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Crawford v. State
617 S.W.2d 925
Tex. Crim. App.
1980
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*1 See, Tarver, this Court. Tarver v. (Tex.1965); Lee,

S.W.2d Honea (1962);

163 Tex. Robinson, Roebuck &

Sears Co. v. 154 Tex. case, present Rang

In the Park application

ers have filed an for Writ of preserving

Error cross-points their below. Appeals,

The error of the Court of Civil

however, is harmless. Since Hernandez et

al. are not entitled “police to recover as

men,” question whether the two or the year

four statute of applies limitations Application

immaterial. The for Writ of refused,

Error is no reversible error. CRAWFORD, Jr., Appellant,

Murriel Texas, Appellee.

The STATE of

No. 57602.

Court of Appeals Criminal

En Banc.

July 1980.

Rehearing 15, 1981. April Denied *2 Watson, employer

Jack a former of Ma- knife, they a hunting bra’s. There stole from an rope binoculars Interna- lariat parked property, tional on the farm Scout shotguns along gauge .410 with two .12 and *3 They then went to and a .22 caliber rifle. appellant’s apartment with the stolen goods. later, appellant

A short time and Mabra appellant’s pickup truck to a 7—11 drove in Store, intending They to rob the cashier. plan proceeded their and to an abandoned Exxon service station with similar inten- They again tions. became nervous and left robbing the station without the attendant. to a Finally, appellant and Mabra drove appel- parked Toot ’n food store and Totum readily lant’s truck where it could not be shotgun which had Carrying seen. the .410 Watson, pair been stolen from Jack night entered the store and robbed Whitfield, cashier, After $32.00. Edith appellant the con- Mrs. Whitfield handed bag, register paper in a tents of the cash her, narrowly missing her appellant fired at at Appellant head. then fired a second shot Mrs. Whitfield point range blank and struck eye, causing in the left her instantaneous death. Selden B. Hale and Charles W. Fair- mur- The two men fled the scene of the weather, Amarillo, Emmett, Colvin and apartment. der and returned to Botsford, Dallas, David L. appellant. for goods they gathered together There all the Curtis, Tom Atty., Dist. Morris L. Over- from the Watson which had been stolen Davis, street and John Asst. Loudder Dist. them, along placed farm and with the mur- Amarillo, Huttash, Attys., Robert State’s Mabra’s car. weapon, der in the trunk of Austin, Atty., for the State. headed pair got into the car and stopped en were

Jack Watson’s farm but police Tom Porter route Amarillo officer OPINION excessive noise. because the muffler made DOUGLAS, to Mabra and Judge. A citation was issued traffic by Offi- were interviewed both defendants appeals from his Murriel Don Crawford permis- gave the officer cer Porter. Mabra upon plea guilty conviction to the of- car, the officer de- to search the but sion capital fense of murder. Punishment Mabra were told clined and assessed at death. proceeded to they go. They were free to minutes The record reflects that a few replaced the they the Watson farm where midnight morning after on the of October items, weapon, including the murder stolen 22, 1975, appellant in his was awakened they had been from which Scout apartment by co-defendant David Mabra. drove back to Appellant taken. and Mabra later, Approximately forty-five minutes Mabra and farm appellant drove to the of Amarillo. Wayne Ricky Holik testified that in

Three weeks after the murder of Edith Janu- Whitfield, appellant and Mabra initiated a 1976, he, appel- ary, David Mabra and the White, neighbor conversation with Jim lant a concert in Amarillo. After attended and friend. In the course of this conversa- concert, appellant’s instigation, tion, appellant bragged to White that he Maywood, of them went Inc. three ’n and Mabra had robbed the Toot Totum they burglarized building There that he himself had shot the de- store‘and destroy number of tools. To evi- stole a “pushed her eye ceased in the brains breakin, appellant set fire to dence of the top Appellant out the of her head.” de- 25, 1976, August appel- building. On flight scribed for White their to the Watson lant and Mabra were arrested for bur- farm, their encounter with the Amarillo plant. While in cus- glary Maywood police crime. He and other details of the burglary tody, appellant confessed they related that scene returned to the Whit- and, later, of Edith to the murder intending or not crime to see whether was admitted confession field. His written *4 the Toot ’n with cam- equipped Totum was into evidence at trial. might eras which have recorded the murder robbery Appellant on film. stated to error are ad grounds Thirteen opened White that if Porter had Officer First he com vanced in brief. stabbed trunk of Mabra’s car he would have reference was plains testimony wherein appellant that him. Jim White testified as the co-defend made to an oral statement grisly of the crime he described the details Mabra. ant David shame, guilt. Appel- showed no sorrow or White, was, only regret lant’s as he told you thereaft- “Q. (Prosecutor) And did stop candy that he not to eat while in did and an inter- have a discussion er the Toot ’n Totum store. view Don Crawford? with police Jim White informed Amarillo de- Richards) did. (Detective I “A. Gary tective Richards of conversation named David “Q. with a fellow Also appellant appellant with and Mabra. Both Mabra? by and Mabra were interviewed Detective “A. Yes. concerning Richards the crime and were release, they re- Following released. their

