the child’s father is and not disputed who the child’s father is. Absent the law, paternity whоse children could be determined obtaining support had no means of from their fathers. directly 722.713; MCL 25.493 MSA addressed the proof problem present in child involv- cases ing illegitimate by providing an additional method which children could obtain support, again, permissible, financial and com- even pelling government supra interest. Clark, See at 461. testing, accuracy

As a result of DNA with which paternity proven significantly can be has increased parties sup- since the in this lawsuit entered into their port agreement. Shapiro, See Psome, Reifler & paternity Legislating paternity DNA test: the future (current (1992-93) action, J Law Health 1, & testing probability methods can determine the accuracy). to 99.999999% However, parties disputed time the before us entered into the agreement, proving very significant was a sup- to an obstacle child’s access to child port. reported pater- The first results of modem DNA nity testing Blakesley, did not occur until 1985. See testing proof paternity: Some con- Scientific troversy key family counsel, issues law 57 La (1997) (“In reported 379, L R fact, since its first matching progressed ‘gen- results in has DNA acceptance ”). eral in less than a decade’ course, Of prior blood-testing while methods could exclude being possible some males from father a child, op Opinion the Court affirmatively par- pinpoint a could not methods those being Thus, when the set- father. male as the ticular parties present was the between tlement establishing paternity awas far more in entered paternity present. than Contested difficult ordeal more than credibil- time were often no at that actions ity Family Study Commission, See Illinois contests. Report 76th to the General and Recommendations Assembly (finding (1969) at that actions corruption coercion, rife with time were often at the every pater- perjury). Consequently, in contested and depended support nity obtaining action, merely putative was, fact, in father on whether the biological on whether the father, but rather the child’s prove that was a court of law she mother could putative only sexually man—the involved with one option Allowing parties entering of into the father. proving paternity private agreements of elimi- in lieu mother would unable nated the risk the procedure proof. established meet her burden of voluntary Paternity provided Act and addi- uncertain suit tional alternative the often process which a could obtain mother illegitimate child. her pre-DNAproof problems light associated

In availability paternity, proving nonmodifi- Paternity specified by pro- Act able child purpose principal i.e., act, to ensure motes the pro- marriage outside a are that minor children bom Whybra, supra. education. vided with and question perhaps cognizance The statute takes legiti- central distinction between certainty lack of formers’ reduced mate children—the By reality, paternity. recognizing regarding this their 463 Mich 248 Opinion Court seeking consequences, its ameliorate the stat ute, applied, rationally related to the state’s ensuring interest children are pro support. vided For these reasons, we conclude that disputed satisfies rational-basis standard of review.12

B. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINYSATISFIED In Gomez, supra at the 538, United States Court that acknowledged treating illegitimate children differently might appropriate under some circum- stances, to “lurking problems due the respect with to proof paternity.” of See Clark, supra also at 461. The very existence of of review, “intermediate” level i.e., a respectful standard of review more of legisla- tive distinctions thаn regard with to the most highly suspect categories race, of nationality, ethnicity, and represents an implicit acknowledgment that there are some immutable distinctions between various classes persons, of and it that is sometimes within the Legis- lature’s prerogative distinctions, address those recognizing testing conclusively pater- Even that dna can establish nity, unreliability testing longer and the that of is no the it obstacle that paternity suits, altogether “proof” once was in this does not eliminate problems paternity Proving paternity of the context suits. involves not establishing genetic the and technical scientific elements of a rela- tionship, variety legal practical burdens, including but also of other and necessity identifying locating putative father, of and need requiring paternity testing, obtain and enforce court orders the emotional psychological trial, burdens associated with the inevitable uncertain- legal process, and, perhaps increasingly remote, ties while problems obtaining associated with reliable test Each results. of these steps proving paternity significant resources, can involve in terms of time, effort, money. Moreover, may conceivably there be circum- paternity ascertaining through legal process may stances in which always interest, paternity be in child’s own best even where such proven conclusively standpoint. could be from a scientific

Opinion of the Court dissimilarity of treatment. the result even where aspect addressing example, legislation some For equal pro- pregnancy not violate and childbirth does merely basis differentiates tection because supra gender. Geduldig, n Rather, 20. such response legislation an immuta- would be direct biologi- women—the between men and ble difference ability Rostker v children. See also to bear cal Goldberg, L Ed 2646; 69 2d 453 US 101 S Ct similarly (1981) (holding situ- women were not registration purposes draft or to men for of a ated draft). permis- Providing is a for children financial governmental important, compelling sible, and even legitimate and between interest. A core distinction difficulty determining children is the certainty paternity with level of of the latter the same respect to the can be ascertained again, one former. And where is uncertain— legitimate and between of the immutable distinctions illegitimate providing an alternative means children— may support obtaining who not child to mothers of substantially prove paternity is otherwise be able to support. goal providing with related children to respect particularly true to the instant This is with parties into their case, where the entered significant plaintiff faced obstacles at a time in which overcoming he was claim that not to defendant’s testing when lack of modem child’s father. The DNA parties their settlement underscores these entered applied statute, case, did not violate as in this that the equal protection. guarantees See, the constitutional supra e.g., at 570-571. Lino, 463 Mich 248

