62 Colo. 214 | Colo. | 1916
delivered the opinion of the court.
Chapter 102, Laws of 1911, after stating that corporations shall file annual reports and specifying what they’ shall contain, at page 259, provides:
“And if any such corporation, joint stock company or association shall fail, refuse or omit to file the annual report aforesaid, and to pay the fee prescribed therefor, within the time above prescribed, all the officers and directors of said corporation shall be jointly and severally and individually liable for all debts of such corporation, joint stock company or association that shall be contracted during the year next preceding the time when such report should by this section have been made and filed and until such report shall be made and filed.
And as a further penalty for such failure, refusal or omission of the president and secretary of such corpo
It is the contention of defendants in error that the action is to collect a penalty given by statute to original creditors, and that the right to recover a penalty cannot be assigned; that the assignment to plaintiff of the claims did not carry with it the right to enforce the statute against the directors making them personally liable for all the debts of the corporation; that though the original creditors could enforce the collection of their claims against the directors, as a penalty, for their failure to file the annual report, the assignee of the claims secured no such right because the right to collect a penalty cannot be assigned.
“Penal laws, strictly and properly, are those imposing punishment for an offense committed against the state, and which,' by the English and American constitutions, the executive of the state has power to pardon. Statutes giving a private action against the wrongdoer are sometimes spoken of as penal in their nature, but in such cases it has been pointed out that neither the liability imposed nor the remedy given is strictly penal.”
“As the statute imposes a burdensome liability on the officers for their wrongful act, it may well be considered penal, in the sense that it should be strictly construed. But as it gives a civil remedy, at the private suit of the creditor only, measured by the amount of his debt, it is as to him clearly remedial. ’ ’
In some respects the statute is penal, while in others it is remedial in character. Penal in its nature as to the directors for the purpose of determining their liability, and to be strictly construed. When the liability is clearly shoAvn, it is remedial in character as to creditors and to be liberally construed in its enforcement.- — Nickerson v. Wheeler, 118 Mass. 295; Marathon Bank v. Jones, 30 Neb. 798, 47 N. W. 208, 10 L. R. A. 658; Cady v. Sanford, 53 Vt. 632; Nebraska Bank v. Walsh, 68 Ark. 433, 59 S. W. 952, 82 Am. St. 301; Machinery Co. v. Smith, 87 Kan. 331, 124 Pac. 414, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 379, Ann. Cas. 1913E 243; Kilton v. Prov. Tool Co., 22 R. I. 605, 48 Atl. 1039.
We are of the opinion that plaintiff as assignee is entitled to maintain this action as a creditor, against the directors, for the recovery of the corporate debts held by it, under the statute imposing liability upon directors. —Boynton v. Sprague, 100 App. Div. 443, 91 N. Y. Supp. 839; Pier v. George, 86 N. Y. 613; Cornell v. Roach, 101 N. Y. 373, 5 N. E. 52; Davis v. Mills, (C. C.), 99 Fed. 39.
The following cases are also cited with reference to statutes making individuals liable for corporate debts •in certain contingencies: Winchester v. Howard, 136 Cal. 432, 64 Pac. 692, 69 Pac. 77, 89 Am. St. 153; Came v. Brigham, 39 Me. 35.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed.
Reversed and remanded.,