turned to the farm and stole Watson you event, “Q. any your after —did shotguns they gauge the .410 and .12 defendant, have occasion to ask the previously guns had were sold stolen. or Crawford, inquire whether Don Maywood, by appellant workers at to two Mabra or David not he or Richard Inc., employed. where he was robbers as the had been involved arrest, admitted to appellant Prior to his ’n To- in that Toot and murderers Maywoodthat he employees three fellow tum murder? had the deceased. Karen Richie murdered Yes, “A. I did. her he had appellant testified that told it, it, or what? “Q. deny they Did admit laughed He about the shooting. done the incident. Carreker testified Sandra They it.” “A. denied break, appellant stated to her on a coffee Mabra since David Appellant contends get for shoot- “Maybe they’ll come and [me] testify any not on trial and did not too, occasion, ing lady.” that old On that was inadmissible by him statement made laughed murder. Keith Car- he about the appellant. him that appellant reker testified that told testimony. objection to There was no bitch in the face.” Car- he “shot that old hearsay as to statement, although Mabra’s reker stated that when he asked Under inculpatory. appellant, was not drunk, he if he was answered that circumstances, committed any error such said that if Carreker cold sober and State, 533 S.W.2d Thomas v. was harmless. murder his anything about the anyone (Tex.Cr.App.1976). partner would “waste him.” Appellant contends that the trial court Appellant signed testified that he permitting attorney erred in district confession in order to clear his conscience read sections of David Mabra’s inadmissible great sense of relief after and that he felt initial cross-examining confession while reading having done so. It was after appellant. prosecutor He contends appellant said to Mabra’s statement did not cross-examine from God, “My putting Detective Garrett: he’s statement, but that he used cross-examina- chair,” whereupon he us both in the electric guise tion as a under which to introduce ad- immediately gave a statement written large portions of the co-defendant’s confes- mitting in the crime but his involvement sion before the jury. complains He also shooting on David placing the for the blame the following by statement made the dis- Mabra. attorney during trict his cross-examination V.A.C.C.P., 38.24, provides: Article appellant: act, declaration part “When of an sticking “You are still version given in evi- writing conversation or you gave fingered you, after Mabra on the party, dence one the whole Mabra gun] took in.” [the subject may inquired into same be Appellant argues prosecutor’s that the re- other, read, as when a letter is all letters marks made reference to the confession of same subject on the same between the the non-testifying in which co-defendant parties may given. be When a detailed appellant was blamed for the actual shoot- act, declaration, writing conversation or ing. evidence, act, given other decla- *5 light jury of the fact the re writing necessary ration or which is to turned a upon appellant’s directed verdict explain fully make it understood or to the plea guilty, it cannot be said that the may given same also be in evidence.” improperly admitted confession contributed State, In Vanderbilt v. 563 S.W.2d appellant’s to plea guilty conviction. A that (Tex.Cr.App.1978),we observed Article jury before a admits all elements of act, explanatory 38.24 does not restrict the the offense and is conclusive of a defend declaration, conversation, writing or to the State, guilt. ant’s Fierro See v. 437 S.W.2d declaration, act, time conversation when the (Tex.Cr.App.1969). explained writing sought or to be occurred however, Appellant, contends that the ev- to render such but extends the rule so as idence bore heavily jury’s on the determina- admissible, necessary if acts or statements which, tion of special the issues under Arti- of, understanding explain or to the to a full 37.071(d)(2),(e), V.A.C.C.P., cle resulted in in evidence acts or statements introduced the assessment of the penalty. death In his by party. the adverse written confession which was introduced ap- to was read aloud Mabra’s confession into evidence defense counsel he admit- during the pellant by Detective Garrett ted that party robbery he was a to the appellant’s confes- preceding conversation murder of Edith Whitfield. He also testi- his own Appellant having sion. introduced helped fied that he prepare for and commit evidence, was statement into the State denied, however, the robbery. carrying He of other properly permitted give evidence gun the shooting the deceased. The writings, transactions conversations and prosecution, cross-examining appel- the appellant’s confes- fully explained lant, portions read certain of David Mabra’s sion, given and the in which it was context appellant first confession which named as short, prosecu- it. In the the motive behind the weapon one who carried the into the whole prove tion the was entitled appel- store and shot the deceased. It is appel- immediately prior to what was said theory jury lant’s that assessed the 38.24, supra. lant’s confession under Article death belief penalty the basis of its for the man”, if it had been error appellant “trigger was the and that Even the co-de portions read prosecutor without David it would Mabra’s confession cross-examining have while assessed a life sentence. fendant’s confession appellant, such error would not rever- truth of merit his second written Ap- statement. sal. The other appellant evidence pellant prosecutor theorizes that knew was, whole, overwhelming. as a The evi- polygraph, knew results of the which, appel- dence particular, showed appellant carry gun into the did not trigger lant to have been the man was so Totum, Toot ’n consequently, should great as to render the co-defendant’s state- implied jury not have relatively insignificant. ment Appellant brandishing walked ’n into the Toot Totum he admitted to four friends that shot had weapon. prosecutor For murder Florida, Edith Whitfield. As in Schneble so, asserts, do introduce was to before the evidence which he knew to (1972), min- confession was be false. utely completely detailed and consistent contention is without merit. This objective And, with the evidence. as in Appellant assumes that the district attor Schneble, “the average jury’ ‘minds of an ney obligated to believe David Mabra’s sig- would not have found State’s case (in second statement which he admitted nificantly persuasive” less had the prosecu- store) and disbe carrying gun into the tor’s recitation of Mabra’s confession been (in which lieve confession he Mabra’s initial excluded. joint There was a trial in the gun). stated carried case. present Schneble In the case there obligation no prosecutor under such joint was no trial. We conclude that regardless polygraph ex reasoning applies case fact here. Schneble committed, If error Results of it was harm- conducted. amination had been examinations, less. of their polygraph virtue consistently been unproven reliability, have Next, appellant prosecu- asserts any purpose. held to inadmissible be permitted inject tor was erroneously State, (Tex.Cr.App. Reed v. 522 S.W.2d During false evidence at trial. cross-exami- (Tex. 1975); King v. nation, following exchange place took Cr.App.1974); Lewis attorney between the and appellant: district State, 496 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); White v. “Q. You something had to shoot Mrs. *6 prose (Tex.Cr.App.1973). The S.W.2d 642 with, though, you Whitfield didn’t ? rely on such whatever to duty cutor had no my possession. “A. Not in data potentially unreliable inadmissible “Q. gun, Walked in there with a loaded con Mabra’s determining which of David you didn’t ? no prosecutor had fessions were true. No, “A. sir. state duty to of Mabra’s believe either “Q. sticking You are to the still version voluntarily taken having Appellant, ments. you gave fingered you, after Mabra stand, subject being discredited the to (Appel- that Mabra took it in ?” attempt In like other witness. his lant’s emphasis) testimony, prosecu impeach the appellant’s Appellant by these remarks contends that reject tor was the co-defendant’s free to prosecutor implied ap- the to the that cross- vigorously versions the crime pellant carrying denied lying when he pos concerning his appellant examine the shotgun ’n the .410 into the Toot Totum. weapon immediately session the murder argues Appellant prosecutor’s re- that State, 545 shooting. Myre v. prior to the carrying of concerning marks the mur- v. (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Weber 820 S.W.2d weapon der were made in bad faith and State, (Tex.Cr.App.1971); 136 472 S.W.2d knowledge falsity. with of their The basis (Tex.Cr. State, 469 Patterson v. for this contention is the fact in his App.1960). Mabra second confession David denied court contends that Appellant shooting Edith Whitfield but admitted that extrane into evidence erroneously allowed initially gun he carried the into the store. Ricky brief, burglary and arson. ous offenses of appellant poly- In his claims that a concerning supported length graph Wayne examination of Mabra testified Holik

931 appellant’s burglary commission of the three Supreme ar- factors which the Court Maywood, objec- son at Inc. There was no Illinois, deemed relevant in Moore v. tion to such testimony until after Holik had U.S. completed his testimony on direct examina- (1) suppres- Those factors are Thereafter, tion. appellant took the stand prosecution sion of such evidence and, on direct examination defense coun- defense, (2) request by after a the evi- sel, testified having committed the bur- defense, dence’s favorable character for glary of Maywood, Inc. The admission of (3) materiality of the evidence. improper evidence will not constitute re- Considering applied these factors as versible error where the defendant volun- case, present facts of the we conclude tarily gives testimony the same as that no reversible error is shown. which is admitted objection. over Cowan v. record before us does not re State, 562 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); S.W.2d 236 requested police report flect that State, Lovell (Tex.Cr. v. S.W.2d suppressed by prosecution. Prior App.1976); State, Allen v. 536 S.W.2d 364 trial, appellant filed a motion for the disclo State, (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Watson v. exculpatory pre sure of evidence. At the (Tex.Cr.App.1976); S.W.2d 619 Dogget v. hearing grant trial motion was State, appellant’s (Tex.Cr.App.1975). S.W.2d 552 thereafter, Immediately ed. and before the waived, Even if error had not been opportunity comply State had had an appellant’s evidence of extraneous offenses motion, appellant’s pretrial with the hear would nevertheless have been admissible. ing was conducted on the voluntariness of Inasmuch as such appel offenses showed During hearing confession. conduct, lant’s toward criminal tendencies production demanded immediate they were pursuant relevant and admissible requested report. of the In view of the fact 37.071, V.A.C.C.P., to Article gives that the did with a State furnish the trial court wide discretion in determin trial, copy report during it cannot be ing what may evidence be offered. Robin deliberately said that such evidence was son v. 63 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977); inadvertently even Livingston withheld. 542 S.W.2d 655 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). No error presented. requested Neither can it be said that the

Appellant argues next prosecu- report was material. United States tion erred in failing provide the defense Agurs, 427 U.S. with a copy of an exculpatory police report (1976), L.Ed.2d 342 Court held prior to trial. The requested report stated (1) possibility the mere that an item of had been cleared after his might helped undisclosed information have interrogation initial concerning the murder the out- might defense or have affected of Edith Appellant alleges Whitfield. come of the trial does not establish “materi- *7 report was relevant on numerous issues sense, (2) ality” in the constitutional particularly but so on the issue of the vol- must have been the omitted evidence untariness of his confession and that it such doubt as would create a reasonable should, therefore, produced have been at a guilt. police about the defendant’s re- pretrial hearing. Jackson v. Denno1 case, provid- port present had it been State, upon He relies Ridyolph v. 503 trial, prior ed not have created a S.W.2d 276 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), and cases cit- reasonable doubt as to the voluntariness of ed therein proposition for the it appellant’s Regarding the re- confession. prosecution reversible error for the to ei- port’s relevance to other issues raised at ther actively suppress inadvertently fail trial, appellant position to com- not in a might disclose evidence which exonerate plain report, including the inasmuch as the or be of material value to the accused. portions, into evi- exculpatory was admitted

In determining copy whether dence and was furnished to reversible a thereof occurred, error has this Court must look to counsel.