Opinion Court possibility support The of nonmodifiable child held 722.713; provided out MCL an MSA 25.493 incen putative tive for a father of child illegitimate not dispute paternity. important This furthered the gov objective support ernmental of ensuring financial for may children who otherwise gone any have without “paternal” support.13 form of child rely on dissents Gerhardt v Moore, Estate of 2d 563; support Wis 441 NW2d 734 (1989), for disputed that the conclusion statute was unconsti- scrutiny. tutional under intermediate Post at 288 J., dissenting); post at (Weaver, C.J., dis- (Kelly, However, as senting). in notes, dissent Gerhardt there important is an distinction between thе facts in Clark, supra, and the facts in Gerhardt: Clark, according Where limitations in to the

Supreme Court, might prevent bringing a mother from a claim behalf of the nonmarital child because she might protect timely act the child’s in interest a man- ner, provision the settlement of the Wisconsin Statutes Kelly compares Evink, Justice the instant case to Evink v 214 Mich App 172; (1995), Appeals 542 NW2d in a case which Court of obvi- attempt child-support obligations a through ated father’s to avoid his vol- untary parental rights. However, termination of his this case illustrates precisely may why appropriate legitimate in be some cases treat differently. right A child’s absolute to receive child paternity can, a fact, from father has value where sup- ascertained. A child does not have an absolute to receive child port putative from a father. The case before is not us a case in a which parent “voluntarily parental rights known has been allowed to release escape support obligation Rather, order to the child . .” . . Id. at 176. this provided case in which a child of uncertain was awith obtaining person who, means of child from because of eviden- tiary limitations, might any obligation pay otherwise have avoided support. analogy An between Evink and the instant case fails the same challenged unavoidably reason that the statute is are there constitutional — legitimate immutable differences between taining children. Ascer- certainty is such a difference. 275 Opinion the Court (Cal- encourages so. at 578 her to do [Id. in this case

issue low, J., dissenting).] operate 25.493 did 722.713; MSA

Likewise, MCL claim bringing from a mother “prevent Rather, operated child.” nonmaritai behalf of [her] might have oth- mothers who those as incentive pater- to invoke the or unable been reluctant erwise highly prospects. uncertain nity process in the face of us, and the statute before statute, Thus, the Wisconsin by Justice burden, suggested not as a operated, J, but as 287, dissenting), n 5 Kelly, post at (Kelly, benefit. was however, that Gerhardt cor presuming,

Even clearly distinguishable on rectly decided, case is challenged Wisconsin First, the statute its facts. all agreements nonmodifiable settlement allowed paternity actions, of whether had regardless paternity Contrary by the court.14 or ascertained been admitted this is a distinction with conclusion, Kelly’s to Justice J, n 10 post 291, at a crucial difference. See (Kelly, 25.493, non- 722.713; MCL MSA allows dissenting). only where agreements modifiable ascertained, illustrating been a distinction has not child, or admits the truth “If defendant is found the father of allegation, agreement, settlement he shall be or enters into a child, adjudged unless denied in such to be the father of such Hosp Haack, General agreement, 2d . . Madison . .” Wis settlement 1975, 52.37(1). (1985), quoting 398, 410, § St also n NW2d See Relations, Dep’t Industry, Wis & Wisconsin Labor Human Larson v 618-619; 595, (1977). 252 NW2d 33 2d agreements 1967, provided for § 52.38 modification settlement St (or father) putative pursuant § St 52.37 if father entered settlement, comply or where the settlement with the terms of the failed monthly support “providing of a child bom out of wed- for the Gerhardt, supra 573, quoting . St filed . . .” has been docketed or lock 1967, § 52.38.

276 463 Mich

Opinion of the Court relationship Michigan clear between the statute and paternity problems. proof the Second, defendant in acknowledged paternity. Gerhardt Id. at 566. It is Kelly as true, observes, Justice that the Wisconsin Supreme did Court not consider the defendant’s of in paternity admission its reaching decision. Post at J., 291, n 10 (Kelly, dissenting). point out, We how ever, that in a Michigan, putative once father has acknowledged paternity, his child is fully entitled to support, just any modifiable as other child whose paternity has been ascertained. 722.1004; MCL MSA 25.604. It where paternity is uncertain that nonmodifiable child is allowed.15 if Thus, we Dep’t Miller, Justice also cites Kelly Public Aid ex rel Cox v 146 Ill of and (1992), suggests Supreme 2d 586 NE2d 1251 that the Illinois Court, “salvage” in to order an otherwise unconstitutional statute similar challenged here, interpreted provision to allowing illegiti the a continuing right mate the paternity to an file action to ascertain allowing as also those children to seek nonmodifiable modification support agreements. 289, (Kelly, J., dissenting). Regardless at n Post Supreme regarding the Illinois Court’s dicta what it would or would not it, challenged statutory find constitutional under facts not before paternity scheme in case allowed an to child file a action any at express language time. The Illinois court relied on the of the state’s Paternity paternity ascertained, Act to conclude that whenever was child was legiti entitled to the same to modifiable child as supra Miller, 411, quoting 1983, 40, par mate children. at Ill Rev Stat ch 1352, “The father of a child bom out of wedlock whose is estab proceeding in a lished this under Act shall be liable its ... to the same extent and in the same manner as the father of the child born in Although expressed opinion lawful . . . ." wedlock its court respect constitutionality hypothetical precluded statute that modification, opinion anything there is no indication in its that it relied on plain language statutory legislative but the of the scheme and intent to complete any determine that the statute allowed modification time that was ascertained and that a nonmodifiable settlement paternity. (“To did not bar a suit to ascertain Id. find otherwise denigrate clearly expressed legislature would be to intent of the public policy State”). appellate well as the fact that mere interpreted differently court had the statute does not mean that “the stat support agreements ute interpreted did allow modification of child until the court dissenting). Rather, do so.” Post at n 8 (Kelly, J., Opinion of the Court facts as those before the with the same faced were say whether we Court, we cannot Wisconsin Clearly, conclusion. under a different would reach similarly Michigan situated law, a defendant is, who has made a one Gerhardt, defendant required paternity, acknowledgment legal would be support, provide fully and the case modifiable distinction with clear before us—a not be would difference. case, 722.713; MCL MSA that, this is true

