192 Iowa 920 | Iowa | 1921
Lead Opinion
“He said it was just the land that he wanted, and that he had decided to go down there and live on it; but on account of some sickness or death, he had decided not to go, and to offer it for sale. I made him an offer, and tried to get him to come down to $200, but he would not cut a bit. He said his land was worth ‡225 an acre, worth the money, and he could not do any better. He recommended it as good land; that it was good farm land. I believed the defendant, believed him as' against Riggs. I relied on what Stevens said. P believed he told me the truth, — that caused me to enter into the written contract. I told him I had always held my land at $100 an acre. He ref is -d to close on those terms, and I finally came down to $90. I nerer saw his land except the one time, and I glanced over it before thq deal was closed in South Dakota.” ■
Plaintiff says that $90 an acre was the actual value of bis land. Plaintiff, while in Texas, made no other investigation or inquiry than stated. The representations were that defendant’s
It appears that there is an irrigation ditch near this land, but the evidence is that it was not large enough to effect an overflow. Another witness says that from his experience in farming irrigated land around Mercedes, he would say that the land is worthless for farming.
“The fact is that you cannot get mules enough in Hidalgo County to pull a plow through it right now; it is very hard to work. When it is dry, it is very hard. When it is wet, nobody can get on it; nobody can walk on it.”
The character of the land in these respects would not be readily observed by such an examination as plaintiff made,— at least, it was for the jury to say. There is other evidence that the land lies fairly well for irrigating purposes. The evidence is that the land would have been worth $225 or more, if as represented. We have not attempted to go into the details of the evidence.
It is contended by appellant that gross inadequacy of price, of itself, is a badge of fraud. They cite Boyd v. Ellis, 11 Iowa 97; Smith v. Grimes, 43 Iowa 356, 363; Sutton v. Greiner, 177 Iowa 532, 536; and other cases. But the two main points in the case are whether the representations were mere puffing, trade
1. The argument of appellee proceeds upon the theory, at least in part, that the mere expression of opinion as to value is not actionable, and that such are the only representations relied upon. As seen by the foregoing, the matter of the value of the land was not the only representation. There were representations of fact; at least, it was a question for the jury whether they were representations of fact or mere expressions of opinion. Hetland v. Bilstad, 140 Iowa 411, 415; Hise v. Thomas, 181 Iowa 700. It is the general rule that mere expressions of opinion as to the value of property, when standing alone, do not constitute actionable fraud. But a representation as to value, in connection with other facts, made and intended to be taken as a fact, where believed and relied upon by the opposite party to his injury, is actionable. Hetland v. Bilstad, supra; Hise v. Thomas, 181 Iowa 700. See, also, Ross v. Bolte, 165 Iowa 499, 508; Irving v. Wagner, 175 Iowa 198, 201; Sutton v. Greiner, 177 Iowa 532, 535; Rembe v. Ferguson, 183 Iowa 29, 37; Edwards v. Foley, 187 Iowa 5, 8; Hogan v. McCombs Bros., 190 Iowa 650. Many other cases might be cited on this point, some of which are cited in' the cases above. In the Hetland case, supra, we quoted with approval from another case, that the rule that no one is liable for an expression of an opinion is applicable only when the opinion stands by itself, as a distinct thing. As said, there are representations other than the statement as to value. The question has been before us many times, and we shall not again review the cases under which plaintiff was entitled to go to the jury on this question. To sustain our conclusion, see cases last above cited, and Hess v. McCardell, 182 Iowa 1121, 1126; Shuttlefield v. Neil, 163 Iowa 470; Christensen v. Jauron, (Iowa) 174 N. W. 499 (not officially reported); Riley v. Bell, 120 Iowa 618, 626. The foregoing are the later cases on the subject.
“A seller who has successfully entrapped his victim with false statements of the kind mentioned will not be permitted to escape when called upon to account in a court of justice, on the ground that his dupe did not, but ought to have, suspected him to be a knave.”
See, also, Button Land Co. v. Noon, 163 Iowa 547; Boddy v. Henry, 126 Iowa 31, 40; Riley v. Bell, 120 Iowa 618; Shuttlefield v. Neil, supra; Scott v. Burnight, 131 Iowa 507; Christensen v. Jauron, supra. In the last named case, though the instruction was erroneous, it was the law of the case, and we considered the question as to whether plaintiffs ascertained the actual condition of the land, and if not, whether they might have done so by the exercise of ordinary diligence, as the court had instructed. Some of the facts there are similar to those in the instant case, bearing upon that question, and we said that whether there was diligence depends on the time at the parties’ disposal, and other circumstances.- It was held, even under the instruction, that it was a question for the jury whether plaintiff discovered, or should have discovered, the actual condition. So it is in the instant case. It was for the jury to say whether, under all the
' "We are of opinion that, under the record, plaintiff was entitled to go to the jury on the questions' now presented. The judgment is — Reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). A very careful reading of all the evidence in the record convinces me that plaintiff did not make a case for the jury.