1. 378 U.S.

932 Honor, Your appellant pled guilty, it was imma- “MR. FAIRWEATHER: I

When might not have con- terial that the officer mistrial at this time.” move for a enough upon cluded that he had evidence answer, although un The witness’ charge appellant. which to appellant responsive, prejudiced neither nor complains of the appellant Next upon guilt reflected his or innocence. negative prosecution’s failure to disclose statement made no witness’ reference day fingerprint test results until rather, the co-de appellant, but concerned any harm allege trial. He does not Error, any, if David Mabra. fendant delay resulted from this in disclosure. Nor harmless. results were has it been shown that the test nature, exculpatory obligating in thus prosecutor urges that Appellant appellant. them to Had State disclose appellant refusing erred in to furnish they exculpatory, any error in their been statements witnesses’ copy of the State’s appellant must be con delayed disclosure to had testified. until after such witnesses light appellant’s sidered harmless is without merit and Appellant’s contention weight guilty plea overwhelming v. holding in White contrary to this Court’s the evidence. State, (Tex.Cr.App. 645 496 S.W.2d State, alleges 1973); v. 514 Appellant next and Hoffman S.W.2d juror Mar excusing potential court erred in (Tex.Cr.App.1974). 253 grounds that tha B. Stulce for cause on the the court contends Next he requirements Witherspoon neither the v. writ appellant’s erroneously admitted Illinois,2 V.T.C.A., Code, nor Penal Section grounds into evidence on ten confession 12.31, objection was were satisfied. No prom by police officers’ that it was induced object improper raised. Failure to would not be penalty ises that the death such potential juror exclusion of a waives at the Jack adduced sought. The evidence State, appeal. error v. 542 Boulware appellant’s hearing showed son v. Denno (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Granviel v. S.W.2d 677 freely and volun State, (Tex.Cr.App.1977). have been 552 107 confession to S.W.2d duly warned of Appellant was tarily given. error grounds In four coercion or subjected to no rights refusing alleges that the court erred find, nor do not any kind. We abuse of intro grant prosecutor after the mistrial toward attention appellant direct our does an oral duced before the evidence of confession any evidence that in which statement made the death by promises was induced charged offense. committing he denied Moreover, sought. not be penalty would inculpatory nor The statement was neither introduced the confession was objection was sus prejudicial. Appellant’s its vol- regarding Any complaints himself. disregard was tained and an instruction to Morales thereby waived. untariness were Error, Sternlight given. any, cured. if (Tex.Cr.App.1971). State, v. S.W.2d State, (Tex.Cr.App.1976); v. S.W.2d (Tex.Cr.App. Smith S.W.2d sufficiency Finally, appellant attacks (Tex. 1976); Marlow jury could upon which the of the evidence State, 500 Cr.App.1976); Paredes v. finding on affirmative have returned an (Tex.Cr.App.1973). e., probability that a special No. i. issue following testi- complains He also commit appellant would existed that *8 mony by Karen Richie: would con- of violence criminal acts Prosecutor) you society. talk to Arti-

“Q. (By the Did to continuing threat stitute a Appellant to Mabra —about yes, David 37.071(d)(2), V.A.C.C.P. cle David — shooting of Mrs. Whitfield? no because required urges that reversal specifi- by the State testimony was offered his lie detec- “A. No sir. When he took special issue. this cally support tor test— 20 L.Ed.2d 2. 391 U.S. (1967).

It is well that the intro candy following established in the Toot ’n Totum store expert duction of psychiatric psychologi the murder. We find that sufficient evi- testimony jury cal a prerequisite is not a presented jury from which dence was finding “yes” special on issue No. 2. probability existed could conclude that a State, (Tex.Cr.App. Brock S.W.2d future acts of appellant would commit 1977); State, (Tex. Burns v. pose a con- criminal violence which State, Cr.App.1977); Granviel v. S.W.2d tinuing society. threat 107 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). testimony The ad shown, having been No reversible error concerning duced trial at the crime itself judgment is affirmed. and surrounding the circumstances its com may probative special mission be more on CLINTON, J., participating. not issue No. 2 any than other evidence which PHILLIPS, dissenting. Judge, might State, the State offer. Brock v. su court majority holds that the trial pra; State, supra. Burns v. allowing prosecutor did not err in present case, Brock, In the inas portion of co- read to the the critical evidence showed that committed confession, defendant David Mabra’s first a brutal and senseless murder in the course implicated appellant in which Mabra as the robbery of a though even the deceased had majority “triggerman” to the offense. The surrendered the regis contents of the cash were further concludes that even if error ter to him and Ap offered no resistance. committed, beyond was harmless the error pellant’s intent merely was not to terrorize accept ei- reasonable doubt. As I cannot shotgun the deceased with the initial blast. conclusion, compelled to dissent. ther I am His intent was firing to cause her death again point defense. range. Appellant blank He was later testified in his own laugh brag heard to and being party about the fact He to the offense. admitted that he had However, shotgun seen Edith Whitfield’s brains carrying he denied pushed out top of her head. His state He killing into the store or the deceased. ments to Keith Carreker and Jim White killed the deceased. testified that Mabra reflected willingness again. his to kill Af confession Appellant introduced his written admitting ter responsibility for the mur testimony. The confession support of his Carreker, der to Keith appellant threatened related the facts as testified same to have him killed if Carreker revealed appellant: anyone Appellant what he knew to else. . .. We went in the Toot N Totum also told Jim White that he would have shotgun. He had carrying David was stabbed Officer Tom Porter if he had at leg. lady watching it beside his tempted to search the trunk of David Ma- cash me and he stood in front of the bra’s car. hamburg- register. got some I went and Three months after the murder of Edith and came er buns and some lunch meat Whitfield, appellant committed the offenses said “You back to the counter. David of burglary committing and arson. money”. said give want to us some She offense, latter appellant knowingly created give you He “Do want “What”. said a risk that loss of human life could occur. no, “Why money”. us some said She o[f] probative Both offenses were on the issue shotgun top put He course not”. likely of whether to commit register “Any- said of the cash and she subsequent criminal acts of violence thing you opened want”. the cash She charged offense in the indictment. See got money out of the register all the Granviel v. supra, and Felder v. register put in a little sack cash it 564 S.W.2d 776 change” I you and said “Do want the “No, change, we don’t want the what