It application given after the even was continued 25.493 testing.16 least in However, at of modem dna advent agree a case which the settlement the in context support pertaining child to for an ment testing, modem DNA the advent of was entered before important governmental clearly are served interests agreement by give continuing to the even to force testing. The advent of such most obvious after the parties allowing to to an order interest upon agreements, such and their conduct in reliance maintaining integrity agreements. In of such this parties cases, in countless similar entered into and agreements settlement that were nonmodifiable by puta expressly approved judge. a circuit court promised were, effect, in fathers such cases tive support judge of child court that the level trial upon imposed be above them would not increased agreement. provided in the settlement the amount Paternity Act, legislature written found that the and as Illinois court pater- support any intended, had of child time allowed modification nity Consequently, be that court’s determination could determinеd. constitutionality statutory is of value. of a dissimilar scheme little case, purposes we not whether MCL of the instant need decide For 25.493, repealed, 722.713; had it would remain constitu- MSA not been scrutiny. ‍​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‍today under tional intermediate [July. 463 Mich Opinion of the Court understandings years To allow these to be altered technological later, on the even basis of advances, expected could to undermine confidence in legitimacy legal system of a fairness promised thing, these individuals one but then later changed game. rules Moreover, if we were promises to allow these to be avoided where techno- logical prove paternity, advances could be utilized to also, we would fairness, need allow such promises technological to be avoided where advances disprove paternity. could be utilized to recognize It is critical that this is not impose designed upon illegitimate burdens chil- parents, dren for the behavior of their or even to dis- courage sexual relations outside the institution of marriage or otherwise influence societal norms. designed paternity proof Rather, it is to address problems important gov- in the context—an repeatedly interest, ernmental sanctioned United States Court—in order to afford the opportunity mother an to bind putative the child’s father order, to a without paternity, thereby a final determination of opportunities afford enhanced for the of ille- gitimate children. We do conclude, as Justice Kelly “[outweigh] contends, that these benefits the. ensuring substantial interest our state has in that our youngsters adequate support throughout receive childhood.” at 291, Post n Rather, 10. we conclude directly that these benefits themselves address “the ensuring youngsters interest our state has in that our аdequate support throughout receive childhood.” They by providing opportunities so do additional to Crego v Coleman

Opinion of the Court support might who otherwise to children obtain that any support whatsoever. be denied altogether ignore fact that the the Nor we can agree compel not mothers does instant statute denying illegiti- support. Rather than nonmodifiable support right fathers, from their mate children the through provides illegitimate children, the statute optional voluntary mothers, a and additional their compromise obtaining support for mechanism —a significant exchange the risk that mother for the no receive and the child would would lose case support support agree- whatsoever. Nonmodifiable support agreements, along are with modifiable ments, required, statute, and are not under the available, only deter- where the court has otherwise enforceable provide agreements sufficient mined that Again, in which this not a case for the child. is judicially right “posit[ed] enforceable chil- state fathers,” natural but dren to from their Mills, same children. denied that supra supra. citing Gomez, opinions dissenting statute, that the conclude providing opportunity rather than an additional actually oper- support, illegitimate children to obtain precludes modifica- ates detriment because it to their support. this not However, tion conclusion of child practical only into to take consideration fails problems confronting the mother proving of dna before the advent child in testing, also to consider that modification but fails merely based on more than is determining whether modification needs. In child’s required into take con- are warranted, courts but also the needs, the child’s sideration, 463 Mich

