Tоny Anthony Crawford was indicted by a Worth County grand jury for possession of less than one ounce of marijuana, OCGA § 16-13-30 (j) (1), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, OCGA § 16-11-131. He was convicted by a jury, his motion for new trial as amended was denied, and he aрpeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
1. Crawford asserts the general grounds. Construed in favor of the jury’s verdict, the evidence shows that a narcotics investigator for the Worth County sheriff’s office obtained a search warrant for Crawford’s residence. The investigator and sheriff’s deputies went to the residence the same evening to execute the warrant. Crawford answered the door, and one of the deputies found a bag containing suspected marijuana in Crawford’s left rear pocket. A chemist with the State Crime Lab identified the substance as marijuana. The deputies continued the search and found a .22 magnum revolver on the headboard of the bed. The cylinder for the revolver was found, loaded, in a dresser drawer containing men’s underwear, socks, and other clothing.
(a) With respect to the conviction for possession of marijuana, Crawford contends the State failed to prove the date of possession as alleged in the indictment. Because the indictment аlleges the date of the offense as material, the proof must correspond to the date alleged.
Price v. State,
(b) Crawford also contends the State failed to prove that he possessed the firearm, which was found in two pieces, one on the headboard of the bed and the other in a dresser drawer. Crawford’s live-in girlfriend testified that she had borrowed the revolver from a friend and that Crawford never handlеd or exercised control over it. But the girlfriend’s testimony as to where she left the revolver on the night of the search was inconsistent with the officers’ testimony as to where it was found. She testified that she placed the revolver and cylinder on toр of the dresser before she left for work that evening. She also testified that the cylinder was unloaded when she left the house. When the officers executed the search warrant, however, they found the revolver on the headboard, the cylindеr in a dresser drawer containing men’s clothing, and four cartridges in the cylinder. A jury is authorized to find constructive possession of a firearm by one occupant of a shared bedroom when the firearm is found in a dresser drawer containing clothing aрpropriate to that occupant’s sex.
Cantrell v. State,
2. The trial court did not err in returning two jurors to the jury panel after Crawford exercised his peremptory strikes to remove them.
1
“The principles of
Batson v. Kentucky,
“To evaluate claims that the state or defendant used peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, the trial court must engage in a three-step process. The opponent of a peremptory chаllenge must make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination; the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to give a race-neutral reason for the strike; the trial court then decides whether the opponent of the strike has proven discriminatory intent.” (Footnotes omitted.)
Chandler v. State,
While the trial court’s use of the three-step process is not crystal clear, it is apparent, viewing the voir dire transcript as a whole, that the trial court first determined that a prima facie case had been made, listened to Crawford’s reasons for all the challenged strikes, then allowed the State to respond before making a decision. This indicates that the trial court accepted Crawford’s explanations as race-neutral under the second step of the test, but at the third step chose to disbelieve them following the State’s responsе.
Russell v. State,
To rebut a prima facie case of discrimination in the use of peremptory strikes, the proponent of the strikes must explain each one. “The explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause, but it must be neutral, related to the case to be tried, and a clear and reasonably specific explanation of his legitimate reasons for exercising the challenges.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Gamble, supra at 327 (5). But “rubber stаmp approval of all nonracial explanations, no matter how whimsical or fanciful, would cripple Batson’s commitment to ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his race.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id.
The еxplanation offered for striking each challenged juror must be evaluated in light of the explanations offered for Crawford’s other peremptory strikes and the strength of the prima facie case. Explanations for other strikes may affеct the trial court’s decision: “A court charged with the duty of determining whether the [proponent] has rebutted a prima facie case may be less troubled by one relatively weak explanation for striking a . . . juror when all the remaining explanаtions are persuasive than where several of the [proponent’s] proffered justifications are questionable. Similarly, a weak prima facie case may be rebutted more readily than a strong one.” Id.
Here, Crawford employed virtually the same words in explaining his peremptory challenges to seven of the nine white male jurors *326 challenged. Counsel repeatedly stated as an explanation that a white male juror was “very conservative,” “very hard-headed” оr “hotheaded,” and “impulsive” or “quick to make decisions ” Seven times, counsel simply stated that a white male juror was challenged “for the same reason” or “reasons” or “the same theory.” He acknowledged, “I realize I’m repeating myself a lot, but it’s the same theory we’ve used.”
Viewing the record on voir dire as a whole, it is clear that the trial court concluded the “conservative, impulsive, hot-headed (or hard-headed)” explanation, either repeated verbatim оr in the shorthand form of “same reason,” was pretextual under the third step of the relevant analysis. 2 With respect to one of the jurors at issue here, Crawford’s counsel also stated, “we were trying to get down the list to get also some black people, which Mr. Crawford is African-American and try to get some more black people on the jury than we were able, to have a fair share.” In light of this candid acknowledgment that race formed a significant part of Crawford’s decision-making in striking one juror for whom the same explanation was given as for seven other white male jurors, we cannot say that the trial court’s rejection of this repetitive explanation was clearly erroneous.
3. Crawford next complains that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a certified copy of his prior felony conviction, contending that the State failed to prove he was the same “Tony Crawford” named in that guilty plea and judgment of conviction. The narcotiсs investigator testified that he had known Crawford for six years. The investigator testified without objection that he verified through the crime information computer Tony Crawford’s name, address, and social security number on the prior felony conviction. Evidence was also presented that Crawford is known as “Tony Crawford.” “Concordance of name alone is some evidence of identity. Further, in the absence of any denial by [Crawford] and no proof to the contrary this concordance оf name is sufficient to show that [Crawford] and the individual previously convicted were the same person. Accordingly, this enumeration is without merit.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Mincey v. State,
4. Finally, Crawford enumerates as error the denial of his motion to suppress. 3 Without any statement of facts or argument, he *327 сontends that the warrant did not set forth sufficient facts from which the magistrate could independently determine the reliability of the information or the informant and that the information was insufficiently corroborated. We disagree.
The narcotics investigator testified that a confidential informant had been inside Crawford’s house within 72 hours of the application for a search warrant and had seen a quantity of cocaine while in the house. The investigator also testified that he had used the cоnfidential informant “probably eight to ten times,” and “pretty much everything that this informant had told me had led to an arrest.” The affidavit in support of the application for a search warrant stated that “this informant has proven to be reliable in the рast by providing information which has led to the arrest of approx. 10-12 persons and the recovery of illegal drugs.” The officer also verified the description of the property as provided by the informant.
Under “common-sense” evaluation, a similarly worded affidavit has been held sufficient to demonstrate the informant’s reliability.
Bowe v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
While Crawford enumerates as error the reinstаtement of two jurors, in the body of his brief he discusses the reinstatement of three jurors. In this case, the discrepancy is insignificant, because Crawford offered the same explanation for all three peremptory strikes.
Significantly, the trial court did nоt return prospective jurors to the panel when Crawford articulated other non-race- and gender-based explanations for his peremptory strike. For example, the trial court accepted strikes when the prospective juror had had disagreements in the past with others in defense counsel’s law firm and when the prospective juror had had personal dealings with Crawford.
The hearing on the motion to suppress was held after the case was submitted to the jury; no explanation for this procedure appears in the record.