For said his actions showed up the no remorse or His is under the drawer”. raised sorrow whatever. She dime, noted, only this regret, appeared as has been to be drawer and said “There is he I said “Well opportunity money did not seize the to eat there is no here”. *9 give put us the dime”. I the dime in the and missed the first I shot. saw the bag bag and I the lunch took the and lady’s hair fluff out I kinda and saw the hamburger meat and the buns and try- was shot hit wall. I turned and the stepped back from the counter and ing get yelled out of the store and dropped picked up them. I them back out, running I I “Crawford”. As was put shotgun top and David the back on pay I did not for heard the second shot. did, the register. cash When he he the snuff and I was so scared that I popped register it down the cash my of snuff in hands. I crushed the can up and it went off. It her hair and blew got pickup Donny back in the and scared her and it hurt her because she right behind me... just again. moaned so he shot her He defense counsel On redirect examination just open stood there with his mouth and confession attempted to read from another shotgun the register. on the cash I gave given by day after he Mabra the grabbed dragged him him the coat and read one set That confession forth above. got got out of the store. We outside and pertinent part: in pickup my apart- in the and went back to up to One and I drove other fellow ment .. . early morning in the Toot ’n Totum store On cross-examination over and defense hours, midnight, and we went well after objection, prosecutor counsel’s elicited robbing the store. in with the intention of gave from confession that he and I held it shotgun, I in carried a .410 police after showed him a confession clerk, I now who lady on the who was the given by day earlier that excul- Mabra Whitfield, while we to be named know pated placed responsibility Mabra and her, threatening robbed and I also entirely appellant. offense we robbed her shotgun with after her prosecutor produced then Mabra’s confes- gun grabbed my companion when began sion and to cross-examine twice, shooting the clerk it went off strenuously with it. Defense counsel ob- killing her. the head and jected that the confession was inadmissible hearsay prosecutor’s reading and the it vio- the store companion I ran from My appellant’s right lated Amendment Sixth confront and cross-examine witnesses. The gave I previous statement appellant’s objections, court overruled night Collins last Officers Kirkwood and prosecutor following from Ma- read the my participation left out the truth about bra’s confession: Toot ’n Totum attempt in our to rob the Donny parked pickup . .. in front gun and I way and the handled get my got of the store and I out to shot, Was she threatened the clerk before got I out of the Donny snuff. said as truthfully described this but statement truck, place.” I “I think I’ll rob this crime, (emphasis my part real thought joking as we are all the he was added) like making time comments this to each at- counsel’s objected The state to defense picked up other. I went in and a can of The court tempt to read this confession. put Copenhagen snuff and started it ap- objection, prohibited sustained the time, I on the counter. At this heard reading pellant from the confession open looked around Donny the door and way. alluding jury or to it Donny shotgun and I saw that had the motion for hearing on At the lady Donny behind him. said to the stipulated that at the time new trial it was said, clerk, your money.” “Give me She of Ma- prosecutor was aware of trial got kidding. “You’ve to be Is this some was further It bra’s second confession. joke?” Donny pulled kind of then knew that prosecutor stipulated that shotgun placed top of the out and it on test adminis- of a lie detector money results register. gave

cash him the She second tered to indicated that paper Donny in a sack and then shot one Mabra holding time. He it with one hand confession was the truth.

935 majority ap- because concludes that and the lie detector test confirmed this. pellant introduced his confession in evi- Given that the court admitted Mabra’s first dence, prove the state “was entitled to confession, go absolutely it was critical to immediately prior whole of what was said forward and admit Mabra’s second confes- confession,” appellant’s to pursuant to Art. prevent j'ury sion in order to from re- 38.24, willing accept Y.A.C.C.P. I am to ceiving totally impression of the a false scope of Art. 38.24 extends to the evidence, jury to assess and to enable the presented situation pro- here —the statute The ad- credibility Mabra’s as a witness. part vides in that: mission of the first confession without declaration, act, . .. When a detailed error. second constituted in evi- writing given conversation or Moreover, recognize to dence, fails act, majority any other declaration or writ-