Opinion оf the Court Although recipients father’s financial circumstances. may of support precluded nonmodifiable be from in support, they pre are obtaining increase also support. cluded from in suffering reduction Even more consequentially, course, statute, of absent the recipients “pre the of nonmodifiable support are cluded” from being support denied such as altogether, where the mother to problems was unable overcome in that proving paternity existed before dna testing. Moreover, putative fathers who to agreed nonmodifi support precluded able are from of taking advantage advances in technology disprove paternity, just to as prove the are paternity.17 mothers Finally, we emphasize again support agree that nonmodifiable ments are enforceable when a court has deter they mined satisfactorily provide that for the child. unpersuasive judici- Justice Kelly finds this statement because of the ary’s underlying goal “ascertaining true, Leg- of the truth.” While this is the islature, law, objectives, particu- in its enactment of the also has other in ensuring supported. lar children are At the time the into, judicial system instant was entered the was less able concerning today. ascertain the might truth matters of than it agreements provided The mothers who entered into the for MCL 722.713; accepted MSA 25.493 nonmodifiable to avoid risk of the receiving support whatsoever, inability no child the in event of their putative was, fact, biological convince the court that the father in the Moreover, they receiving father. avoided the risk of a reduction in child parties’ in the event that the child’s needs and the financial situa- reduction, they tion warranted such and also avoided the risk that the putative could, teсhnology, sup- father with advances in eliminate child port altogether. Similarly, putative agreed the fathers to nonmodifiable support to determining perhaps incorrectly, avoid the risk of the court — certainly certainty they and with biological scientific were the —that goal ascertaining compromised par- fathers. The the truth is not when ties, recognizing strengths proofs weaknesses available situation, agree their unnecessary might to make concessions so each avoid Here, Legislature allowed, parties risks. has and the have agreed, given that a putative child should receive child from the judicial particularly father even without ascertainment of truth where, here, judiciary lacked the means which to this ascertain any genuine certainty. degree Opinion the Court every anticipate certainly cannot courts While the every change circumstances, in the child’s need analyzed presumably agreements been have these provide ability adequately light of their throughout childhood. child directly substantially and statute is Because the support obtaining goal general child of related to the it is substan- children, because and for tially legitimate directly con- related to the state’s proof problems regarding in the cern an unconstitutional that it is not we find context, regardless protection equal of law, under the denial of standards intermediate basis or whether the rational employed. of review are

VI. CONCLUSION characterizing ways of There are alternative statutory provi- by the instant created classifications stat- is that this characterization One reasonable sion. distinguishes whose between children ute pater- whose and children ascertained has not been nity Alternatively, the classifica- has been ascertained. by challenged could reason- statute tions created illegitimacy being ably on as based characterized bom out of children affects the statute because wedlock. merely challenged

Viewing which as one statute paternity has of whether on the basis differentiates rationally that the statute we find ascertained, been ensuring legitimate interest state related to the provided with are of wedlock bom out minor children viewing chal- Moreover, and education. distinguishes lenged one that as Mich Dissenting Opinion by J. Kelly, the basis of illegitimacy, we find that the statute’s purpose of providing support for illegitimate children is an important, and even compelling, state interest and that the challenged statute, applied, substan- tially and directly important advances this interest providing an problems avenue to avoid associated with proving paternity, yet provide still the child.

Therefore, we find that, regardless of this Court’s characterization of the classifications created challenged statute, the statute does not violate the constitutional guarantees equal protection law. We reverse the judgment the Court Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with opinion. this We do not jurisdiction. retain

Taylor, Corrigan, Young, JJ., concurred Markman, J. J. (dissenting). Paternity The Act, before

Kelly, being amended, impermissibly discriminated against by children denying opportunity them the accorded legitimate children for modification of agreements for providing their support.1 State “[A] may not invidiously discriminate against by denying them substantial benefits accorded children generally.” Gomez Perez, v 409 US 535, 538; 93 872; S Ct 35 L Ed 2d 56 (1973). Therefore, I would affirm the Appeals Court of decision and 722.713; part MCL Paternity Act, MSA 25.493 was of the MCL 722.711 seq.-, seq. et repealed by MSA 25.491 et It Legislature, was the effective 1, 1997, Appeals June after the Court of declared it unconstitutional Thomas, App Dones v 674; 210 Mich (1995). 534 NW2d 221 See 1996 PA 308. by Opinion Dissenting Kelly, J. par of further consideration for the case remand retroactivity.2 pertaining arguments to ties’ provided: at issue 3 of the Section by compromise mother or made agreement or a) An person with the on their behalf authorized some child or of the concerning and education father only when upon the child binding the mother and shall be compel and educa- jurisdiction having to the court provi- adequate that shall have determined the child tion of reasonably payment otherwise or secured sion is compromise. approved agreement or has compromise, performance or b) of the the mother approved, other remedies shall bar when so the child. and education or child [Emphasis added.] A challenge equal protection brought Plaintiff any majority one of three § indicated, has 3. As the equal protec- applies of review standards different depending challenges, the nature tion p alleged Ante, 259. classification. majority’s holding disagree it is

I apply equally basis stan- the rational reasonable apply § or an intermediate 3 as to dard of review p scrutiny heightened 264. Intermedi- Ante, standard. dispa- scrutiny applies heightened to claims ate or illegitimacy legitimacy or on the rate treatment based person. S Ct US Habluetzel, Mills retroactivity, concerning arguments because I do not treat majority Appeals in this case. the Court issue was not considered J., concurring) 284, 297; (1998) App 277 (Fitzgerald, 591 NW2d 232 Mich (CregoIII). 284 463 Mich 248 Dissenting Opinion by J. Kelly, Brown, Pickett v 1549; 71 L Ed 2d 770 462 US (1982); 2199; 103 S Ct 76 L Ed 2d 372 1; (1983). majority reasonably

The states that one could char- differently treating acterize children on the § Ante, paternity of whether has basis been established. p 266. That on view focuses thе fact that illegitimate children whose has been established are not Then, supports affected the statute. a rational review, basis standard of because a classification based on invokes neither intermediate nor Plyler Doe, v scrutiny. strict 202, 216-217; See 457 US 2382; 102 S Ct L Ed 2d (1982) (identifying situ- Mills, scrutiny ations in which supra strict applies); scrutiny situations in which (identifying intermediate applies). majority’s

The view is flawed. It is unreasonable find that the statute did except anything distinguish the treatment of the basis legitimacy. not all Although dispa children received rate treatment reality under the dominant § is that illegitimate children, they alone, dispa received rate treatment. The majority acknowledges is no apparent set of circumstances under “[t]here which a legitimate child object would be the of an enforceable, support agreement.” Ante, nonmodifiable p 266.3

The United States Court has held interme- scrutiny diate or heightened apply under similar Jeter, Clark v circumstances. US 108 S Ct 1910; 100 L Ed Williams (1988); 2d 465 see also Paternity description provisions only apply Act’s stated that its upon jurisdiction children: “An act to confer circuit courts proceedings compel provide support over of children bom out of preamble. . . . wedlock .” 1956 PA 205 285 Dissenting Opinion Kelly, J. Supp (SD 1995); NY, Gerhardt Lambert, 902 F 563; 441 NW2d 734 150 Wis 2d Moore, Estate of Pennsylvania (1989). Court considered Clark, the In prove required illegitimate children statute support paternity seeking fathers. It from their before paternity brought required suit to establish that a supra years Clark, birth. of the children’s six within at 457. support legitimate seek children could contrast,

In any parents statute did not time. Id. The at from their by blocking illegitimate their children affect all attempts fathers. It from their obtain to only had not children who affected those years paternity of birth. within six established been identified could have here, as Thus, had been determined whose as those However, the Court had not. those whose applied instead it fact, about that was not concerned scrutiny It of the statute. to a review intermediate stated: period obtaining . . . must be suf- “First, the opportu- present

ficiently long reasonable in duration to assert nity an interest in such children for those with placed any Second, time limitation on their behalf. claims substantially to the related opportunity must be on that avoiding litigation or stale in State’s interest fraud- Mills, supra supra [Clark, 462, quoting at ulent claims." added).] (emphasis 99-100 the statute was unconstitutional

The Court held substantially related to it was basis that on the important Id. at 464.4 interest. state Clark, that, determined majority Court never states actually challenged a classification on created whether Mich Dissenting Opinion Kelly, J.

I reach the same conclusion did the United Supreme Court in States Clark. Even 3 did though § every child, not include scru intermediate tiny must apply any where the statute affected child’s parental to receive on the basis of ille gitimacy. Accordingly, intermediate or heightened scrutiny should be the standard used consid constitutionality 3. ering Clark, supra §of at 461.5 illegitimacy. Ante, p 268, recognize basis of n It fails 11. that there was compelled apply no other in issue Clark that would have the Court to the scrutiny Thus, intermediate of standard review. I conclude that the Court did find that the a statute created classification on the basis of illegitimacy. 5 majority quotes Geduldig Aiello, 484; 2485; The from v US 94 Ct 417 S position. p (1974), Ante, However, 41 L Ed 2d 256 its to 265. cases Geduldig applicable that have followed that indicate it is not here. See Westinghouse Corp, 360, 357, (CA 3, 1978) Eberts v Electric 581 F2d n 1 (“[Geduldig] simply preg is an insurance case and the of allows exclusion nancy-related employer’s disability plan”). disabilities from an benefits by following regarding The Sixth Circuit the wrote cited the footnote now majority: apparent reading “It is from our of footnote 20 that the particular Court’s observations are made in the and narrow confines of power pragmatic the state’s to draw flexible and lines in the social welfare Satty Co, 850, 6, area.” (CA 1975). Gas Nashville 522 F2d 853 Supreme Court, affirming The United States in the Sixth Circuit deci- Satty, Geduldig sion in made distinction between even this case more clear: Here, comparison, petitioner merely has not refused to extend receive, to women a benefit that men cannot and do not has but imposed on women a substantial burden that need men not suffer. The distinction between benefits and burdens is more than one Gilbert, 125; semantics. We held in Electric Co v 429 [General US 401; (based (1976) 97 S Geduldig)], Ct 50 L Ed 2d 343 that [the require greater paid did not that economic to statute] one benefits be or differing sex the other “because of their roles in the ‘scheme ” existence,’ holding of human n 429 US 17. But that does permit employer allow us to read to an to burden [the statute] employees way deprive employment female such a in them of opportunities because of their different role. Gas Co v [Nashville Satty, 136, 142; (1977).] US 98 S Ct 54 L Ed 2d 356 Similarly, here, § 3 not a is statute that results an underinclusive offering program Rather, imposes § insurance or social benefits. Dissenting Opinion Keixy, J.