ing necessary fully application which is to in this make it of Art. 38.24 may understood or explain the same Amendment case appellant’s violates Sixth given also be in evidence. right to confront and cross-examine wit- U.S. 85 nesses. Pointer v. 380 However, egregiously the trial court (1965). erred in 923 This admitting Mabra’s first confession S.Ct. 13 L.Ed.2d admitting without also second con Mabra’s right long recognized as essen- been [“has] requested fession as by appellant. As this Mississip- process.” tial to due Chambers v. out, Court previously pointed pur has 1038, 1045, 284, 295, pi, 35 410 U.S. S.Ct. pose of Art. 38.24 possibility is to reduce the Oliver, L.Ed.2d 297 In re See the fact finder will a receive false 257, 273, 92 L.Ed. 682 U.S. 68 S.Ct. impression by hearing only part a of the State, (1948); Coulter v. conversation, concerning evidence writ (Tex.Cr.App.1973). act, ing, or declaration. Vanderbilt v. Alabama, Douglas 380 U.S. State, 563 S.W.2d 590 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); (1965), compan- S.Ct. (Tex.Cr. Roman v. App.1974); Rodriguez Pointer, see supra, 597 ion case to establishes J., (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (Phillips, S.W.2d 917 by prosecutor action such as was taken dissenting). The admission of Mabra’s first right in this case denies a defendant his that, confession j'ury led the to believe ac At confrontation and cross-examination. Mabra, cording wielded the case the state the defendant’s trial in that weapon murder entirely and in fact was to testi- called the codefendant to the stand responsible for the j'ury offense. The also fy against the defendant. The codefend- was informed confessed ant, privi- Lloyd, a man named invoked his seeing after Mabra’s first confession. The lege against self-incrimination and refused impression inevitable j'ury by left on the guise any questions. answer Under this evidence was that Mabra claimed to be refreshing Lloyd’s memory prosecu- innocent, and that confessed as he deny state- Lloyd tor asked to confirm or did simply in order place part prosecutor Lloyd’s read from ments blame for the commission of the murder on Lloyd confession. refused to answer Mabra. questions, prosecutor continued un- but the impression This entirely misleading til he had read the entire confession. and false. In actuality, repudiated Mabra inculpated confession the defendant. The confession, admitting first that he reading con- Court held shotgun carried the into the store and equivalent fession to the was the threatened weapon. the deceased with the evidence, and admitting the confession This version of the events corroborated sev- inability to concluded that the defendant’s parts eral confession. It un- Lloyd concerning the confes- cross-examine doubtedly support appel- would have lent right “plainly of cross- sion denied trigger- [him] lant’s claim that Mabra was the examination secured the Confrontation man. expressly Mabra stated that his version, second confession 1077. was the correct Id. at 380 Clause.” U.S. S., all, Moreover, Bruton v. U. tent minimal. even if *11 1620, (1968), Supreme the 20 L.Ed.2d 476 presenting interest in the state the whole again Court held that the admission of a picture were the admission well served denied the de- co-defendant’s confession confession, appellant’s of Mabra’s first ina- right fendant his of cross-examination. in order to bility to cross-examine Mabra The Court viewed the admission confession, accuracy measure the the prejudicial of the it confession as so extremely prejudicial combined with the by the trial held the error was not cured in the con- nature of the matters asserted disregard jury court’s instruction to the fession, outweigh state’s interest. the determining the confession in the defend- S., supra. Compare Bruton v. U. guilt ant’s or innocence. Bruton, teach us Douglas, and Chambers later, Mississippi, in Chambers v. su- Still procedural or evidentiary when a state pra, application the Court held that deny his basic operates law a defendant prevent Mississippi voucher rule to cross-examine wit- right to confront and cross-examining defendant from a state’s nesses, give way in the the state law must operated deny witness the defendant his convincing interest in absence of a state rights under Clause. the Confrontation application of the law. The favor of the The Court stated: confession in this admission of Mabra’s first right . . . The of cross-examination right to confront case denied proce- more than a desirable rule of trial witnesses, no com- and cross-examine implicit dure. It is in the constitutional 38.24 was peting under Art. state interest confrontation, helps right of assure of the confession served. admission “accuracy truth-determining of the dimension. constitutional was error a Evans, 74, process.” Dutton v. 400 U.S. majority, 210, 220, Contrary position 91 S.Ct. States, (1970); a reason- [supra]. beyond Bruton v. United the error was not harmless is, indeed, It “an essential and fundamen- discussion of majority’s able doubt. The requirement tal for the kind of fair trial it relies on the matter indicates country’s which is this constitutional regarding ap- case strength of the State’s goal.” [supra]. Of Pointer v. determining guilt innocence in pellant’s course, right and to cross- to confront Appellant’s error was harmless. may, ap- in examine is not absolute and however, never in innocence, guilt or cases, oth- propriate bow to accommodate guilty to the pleaded question; appellant legitimate er interests in the criminal tri- jury in this case jury. The sole task of Stubbs, 408 process. g., al E. Mancusi v. was to make two determinations: 2308, 33 L.Ed.2d 293 U.S. 92 S.Ct. appellant that (1) whether the conduct (1972). significant But its denial or dimi- committed death was caused the victim’s question nution calls into the ultimate ex- the reasonable deliberately and with ” “ ‘integrity fact-finding process’ of the victim or of the pectation that the death requires competing interest that the result; and another would Berger closely be examined. v. Califor- appel- (2) probable whether it was nia, 314, 315, 540, 541, 21 U.S. S.Ct. of vio- acts commit criminal lant would (1969). L.Ed.2d 508 continuing constitute lence that would 1046. Id. at 410 U.S. 93 S.Ct. society. threat competing present state case trial Evidence was adduced 34.24, applying supra, Art. is to interest making two jury these solely to aid the receive a false insure that the does not determinations. part impression by hearing only a question for our consideration concerning event. As we have evidence an found jury would have whether served, seen, interest not well significantly less punishment state’s case on disservice, positive in fact was done first confession had Mabra’s persuasive first confession. the admission of Mabra’s case, Cf. Schneble from evidence. Thus the state interest in this if exis- been excluded Florida, jury’s 31 fluenced the special U.S. determination of L.Ed.2d 340 If there is a reasonable issue two. number possibility that the confession contributed jury’s inquiries It stressed that a must be to either of jury’s two affirmative an punishment qualitatively on the issues are special above, swers to the issues set forth guilt inquiry different from its or inno- the error is not Chapman harmless. Cf. cence. The issues to be resolved at California, punishment phase precise. are much less (1967); Florida, L.Ed.2d 705 Schneble v. Key punishment issues such as terms supra. *12 “probability” “deliberateness” have The largely state’s case consisted defined, undoubtedly they never been testimony of persons appel- four to whom subject varying interpretations. are Pre- bragged lant that he shot the deceased. dicting dangerousness future is at best im- The presented state eyewitness no testimo- precise, speculation. and often mere ny concerning Appellant the offense. took range punish- of evidence admissible at the although stand and testified that he stage ment largely determined offense, participated in the he was not the trial court in its Art. 37.- discretion. See triggerman. Appellant contradicted the 071(a), jury has a V.A.C.C.P. Thus the testimony of the by deny- state’s witnesses range wide factors to consider in resolv- ing that he told them he shot the deceased. ing punishment issues. Given the im- In order to bolster its case that precise inquiries punish- on nature of the shooting, did the the state introduced Ma- ment, corresponding potential for bra’s placing first confession on jurors disagreement among on the determi- the entire responsibility robbery for the issues, special nation of the it is unreason- murder, and exculpating Mabra. admitting able to conclude that the error in Mabra’s first confession was the evi- beyond Mabra’s confession was harmless a dence introduced concerning the state reasonable doubt. the actual commission of the It offense. conclusion, punish- on the state’s case important special state’s case on overwhelming. ment was not There one, issue number provided jury as it confession, room, ample absent Mabra’s for with information on the deliberateness of to have answered at least one of appellant’s conduct, expectation and on the special negative, there- two issues in the that death would result from his conduct. by limiting appellant’s punishment to life Appellant’s admissions to the four state’s imprisonment. majority in con- errs light witnesses shed no on the circumstanc- cluding that the error was harmless. offense, es of the signifi- and thus were not cantly probative of the deliberateness and remand- This case should be reversed Appellant’s testimony conduct. ed for a new trial. I dissent. and confession cast doubt on the deliberate- ness of his conduct resulted in the ROBERTS, J., joins in dissent. victim’s death. ROBERTS, dissenting. Judge, Moreover, affirming testimony have been Venire woman Stulce could not the state’s witnesses that was the properly; unequivocally excused she stated triggerman, certainly the confession almost giving the death that she could consider impact jurors’ had an on the with minds excusing penalty, only ground and the respect special issue number two. Juries 12.31(b) misapplication her of Section was. (and undoubtedly reasonably) trigger- view the Penal Code. men as constituting greater threat “Q. “oath” You cannot state that? [The society nontriggermen. Appellant’s than 12.31(b)] of Sec. testimony and raised an issue as confession “A. No. triggerman. who was the Mabra’s con- “Q. fession tended to resolve that issue You would think about what were, appellant, doing undoubtedly and in so in- and that your effect of answers struggling necessarily your intrude on deci- to show the trial court that the sion of how to answer those issues? juror proper could not be excused under the 12.31(b), interpretation of waived Right. “A. Section ground procedural by- even this made a “Q. human, just That’s isn’t it? pass of it. “A. Yes. So, “Q. actually, you cannot state under place, impose In the second the Court can your oath that would not deliberations only by talking this waiver doctrine out of be affected? both sides of its constitutional mouth. On “A. No. 6, 1976, October we held that there no “Q. other, objection improper We understand merit to an it was each don’t juror