B scrutiny, intermediate to survive In order must be complained of in the treatment that results important governmental “substantially to an related majority attempts 461. supra at Clark, objective.” scrutiny is intermediate when that, even to show Ante, p 281. muster. constitutional passes applied, § objective of § important government It relates problems con- paternity proof in the address illegitimate mother of in order to afford the ... text putative father to a opportunity the child’s to bind paternity, support order, without a final determination sup- opportunities thereby for the enhanced to afford [Ante, p port children. 278.] the state’s interest importance of recognize I opportunity enhancing However, I disagree fathers. support from their obtain substantially related 3 majority § purpose. did not rest its in Clark While the Court need that the recognized on such grounds, decision over time. support changes for child belatedly might “a loss of income realize A mother Pickett, supra child,” to care for the attributable to need likely Furthermore, are [p financial difficulties 12]. expenses incurs for cloth- as the child matures and increase questionable school, . . . Thus it is ing, and medical care. reasonably requires it most ‍​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‍when a State acts whether years support brought within six to be actions supra [Clark, at illegitimate child’s birth. 463-464.] of any by foreclosing their mothers children and burden on Gerhardt, supra modify support agreements. at opportunity See 572. 463 Mich 248 [July- Dissenting Opinion by J. Kelly,

How much more is it for a unreasonable state to preclude any support agreements modifications to shortly light into after entered a child’s birth in Supreme same those factors? The Wisconsin Court question answered that when decided the case of supra, Gerhardt, on remand from United States Supreme light Court for reconsideration of Clark.6 Gerhardt,

In the Wisconsin Court consid statutory provision lump-sum ered a that authorized payments encourage the settlement of provision cases. forbade revision or alteration comply settlements, of such unless the father failed to supra Gerhardt, with their terms. at 571. The court concluded: precluded seeking

Because marital children are not from support notwithstanding prior additional child a order court setting support, the amount of prohibiting we conclude that lump-sum agree- nonmarital children involved in settlement seeking ments from additional amounts to a denial protection. equal at [Id. 565.] argued, majority In Gerhardt, the defendant as the statutory provision gives here, concludes that the ille- gitimate option children an additional in the form a lump-sum provision. p settlement Id. at 571; ante, recognized 279. The court, however, Gerhardt argument. error in that appears Moore, The remand order at: Gerhardt Estate 486 US 2814; (1988). 108 S Ct 100 L 2dEd statutory provision The Court stated the issue follows: “[W]hether denying lump nonmarital children involved in sum child settle- ability father, ments seek additional from children, equal protection denied marital to a amounts denial of

law.” Id. 735. by Dissenting Opinion Kelly, J. reality option to the detri has in worked is an that [I]t best, illusory is, many It at an children. nonmarital

ment is, reality, an amounting at all. to no benefit It benefit procedural bars invali to the burden. Similar additional cases, lump-sum settlement in the Clark line dated opportu provision deprives children the certain nonmarital support. Although nity adequate Clark and to obtain statutory limitation bars to the cited therein deal cases actions, seeking child additional filing of the bar to precisely iump:sum agreement works in results from a attached to the Regardless manner. of the label the same child, statutory bar, The nonmarital the result is the same. child, seeking marital is barred from additional unlike the hardly support, regardless That to the of need. fair child, That is what much less constitutional. nonmarital Supreme recognized remanding States Court the United today. action, recognize we at this and that is what [Id. added).][8] (emphasis 571-572 Supreme A New is not alone in its conclusion. The Wisconsin Court appellate a New York court would York federal district court believed that substantially New York statute on the basis of Clark strike down a similar permit illegitimate to statute so that it would an child or construe the Williams, supra support agreement. n 5. of a seek modification Supreme Gerhardt, Court, of Clark and took The Illinois on the basis approach. Dep’t Miller, 146 Ill 2d In Public Aid ex rel Cox v the second 399, 408-410; (1992), “whether a set 586 NE2d 1251 that court considered subsequent in a action bar a tlement order and dismissal entered support.” illegitimate brought Id. or on behalf of the minor action appellate previous court held court identified that decisions at 403. The “ father, ‘permit mother, alleged Paternity Illinois Act did not supported bring public agency after which has the child to an action or a ” (citation court-approved reached.’ Id. at 402 omit settlement has been equal analysis agreed ted). Gerhardt. It held that The court with the protection were un law would be violated if children of the support agreements legitimate when modification of child able to seek statutory scheme, salvage opportunity. 411. To had that Id. at children bring an action to the act to allow the court read modify assertion, Contrary majority’s support agreements. to the child statutory bring “plain language scheme” allowed nothing any paternity. Id. said of a time to ascertain It action at modify agreements. Id: otherwise nonmodifiable child’s my identifying majority attempts citation to Cox to discredit ante, trying distinguish instant case from it. See as dicta 463 Mich 248

Dissenting Opinion by J. Kelly, I agree with the Wisconsin Court that stat utes such as 3 violate an illegitimate § child’s right to equal protection of the law. Similar to the Wisconsin statute, actually 3§ limited the opportunities for ille gitimate children support to receive puta from their tive fathers. It by did so any foreclosing oрportunity for support orders beyond to be modified what was agreed to under very likely conditions unfavorable to .9 both mother and child It is unreasonable to believe that an agreement entered into the onset of a child’s life accurately can anticipate provide and all the contingencies that will child face until reach ing adulthood. I Thus, conclude that 3§ worked and against failed to substantially related to the pp 276-277, Cox, n 15. In the statute did not allow modification of child support agreements interpreted until the court it to do so. That was in the challenge face of a constitutional on the basis of Clark and Gerhardt. Thus, case, the case is similar to the instant and its discussion of Clark and Gerhardt were essential to its resolution. The United States Court identified the difficult situation that deciding a mother faces when whether to file a suit. requires experience appreciate “It little to the obstacles to such suits during year. that confront unwed mothers the child’s first by expenses Financial difficulties caused child-birth or a birth- income, related continuing loss of father, affection for the child’s disapproval family desire to avoid community, and or the emo-

tional strain and confusion that illegiti- often attend the birth of an mate child all filing encumber a mother’s of a suit . . . .” [Mills, supra at 103.] present Those factors decide, shortly are when an unwed mother must birth, accept after her child’s putative whether to a settlement from the father. How could she be certain of the needs of her and her child eighteen years? Cox, supra for the next readily appar- See n 8 at 407. It is that, circumstances, ent may under such a mother and child not receive opportunities” majority the “enhanced provides that the § asserts ante, p them. See 278. Dissenting Opinion Kelly, J. adеquate child procuring interest state’s children.10 for illegitimate situation, our Court of analogous In a somewhat father could not that a noncustodial Appeals declared voluntarily his child his obligation avoid Evink, Evink v parental rights. his terminating (1995). recognized 542 NW2d 328 It App 172; Mich right parental sup- an inherent child has “[a] may away a child’s “parents bargain port” support.” Id. at 175-176 adequate to receive omitted): (citations majority appropriate weight give to the fact that settle- fails agreements child when result in a burden on the mother ment ante, p

they provide inadequate support. See 275. majority addition, attempts between this In to draw distinction because the statute in Gerhardt allowed nonmodifiable case and Gerhardt paternity Also, Gerhardt, support agreements in actions. in there child all paternity. a a an admission of Id. Each is distinction without differ- was applied paternity in to all actions ence. The fact that the statute Gerhardt disparate § the fact that both it and 3 had effects on does not diminish majority asserts, relationship is, illegitimate a children. There as the clear paternity proof problems. However, Michigan our in between statute against illegitimate § children in the it is also true that 3 discriminates in manner as the statute at issue Gerhardt. same any significance was is it of that there an admission of Neither That was irrelevant to the court’s determination that the in Gerhardt. fact important objec- substantially government was not related to an Gerhardt, supra Coa;, supra at also at 408. One would tive. see Gerhardt, expect that, or established in had not been admitted here, have not been the Gerhardt court would reached the same as it has conclusion. majority justify statute, a In an the the reaches to find effort benefit “putativе agreed fathers who to nonmodifiable are in the fact disprove precluded taking advantage technology from of advances Ante, just prove paternity.” p paternity, are to 280.1 fail to mothers major benefit, goals is to ascertain that is a because one of our see how clearly a substantial state interest in The state does not have the truth. majority Although avoiding furthering names falsehood and the truth. outweigh provides, none of benefits that the statute them additional ensuring youngsters that our receive interest our state has substantial adequate support throughout childhood. 463 Mich 248 Dissenting Opinion by J. Kelly, accept position parent To defendant’s would be to allow a voluntarily parental rights escape release in order to support obligation child where the child remains in the cus tody biological parent. of the other sup Such result is not ported by statute, law, public policy. case or sound [Id. 176.]

CONCLUSION Paternity presented § In case, this 3 of the Act opportunity, evading father with the same that of his support obligation, rejected by child as was the Court Appeals in Evink. The act allowed a father to vol untarily support agreement enter into a child that the modify, mother could not even if the child’s needs escape increased. The act allowed a father to his responsibility provide for his child, and the deprived was of that to which it was entitled.11No “loophole” similar exists in the law for the benefit of legitimate fathers children.

Accordingly, § I conclude that 3 violated illegitimate equal protection children to under the doing, myself align position law. In so I with the panels Appeals,12 three different of the Court of 11Contrary majority, precisely to the assertion Evink illustrates why we should not allow children to be burdened support agreements. p ante, major- nonmodifiable child See n 13. The ity acknowledge putative may very fails to that a father well know that he However, may profit is the father of a child. he be able to from the diffi- procure cult situation the mother faces to a settlement he finds favorable. majority providing identifies the statute as child with opportunity to might obtain child from someone who not oth- provide However, erwise it. might it also allows someone who otherwise responsible adequate have been obligation. to avoid that Dones, supra; Crego Coleman, App See n 1 (1997) v 226 Mich (Crego II); Coleman, supra (Crego III). n 2 Crego v Coleman Dissenting Opinion by C.J. Weaver, Supreme Court,13 Illinois and Wisconsin majority proceed down a dif Court.14 decides path. ferent I would affirm the of the Court judgment further Appeals remand for consideration of parties’ retroactivity. I can arguments concerning the majority path not follow down a leads to a position contrary to the constitution. J., J.