we? Witherspoon -qualified to excuse a 12.31(b). ground the broader of Section “A. I think. (Tex.Cr. Moore v. Honor, “MR. Your we would CURTIS: began case six App.). Jury selection this challenge for respectfully cause based 11, 1977). Now (April months later on Section 12.31.” appellant was at fault Court holds that the very thing This is the that the Constitution *13 objection that we had six raising for not an could, did, forbids. a ex- “Such test legally earlier held to be worthless. months jurors they clude who stated that would be require ungracious is of us to At the least it possibility ‘affected’ the of the death recognize merit in an defense counsel to penalty, apparently only but who meant not; worst, it argument when we could potentially consequences that the lethal of process due and due course of denies him their decision would invest their delibera- saying to appeal. law on It is tantamount greater tions with gravity seriousness and opinions or would Ad- our on constitutional law are emotionally.” involve them 49, Texas, ams v. notoriously untrustworthy attorneys S.Ct. so 2521, 2528, (1980). following 65 L.Ed.2d 581 them. justified are not worse, Even tried when defense counsel that our Finally, persuaded I am not question juror to the crucial differ on than was our any waiver doctrine is better generally being ence between “affected” 12.31(b). holding It mistaken on Section failing special to issues im answer State, 542 S.W.2d 677 rose in Boulware v. * (see Texas, partially supra), Adams v. legs: waiver and (Tex.Cr.App.1976), on two objections court twice sustained the State’s leg error was harmless error. The harmless questions departed they to because Georgia, Davis v. promptly in knocked down v. statutory language. from the As Adams 50 L.Ed.2d 399 U.S. teaches, necessary go Texas it is behind the theories leg rests on The waiver misapplication if is statutory language should not be allowed to that defendants to be avoided. judges and that counsel “sandbag” trial today choose, In the face of this error the Court rea for tactical may deliberately waived because question that the was already I sons, rights. As holds to waive certain objection “no was raised.” said, say that this is have it fantastic from the objections hiding his with, begin To twice asked court; questions to ask trying trial he was questions improper ap- which illustrated the trial (correct) theory, and the to advance his plication 12.31(b), objections Section choice could rejected No tactical court him. questions to his both times. were sustained event, it have been involved. This was court’s atten- sufficient to call the of waiver doctrine no means clear that this error, an tion to its and it was better‘than Witherspoon object applies to simply by failure to objection would have been. It Ohio, 403 U.S. Wigglesworth v. say appellant, fantastic to that the who error. See * you it with you question answer honest- couldn’t answer that factual answer means complete integrity?” “Can’t rejected ly, you your though The court even know the effect of asked, question I it answers?” Counsel also by “Do take as irrelevant. your your knowing answer that the effect of (1971) “In of the recent decisions of the 97 S.Ct. 29 L.Ed.2d 857 view of the United States

(reversing Court decision which held Wither- may be waived guarantee a constitutional waived). spoon error This error affects by a counsel for the failure defendant’s fact-finders; very it is not like an im organiza- object improper such as proper grand trying jury venire or of a trial level grand jury tion of at the jail defendant in a uniform. waiver, our above discussed decisions question We have decided this waiver object to we the failure to hold in an off-handed manner three weeks member venire improper exclusion v. after the decision in Adams be con- right and cannot waives that it (No. U.S. Hovila appeal. sidered on [532 79-5175, 1980). It should receive full con- they insofar as and all cases S.W.2d 243] sideration, but I it has not. dissent. contrary See hold are overruled. also Tezend [484 J., PHILLIPS, joins in this dissent. (Tex.Cr.App.)]. that, objection, “We absent an hold ON OPINION APPELLANT’S MOTION excusing err trial did not court FOR REHEARING Holt, jurors, though they Hurse and even thoroughly as DAVIS, questioned were Judge. TOM G. not as been reference they might have with Appeal is taken from a conviction penalty their render death ability to capital Following murder. plea may reveal.” no what the trial matter guilty, jury the court instructed the to re- Id. at and 683. turn a verdict guilty. then *14 recently The of Supreme Court California “yes” answered questions to the first two People issues in v. Velas considered similar 37.071(b) punishment under Art. 306, 425, Cal.Rptr. 606 quez, 162 26 Cal.3d assessed death. (1980) People Lanphear, 26 P.2d 341 v. Appellant contends the court erred in sus- 601, 689 814, Cal.Rptr. 608 P.2d Cal.3d 163 taining challenge for State’s cause to cases, were (1980). In those defendants prospective juror Matha record Stulce. The murder and sentenced convicted of reflects that challenge State’s on were reversed death. The convictions Code, upon based V.T.C.A. Penal 12.- Sec. pro appeal after the Court concluded 31(b).1 original submission, On it was held viola spective had been jurors excused appellant’s object failure to to the al- 510, Illinois, Witherspoon of v. tion leged improper exclusion of waived Stulce 1770, (1968). The L.Ed.2d 776 88 S.Ct. 20 error for purposes appeal. rejected Court the State’s contention This held consistently Court has that the ex- object failure to to the the defendants’ object improper failure to exclusion Witherspoon jurors cusal of waived the prospective juror capital of a in a murder appealed and in Cali error. then The State trial, purposes ap- 903, waives the error for 448 100 S.Ct. Velasquez, fornia U.S. v. State, peal.2 3042, (1980) In Boulware v. 542 S.W.2d 65 1132 and California L.Ed.2d 57, 677, 66 following: Lanphear, U.S. -, this Court stated the v. 448 101 S.Ct. State, provides Cr.App.); 238 1. That statute v. S.W.2d as follows: Russell 598 State, Esquivel (Tex.Cr.App.); v. 595 S.W.2d “Prospective jurors shall be informed that State, (Tex.Cr.App.); S.W.2d 516 Burks 583 v. imprisonment sentence of life or is death State, (Tex.Cr.App.); S.W.2d 389 Earvin v. 582 mandatory capital felony. on conviction of a State, (Tex.Cr.App.); Byrd 569 Von v. 794 prospective disqualified juror A shall be from State, (Tex.Cr.App.); Hughes v. S.W.2d 883 juror serving aas unless he states under oath State, (Tex.Cr.App.); v. Hovila 562 S.W.2d 857 mandatory penalty that the or im- death State, (Tex.Cr.App.); Burns v. 562 243 S.W.2d prisonment for life will not affect his deliber- State, Shippy (Tex.Cr.App.); v. 556 270 S.W.2d ations on issue of fact.” (Tex.Cr.App.); v. 556 246 Granviel S.W.2d State, State, (Tex.Cr.App.); (Tex.Cr. Boulware 2. See White v. 610 S.W.2d 504 S.W.2d 107 552 App.); (Tex. (Tex.Cr.App.). Brandon S.W.2d v. 677 v. 567 542 S.W.2d (1980), Supreme L.Ed.2d 13 require speculation Court of the that appellant would United States vacated and remanded the challenge not her for cause under Art. 35.- causes for light 16, V.A.C.C.P., further consideration in and that he found Stulce’s Texas, Adams sex, race, v. age, religious occupation, prefer- U.S. ence, status, etc., 65 L.Ed.2d prior jury marital service acceptable to the extent that he would not Adams, Supreme Court recited the peremptory have used a strike her. setting factual following of the case in the speculate Even if we manner, the State’s submission and “[o]n challenged not have for cause Stulce petitioner’s objections, over judge the trial her, peremptory challenge exercised a on jurors excused a number of prospective who we cannot he assume that would have de- were unwilling or unable to take the Sec. jurors sired to have her as one of the twelve 12.31(b) (Emphasis added). oath.” The (from panel) the entire who was to render a ultimately Court concluded that Sec. 12.- verdict in his case. We cannot conclude 31(b), supra, applied had been in Adams’ the only reason failed to trial prospective jurors exclude on object to was the the exclusion of Stulce as grounds impermissible under Witherspoon. yet as found in Adams unestablished defect Appellant urges that his failure to Texas, supra. object April Stulce’s exclusion on may We not therefore find that light should be excused in of the fact complain prospective of the exclusion that Adams supra, not decid juror appeal. Stulce for the first time ed until June 1980. This Court has rehearing is motion .de- previously held that where a defect of con nied. magnitude stitutional has not been estab trial, lished at the time of the failure of ROBERTS, J., given for reasons dissents object counsel to does not constitute waiver. original in his submis- dissenting opinion on Sanders, Ex (Tex.Cr. Parte 588 S.W.2d 383 sion. App.); Casarez, Ex Parte CLINTON, dissenting. Judge, (Tex.Cr.App.); Taylor, Ex Parte 748 (Tex.Cr.App.). holding Such bot of the United States Court tomed on premise there was no has now Wither- explicit made the fact that logical tactical or reason for counsel’s fail Illinois, spoon v. U.S. *15 object ure to other than the fact that the (1968)1 progeny,2 20 L.Ed.2d 776 its defect had not been established at the time beyond which have drawn limit the outer of trial. “legitimate in- the State has no “valid” or jurors for excluding prospective terest” in In appel- order for this to Court excuse cause, “feelings,” on account of their exclusion, lant’s object failure to to Stulce’s “views,” “beliefs,” about the “opinions” or we would be required to assume that the Texas, death v. penalty.3 Adams 448 U.S. prospective juror acceptable appel- to 38, 2521, 100 581 S.Ct. 65 L.Ed.2d every respect negate possi- lant in the [Hereinafter, Adams.] bility looked with favor on the excusing Court, “Witherspoon court’s action in the venire- According to the assumption power man. Such an would further to ... is a limitation on the State’s nothing Witherspoon. having grounds 1. Hereinafter “Unlike for exclusion per- capital punishment, such as to do with Holman, Specifically, 2. bias, ill-health, hardship, Boulden 394 U.S. or sonal financial (1969); 89 S.Ct. 12.31(b) L.Ed.2d 433 peremptory challenges, the focuses § Ohio, Lockett v. inquiry directly prospective juror’s on the (1978); L.Ed.2d 973 and Adams v. infra. penalty, hence beliefs about the death clearly scope falls within the of the Wither- Indeed, Supreme 3. the made short shrift Court spoon doctrine.” argument Code, that V.T.C.A. Penal Texas, infra, (All Adams v. at 2528. S.Ct. 12.31(b), exclusion, “separate” § a cause for emphasis supplied throughout by the writer distinct from the interests advanced the indicated.) opinion of this unless otherwise Witherspoon doctrine: penalty expressed or conscien- jurors are barred the death if prospective exclude: scruples its in- religious against or tious jury views from service because of their can constitu- DEFENDANT fliction. NO ‘any broader capital punishment about on of a death at hands tionally put be to law or inability basis’ than to follow the tribunal SO SELECTED.” oaths, by their can- penalty abide the death 521-523, Illinois, Witherspoon Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at S.Ct. not be carried out. at 1776-1778. supra, n. at at S.Ct. [391 U.S.] [88 Adams, n. supra, ...” short, “legiti- 21] having no the State — at 2527. capital obtaining a beyond interest” mate abide which the law and jury will follow And on has drawn what basis the Court employ- from juror’s prohibited oath —is which neutrality,” point the “line of at operates ing any method of selection ends, “legitimate interest” State’s broader jurors cause on a to exclude for past the death point which execution of criterion, Amendment the Sixth because seen penalty “cannot be carried out?” As tribunal, organized “a forbids result: Court, stakes are by the the constitutional death;” jury uncom- “a return a verdict of high: to die.” a man to condemn monly willing quest jury capable impos- of “In its for a great provided a Supreme has Court ing penalty, produced death State with states guidance of to assist the deal jury willing a uncommonly a to condemn constitutional implementing burden their to die. man juror capital cases.5 selection in methods is, course, may It settled that a State effectuating Wither- burden of But the whether not entrust the determination of ultimately upon falls spoon doctrine guilty a man is innocent or a tribunal states, legislatures and courts including the ‘organized to convict.’ omit- [Citations prosecution. well as involved in as those requires step It but a from short ted] great has a only capital defendant Not hold, today, principle as we do employed of selection stake method that a determi- may State not entrust the jury: obtain his nation of a man live or whether should given case testimony voir a “If the dire a a organized die to tribunal to return excluded were indicates that veniremen Specifically, we hold verdict death. this, death basis than broader be sentence of death cannot if even be carried out sentence cannot jury imposed carried out IF the statutory or law applicable case

recommended it BY ex- sup- WAS CHOSEN jurisdiction appear would relevant simply be- cluding ground of exclu- veniremen cause narrower port they objections to general cause voiced sion.” 1772; (3) Witherspoon Observing Witherspoon’s “ve- 88 S.Ct. at 4. had “not unmistakably respect [a.] the it clear shown” made been verdict of to be “biased” with niremen who... guilt, automatically they vote Court characteriz- that imposition ” capital punishment re- as “in its role as without ed arbiter of "self-evident the fact that *16 punishment imposed, developed any might this gard to be that be evidence jury woefully impartiality them, fell short of before or [b.] the trial of the case at [Witherspoon] which under the penalty entitled would toward death their attitude Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. making impartial [Citations prevent deci- an them from 518, Witherspoon at at 88 S.Ct. omitted].” guilt.” [Emphasis defendant’s sion as 1775. 522, 21, Witherspoon original] S.Ct. at at n. 88 2525; 21; (4) 1777, Adams, 100 at n. S.Ct. capital excluding: The State 5. has a “valid interest” in punishment “those beliefs about whose (1) “prospective jurors their who state that ignore or violate would lead them to their oaths.” the law capital punishment reservations would about 2529; (5) Adams, 100 at S.Ct. prevent making impartial them from deci- an capi- irrevocably opposed to those who “so are guilt.” Witherspoon sion as to the defendant’s legiti- punishment frustrate the State’s tal as to 513, 1772; say (2) at 88 who S.Ct. at “those constitutionally efforts to administer its mate valid they impose could never vote to the death Adams, penalty death scheme.” penalty they to con- or that would refuse even at S.Ct. 2529. imposition them.” sider its in the case before Witherspoon 522, 21, 1777, at repetition.” But, n. at S.Ct. bear it repeat did Thus, Texas, n. point 21. in because penalty the death is the Court had noted “fre- Witherspoon quent vacated, references as a not by but virtue of Article ground ‘disqualifying prospective jur- for 37.07, 3(c), V.A.C.C.P., a new trial is re- § ” ors,’ State, and it found that and the “the quired every in case in which the “voir dire Appeals, might Texas Court of Criminal testimony. . . indicates that veniremen were assuming have fallen into the error of any excluded on basis broader” than that Witherspoon 12.31(b) are both § delineated by Witherspoon. exclusion," grounds for explaining in In Witherspoon, the State’s selection 12.31(b) paragraph may next how lead to § method prospective condemned because Witherspoon.6 forbidden “exclusions by jurors they who stated did not believe in view, my the burden on this Thus in penalty the death were excused “without dire examination State clear: the voir any attempt to determine whether they juror “inquiry each must reflect an which could nonetheless return a verdict separates vote those who would never for death;” having those who admitted consci- who penalty the ultimate from those would scruples against entious penalty the death cases,” reserve in order to it for the direst were excused “without effort to find standards em- jury-selection show that “the out whether scruples invariably their ployed very undermined ‘the in- [have not] ” compel against capital punish- them to vote process.’ Witherspoon tegrity of the .. . Witherspoon 514-515, ment.” at at S.Ct. n.22, 1777, quoting at n. 88 S.Ct. at 1772-1773. Walker, 618, 639, Linkletter v. 381 U.S. 1731, 1743, 14 L.Ed.2d The Witherspoon doctrine, said the Su- Adams, preme ground Court in “is not a for however, those, believe There are who challenging any juror,” prospective and it capital dealt prejudice” the “serious thought point “this may seem too obvious to by practice”9 defendants a “State’s State, evidence, (Tex.Cr.App. 6. Hovila v. 532 S.W.2d 293 tive of the could not abide 1975) just understanding reflects such an existing law and would not follow the trial Witherspoon doctrine, whereas Boulware v. instructions, court’s penalty assess such could not State, 1976) (Tex.Cr.App. 542 S.W.2d 677 in bar, particular type of case at Hovila, overruling id. at did not. Adams etc. favorably; alludes to Hovila it is omitted from in- If the defense with or without counsel opinions perceived by the list of seven the Su terrogation no further indicates there are preme Court, previous Court to indicate the as questions, may court it be well for the ly constituted, might have fallen into error. inquire if such action means that the defense Adams, 2527, 2528, 100 S.Ct. at n.6. On the cause, opposing challenge is not or if hand, Boulware, supra, relegated other single to a personally the defendant and his counsel are solitary dissenting opin mention in the affirmatively juror is im- [satisfied poetic justice ion of Justice This REHNQUIST. partial], colloquy is and make sure such is not lost on the writer. part made of the record.” 457 S.W.2d at 911-912. Accord: Grider v. 515, n.9, Witherspoon 7. 88 S.Ct. at n.9. (Tex.Cr.App. 398-399 Judge (now Presiding) fully grasped 8. Onion 1971). import Witherspoon regards as the bur- Harris, disposition supra, in While the placed thereby upon den State Harris v. subsequently Su- reversed the United States (Tex.Cr.App.1971) 457 S.W.2d 903 when preme Court in Harris v. he wrote: (1971), we are prematurely challenging “Before for cause a assuming impli- safe in not that the reversal did prospective juror only affirmatively who has language quoted cate the above. statutory question, answered the so-called prosecutors go beyond should such initial ex- Witherspoon, synopsizing 9.In its decision *17 pression scruples’ of ‘conscientious or dis- Supreme State “[t]he the Court observed capital punishment claimer of belief in to was held to have no valid interest in such a clearly pro- ascertain and establish that the * * * exclusion.... The broad-based rule of spective juror automatically vote defendant, hand, seriously on the other penalty any regard- the death in case Adams, prejudiced by practice." the State's facts, less of the could never vote for or 100 S.Ct. at 2525. imposition irrespec- consider its in case