Cavanagh, Kelly, concurred I respectfully major- C.J. dissent from the Weaver, ity’s 722.713; conclusion that MCL MSA 25.493 did not equal protection. violate I believe that the statute cre- ates a classification on illegitimacy based and that the scrutiny cannot heightened withstand the applied to such a Therefore, classification. I would affirm the Court of Appeals.

Because there are situations which illegitimate children receive a right modifiable support, majority opines that this statute does not create a classification based on but one illegitimacy, based on “paternity whether been legally determined.” ha[s] Ante at 264. I disagree.

Children have a from right their biologi- parents. cal Evink, See Evink v 214 Mich App 172, 175-176; 542 NW2d 328 (1995). majority As the acknowledges, 722.713; MCL MSA 25.493 affects illegitimate children, them precluding from оbtaining additional to meet changing parties needs where the have reached settlement pursuant By the statute. there contrast, are no circumstances under which a legitimate child n 8 Cox, See Gerhardt, supra. supra. 294 463 248 Mich Dissenting Opinion by C.J. Weaver, from for future modi- petitioning would be foreclosed support. to MCL 552.17(1); fication of child Pursuant couples may peti- children of 25.97(1), MSA divorced modify upon award tion the court to dem- circumstances, and the onstrating changed parents away bargain cannot to seek modification of support. Calley Calley, App 380, 382, See v 197 Mich Johns, n v 1; (1992); 496 NW2d Johns 178 Mich App 106; 143 NW2d 446 I 101, (1989). Therefore, would conclude that the statute classifies children on the basis of illegitimacy and not the basis of whether has been legally determined. subject Classifications based on are illegitimacy scrutiny. heightened Jeter, 456, 461; Clark v 486 US L 1910; Spada 108 S Ct Ed 2d 465 (1988); Pauley, App 196, 203; 149 Mich 385 NW2d 746 (1986). heightened scrutiny, statutory To withstand classi- substantially important fication must be related to an objective. governmental Clark, supra This 461. scrutiny level of “is not a toothless one.” Pickett v 1, 8; L Brown, 2199; US 103 S Ct 76 Ed 2d 372 Mathews v 427 US (1983), quoting Lucas, 495, 510; 96 L 2755; S Ct 49 Ed 2d 651 MCL (1976). 722.713; MSA satisfy 25.493 fails to this standard.

In upholding statute, majority concludes substantially that the statute is “permis- related to the sible, important, and even compelling governmental interest” of financial providing for children. majority Ante at 273. The reasons that the statute affords children an optional “additional support” by mechanism for obtaining allowing the parties proof problems may to circumvent in paternity arise cases. Ante at 279. I disagree. Dissenting Opinion Weaver, C.J. problems proving recognize that the I distinguish legitimate chil children from support. this However, for child dren in their claims “sufficiently weighty justification nor sub is neither uphold stantially MCL to the limitation” related equal protection. Mills v under 722.713;MSA 25.493 71 L Ed 2d 1549; 102 S Ct Habluetzel, 456 US concurring).1 (1982) (O’Connоr, J., Nor are the finality sufficient to interests in settlement state’s illegitimacy. justify a based on classification support. earlier, children have As noted oper- supra than However, at 175-176. rather Evink, support, the stat- mechanism for ate as an additional reality, imposes illegitimate a burden on chil- ute, in ability adequate by restricting their to obtain dren support. made a simi- Wisconsin Court The statutory striking scheme when down a lar conclusion lump- precluded illegitimate in children involved that seeking agreements additional from sum settlement support, stating, reality option to the detri- is an that has worked [I]t illusory many is, best, It an

ment of nonmarital children. is, reality, amounting an benefit to no benefit at all. It Moore, 150 Wis 2d additional burden. v Estate [Gerhardt 563, 571; (1989).] 441 NW2d 734 may possibility encounter circum- vary their need for does not stances that alter legitimate illegitimate Both children. between may give rise to a need encounter circumstances that support. Yet, in the case of for increased they may deprived opportunity to children, joined justices of Justice O’Connor’s con- A total of five this section opinion. Mills, supra curring at 102. 463 Mich 248 Dissenting Opinion by C.J. Weaver, changed seek increased on the basis of cir- parents agree- cumstances because their an entered pursuant ‍​​‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‍precludes ment, statute, modifi- actually operates Thus, cation. the statute to their detriment. my opinion, proof problems

In neither nor the finality outweigh interests of settlement and the irrev- potentially damaging ocable and effect that a may changing nonmodifiable settlement have on the Consequently, financial needs children. substantially sup- the statute is not related to the posed namely, providing interest it seeks to serve— obtaining support illegit- additional mechanism for imate children—and it should be determined to be equal protection. violative of

Case Details

Case Name: Crego v. Coleman

Court Name: Michigan Supreme Court

Date Published: Jul 31, 2000

Citation: 615 N.W.2d 218

Docket Number: 113485, Calendar No. 4

Court Abbreviation: Mich.