943 “pro- but “the neutrality” merely prejudices, of and obliterates line “crosse[s] to its legitimate efforts administer State’s jury uncommonly willing to con- duce[s] penalty constitutionally valid death die,” may by demn a man be waived 11 Adams, 100 S.Ct. 2529. scheme.” object. defendant he fail to Anoma- should is, heaped as this on lous notion insult law, of proposition than an asserted More for injury only justification when cited to Califor- conjectural resort I sense Supreme fur- vacating it is the for Court’s v. supra and Velasquez, California nia v. light two ther consideration in of Adams hostility toward supra, of Lanphear, a touch re- Supreme judgments California Court for its Supreme States Court the United versing capital murder convictions. picto- white a black and failure to draw the United majority implies that resort telling courts of last graph State granted on Supreme Court certiorari States by a given penalty death being question10 presented in both Cal the second of organized return a verdict “tribunal 903, 100 S.Ct. Velasquez, ifornia v. 448 U.S. per harm to an accused death” constitutes 3042, (1980) and California nature that se, harm of such a fundamental 57, 66 Lanphear, - U.S. -, objection by v. of an presence absence wait- (1980), inconsequential. the caus This L.Ed.2d 13 then remanded the defense is departure from the of Ad is a sad light es for further in and-see attitude consideration oner- its with this Court meets ams, latter, care laying because in the factu of many more How responsibilities. ous excused setting, jurors al had been stated ultimately capital convictions will murder realm petitioner’s objection.” “over In the such an result of be reversed as a direct however, likely, more speculation it is far 12.31(b), supra, application § untenable Supreme with Peo that the Court’s concern by rectified Witherspoon, recently vis-a-vis 425, 162 Cal. ple Velasquez, v. 26 Cal.3d go in To extent shall we Adams'! what 306, (1980) People v. Rptr. 606 P.2d 341 and already fault- decisions adding to the list of 601, Cal.Rptr. 26 163 Lanphear, Cal.3d ed? (1980), P.2d 689 focused the exces 608 dogmatic literal sively application fully capable indepen- and This Court is of an by dent, reading analysis of Witherspoon upon dispassionate doctrine insisted Supreme Court, the California subject,12 the numerous authorities on which not Velasquez, supra, question pate 10. In in might second deliberations which lead was, presented penalty.” death “(2) alleged Witherspoon 27 4155. in CrL error this had, by object?” case waived defense’s failure to Court of California course, Velasquez 27 4068. CrL reversed the convictions Lanphear, supra, virtually In Lanphear jurors identical and cused, because such were ex- question presented: second Witherspoon holding permits exclu- “(2) alleged Witherspoon in this error opposition” sion if to the death “automatic by object?” case waived failure of defense to “unmistakably penalty is made clear.” 27 4155. CrL past, opinion If in Adams obscured in the speculation no room for as to the State’s leaves Velasquez Lanphear, ques- 11. first capital “legitimate See n. interest” in voir dire. by tions raised in its the State California 5, ante. petitions certiorari, respectively, for writ of were: course, objection in With voiced 12.Of no .was “(1) May prospective juror for be removed itself, Bishop, erspoon 398 nor in Maxwell v. Witherspoon cause under v. when he Illinois (1970); 26 221 U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d might hypothetical states there be case Holman, 478, 89 and in v. Boulden in which crime was so that death heinous (1969) the defense S.Ct. 22 L.Ed.2d penalty has could be considered but that he exclusions, actually the de as did assented hypothetical not been to think of of that able Wiggiesworth, St.2d 18 Ohio fense State nature?” (1969) [holding defendant N.E.2d 27 CrL 4068. error], per Witherspoon “(1) cu May juror waived reversed prospective be removed Ohio, Wiggiesworth U.S. Witherspoon riam in cause if trial under v. Illinois judge separate See also has L.Ed.2d described each of deci- circumstances, (Tex.Cr.App. regarding guilt, special Harris v. 457 S.W.2d 903 sions 1970) penalty juror Witherspoon juror, [holding error was to be made object], partici- re states that think he does not he could waived failure of defense *18 only motivated by the welfare of the crimi- justice

nal process in this State and the

integrity of the law. requires It no extra- that,

ordinary insight given conclude “harmless,”13

Witherspoon error cannot be

neither can it be “waived” a failure to

object. But like one who stands with his

back to the street because no one told him parade passing by, majority in-

dulges a delusion liability for the bar-

rage of today reversals it énsures lies else- where; in truth it lies here.

I dissent.

TEAGUE, J., joins.

Harvey HACKBARTH, Herman

Appellant, Texas, Appellee.

The STATE of

No. 61085. Texas,

Court of Criminal Appeals of

Panel 2.No. 1,

July 1981. 947, 523, 22, Witherspoon, versed in Harris v. 403 U.S. 91 S.Ct. See also at 391 U.S. n. 29 L.Ed.2d 859 In Davis v. n. wherein objection 236 Ga. 225 S.E.2d Court stated: “insufficient,” clear, jury-se- found but still the voir dire ex "... think it .. that the [W]e . constitutionally amination was necessarily held employed inade lection standards here quate, id 225 S.E.2d at 244. very integrity undermined ‘the of the ... process’ fate, petitioner’s decided Georgia, 13. Davis v. ... and we have concluded that neither (1976) [holding nor that the lack of reliance of law officials ... enforcement systematic, qualified impact holding intentional exclusion of a of a retroactive group jurors test, determining justice is not the but warrants a deci- administration of ... rather, improperly fully application whether “a venireman is ex- sion retroactive cluded,” so, “any subsequently imposed today.” holding and if we announce [Cita- penalty death cannot stand].” tions omitted]

Case Details

Case Name: Crawford v. State
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Jul 16, 1980
Citation: 617 S.W.2d 925
Docket Number: 57602
Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.
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